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ABSTRACT 
 
BRANNON D. INGRAM - Deobandis Abroad: Sufism, Ethics and Polemics in a Global Islamic 
Movement 
 
(Under the direction of Carl W. Ernst) 
 
This dissertation examines contemporary Islamic debates about the ethics and legality of 
Sufism (Islamic mysticism) within a globally influential movement based at the Islamic seminary 
(madrasa) known as Dar al-`Ulum Deoband in northern India. Two overarching, and interrelated, 
questions motivate this dissertation. What are the historical origins of Deoband’s critique of 
Sufism? And how is this critique variously appropriated and contested in the contemporary 
world? To this end, it reconstructs the contours of Deoband’s engagement with Sufism in the 
works of its founders and how this critique traveled through the Deobandi network to South 
Africa, home to the most prominent Deobandi madrasas outside of South Asia and wide 
participation in the Sufi devotions that the Deobandis have most vociferously critiqued. 
 The first and second chapters explore how Deobandis conceived Sufism exclusively as 
ethical reform (islah) of the self and argued certain devotional practices (especially celebration of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday and of Sufi saints’ death anniversaries) are illicit innovations 
(bid`a) in Islam. The third chapter reconstructs how Deobandi thought and institutions took root 
in South Africa, attending to the circulation of Deobandi writings within South Africa and the 
founding of South African Deobandi madrasas. The fourth chapter demonstrates how Deobandi 
students position themselves within an imagined ‘Deobandi’ network and how they seek to 
embody and internalize the ethics of Sufi practice. The fifth and sixth chapters assess the 
reception of Deobandi critiques of Sufism in the South African public sphere, particularly in the 
context of Muslim politics, society and popular media during and after apartheid.
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A note on orthography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
For transliteration of Urdu and Arabic texts, I have kept orthographical standards fairly 
simple: I have used ` to represent the `ayn and ‘ to represent the hamza. But as the lingua franca 
of Muslim textual discourse in South Africa is English, locally published texts transliterate terms 
from the Urdu and Arabic using a wide variety of standards (or none at all). This presents special 
orthographical dilemmas. Thus, throughout South Africa words such as salat are typically 
rendered salaat. Dar al-`Ulum becomes ‘Darul Uloom’. Spelling for the mawlud festival, central 
to this research, is especially vexing: ‘mawlud’, ‘mawlood’, ‘moulood’, and ‘mouloud’ are all in 
common use. Ashraf `Ali Thanawi’s name can be rendered ‘Thanvi’, ‘Thanavi’, ‘Thanwi’ or 
‘Thanawi’, all equally legitimate spellings. Sufi is commonly written ‘Soofie’. The orthographic 
traditions of the Cape only compound the difficulties. Names such as Jamal al-Din are often 
written ‘Gamieldien’; `Abd al-Qadir becomes ‘Abdulkader’ or ‘Abdulkader’; Ali becomes `Alie’. 
Qasim can be spelled ‘Cassim’. Masjid may be spelled ‘masjied’. 
 My modus operandi throughout this dissertation has been to uphold my own standard for 
words that I transliterate from the Urdu (for example, I use ‘mawlud’ and ‘Thanawi’), while 
retaining spellings as they appear in South African English-language publications, in both titles 
and quotations. Thus I will write Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, but if I am quoting a text that spells his 
name differently, I will of course spell it as it appears in that text.  
 x 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, 
remain not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion 
of inferior mediators or subordinary agents, which interpose between mankind 
and their supreme deity. These demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of 
human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of 
devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry, which had been formerly banished by 
the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous and indigent mortals … 
 
- Hume, “Flux and Reflux of Polytheism and Theism” (1757)
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In mid-February of 2009, I was staying in the spartan guest quarters of the Dar al-`Ulum 
Deoband, the renowned madrasa north of Delhi named after the ancient city where it was 
founded in 1866. Despite its modest size, at least by Indian standards, Deoband is a bustling 
center of trade, its bazaars teeming with life late into the night. The circuitous paths leading 
through the bazaar towards the madrasa are lined with scores of shops selling Urdu books, prayer 
rugs, Qur’ans, perfume, with the occasional food stall or internet café. At the juncture of several 
of these lanes stood a dormitory for the Dar al-`Ulum’s alumni and guests, where I was staying 
during my sojourn for research in Deoband. 
The rooms had multiple beds, and this night I shared mine with some Sri Lankan 
Muslims undertaking preaching tours for the Tablighi Jama`at, now the world’s largest Muslim 
pietist organization, one that grew directly out of Deobandi teachings. The Tablighis retired early, 
and so I wandered into the courtyard where a group of young men were sitting in a circle chatting 
in Bengali. Curious about my presence, they summoned me towards their circle and made a place 
for me to sit. In this conversation, as with many to come, I had to give an account of myself. 
What was I doing there? Why had I traveled seven thousand miles from the United States for the 
sole reason of researching Deoband? As with so many conversations I would have over the 
course of my research, politics came up almost immediately. 
 2 
 Deobandi students are all too aware of the hyperbolic, alarmist accusations against their 
institution in the media. They are all too aware of the conferences, the ‘think tanks’, the research 
agendas, the ‘policy papers’, in short, the entire Western bureaucratic apparatus that has brought 
Deoband and madrasa students everywhere under critical scrutiny. One need only consider the 
very title of a recent paper, “Deobandi Islam: The Religion of the Taliban,” to get a palpable 
sense of these claims.1 As I sat with these alumni from Bengal, one of the first questions to arise 
concerned the Taliban. A student who insisted on speaking to me in English asked me, “Do you 
think we are part of the Taliban? People come here and do not want to know about us because of 
the scholars that come from here. No, they want to know about what the Taliban does, so so many 
miles away. Look, let me show you.” He proceeded to draw a large circle on the floor with his 
finger. “This space here is everything this school has done. Now take just the smallest point in 
this circle,” he said, pointing to an imaginary, arbitrarily chosen dot in the circle. “There is the 
Taliban.” So it is part of Deoband, I asked? Not just an aberration? “Sure, fine. But you must look 
at the whole circle.” 
 This dissertation is about the whole circle. Deoband’s connections to the Taliban are part 
of the why of this dissertation,2 but it is not part of the what; this dissertation considers, above all, 
Deoband’s role in the evolving history of South Asian and, by extension, global Sufism in the 
modern era. Readers hoping for a diagnosis of Deoband as a ‘fundamentalist’ political movement 
will be disappointed.   
                                                       
1 Published by the Defense Language Institute. See www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/ 
Deobandi_Islam.pdf. (Last assessed 13 November 2010) 
 
2 One of the only scholars, to my knowledge, who has done extensive work on Deoband’s connections to 
the Northwest frontier province of Pakistan, and ultimately the Taliban, is Sana Haroon. See “The Rise of 
Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and Its Implications in Colonial India and Pakistan, 
1914-1996,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 18, 1 (2008): 47-70. Haroon argues that “the ‘Deobandi’ 
religious politics inherited by Pakistan in 1947 were not Deobandi at all.” Not all of the so-called 
‘Deobandis’ exerting their influence on Pakistani politics at this time were graduates of Dar al-`Ulum 
Deoband, and many who were graduates were not involved in politics. ‘Deobandi’ was “a transferable and 
inheritable title, conferred and assumed on and by any scholar or would-be scholar that aligned himself 
with another Deobandi, or, after 1920, with the [Jamiatul Ulama-i Hind] … Hence ‘Deobandi’ did not refer 
to a pedagogy but to a system of allies mutually descended from an increasingly distant institution with 
which they maintained as close a relationship as they could.” Pg. 58. 
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The Dar al-`Ulum Deoband emerged in 1866 in wake of a sharp decline in Muslim 
political power in British India. Its founders aimed to reverse a perceived moral and intellectual 
decline among India’s Muslims. As the madrasa gained prestige, Deobandi graduates founded 
other madrasas with similar curricula; today, the Deobandi network boasts thousands of 
madrasas around the world. This unassuming madrasa is the central node in an intricate network 
bound by people, texts, institutions and ideas. As the network has expanded, it has carried certain 
ideas with it. This dissertation is about one of them, namely Deoband’s globally consequential, 
and globally contested, critique of Sufi piety. 
 As Deoband’s network expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its 
scholars embarked on a critical interrogation of Sufism. But unlike the Wahhabi movement, their 
contemporaries in the Arabian peninsula, Deobandis did not aim to destroy Sufism completely; in 
fact, as I will argue here, Deobandi scholars defined Sufism as essential to their reformist mission 
and sought to refashion Sufism solely as an ethics of the self while ‘purifying’ it of controversial 
devotional practices, principally the celebration of Muhammad’s birth (mawlud), beloved by 
Sufis for centuries, and of Sufi saints’ death anniversaries (`urs), believing them to be practices 
that bordered on ‘worship’ of the Prophet Muhammad and the Sufi saints.3 Investigating how this 
ambivalence emerged in the history of the Deoband movement and how it plays out in a political 
and social context outside of South Asia are the dual goals of this dissertation. Hence a simple 
query animates my project: what happens when this Deobandi ambivalence, this contestation and 
debate over Sufism, travels into new social and political contexts beyond South Asia? To what 
extent is it mobile? Is mobility tantamount to portability? In other words, what forms of 
                                                       
3 Esther Peskes has attempted to argue to the contrary that Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab was not as 
dogmatically and resolutely anti-Sufi as contemporary scholars have interpreted him to be. See Esther 
Peskes, “The Wahhabiyya and Sufism in the Eighteenth Century,” in Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, 
eds. Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, Leiden: Brill, 1999. 
Scott Kugle, in a rejoinder to Peskes, remains unconvinced. See his Sufis and Saints’ Bodies: Mysticism, 
Corporeality, and Sacred Power in Islam, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007, 280-281. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, besides the Wahhabis, the Fara’izi movement in Bengal was also 
stridently anti-Sufi. This simplistic anti-Sufism was appropriated in the twentieth century by some Muslim 
nationalists in South Asia, Maududi foremost among them. See Marc Gaborieau’s essay, “Criticizing the 
Sufis: The Debate in Early-Nineteenth Century India,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested, 452-453. 
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contestation does it meet? What accommodations does it make? To this end, it follows the 
Deobandi critique of Sufism to South Africa, home to the among the largest numbers of Deobandi 
madrasas outside of South Asia and wide support for the very Sufi practices that Deobandis have 
most fiercely contested.4 In short, it seeks to gauge the how these critiques change across space 
and time. 
A study of how critiques are received must also necessarily be a study of how they are 
mediated; to the extent that the Deobandi ambivalence towards Sufism is a mobile one, it travels 
as a bundle, a package of beliefs, practices and dispositions. This dissertation consciously 
attempts to avoid reifying these critiques as they travel. Deobandi discourses surrounding Sufism, 
ethics and the ‘self’, as we will see, are mediated as they travel via specific texts, to be sure, but 
are also discussed in mosques, on radio stations, in public lectures, and in public preaching 
‘assemblies’ (majalis). This dissertation, therefore, views “religion as a practice of mediation,” 
and submits that it is not sufficient merely to reconstruct the textual history of debates about 
Sufism; we must discern how those debates are mediated, and how they are debated publicly, 
beyond the purview of texts.5 And given Deoband’s impact on global Islam, this purview 
encompasses tens, if not hundreds, of millions of Muslims, consciously or unconsciously, 
willingly or not.  
Deoband’s critique of Sufism is a matter of utmost importance for some Muslims, a 
matter of choosing between salvation and damnation, and a matter of utter triviality for other 
Muslims, a fruitless theological cavil at best and at worst, a stifling distraction from more 
pressing matters. At the heart of the debate is defining what Sufism is, how it is practiced, who 
                                                       
4 Beyond South Asia, South Africa, Malaysia and the United Kingdom have comparatively large numbers 
of Deobandi madrasas. South Africa boasts at least ten large Deobandi Dar al-`Ulums, but this number 
does not include numerous smaller madrasas for young male and female students that are affiliated with 
the larger ones, or directed by their personnel. However, it is difficult to gauge precisely how many 
‘Deobandi’ madrasas exist in a given location, and partly depends on how one defines them.  
 
5 Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, “Introduction,” in Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, eds. Religion, 
media, and the public sphere, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, 7. 
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gets to define it and under what authority. A contestation over Sufism is a contestation over Islam 
itself, by virtue of Sufism’s paramount importance in the lives of countless Muslims. At the same 
time, this dissertation considers not only debates within Deoband about Sufism, but equally, 
debates among other Muslims about Deoband - its ideologies, its origins, and the legitimacy of its 
claims to represent Sunni Islam. 
 
 Why Deoband? Why South Africa? 
This dissertation is one of a small handful of book-length studies on Deoband in English, 
and the only extended study of Deoband outside of South Asia.6 But why is Deoband important 
beyond the realm of South Asian geopolitics? The scholars, students, ideas and texts emanating 
from the madrasa at Deoband and from its affiliated institutions around the world, taken as a 
whole, constitute arguably the most influential intellectual trend within Islam outside of the 
Middle East of the last two centuries. Deoband has shaped contemporary Islamic debates on 
normative piety and, more broadly, the very parameters of acceptable belief and practice. Indeed, 
the great historian of the modern Islamic world, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, once declared: “Next to 
the Azhar of Cairo, [Deoband] is the most important and respected theological academy of the 
Muslim world.”7 
There are at least three ways in which this dissertation contributes to a more nuanced 
conversation about madrasas in general and Deoband specifically. First, when ‘Deoband’ appears 
in popular media it is often in reference to its alleged antagonism to Sufism and Sufi shrines. 
Deobandi scholars are widely known for their condemnation of Sufi devotional practices, yet are 
                                                       
6 Barbara Metcalf’s Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1982, remains the authoritative study of Deoband, despite being almost three decades old, and her 
omission of early twentieth century political engagements by Deobandi `ulama’ has been critically 
discussed in Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Besides Metcalf’s study, Zia ul-Hasan Faruqi’s The Deoband 
School and the Demand for Pakistan, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, is another noteworthy, 
though outdated, examination of Deoband in the context of early twentieth century Indian politics. The 
literature on Deoband in Urdu is, predictably, voluminous. 
 
7 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, London: Victor Gollancz, 1946, 295. 
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far less often known for their own Sufi piety. Reports by news agencies concerning recent 
bombings of Sufi shrines in Pakistan, some of which have labeled the bombers specifically as 
‘Deobandi’, accentuate this ignorance of Deobandi Sufism.8 Unfortunately, the focus on 
contemporary Pakistani geopolitics skews these reports. To take a recent example, coverage of 
the Nishtar Park mawlud bombing in Karachi and the bombing of the Data Ganj Bakhsh Sufi 
shrine in Lahore cited an alleged Deobandi hostility to Sufism, suggesting not just that 
Deobandis’ critique is culpable for this violence (and perhaps in some limited ways, it is) but that 
Deobandis are antagonistic to Sufism as a whole. As the British newspaper The Guardian 
recently concluded, “Sufism is offensive to Muslims from the more ascetic Wahabbi [sic] and 
Deobandi sects, who consider worship of any saint to be heretical, and that the only access to God 
is through direct prayer.”9  
Pausing a moment to unpack this claim is worthwhile. The so-called Deobandi ‘sect’ 
would proudly challenge the notion that Sufism is somehow ‘offensive’ to their religious 
sensibilities; as this dissertation will make abundantly clear, Deobandis define Sufism as 
absolutely essential to their understanding of Islam. At the same time, the Sufis whose practices 
are in question would fiercely contest the notion that their reverence of the saints amounts to 
‘worship’. Here The Guardian unwittingly repeats one of the least accurate accusations that some 
Deobandis level towards Sufis: that Sufis indulge in ‘grave worship’ (qabr parasti). One would 
be extremely hard-pressed to find a single Sufi who would readily admit to ‘worshipping’ graves. 
On the other hand, the newspaper all too easily lumps Deobandis in the same category with 
‘Wahhabis’. This is doubly ironic; first, as Wahhabis have historically criticized Sufism as such 
rather than, as Deobandis have, a limited number of Sufi devotional practices, and second, as 
Deobandis have actively sought to distance themselves from Wahhabis. Deobandis have in fact 
                                                       
8 For example, Rania Abouzeid, “Taliban Targets, Pakistan’s Sufi Muslims Fight Back,” Time, 10 
November 2010. 
 
9 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/02/suicide-bombers-kill-dozens-pakistan-shrine (last accessed 
on 17 November 2010). 
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actively criticized Wahhabis’ rejection of taqlid, commitment to one (and only one) of the 
traditional Islamic legal schools. 
Yet the notion unwittingly peddled in The Guardian, that of ‘mystical’ Islam perpetually 
in conflict with the ‘law’, a notion now thoroughly embedded in Western liberal views of Sufism 
as a ‘moderate’ alternative to ‘Islamism’, is rooted in a much older Orientalist dichotomy 
between the legal scholar and the Sufi - or in the words of a well-known advocate of this view, 
‘doctor and saint’.10 Perhaps in some ways this dichotomy is being ‘spoken to power’ in current 
global polemics and counter-polemics, in South Africa as much as in Pakistan. At the same time, 
Orientalists largely ignored the `ulama’ - and especially, as in this dissertation, `ulama’ as Sufis – 
and considered them outmoded relics of Islam’s medieval past. This approach to the `ulama’ 
ignores how they are ‘custodians’ of a tradition that is “constantly imagined, reconstructed, 
argued over, defended and modified.”11 Or as Fuad Naeem argues, “A preference for originality 
over ‘tradition’ led to an overemphasis on modernist figures, on the one hand, and Islamist or 
‘fundamentalist’ figures and movements, on the other, often combined with a tacit supposition 
that the `ulama’ and Sufis represented ‘medieval’ discourses that would not long survive the 
triumph of modernity.”12 
Secondly, and more broadly, this dissertation is also a contribution to the study of 
madrasas, those much-maligned and poorly understood institutions of traditional Islamic 
learning. One recent study puts the number of Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan alone at 
approximately 7000, as of 2002.13 Though some landmark studies have emerged in recent years, 
                                                       
10 See Ernest Gellner, “Doctor and Saint,” in Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in 
the Middle East since 1500, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. 
 
11 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The ‘Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 10. 
 
12 Fuad Naeem, “Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana Ashraf `Ali Thanvi of Deoband and 
Mawlana Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly and their paradigms of Islamic revivalism,” The Muslim World 99, 
3 (2009): 435-451, at 436. 
 
13 Tariq Rahman, Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 190-191. 
 8 
the scholarship on contemporary madrasas remains thin.14 This study presents contemporary 
Deobandi madrasas not as radical ‘terrorist factories’ but as sober, traditionalist institutions that 
combine scholarship in the great medieval commentaries on Qur’an, hadith and law with a 
dynamic mobility that has seen Deobandi madrasas move across the globe. Historically, in fact, 
far from facilitating militancy, madrasa networks were engines behind Islam’s global 
cosmopolitanism, networks that compelled students to travel across continents long before the era 
of ‘globalization’.15 
What is Deoband’s importance in the history of the madrasa as an institution? As the 
central node in a vast madrasa network, Deoband is part of an educational tradition that dates 
back centuries, even as the founders of Deoband altered the nature and structure of the madrasa 
curriculum to accommodate the exigencies of colonial India. The first madrasa is believed to 
originate in Khurasan in the tenth century, spreading to Baghdad by 1063, to Cairo in the 1170’s, 
and eventually to India by the early thirteenth century.16 In time, the madrasa became the most 
recognizable and near-ubiquitous institution of medieval Islamicate society. By the thirteenth 
                                                       
14 Examples of this literature include: Mumtaz Ahmad and Matthew J. Nelson, eds. Islamic Education in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan: Trends in Tertiary Institutions, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009; 
Arshad Alam, “The Enemy Within,” Modern Asian Studies 42, 2/3 (2008): 605-627; Masooda Bano, 
“Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan,” Journal of Islamic Studies 18, 1 (2007): 
43-68; Sophie Gilliat-Ray, “Closed Doors: (Not) Accessing Deobandi dar ul-uloom in Britain,” Fieldwork 
in Religion 1, 1 (2005): 7-33; Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut Reifeld, eds. Islamic Education, Diversity and 
National Identity: Dini Madaris in India Post-911, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications, 
2006; Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of 
Modern Muslim Education, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009; Jamal Malik, ed. Madrasas in 
South Asia: Teaching Terror? London, New York: Routledge, 2008; Farish Noor and Yoginder Sikand, 
eds. The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008; Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia, New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2008; Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of the Believers, New Delhi: Penguin Asia, 2005; 
Marieke Winkelmann, From Behind the Curtain: A Study of a Girls’ Madrasa in India, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2005. 
 
15 According to one assessment, new restrictions on the transnational movement of madrasa students 
threaten this cosmopolitanism, as some countries have rendered it increasingly difficult for foreign students 
to enter for madrasa study. See Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand, and Martin van Bruinessen, “Behind the 
Walls: Re-Appraising the Role and Importance of Madrasas in the World Today,” in Farish A. Noor, 
Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, eds. The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and 
Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, 21. 
 
16 Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992, 8-9. 
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century, the madrasa had developed into what one scholar has termed an “educational charitable 
complex,” incorporating mosques, Sufi khanqahs, and even hospitals.17  
Traditionally, madrasas’ principally oral mode of learning centered around the 
memorization of key texts.18 This does not mean that these texts were somehow frozen; instead, 
as Michael Chamberlain has elegantly expressed it, they were “enacted fortuitously in time,” and 
could thus be invoked to serve various needs in various contexts.19 In the medieval madrasa, 
there was no set curriculum, no slate of exams; students who mastered a given text would get an 
ijaza, a certificate permitting them to transmit specific texts in turn. Indeed “medieval Muslims 
themselves seem to have been remarkably uninterested in where an individual studied. The only 
thing that mattered was with whom one had studied,” a system that “remained throughout the 
medieval period fundamentally personal and informal, and consequently, in many ways, flexible 
and inclusive.”20 Since they did not charge tuition, madrasas typically depended on charitable 
endowments (awqaf) to sustain themselves, and often the madrasa would include a tomb-
complex devoted to the pious benefactor and his or her family. These tombs would become the 
objects of local pilgrimage and devotion, ironic given Deobandis’ later mission to oppose tomb-
based devotional Islam.  
Deoband changed all of this. Establishing, for the first time in Islamic history, what one 
scholar has called an Islamic “curriculum,” Deoband’s founders pioneered a fixed program for all 
                                                       
17 Said Amir Arjomand, “The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development of 
Institutions of Learning from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Century,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 41, 2 (1999): 263-293, at 264. 
 
18 For the role of orality in Islamic learning, see among other works, Dale Eickelman, Knowledge and 
Power in Morocco, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, and Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of 
Knowledge in Medieval Cairo, especially 19-43. 
 
19 Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, 143; quoted in Jonathan P. Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, 
Education, and the Problem of Muslim Identity,” in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. 
Schooling Islam: the culture and politics of modern Muslim education, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007, 47. 
 
20 Jonathan P. Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of Muslim 
Identity,” 43. 
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students, a slate of exams to gauge students’ progress, formal graduation ceremonies, a central 
library, salaried faculty, and relied on individual donations rather than political or courtly 
patronage.21 The fact that the madrasa did not depend on the caprice of external patrons allowed 
it to be, according to Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “disembedded” from traditional social networks. 
This contributed to its mobility, allowing the Deoband ‘model’ to be replicated by other 
madrasas as early as six months after its initial founding.22 Yet this dissertation will demonstrate 
that mobility is not necessarily the same as portability; even though a Deobandi curriculum may 
be relatively fixed, whether in a madrasa in rural India or urban South Africa, the ideologies that 
travel with Deoband encounter complex forms of resistance and contestation.  
Third, this project self-consciously seeks to expand the existing parameters of what 
constitutes ‘Islamic studies’. This discipline is still defined in the view of many within and 
outside of the field as “the study of classical Arabic texts such as the Qur’an and the foundational 
texts of Islamic law.” In the views of Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, it remains “somehow 
convenient to gloss over the need to document and trace multiple varieties and regional variations 
of Islamic religiosity in later and recent history.”23 This dissertation is borne of a conscious desire 
to move the study of Islam beyond the domain of the Middle East geographically, the classical 
era historically, and Arabic textually. From the predominant vantage point of ‘Islamic studies’, 
even India is on the ‘margins’ of the Muslim world, despite boasting well over a millennium of 
Islamic history and one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. South Africa is, to be 
sure, even more on the ‘margins’. But this project will show that to be on the margins is not 
                                                       
21 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The ‘Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 68. For a detailed discussion of these 
pedagogical innovations, see Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, 92-95. The madrasa at 
Saharanpur, some thirty kilometers from Deoband, was the first madrasa to be founded along the Deobandi 
‘model’, roughly six months after Deoband was founded in 1866. 
 
22 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf `Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia, Oxford: Oneworld, 2008, 
9. 
 
23 Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, “Introduction: Toward a Post-Orientalist Approach to Islamic 
Religious Studies,” in Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, eds. Rethinking Islamic Studies: From 
Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism, Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2010, 13-14. 
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necessarily to be marginal; in fact, Deoband is its own center, one from which nodes in a larger 
network fan out across the globe, and the Muslims of South Africa are particularly well-
connected with global discourses in contemporary Islam, despite their negligible numbers. 
Why, then, South Africa? I knew from the initial stages of planning that I wanted to be 
among the first to research Deoband outside of South Asia. I could have conducted this research 
in any number of countries beyond the subcontinent that have a distinct Deobandi presence: 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, even the United States. But South Africa stands out 
among all them for several reasons.  
First, as Dietrich Reetz has observed, “The longest interaction between the Deoband 
school and foreign Deobandi networks exists perhaps with its branches in South Africa.”24 South 
Africa is by no means the only country in southern Africa where Deobandis have settled, but it is 
by far the most significant.25 One figure states that 199 South Africans graduated from the Dar al-
`Ulum Deoband between its founding in 1866 and 1976, when the source was published, the 
largest number of any country outside of South Asia besides Malaysia, with 445 students. And 
the number would be far higher if we were to include South Africans who graduated from 
Deobandi madrasas inside South Africa itself, or from Deobandi madrasas in South Asia other 
than the original Dar al-`Ulum Deoband.26  
Second, while South Africa has few Muslims relative to its total population, South Africa 
is uniquely situated as a site for this research for many reasons.27 To begin with, South Africa’s 
                                                       
24 Dietrich Reetz, “The Deoband Universe: What Makes a Transcultural and Transnational Movement of 
Islam?” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, 1 (2007): 139-158, at 153. 
 
25 Deobandi scholars have also brought their critiques of Sufism to Mozambique (see Liazzat J. K. Bonnate, 
“Muslim Religious Leadership in Post-Colonial Mozambique,” South African Historical Journal 60, 4 
(2008): 637-654, especially 640-641) as well as Reunion (see Marie-France Mourrégot, L’islam à l’île de la 
Réunion, Paris: Harmattan, 2010).  
 
26 Muhammad Faruq, Afriqah aur Khidmat-i Faqih al-Ummat. Deoband: Maktabah-yi Nashr al-Mahmud, 
1990, 144. 
 
27 According to the 2001 census, Muslims constitute roughly 1.5% of its nearly 50 million inhabitants. 
Statistics South Africa, Census 2001: Primary Tables South Africa, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2004, 
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Muslims maintain a presence and visibility that is far out of proportion to their marginal numbers; 
they engage with South African society and politics to a degree for which the designation 
‘minority’ does little justice.28 And unlike the minority Muslim populations of, say, continental 
Europe and North America, Muslims in South Africa have had a documented, continuous history 
in South Africa for nearly three-and-a-half centuries. South African Islam thus does not fit the 
standard taxonomies that divide the Muslim world into neat geographic units; South Africa’s 
Muslims are a small minority living in a modern, secular and democratic republic defined in no 
small way by its historical links to Europe, yet its Muslims face a vastly different array of 
challenges from those faced by European Muslims. Furthermore, its Muslims are clearly 
‘African’ but are quite different culturally, ethnically and linguistically from the Muslims 
typically grouped within the rubric of ‘sub-Saharan Africa’.29 And South Africa’s geography and 
history have resulted in a remarkably diverse array of Muslims coming to its shores, from locales 
as diverse as the Indonesian archipelago, the Indian subcontinent, sub-Saharan Africa, and today, 
from many other parts of the Muslim world. In short, South African Islam stands at a nexus of 
global flows: European, African, Middle Eastern, South Asian and Southeast Asian. South Africa 
is, at once, intimately connected to South Asia in particular - in terms of the movement of people, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
24 – 25. See also Jurgens Hendricks and Johannes Erasmus, “The New Religious Landscape of South 
Africa,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 121 (2005): 88-111 for numbers on religious 
communities in this census. 
 
28 This general point has been made well by Tamara Sonn, “Muslims in South Africa: A Very Visible 
Minority,” in Yvonne Haddad and Jane I. Smith, eds. Muslim Minorities in the West, Walnut Creek: 
Altamira Press, 2002. As for political participation, Abdulkader Tayob notes that as of 2007, 18 out of 350 
members of parliament were Muslim (4.5%), 2 out of 26 ministers (7.6%), 2 out of 22 deputy ministers 
(9%), and 15 out of 210 Cape Town city counselors (7%) – in every sense, then, vastly out of proportion to 
their numbers. See his “Islamic Politics in South Africa between Identity and Utopia,” South African 
Historical Journal 60, 4, (2008): 583-599, at 589.  
 
29 The complexity of South Africa’s Muslims serves as a corrective to older, problematic approaches to 
understanding Islam on this continent. Stark dichotomies between ‘Islam in Africa’ and ‘African Islam’ – 
the former implying an importation of a timeless, unchanging ‘Islam’ and the latter implying processes of 
indigenization – are untenable. For a classic statement of this dichotomy, see Eva Evers Rosander and 
David Westerlund, African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1997. And for a powerful critique of this approach, see Benjamin F. Soares, "Notes 
on the Anthropological Study of Islam and Muslim Societies in Africa," Culture and Religion 1, 2 (2000): 
277-285, especially 279-280. 
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ideas, and goods - and yet sufficiently removed from it to generate numerous compelling issues 
regarding the way South African Muslims of South Asian origin define themselves as South 
Africans. 
 
Who or what is a ‘Deobandi’? 
This is not an easy question to answer. Deoband is first and foremost a place: a town of 
some 150,000 residents approximately one hundred miles north of Delhi. The historic madrasa, 
Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, is named after the town that hosts it. But ‘Deobandis’ do not carry cards 
that identify them as such, even though many of Deoband’s critics speak as if they do. A 
‘Deobandi’ can, of course, be a graduate of the Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, but many other madrasas 
and institutions are linked to the original Deoband madrasa through relationships between 
teachers, students, alumni and patrons, what Metcalf describes as Deoband’s “concentric circles 
of influence.”30 For the most part this ‘link’ is informal and unofficial, rendering it difficult even 
to estimate the number of ‘Deobandi’ madrasas, though in recent decades, the Deobandi 
madrasas in India, at least, have attempted to organize into an official body.31 
It is important to differentiate between Deobandi individuals (`ulama’, muftis, students, 
alumni) and Deobandi institutions (madrasas, jama`ats, `ulama’ councils). One of the major 
assertions of this dissertation is that Deobandi thought is so internally diverse, on issues ranging 
from mawlud to the legitimacy of political alignments with non-Muslims, that this diversity gives 
the lie to the common misconception that ‘Deoband’ is a uniform, monolithic ideology. This is 
                                                       
30 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, 235. 
 
31 Deobandi scholars concerned with standardizing curricula created the Rabita Madaris Arabiyya 
(Association of Arabic Schools) at Dar al-`Ulum Deoband in 1994. The RMA claimed 1152 affiliated 
madrasas in India as of March 2004, but to my knowledge, similar efforts to establish an official body for 
Deobandi madrasa networks do not exist elsewhere. See Dietrich Reetz, “Change and Stagnation in Islamic 
Education: The Dar ul-`Ulum Deoband after the Split in 1982,” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and 
Martin van Bruinessen, eds. The Madrasa in Asia, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, 82. 
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especially important insofar as Deoband’s critics are invested in maintaining this misconception 
because it serves their rhetorical ends. 
Throughout this dissertation, I will speak of Deoband’s ‘network’ of madrasas that spans 
the globe. Unfortunately, especially in the past decade, when describing Muslims the word 
‘network’ has become irredeemably loaded with a connotation I hope to avoid.32 By no means is a 
graduate of any of these madrasas necessarily and automatically labeled a ‘Deobandi’; in fact, 
some students and faculty whom I interviewed eschewed this designation outright, not out of 
disrespect to their alma mater but because they insist their worldview cannot be limited to a 
single ideological mantra. As one interviewee put it, “I am not a ‘Deobandi’. I have not seen 
Deoband with my own eyes. I am a student of the din.”33 This is, of course, its own sort of 
rhetorical positioning; there is a profound tension within Deoband between acknowledging the 
unique contributions that this movement has made to contemporary Islam, on the one hand, and 
believing that it is not really a ‘movement’ at all, on the other, since its adherents believe it to be 
nothing more than Sunni Islam per se. As one South African polemic has it, Deoband’s 
detractors, especially those of its historic rivals, the Barelwi movement (pejoratively called ‘grave 
worshippers’ here), “convey the impression that the Ulama of Deoband are a new group or a sect 
which has arisen recently, hence they refer to the Ulama of the Sunnah as the ‘Deobandi 
Movement’. Deoband is merely the name of a town in India where the famous Darul Uloom is 
located. If the Deobandi Ulama’s beliefs and teachings are unacceptable to the grave-worshippers 
then in actual fact their dislike is for the beliefs and teachings propagated by the Sahaabah since 
[Deoband’s] beliefs and teachings are in fact the Shariah of Islam which was handed to the 
Ummah by the Sahaabah of Rasulullah.”34  
                                                       
32 Indeed, when describing Muslims, words such as ‘network’ are all too often accompanied by foreboding 
qualifiers such as ‘shadowy’ or ‘stealth’.  
 
33 Interview with Ismail Alie at Qasimul Uloom, Cape Town, 22 September 2009. 
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This positioning manifests itself as a constant slippage in Deobandis’ own works, a 
tacking back and forth between identifying Deoband’s profound importance and assimilating it to 
Sunni Islam tout court. Even in the authoritative history of the school, the author asserts 
confidently that “Deobandism” (Deobandiyat) “is neither a legal school (mazhab) nor a sect 
(firqa), though its opponents attempt to present it as a school or sect to the masses, but rather is a 
comprehensive register and complete ‘edition’ of the ideology (maslak) of the Ahl-i Sunnat wa-l 
Jammat.”35 Yet the very fact that this history presents Deoband as an ‘ism’ (Deobandiyat) 
foregrounds the tension in how to talk about it as a phenomenon without reifying it. 
A further complication in defining ‘Deoband’ is that some organizations, most notably 
the Tablighi Jama`at but additionally various political organizations active in India and Pakistan, 
have grown directly out of Deobandi teachings or have been founded by Deobandi scholars. The 
Tablighi Jama`at is now the world’s largest Muslim pietist movement, with tens of millions of 
followers. While the Tablighi Jama`at may not be a ‘Deobandi’ organization in the strictest sense 
of the word, its founder, Muhammad Ilyas, studied with three of the most prominent early 
Deobandi scholars: Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Mahmud al-Hasan, and Khalil Ahmad 
Saharanpuri.36 The Tablighi Jama`at is indisputably linked at every level with Deobandi 
madrasas, in South Asia, South Africa, and elsewhere. Yet not everyone involved in the Tablighi 
Jama`at has a formal relation to a Deobandi madrasa or other institution, even as they participate 
in the ideological projects of Deoband. 
Defining ‘Deobandi’ too rigidly, then, denies it its elasticity, yet defining it too loosely 
recapitulates how these terms are bent and stretched in a Procrustean manner within polemical 
                                                                                                                                                                  
34 Young Men’s Muslim Association, Who are the People of Sunnah? Benoni, South Africa: Young Men’s 
Muslim Association, 1987, 4. (emphasis added) 
 
35 Sayyid Mahbub Rizvi, Tarikh-i Dar al-`Ulum Deoband. Deoband: Idarah-yi Ihtimam-i Dar al-`Ulum 
Deoband, 1977, 24. 
 
36 Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi-Jama`at (1920-2000), New Delhi: 
Orient Longman, 2002, 126-127. 
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discourses, such that individuals and institutions that have no historical relation to Deoband 
whatsoever can be branded as ‘Deobandi’ on account of certain views. Amidst such slippery 
discourse, we must be especially wary of reifying the very terms that we seek to critically 
analyze. This wariness should not, however, lead us to deconstruct ‘Deoband’ ad infinitum and 
regard it, as one recent author has, as merely a “fictional unity … a complex series of intersecting 
and overlapping dispositifs, as assemblages or formations of power.”37 
Aside from these conflicting perspectives on what ‘Deoband’ is, there remains one of the 
Deobandis’ own, rather technical, definitions, this one culled from the Urdu mission statement of 
the madrasa’s own website: 
The Dar al-`Ulum is Muslim in terms of religion (dinan), Ahl-i Sunna wal-
Jama`a in terms of sect (firqan), Hanafi in terms of school (madhhaban), Sufi in 
terms of temper (mashraban), Maturidi Ash`ari in terms of theology (kalaman), 
Chishti in terms of the Sufi path (sulukan), albeit combining all the Sufi orders, 
Wali Allahi in terms of intellect (fikran), Qasimi in terms of its fundamental 
principles (usulan), Rashidi in terms of its branches (furu`an), and Deobandi in 
terms of its lineage (nisbatan).38 
 
In other words, Deobandis define themselves as: a Sunni Muslim movement, Hanafi in law and 
Ash`ari in theology, embracing Sufism as a defining trait but the Indian Chishti tradition in 
particular, indebted to its precursor Shah Wali Allah intellectually, to its founder Muhammad 
Qasim Nanautawi for its very existence, and to the pioneering scholar Rashid Ahmad Gangohi for 
its specific legal proclivities. Those who adhere to this view can claim the title of ‘Deobandi’ 
without any controversy. Yet perhaps it will come as no surprise that not all Deobandis adhere 
uniformly to every facet of this official description. 
 
 
                                                       
37 Najeeb A. Jan, “The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, the Deoband ‘Ulama, and the Biopolitics of Islam,” 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Department of History, 2010, 21. 
 
38 “`Ulama’-yi Deoband ka Maslak wa Mashrab,” http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/aboutdarululoom/3 
.htm (last accessed 10 January 2011). It is rather odd that Rizvi’s Tarikh expressly rejects the use of the 
word ‘sect’ (firqa) to desribe Deoband, yet this official definition on the madrasa’s website apparently sees 
no problem with using this loaded term. 
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Sufism, Ethics, Polemics 
Throughout this dissertation, I will draw a distinction between what I call Deoband’s 
‘constructive project’ and what I call their ‘critical project’. The former encompasses a re-
alignment of Sufism with an ethics of the self, but this is possible only after purging the self of 
negative ethical traits. This act of internal purgation is analogous to the process of purgation on a 
societal level, but the substance of the two is different. The internal purification (tazkiya al-nafs, 
purifying the lower self) is rooted in classical Sufi vocabularies of selfhood, but its external 
counterpart is a distinctly modern affair, carried out in print via scores of polemical treatises, 
some consisting of erudite legal argumentation in Arabic and Urdu, written largely for an 
scholarly audience of other `ulama’, and some consisting of simplified, condensed versions of 
these arguments in English and other languages, written for a rapidly expanding Muslim public 
(and it is these shorter pamphlets and tracts that become especially important in the South African 
context).  
These public polemics are predicated on the idea that Deobandi scholars knew their 
success in reforming Sufism would be nominal if limited to the discursive plane of intra-`ulama’ 
debate. They sought a way to reach mass audiences of literate Muslims directly. Composition of 
pamphlets and tracts was one method of executing this vision, but I will posit later that the 
Tablighi Jama`at ultimately became a far more effective method for achieving it, insofar as it 
translated Deobandi teachings on Sufi ethics into a regime of quotidian discipline and practice 
(and even distended the social boundaries of Sufism itself, such that one need not be a Sufi to be a 
Tablighi). The first two chapters will address some of the Deobandis’ scholarly polemics, while 
the latter two will address their public ones. Before proceeding, though, I want to be clear about 
how I am using these three crucial terms: Sufism, ethics, polemics.  
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Sufism 
A central contention of this dissertation is that Deobandis purged Sufism of its devotional 
elements and recast Sufism as ethical self-formation.39 Deobandis would doubtless object to this 
claim; for them, these allegedly illicit devotional practices were never part of Sufism, but were 
mere accretions that formed around the veneration of Sufi saints. This dilemma invokes a 
problem with how to define ‘Sufism’, since Sufism itself is - and perhaps always has been - an 
internally contested, incessantly debated entity. Sufism is in fact one of the preeminent sites of 
contestation over belief, practice, authority, and space within Islam in the last two centuries, a 
struggle over what Sherali Tareen has called “competing normativities.”40 
For my purposes here, I will propose that ‘Sufism’ be understood as a tripartite entity, 
consisting of three intersecting, mutually constitutive domains: literary, interpersonal/ 
institutional, and ritual/devotional. The literary level is familiar to most, encompassing of course 
the great canons of Sufi poetry, but equally, the innumerable treatises on traversing the Sufi path. 
The interpersonal and institutional level concerns relations between Sufi masters and disciples, 
initiations into Sufi orders, and the inculcation of Sufi ethical virtues through study with, and 
sitting in the presence of, Sufi masters. Finally, the ritual/devotional level concerns the multiple 
forms of devotional piety that especially coalesce around the veneration of Sufi saints (awliya’) at 
their tombs. What will become clear as this dissertation proceeds is that Deobandis embraced the 
first two dimensions of Sufism but firmly rejected the third. Their interrogation of Sufism was, in 
other words, an internal critique of Sufism by Sufis. 
The ‘sober’ Sufism advocated by Deobandi scholars has an ancient pedigree in Islam; as 
                                                       
39 One could perhaps usefully compare this purging of Sufism of its devotional elements with a similar 
process that has transpired in Iranian contexts, in which Sufi orders have been frowned upon but ‘Sufism’ 
itself has been recast as ‘gnosis’ (`irfan). See Nasrollah Pourjavady, “Opposition to Sufism in Twelver 
Shiism,” in Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, eds. Islamic Mysticism Contested, Leiden: Brill, 1999, 
621. 
 
40 Sherali Tareen, “Normativity, Heresy and the Politics of Authenticity in South Asian Islam,” The Muslim 
World 99, 3 (2009): 521-552, at 525. 
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we will see, what distinguishes the Deobandis’ approach to Sufism is its engagement with 
modern apologetics over Sufism, defending Sufism as a whole from its detractors, and a firm 
belief that bringing a ‘purified’ and ‘sober’ Sufi piety to the Muslim masses is essential to 
rejuvenate the Muslim body politic in the contemporary world.  
A few brief examples will suffice to suggest the scope of Deobandis’ premodern Sufi 
antecedents. For instance, Abu Nasr `Abdallah al-Sarraj’s (d. 988) Kitab al-luma’ fi-l tasawwuf 
grounded Sufism in the Qur’an and the (then) nascent shari’a law,41 while Abu Talib al-Makki (d. 
996), a hadith scholar, privileged a conservative, ascetic Sufism in his Qut al-qulub.42 `Abd al 
Rahman al-Sulami’s (d. 1021) Tabaqat as-sufiyya secures a distinctly ‘sober’ pedigree for the 
Sufis of eleventh century Khurasan, privileging Sufis descending from Junayd al-Baghdadi.43 
Abu Nu’aym al-Isfahani (d. 1038) followed on the heels of Sulami with a biographical 
compendium, Hilyat al-awliya’, which essentially sees the narrative of Sufism from the vantage 
of a legal traditionalist, including two of the founders of Sunni Islam’s orthodox legal schools, 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi`i, among the Sufi saints.44 Isfahani was not 
so much a Sufi who wanted to make Sufism palatable to Islamic legal scholars, but a legal scholar 
who simply saw no contradiction between Sufism and Islamic law as it existed then. Similarly, 
the work of `Abd al-Karim Qushayri (d. 1072) and `Ali al-Hujwiri (d. 1073) reinforced the status 
of Sufism as an expression of the ethos of the shari`a. Hujwiri explicitly states that Sufism 
                                                       
41 Ahmet Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007, 67-
69. 
 
42 The secondary bibliography on Makki is limited. On Makki’s traditionalism, see John Renard, 
Knowledge of God in classical Sufism: foundations of Islamic mystical theology, New York: Paulist Press, 
2004, as well as W. Mohd Azam, “Abu Talib al-Makki: A Traditional Sufi,” Hamdard Islamicus 22, 3 
(1999): 71-79. 
 
43 See Jawid Mojaddedi, The biographical tradition in Sufism: the tabaqat genre from al-Sulami to Jami, 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001, 9-40. 
 
44 See Jawid Mojaddedi, The biographical tradition in Sufism: the tabaqat genre from al-Sulami to Jami, 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001, 41-68. As Mojaddedi points out, the selectivity of the tabaqat 
genre reveals specific predilections of each compiler, and the ‘Sufi’ biographies that Isfahani relates are 
mostly from the earliest generations of Muslims, long before any coherent, self-conscious ‘Sufism’ 
emerged, thus grounding Isfahani’s own vision of ‘Sufism’ in the lives of the pious ancestors (salaf). 
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embodies Qur’anic ethics and includes founders of the Sunni legal schools, including Shafi`i, 
Abu Hanifa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, in his biographies as Sufis. Qushayri, a Shafi`i legal scholar, 
grounds his Sufism in the teachings of the ‘sober’ Junayd, just as one of the co-founders of the 
Deoband madrasa, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, would eight centuries later.45 
Just as Deobandis were by no means the first Sufis to align Sufism with Islamic legal 
discourses, nor the first to cast Sufism in the language of Islamic ethics, they were also not the 
first to embark on a critique of Sufism. Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1200) is usually credited with composing 
the first full-scale critique of Sufism and Sufis. In his Talbis Iblis, Jawzi faulted Isfahani for 
including the pious ancestors (salaf) in his Sufi narrative. Al-Jawzi was principally concerned 
with purging Sufism of libertine currents (ibaha), yet substantively Jawzi’s critiques are hardly 
different from some Sufis’ own critiques, such as those of Sarraj and Hujwiri. If Jawzi was 
primarily concerned with critique of ‘licentious’ Sufi practices, his disciple Ibn Taymiyya was 
primarily concerned with critique of Sufi metaphysics, particularly that of Ibn Arabi.46  
At the same time that discourses articulating Sufism in Islamic legal language began to 
emerge, popular Sufi devotions were also emerging - practices that Deobandis would critique in 
British India centuries later. Sufism became a central fixture of medieval Muslim civilization, 
mediating between people and institutions in the absence of a strong caliphal presence. This 
context gave rise to mass-participation in Sufi practices; the first organized mass pilgrimages 
(ziyarat) to Sufis saints’ tombs date from the early thirteenth century, coinciding tellingly with 
the emergence of the first ‘orders’ in Sufism,47 with those founded according to the teachings of 
Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi (d. 1168) and `Abd al-Qadir Jilani (d. 1166) being among the earliest. 
                                                       
45 See, for instance, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Imdad al-Suluk, Deoband: Dar al-Kitab Deoband, 2005, 155-
156, where Gangohi relates sayings of Junayd and Tustari regarding the nature of Sufis’ companionship 
with God, but he relies on Junayd throughout his treatise. 
 
46 Alexander Kynsh, Ibn ‘Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in 
Medieval Islam, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, 89-92. 
 
47 Christopher S. Taylor, In the Vicinity of the Righteous, Ziyara and the Veneration of Muslim Saints in 
Late Medieval Egypt, Leiden: Brill, 1999, 12-14. 
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Popular Sufism, in any case, especially the intercession of saints, became the bête noire of 
Sufism’s critics, from the thirteenth century to the present day.  
Yet, beginning in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one can discern a 
sort of crescendo in both the number and strength of accusations against Sufis across the Muslim 
world.48 “While these currents of dissatisfaction with Sufism had long been present in the umma,” 
one author notes, “they were to grow substantially from the middle of the eighteenth century, 
giving rise to a greater variety of self-questioning among Muslims as well as attacks from outside 
the Islamic world.”49 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anti-Sufi polemics and Sufi 
counter-polemics became both more frequent and more intense. The technologies of print and the 
use of mass media aided Sufis’ detractors, who typically cast Sufis as partly responsible for the 
loss of Muslim political power in the contemporary era. They accuse Sufis of having forsaken the 
sunna, contributing in no small part to the impotence of Muslims morally and politically. 
European Orientalists, unwitting rhetorical allies of the Sufis’ critics, reiterated the distinction 
between Sufism and the Law, lauding the universal ‘spirituality’ of the greatest Sufi poets (Rumi, 
Hafez, and the like) in juxtaposition to the dry, Semitic ‘legalism’ of the Qur’an and Shari`a.50 
More recently, contemporary Western discourses on Sufism have, in a far more subtle way, 
propped up Sufism as an ecumenical, irenic antidote to the militant, exclusivist claims of 
Islamists.51  
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Ethics 
A central contention of this dissertation is that Deobandi understandings of Sufism 
emphasize, above all else, the agency of the individual self in ethical self-formation. By ‘self-
formation’ or ‘self-fashioning’, I do not mean to imply that Deobandi or Sufi ‘selves’ are stable 
entities, or that - despite Sufi claims to the contrary - an individual self can ever become 
‘perfected’ (kamil). Above all, ‘self-fashioning’ is premised not on the notion that “belief, 
discussion or persuasion … transforms a person, but practice - action, repetitive behavior, and 
physical habits. It also points to a process, an on-going practice, the fulfillment of which in this 
life is impossible.”52 The self, then, is a project. The goal of fashioning the self, which always 
takes the Prophetic sunna as the ultimate reference point, is never complete; rather, one 
approaches that goal asymptotically, rather like the way a curve approaches a line. 
This self is made and re-made through an engagement with the ethical traditions of Islam. 
What do I mean by ‘ethics’ in this context? What I do not mean is the humanist ethics of the 
Western Enlightenment that sought to deduce universally normative values through the rational 
faculties, most salient in the philosophy of Kant. Of course, the subjects of this dissertation 
believe their values to be universally normative; but they derive those values from participating in 
a tradition, not from a deductive intellectual process. ‘Ethics’ here does not suggest rarefied, 
abstract speculation about the ‘good’ or the ‘good life’ - though Muslims in general, and 
Deobandis in particular, have certainly engaged in copious speculation on what the ‘good’ is. 
Here ‘ethics’ denotes a discourse which one accesses through the study of the Qur’an and the 
Prophetic sunna and by observing and imitating the pious exemplars of the Sufi tradition, who 
were its living embodiments. It is an ethics based not just on assenting to metaphysical claims 
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about truth, but equally on embodying pious dispositions in accord with the Prophetic model - or 
more precisely, how that Prophetic model has been filtered through centuries of commentary. It is 
an ‘imitatio Muhammadi’, as Annemarie Schimmel put it, yet never mere passive imitation, since 
these pious dispositions must be actively internalized.53 They direct the demeanor of the body as 
much as they do the deliberations of the rational mind. 
Multiple scholars in recent years have called for a resuscitation of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, a trend beginning especially with Alisdair Macintyre. Macintyre found a powerful critique 
of Enlightenment ethics in the work of Nietzsche, yet ultimately preferred Aristotle over 
Nietzsche in his project to re-establish ethics as an embodied virtue that grows organically out of 
specific moral traditions; in Macintyre’s powerful phrase, we are waiting not for Godot, but for 
St. Benedict.54 For the Deobandis, the akhlaq-i hamida, the ‘noble virtues’ of Sufism, provide the 
vocabularies of subjectification, to invoke Foucault’s terminology, through which the self is 
realized. These vocabularies are by no means limited to Deobandis, of course; in a different 
context altogether, Charles Hirschkind has described how sermons “evoke in the sensitive listener 
a particular set of ethical responses, foremost among them fear (khauf), humility (khusho'), regret 
(nadm), repentance (tauba), and tranquility (itmi'nan or sakina). As elaborated within classical 
Islamic moral doctrine, these are the affective dispositions that endow a believer’s heart with the 
capacities of moral discrimination necessary for proper conduct.”55 Each of these dispositions is 
cultivated in Deobandi Sufism. Pursuit of the ‘noble virtues’ is comparable to how Pierre Hadot 
described Stoic “spiritual exercises,” especially the pursuit of “self-mastery.”56 Such 
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subjectification, with specific reference to Sufism, is “the production of a morally and socially 
bounded individual self through a process of inward reflexivity,”57 yet for the Deobandis such 
mastery is never in the abstract: mastery of the self is not a means, but an end towards freeing one 
from the constraints of this world, constraints that distract human beings from the sole reason 
they were placed on this earth, namely, to worship God and express thankfulness (shukr) for his 
beneficence. Saba Mahmood sees this form of subjectivity not merely “as a private space of self-
cultivation, but as an effect of a modality of power operationalized through a set of moral codes 
that summon a subject to constitute herself in accord with its precepts.”58 In the case of 
Deobandis’ Sufi ethics, the cumulative power of their own ‘tradition’ exerts itself upon this 
discourse of self-transformation and self-perfection.  
To show how individual Deobandis live the ethics of the Prophetic model, it is important 
to note the Sufi terms that most nearly approach this notion of a lived, embodied ethics. The 
terms that Deobandis, and Sufis generally, use are crucial here, especially akhlaq and adab. 
Akhlaq derives from the semantic root that connotes ‘creation’ and suggests humans’ ‘created 
nature’. This view sees human beings as fundamentally good when they are attuned to the highest 
ideals for which God created them, especially worship. In Deobandi discourses, one reads often 
of ‘ethical reformation’ (akhlaq ki islah). With its semantic connotations of ‘disciplining’, an 
apposite notion is adab, connoting ‘civility’ and the collected wisdom found in a tradition, that is, 
its best habits and norms. The Deobandis have called adab the essence of Sufism, as in Rashid 
Ahmad Gangohi deeming adab the “most fundamental” aspect of Sufism or as in Zafar Ahmad 
Uthmani’s declaring that Sufism is “entirely adab.”59 
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The ethical tradition of which Deobandis see themselves as an extension is grounded in 
Sufism broadly, and the Sufi legacies of the Indian subcontinent specifically. The notion that 
ethics are at the core of Sufism did not emerge in the nineteenth century; far from it, this idea has 
its roots in early Sufi history. As the eleventh century Sufi al-Qushayri stated, “Sufism means to 
take on every sublime moral characteristic from the life of the Prophet and to leave behind every 
lowly one.”60 What is more, even then Qushayri was preoccupied with justifying Sufism to its 
nascent critics, as Deobandi Sufis would centuries later but for entirely different reasons and in 
entirely different contexts, as we will see.61 
 
 Polemics 
 Classical rhetorical theory has often differentiated between publics (dispersed, rational) 
and crowds (present, emotional).62 In this view, rational individuals deliberate over the merits of 
an argument, as opposed to crowds where mob sentiments prevail. This classical notion of publics 
is based on “bourgeois norms of individualism and rationality of classic liberalism, with a nation 
of citizens each pursuing their own self-interest, conversing, debating and deciding independently 
without regard to loyalties or obligation.”63 In the Kantian formulation, the ‘public’ is a sort of 
liminal space where “ideas are presented on their own merits by self-reflective moral subjects 
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rather than as emanating from authorities such as preachers, judges, and rulers. Authority is 
vested in the public sphere itself.”64 
With these assumptions embedded in the very notion of ‘publics’, how do we account for 
agonistic, polemical discourses in the public sphere? And how do we account for publics formed, 
in a distinctly un-Kantian fashion, by the moral suasion of polemicists? The word ‘polemic’ 
stems etymologically from the Greek polemos meaning ‘war’ or ‘battle.’65 It became an 
inherently agonistic mode of discourse typical of the ‘pamphlet wars’ of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Europe.66 It is a form of rhetorical “retrenchment, the hardening of partisan 
identities and ideas, a sort of discursive calcification.”67 But we must also attend to ways that 
polemics are not just battles between hostile interlocutors, but interpellate audiences beyond the 
dichotomous model of addresser and addressee, as polemics aim not only “to convert the object 
of attack but to convince a wider audience that the case is so.”68 With reference to this discursive 
feature of polemics, Lander proposes that polemics are “polarizing but also pluralizing,” to the 
extent they polarize interlocutors but also open up the space of polemic to incorporate mere 
‘bypassers’.69 Polemics also address, in Warner’s words, “onlookers.” The audience for polemic 
is multifarious and amorphous; “the agonistic interlocutor is coupled with passive interlocutors; 
known enemies with indifferent strangers; parties present to a dialogue situation with parties 
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whose textual location might be in other genres or scenes of circulation entirely.”70 This feature 
of polemical discourse will be crucial for understanding how Deobandis’ polemics were variously 
appropriated, rejected and/or simply ignored by a sizeable population of the Muslim public of 
South Africa.  
Several scholars have adapted the concept of polemics for analyzing public religious 
discourse in modern South Asia, forms of discourse in which the Deobandis participated widely.71 
It may not be an exaggeration to state that South Asian communal identities were formed largely 
through polemics. Such ‘boundaries’ are of course always in flux, even if the polemicists 
themselves present them rhetorically as fixed. Paraphrasing Mary Douglas, Appadurai has noted 
how “moral and social taxonomies find abhorrent the items that blur their boundaries.”72 I suggest 
this is all the more true of boundary-making between historical rivals such as the Deobandis and 
Barelwis, who share nearly identical legal and theological proclivities. In fact, their starkly 
different visions of Sufi devotional piety distinguish the two far more than anything else. 
In the South Asian context, the term ‘polemic’ roughly corresponds to the term 
munazara, ‘disputation’, derived from an Arabic root meaning ‘to look at’ or ‘evaluate’. The 
munazara was typically a person-to-person debate, held at a certain time and place and before an 
audience, such as a noteworthy munazara that took place between Muslim `ulama’ and Christian 
missionaries at Agra in April 1854 over the nature of revelation.73 These are not debates that one 
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or another of the interlocutors would ‘win’,74 but the agonistic tone of these public forums would 
presage later debates between Hindu revivalist groups such as the Arya Samaj, the Ahmadis, and 
others. These competitors in a crowded discursive field included the Barelvis, the Ahmadiyya 
movement, and Christian missionaries.75 Each group became an entity against which Deobandis 
defined themselves rhetorically through the medium of polemic - the Barelvis because of their 
support for shrine-based Sufism, the Ahmadis for their incendiary claim for the continuation of 
prophecy after Muhammad, and Christian missionaries because of their schools that Deobandis 
believed corrupted Muslim society. In short, Deobandis constructed their identities gradually in 
opposition to competing claims to normative Islamic authority, especially as it concerned Sufism. 
The polemics that I examine in the final two chapters are mostly textual in nature, though there 
were several high-profile public debates that could be properly called munazaras, even if that 
term was not specifically used to describe them. 
  
 Chapter summary 
The first two chapters inquire into the origins of the Deobandi critique of Sufism in the 
Urdu works of its founding scholars and argue that these scholars bifurcated Sufism, recasting it 
exclusively as the ethical reform of the self while consigning popular Sufi practices to the realm 
of ‘cultural’ accretions. The first - What Sufism Is Not: Sufi Devotions and the Origins of the 
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Deobandi Critique - shows how Deobandi scholars argued that certain Sufi practices were 
impermissible ‘innovations’ (bid`a) in religion and that it was the duty of traditional Islamic 
scholars to intervene directly to educate Muslims on these moral dangers, what I call Deoband’s 
‘critical project’. Their writings posed questions that shook the foundations of Sufi piety in 
colonial India: does Sufis’ reverence towards the Sufi saints (awliya’) detract from the reverence 
that Muslims believe is due solely to God? Does their veneration of the Prophet Muhammad 
border on deifying him or on ascribing to him divine qualities of omniscience or omnipresence? 
Do certain practices - for example, making pilgrimages to the gravesites of past Sufi masters on 
the anniversary of their deaths - violate Prophetic norms (sunna)?  
While the first chapter reconstructs how Deobandis sought to purge Sufism of these 
controversial elements, the second - What Sufism Is: Deobandi Sufism and the Ethics of the Self - 
details how they aimed to reassemble Sufi piety solely as ethical self-formation, what I call their 
‘constructive project’. First, they reduced the Sufi path largely to the process of divesting oneself 
of base ethical qualities (akhlaq-i razila) and embodying ‘noble’ ones (akhlaq-i hamida); 
accordingly, they viewed Sufi saints purely as moral exemplars, and strictly rejected the more 
traditional view of Sufi masters as sources of divinely inspired knowledge or as conduits for 
intercession with God. Secondly, their treatises and manuals for Sufi students reframed Sufism’s 
place in Islam in apologetic terms; seeking to justify Sufism in terms of the Qur’an and Prophetic 
norms (sunna), Deobandis wrote from a liminal space between criticizing some Sufis for 
indulging in contested practices and criticizing ‘modernists’ and ‘Wahhabis’ who dismissed 
Sufism as such. They saw Sufism, ethics and Islamic law as overlapping, mutually constitutive 
domains of piety. 
The third chapter - How a Tradition Travels: Deobandi Scholars, Texts and Institutions in 
South Africa - reconstructs how Deoband took root in South Africa institutionally and 
ideologically, roughly between the 1920’s and 1970’s, focusing on the founding of Deobandi 
madrasas and the formation of a Deobandi discourse, highlighting the reciprocal relation between 
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the formation of the Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa and the growth of Deobandi thought. It also 
attends to the relative lack of a local awareness of ‘Deoband’ as a distinct identity or ‘brand’ 
during this period; as we will see in the final two chapters, this ‘branding’ of Deoband emerged in 
the volatile context of Muslim anti-apartheid politics. Next, I outline the roles that two Deobandi 
scholars of the Indian subcontinent, Muhammad Masihullah Khan and Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, 
played in linking subcontinental Deoband with South African Deoband, and conclude with a brief 
overview of Deobandi madrasas in South Africa. 
 The fourth chapter - Locating Deobandi Sufism: The Madrasa and the Majlis - shifts 
from texts to ethnography. Through my fieldwork at Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville madrasa near 
Johannesburg and at Deobandi public sermons (majalis) on Sufism, I explore how South African 
Deobandi students imagine themselves as part of a larger network and tradition, how they seek to 
embody and internalize the ethics of Sufi practice, how these orientations to ‘Deoband’ and 
Sufism inform the daily lives of students, and how Deobandi scholars translate their Sufi ethics 
into everyday discourses of piety. Here, Deoband’s ‘constructive project’ - reassembling Sufism 
as ethics - takes on a tangible form.  
 While the first four chapters trace how the Deobandi critique of Sufism emerged in 
colonial India, how that critique traveled to South Africa, and how it informs local Deobandi 
madrasas, the final two chapters examine the public reception of their critiques among South 
African Muslims, historically and contemporaneously. 
The fifth chapter – Deoband in Public: Polemics and Apartheid Politics – assesses the 
reception of Deobandi critiques in the context of Muslim anti-apartheid politics. Here I focus, 
first, on polemics and counterpolemics between Deobandis and Barelwis, principally during the 
1980’s, a period that coincides with the mass mobilization of Muslims against apartheid; and 
secondly, I examine a series of public confrontations between Deobandis and their interlocutors. 
Understanding the public reception of Deoband’s critique of Sufism is impossible without 
attending to these confrontations, in which many Muslims roundly dismissed Deobandi critiques 
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as ‘Indian’ theological quibbles that were, at best, irrelevant to the task of liberating South Africa. 
After Deobandi scholars criticized Muslim activists for mobilizing against apartheid alongside 
activists of other faiths, and even justified this position in terms of their Sufi ethics, a growing 
number of Muslims lambasted Deobandis for their alleged ‘collaborationist’ stance towards the 
apartheid regime.  
The sixth and final chapter – New Rivalries, New Rhetoric: Sufism, Media and 
‘Heritage’ after Apartheid – locates shifts in debate about Sufi devotional piety in the context of 
new forms of religious media and post-apartheid rights discourses. As Sufi practices were debated 
on radio and in television, the debates brought new participants into their purview, participants 
who were not historically partisans to this ‘Indian’ debate, and the specificities of the historical 
Deobandi/Barelwi polemic gave way to a broader discursive field, one in which, for example, 
Salafi critiques of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebration were as, if not more, relevant as 
Deobandis’ critiques. The explosion of post-apartheid religious media (Islamic radio and 
television) enabled new forms and structures for debating Sufism publically, at the same time that 
new discourses of ‘cultural rights’ informed how the Cape’s Muslims, in particular, defended 
local celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday and the visitation of local Sufi saints’ tombs as an 
indelible feature of local ‘heritage’, most salient in how Muslims invoked the post-apartheid 
constitutional protection of heritage to defend local Sufi saints’ tombs from destruction by 
developers. 
 
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER ONE 
What Sufism Is Not: Sufi Devotions and the Origins of the Deobandi Critique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hajji Imdadullah al-Makki, one of nineteenth century India’s greatest Sufis and the 
mentor to an entire generation of Deobandis, once quipped: “Every person sees a different color 
in me, though in fact I have no color. I am like the water which appears to take on the color of the 
bottle in which it is filled.”1 This suggests several things. It signals a certain elasticity, a 
mutability at the heart of Deoband; it marks, as we will see, an ambivalence within Deoband 
towards the legacy of Hajji Imdadullah and, by extension, the Indian Sufi heritage that he 
represents. But perhaps most of all, it suggests how Deobandis past and present have turned 
towards their origins as a source of guidance, in a way surpassed only by their turn for guidance 
towards the earliest generations of Muslims - the wisdom forged in the era of the Prophet and his 
Companions. For this reason, we begin with the origins of Deobandi critiques of Sufism in the 
works of its founding figures.  
The internal disputes that transpired between the luminaries of early Deoband point to a 
penchant in the Deobandi tradition for debate and robust intellectual exchange - hardly 
conforming to their contemporary critics’ view of Deobandis as uniformly ideological.2 At the 
                                                       
1 Muhammad Zakariyya, Tarikh-i Mashaikh-i Chisht, Karachi: Maktaba al-Shaykh, 1976, 258. 
 
2 In fact, Mahmud Hasan Gangohi’s The Limits of Difference (Hudud-i Ikhtilaf), discussed in the third 
chapter, is devoted almost entirely to showing how Deobandi `ulama’ continued to respect one another 
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same time Deobandis have often projected an image of ideological cohesion in its polemics and 
counter-polemics with the Barelwis and other ideological rivals in nineteenth century British 
India. This spirit of debate animated an ongoing conversation within early Deoband over what 
constitutes permissible and impermissible belief and actions, centering on practices held dear by 
the Sufis of the Indian subcontinent for centuries. Deobandis were by no means the first to contest 
or question the validity of these practices; however, the force of their critique reverberates today 
on a global scale. 
Various currents of nineteenth century Indian Islam converge in the founding of the 
Deoband madrasa, emanating from an array of influential characters: Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (d. 
1831), the jihadi rebel and charismatic leader of a fledgling frontier state; Muhammad Isma`il (d. 
1831), Sayyid Ahmad’s tireless campaigner and literary propagandist; Hajji Imdadullah al-Makki 
(d. 1899), arguably the most important Sufi of late colonial India, who mentored a generation of 
Sufis and leaders but whose lack of legal training as an `alim compromised his status in the eyes 
of some early Deobandis; Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905), co-founder of the Deoband madrasa 
and an expert legalist, whose sober Sufism and unflinching conservatism shaped Deoband’s ethos 
into the present; and finally Ashraf `Ali Thanawi (d. 1943), the endlessly prolific visionary of 
early twentieth century Deoband, who synthesized legal conservatism and Sufi ethics in a body of 
work that is largely responsible for making Deoband a global phenomenon. 
Many Deobandis have made critical interventions into the discourse on Sufism and Sufi 
devotional practices. I chose these five figures for several reasons. First, Sayyid Ahmad and 
Muhammad Isma`il incited the drive towards purifying Indian Muslim society of illicit Sufi 
practices that the founding figures of Deoband channeled into their movement for ethical and 
educational reform. While not Deobandis as such, many Deobandis treat these two as Deobandis 
avant la lettre. Second, Imdadullah was the Sufi master of both Gangohi and Thanawi, and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
despite major internal differences and disputes, particularly over the Tablighi Jama`at and the extent to 
which Deobandi `ulama’ should be involved in politics, if at all. 
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exerted a profound influence upon Gangohi, Thanawi and scores of other early Deobandis, even 
as he was, strictly speaking, unaffiliated with the workings of the madrasa. Third, Gangohi and 
Thanawi had differing interpretations of Imdadullah’s legacy; in drawing the parameters of 
acceptable norms Gangohi was far more strict, Thanawi more flexible. If Thanawi’s is, in some 
ways, a mediating position between the elastic, conciliatory ontology of Imdadullah and the 
unyielding ontology of Gangohi, we will see that most contemporary Deobandis, whether in 
South Africa or elsewhere, also position themselves in this intermediate space. 
In this chapter I will show, firstly, how a strict, minimalist interpretation of doctrine of 
tawhid, the ‘unicity’ of God, animated Deobandi thinking on shirk (‘association’ of God with 
worldly entities, tantamount to polytheism) and on the boundaries of bid`a, heretical innovation 
in religious matters. Within Deobandi discussions of tawhid, shirk, and bid`a, entire practices 
and, indeed, ways of life cherished by Sufis came under critical scrutiny: does the degree of 
reverence held for the Prophet Muhammad in mawlud festivals threaten to deify him? Should we 
accord the Prophet superhuman knowledge of ‘unseen’ things? Does the mawlud implicitly 
regard the Prophet Muhammad as omniscient or omnipresent? Do the powers accorded to Sufi 
saints in the grave border on quasi-divine?3 Is the Sufi grave itself, with its magnetic pull on the 
hearts and emotions of the unlettered masses, a threat to moral order? In this chapter, we will 
examine the origin of these critiques within early Deobandi circles. In subsequent chapters, we 
will also examine the effectiveness of these critiques, which are inseparable from Deoband’s 
public persona, defined as much by their detractors as by Deobandis themselves. 
I then trace the origins of Deoband’s reformist impulse to the work of Muhammad 
Isma`il (d. 1831), who sought to purge Indian Muslim society of what he claimed were illicit 
                                                       
3 As Engseng Ho stated in his study of grave-pilgrimage networks in the Indian Ocean sphere, “The grave 
is a productive starting point because it is a particularly dense semiotic object … As a compound of place, 
person, name, tombstone, and text, the grave enacts a passage from silence to vocalization.” For this very 
reason, Ho explains, Ibn Taymiyya opposed visiting graves because they create “powerful dynamics of 
signification with the potential to create communities based not on revelation but on something 
autochthonous and incipient in the grave complex.” See Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and 
Mobility across the Indian Ocean, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, 25. 
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cultural accretions, especially surrounding Sufi devotional practices that, in his view, have 
poisoned the Muslim body politic. As we will see, early Deobandis such as Gangohi referenced 
Muhammad Isma`il’s works and urged his followers to read them. Next, the bulk of this chapter 
parses the views of Imdadullah, Gangohi and Thanawi on the mawlud, the celebration of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, and on the `urs, the celebration of the death anniversary of a Sufi 
saint, drawing principally on Imdadullah’s Decision on Seven Controversies (Faisala Haft 
Mas’ala) and The Brilliance of Hearts (Ziya’ al-Qulub), on Gangohi’s collected fatwas (Fatawa-
yi Rashidiyya), and on Thanawi’s The Reformation of Customs (Islah-i Rusum) and Heavenly 
Ornaments (Bihishti Zewar). I single out these two popular devotional practices deliberately, as 
these two forms of piety are among the most hotly contested in contemporary South African 
Islam and, therefore, set the stage for understanding the contours of contemporary debates beyond 
South Asia, among ‘Deobandis abroad’.  
 
Sayyid Ahmad, Muhammad Isma`il and the Roots of Deobandi Critique  
One could conceivably trace Deobandi discourse on bid`a and shirk back to Ahmad 
Sirhindi (d. 1624)4 or even to Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).5 But it is Shah Wali Allah (1703 - 62), 
whom Deobandis claim as the earliest precursor of their movement. In the work of Wali Allah, 
we can see a gradual evolution from openly accepting certain practices at the tombs of saints that 
later Deobandis would condemn, to a relatively strict condemnation of the ‘heresies’ of tomb-
based Sufi festivals. His early writings, especially Al-Qawl al-Jamil and Intibah fi Salasil Awliya’ 
                                                       
4 Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), often called by the honorific title mujaddid-i alf-i thani (‘reviver of the second 
millennium’), is widely revered in the subcontinent as one who ‘preserved’ orthodoxy from the innovations 
of Akbar’s court. The standard work on Ahmad Sirhindi remains Yohanan Friedmann’s Shaykh Ahmad 
Sirhindi: an outline of his thought and a study of his image in the eyes of posterity, McGill: Queen's 
University Press, 1971. Friedmann restores the centrality of Sufism in the life and writings of Sirhindi 
while dismantling the older historiographic tropes that Sirhindi saved ‘orthodoxy’ from Akbar. According 
to Friedmann this notion emerges only in 1919, with the nationalist historiography of Abul Kalam Azad. 
 
5 The bibliography on Ibn Taymiyya is substantial. On his critique of Sufism, see the discussion in 
Alexander Knysh’s Ibn ‘Arabi in the later Islamic tradition: the making of a polemical image, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999, 87 - 112.  
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Allah, describe the etiquette of entering a Sufi saint’s tomb in great detail, suggesting that he had 
few, if any, reservations about visiting these sites.6 His description of concentrating on the image 
of a deceased Sufi saint (tawajjuh) from the same period resonates, as we will see below, with 
Imdadullah's own descriptions of this practice: 
If the godly man is still alive, the disciple should sit down in front of his; and if 
the former is dead, he ought to crouch down at his grave. Next, he should purge 
his mind of all possible distractions, and then lead after a while his spirit to that 
of the godly man so that in the end he becomes closely united with the latter’s 
spirit and he himself is merged into him. After having come to his senses again, 
he will discover in his soul all qualities that constitute the nature of the spiritual 
affiliation with this godly man.7 
 
Yet in later life, he roundly rejected “what people have devised in the matter of shrines, taking 
them as grounds where melas [fairs] are held,” which “belongs to the worst heresies.”8 
Shah `Abd al-Aziz (d. 1823 or 4), Wali Allah’s son and intellectual successor, also held a 
comparatively lenient view of visiting Sufi saints’ tombs, believing it permissible to make 
pilgrimages to them, so long as one does not specify a date for the `urs and make the pilgrimage 
in large numbers, or circumambulate the tombs, for this, he says, will resemble the worship of 
idols, presaging Gangohi’s similar judgment some decades later. But strikingly, Shah `Abd al-
Aziz does believe that the Sufi saints have powers of intercession to speak to the deceased saints 
and even to ask for their intercession; to do so, he recommends, one need only go to the gravesite, 
put one’s fingers on the grave near the head of the Sufi saint, and after a litany of Qur’anic 
                                                       
6 J. M. S. Baljon, “Shah Waliullah and the Dargah,” in Christian W. Troll, ed. Muslim Shrines in India: 
Their Character, History and Significance, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003, 189-190. Waliullah 
describes the etiquette of visiting a tomb as the following: “The visitor should first recite the Fatiha whilst 
performing to rak'as. Next he should squat on his heels with his face turned towards the dead and his back 
towards the Ka'ba and recite the Surat al-Mulk ... After that, he should exclaim Allahu akbar, should 
profess la ilaha illa llah, and should recite the Surat al-Fatiha eleven times. Then he must approach the 
dead calling out twenty-one times Ya Rabb (Oh Lord), and pronounce Ya Ruh (Oh Spirit), driving this 
forcefully into the heavens, and repeat Ya Ruh, driving it now forcefully into his heart, until at last he may 
gain relaxation of mind and inner light. Finally, he should wait to see whether an effusion of beneficence 
from the inhabitant of the grave may flow upon his heart." 
 
7 Ibid., 190. 
 
8 Ibid., 195. Exploring the reasons for this shift is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the gradual 
transition suggests that reformist critiques of Sufism certainly predate the invectives of Muhammad Isma`il. 
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invocations, say “Your holiness! Will you also help us with your prayers and intercession 
(shifa`at)?”9  
It is clear, then, that reformist critiques of Sufi devotions predate the powerful movement 
of Sayyid Ahmad and Muhammad Isma`il, albeit with qualifications (Muhammad Isma`il would 
not have approved of Shah `Abd al-Aziz even limited acceptance of saintly intercession). 
Moreover, Sayyid Ahmad and Muhammad Isma`il were by no means the only ones advancing 
these critiques; similar claims arose, for instance, out of the work of Khurram `Ali Bilhauri, 
whose Nasihat al-Muslimin of 1823 suggested that “In the same way that the heathens worship 
the idols, Muslims started worshipping the tombs of the saints whom they believe to be as 
powerful as Allah.”10 
But Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1831) and his literary propagandist, Muhammad Isma`il 
Barelwi (d. 1831), were the most immediate antecedents to the Deobandis’ reformist project.11 
Beloved of a whole generation of early Deobandis, Sayyid Ahmad was born in 1786 in the town 
of Rai Bareilly in Awadh. He studied in Delhi, and from an early age he began to attract a loyal 
following of Muslims anxious about the perceived downfall of the Indian Muslims’ political and 
social influence. A preaching tour of the Ganges delta valley from 1818 to 1821 solidified his 
influence. He then went on the hajj with some 600 disciples from 1821 to 1824, departing from 
Bengal, and began raising the call to jihad against the Sikhs upon his return to India.12 In 1831 
                                                       
9 S. A. A. Rizvi, Shah `Abd al-Aziz: Puritanism, sectarian polemics and jihad, Canberra: Ma`rifat 
Publishing, 1982, 190-192. 
 
10 Marc Gaborieau, “A Nineteenth-Century Indian ‘Wahhabi’ Tract Against the Cult of Muslim Saints: Al-
Balagh al-Mubin,” 198. 
 
11 The name ‘Barelwi’ signifies Sayyid Ahmad’s place of origin – Rai Bareilly – and has no relation at all 
with the Barelwi movement, Deoband’s principal competitors in the South Asian context. 
 
12 Muhammad Hedayetullah, Sayyid Ahmad: A Study of the Religious Reform Movement of Sayyid Ahmad 
of Ra’e Bareli, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970, 44 and 115-118. There are numerous Urdu 
biographies of Sayyid Ahmad, many verging on hagiography. See, for example, Abul Hasan `Ali Nadvi, 
Sirat-i Sayyid Ahmad Shahid, Lucknow: Majlis-i Tahqiqat va Nashriyyat-i Islam, 1977, and Ghulam Rasul 
Mahr, Sayyid Ahmad Shahid, Lahore: Kitab Manzil, 1954-1956. His main treatise, Taqwiyyat al-Iman, was 
translated into English soon after its appearance by the Indian British authorities, concerned about its 
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Sayyid Ahmad and his compatriots were killed at Balakot fighting against Sikh armies under 
Maharaja Sher Singh. For his followers, his death only amplified his mythic status, and through 
aggressive printing in Urdu, the movement of Sayyid Ahmad reached a popular audience; 
Muhammad Isma`il’s works were read out loud to throngs of Muslims in small villages across 
North India.13 About one of these, Taqwiyyat al-Iman, one report stated in rather hyperbolic 
terms, “six million copies have been printed and distributed, benefiting tens of millions of 
persons. This is a unique honor for the book; no other human writing, it can be safely asserted, 
has achieved such popularity.”14 The British were unsurprisingly circumspect about his 
movement. “The whole object of his career,” reports one British study of 1832, published just a 
year after Sayyid Ahmad’s death, “was to rouse and unite Mahommedan feeling in support of his 
own views of fanaticism and aggrandizement.”15 
Both Sayyid Ahmad and Muhammad Isma`il, like Gangohi and Thanawi after them, 
participated in the centuries-old discourse on Sufism in the subcontinent at the same time that 
they made critical interventions into it. Sayyid Ahmad and Muhammad Isma`il claimed initiations 
                                                                                                                                                                  
impact on popular Muslim sentiments in the subcontinent. See Mir Shahamat Ali, “Translation of the 
Takwiyat-ul-Iman, preceded by a Notice of the Author, Maulavi Isma`il Hajji,” Journal of the Asiatic 
Society of Bengal 13 (1852): 310-372.  This was later reprinted as Mir Shahamat Ali, Support of the Faith: 
English Translation of Shah Isma`il Shahid’s Taqwiyat-ul-Iman, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1969. 
13 For a discussion of the impact of print on this movement, see Marc Gaborieau’s “Late Persian, Early 
Urdu: The Case of ‘Wahhabi’ Literature (1818-1857),” in Françoise Nalini Delvoye, ed. Confluence of 
Cultures: French Contributions to Indo-Persian Studies, New Delhi: Manohar, 1994, and the same author’s 
“Sufism in the First Indian Wahhabi Manifesto: Siratu'l Mustaqim by Isma`il Shahid and `Abdu'l Hayy,” in 
Muzaffar Alam, Françoise Delvoye Nalini and Marc Gaborieau, eds. The Making of Indo-Persian Culture: 
Indian and French Studies, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2000. Interestingly, the French 
ethnographer Garcin de Tassy was well aware of the work of the Indian ‘Wahhabis’ and even seemed to 
sympathize with the rising reformist movement of Sayyid Ahmad. Writing in 1838, he stated, “One must 
say that probably in no country the Muslim religion is more in need of reform than in India. Surrounded by 
idolaters, the Muslims adopted most of their usages. The antique simplicity of Islam gave way to festivals 
and pagan ceremonies; ignoble masquerades defile the observances of the cult of the disciples of 
Mahomet.” See Marc Gaborieau, “Muslim Saints, Faquirs and Pilgrims in 1831 According to Garcin de 
Tassy,” in Jamal Malik, ed. Perspectives of Mutual Encounters in South Asian History, 1760-1860, Leiden: 
Brill, 2000, 151. 
 
14 Mir Shahamat Ali, Support of the Faith: English Translation of Shah Isma`il Shahid’s Taqwiyat-ul-Iman, 
Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1969, xxi-xiv. 
 
15 J. R. Colvin, “Notice of the Particular Tenets Held by the Followers of Syed Ahmad, taken chiefly from 
the ‘Sirat-ul-Mustaqim’ a principal Treatise of that Sect,” Journal of the Asiatic Society, 11 (1832): 479-
498, at 480.  
 39 
into multiple Sufi lineages, including the Naqshbandi, Qadiri, and Chishti orders. Sayyid Ahmad 
claimed multiple Uwaysi initiations (initiations by way of dreams or visions) from prominent Sufi 
shaykhs, including such luminaries as `Abd al-Qadir Jilani, Baha al-din Naqshbandi, and Qutb al-
din Bakhtiyar Kaki. The movement’s first manifesto was the treatise Sirat al-mustaqim, 
consisting of the teachings of Sayyid Ahmad on various Sufi subjects, written first in Persian by 
Muhammad Isma`il and Muhammad `Abd al-Hayy, and later translated into Urdu.16  
Muhammad Isma`il composed numerous treatises, the most important being 
Strengthening of the Faith (Taqwiyyat al-Iman), written around 1824.17 Its central argument is 
simple but has immense and complex repercussions for the religio-political imaginary of South 
Asian Muslims: tawhid, the absolute unity of God, is diametrically opposed to shirk, associating 
another person or thing in any way with God. Sunna, the morally sanctioned path of right belief 
and conduct articulated in the words and deeds of the Prophet, is diametrically opposed to bid`a.18 
Muhammad Isma`il conceived of bid`a in three ways: first, as a practice that directly opposes or 
invalidates sunna; second, as a practice done with same intent or regularity of the sunna but not 
part of it - in other words, creating a kind of false or counter-religion alongside the sunna; or 
third, making anything obligatory that is not explicitly condemned. 
                                                       
16 The Sirat al-Mustaqim contains, among other things, a theory of the ‘path of sainthood’ (rah-i wilayat) 
compared to the ‘path of prophecy’ (rah-i nubuwat) and a detailed analysis of zikr techniques in the Qadiri, 
Naqshbandi and Chishti silsilas. The Urdu translation of the Persian is still widely read; for a recent 
Deobandi edition, see Muhammad Isma`il, Sirat-i Mustaqim, Deoband, Dar al-Kitab Deoband, n.d. See 
Marc Gaborieau, “Sufism in the First Indian Wahhabi Manifesto: Siratu’l Mustaqim by Isma`il Shahid and 
‘Abdu’l Hayy,” in Muzaffar Alam, Françoise Nalini Delvoye and Marc Gaborieau, eds. The Making of 
Indo-Persian Culture: Indian and French Studies, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. The text gave considerable 
anxiety to British authorities who were already predisposed to question the loyalty of their Muslim subjects 
in India, an anxiety evident in J. R. Colvin, “Notice of the Particular Tenets Held by the Followers of Syed 
Ahmad, taken chiefly from the ‘Sirat-ul-Mustaqim’ a principal Treatise of that Sect,” Journal of the Asiatic 
Society, 11 (1832): 479-498. 
 
17 Marc Gaborieau, “Late Persian, Early Urdu: The Case of ‘Wahhabi’ Literature (1818-1857),” in 
Françoise Delvoye Nalini, ed. Confluence of Cultures: French Contributions to Indo-Persian Studies, New 
Delhi: Manohar, 1994, 177. 
 
18 Muhammad Isma`il, Taqwiyyat al-Iman ma`a tazkir al-Ikhwan, Multan: Kutub Khana-yi Majidiyya, n.d., 
11-12.  
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He identifies four fundamental forms of shirk: association with God in knowledge (ishrak 
fi-l `ilm), association with God in power (ishrak fi-l tasarruf), association with God in worship 
(ishrak fi-l `ibadat), and association with God in matters of custom or everyday life (ishrak fi-l 
‘adah).19 Each of these forms of what Muhammad Isma`il considered shirk would later shape 
early Deobandi thought. ‘Association’ with God in knowledge informed debates about whether 
the Prophet Muhammad has knowledge of the ‘unseen’ (`ilm-i ghaib). ‘Association’ with God in 
power led into debates about whether there are theoretical limits to God’s sovereignty, namely 
whether God could produce additional prophets of Muhammad’s stature or even tell a lie, and 
whether to suggest that God is somehow incapable of doing so is itself akin to denying his 
limitless omnipotence. The latter two categories are the most salient here; ‘association’ with God 
in worship and in customary practices covered those Sufi practices that bore a dangerous 
similarity to the worship accorded solely to God, or customary practices that resembled acts 
sanctioned by the sunna - such as the reverence bestowed upon the Prophet Muhammad during 
the mawlud or in the act of granting him salutations, or upon the Sufi saints during their death 
anniversary festivities. 
Muhammad Isma`il articulates a stark and radically polarized vision of divine 
sovereignty in which human beings, including all prophets and Sufi saints, are utterly 
powerless before God’s majesty, thereby undercutting the very possibility of saintly 
intercession between God and humankind. One is easily reminded here of Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of sovereignty as “he who decides on the exception.”20 The sovereign, in this vision, is 
the sole power capable of deciding on the exception to otherwise immutable rules and laws. 
The sovereign by definition transcends the law, simultaneously dictating the law and exempt 
from it. Schmitt himself identified his notion of sovereignty as a kind of secularized theology. 
                                                       
19Ibid., 12-15.  
 
20 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George 
Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005, 5. 
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The state of exception, Schmitt writes, is “analogous to the miracle.”21 In a similar sense 
Muhammad Isma`il submits that God is so powerful that he could instantaneously and 
miraculously upend and subvert every law of the universe and every article of Islamic faith 
and replace them with an entirely new system. He could replace the Prophet Muhammad with 
another Prophet, or create scores of new Prophets: “Verily the power of this Shah of Shahs is 
so great that in an instant, solely by pronouncing the command ‘Be!’ God can create millions 
of prophets, saints, djinn, and angels equal to Gabriel and Muhammad, or in a single breath, 
can turn the whole universe upside down and bestow upon it a wholly new creation.”22  
Beyond the realm of the sunna, properly circumscribed, exists the impure and corrupting 
domain of ‘culture’.23 Muhammad Isma`il names three broad cultural domains that distract 
Muslims from the sunna: the conventions of one’s parents, the teachings of Sufi pirs, and the 
secular rule of kings. But the customary practices of Sufis are particularly assailed here. 
Muhammad Isma`il’s project is a drive towards ‘purification’, towards demarcating a strict 
boundary between the human and the divine with no commerce between the two, between what 
has agency (God alone) and what does not (all else).24 For Muhammad Isma`il, shirk is, in a 
sense, mis-assigning agency. It is the assumption that dead saints have agency, or that the amulet 
crafted by a Sufi pir for curing an illness has agency, that astrological predictions exercise agency 
over the future, and so on. 
For Muhammad Isma`il, these customary practices impinge on the sphere of the sunna. 
They threaten to corrupt it, or more sinisterly, to imitate it, to create a faux-sunna alongside the 
                                                       
21Ibid., 36. 
 
22 Muhammad Isma`il, Taqwiyyat al-Iman ma`a tazkir al-Ikhwan, 29. 
 
23 I have chosen the word ‘culture’ here to translate several words in Urdu that each have distinct 
connotations: ‘adat, from the Arabic root ‘to return to’, suggesting habit or convention; rivaya, derived 
from the Persian root ‘to go’, suggesting something that is current, tolerated or widely accepted; and rasm, 
meaning ‘to mark, trace or delineate’, connoting established usage or law. 
 
24 Compare the discussion of “purification” in Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, translated by 
Catherine Porter, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, 10-12. 
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true one.25 Practices within this rubric of ‘culture’ vary widely, ranging from marriage rites to 
veneration of the dead and to the customs of naming children. In the Taqwiyyat al-Iman, 
Muhammad Isma`il particularly execrates the cultural practices that Indian Muslims have adopted 
from Hinduism. “Contemporary Muslims of Hindustan have adopted countless new paths,” he 
writes, “sacrificing an animal at the birth of a daughter, naming a child after a saint, leaving flags 
at the graves of saints, tying bracelets around the groom’s wrist at weddings, and the like.” In the 
Tazkir al-Ikhwan, he devotes an entire chapter to enumerating the worst offenses: singing, taking 
pride in one’s family lineage, Hindu customs in weddings, the prohibition on widow remarriage, 
reciting poems of lamentation, and excessive embellishment on clothing or the body. “So do not 
follow new paths and customs,” he enjoins, “but follow only the noble path trod before by the 
Prophet and his companions. They chose the best and the firmest practices and customs, and in 
this manner made their inner selves exceedingly pure and holy.”26  
Ultimately, Sayyid Ahmad’s military exploits were unsuccessful. Some followers 
continued to fight against the Sikhs and later the British; some, on the other hand, broke with the 
jihad movement but continued their critiques of Sufi devotional practices, such as Karamat Ali of 
Jaunpur.27 From 1857 onward, after the catastrophic blow that the British dealt to resistance 
throughout the subcontinent, the movement was forced to be on the defensive, especially as 
                                                       
25 Muhammad Isma`il, Taqwiyyat al-Iman ma`a tazkir al-Ikhwan, 15-16. A good example is the following 
litany of practices: “The observance of the following rites is prohibited for any being other than Allah: 
prostration, bowing down, standing with folded arms, spending money in the name of an individual, fasting 
out of respect to his memory, proceeding to a distant shrine in the dress of a pilgrim, and calling aloud his 
name while going along, or doing other absurdities. Also, one should not slay cattle purposely while on 
pilgrimage, go around the shrine, make prostration before it, carry animals for sacrifice, make vows, cover 
the grave with a sheet, utter prayers while standing at its threshold, ask for the accomplishment of other 
wishes concerning this and the world to come, kiss any particular stone … light lamps around it … prepare 
things for the ablution of its visitors, consider the water of the place sacred, sprinkle it over the body, and 
carry it away for absent friends, leave the shrine to walk backwards with one’s face towards it, hold the 
jungle around it in respect, refrain from slaying any animals found nearby or from cutting trees or grasses 
growing there … Should anyone in any way observe these or honors any entity other than Allah, he shall 
certainly be guilty of shirk.” 
 
26 Ibid., 72. 
 
27 Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008, 135-
138. 
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supporters in Afghanistan and elsewhere abandoned the movement. The movement was finally 
snuffed out with 1863 Ambala campaign, with the so-called ‘Wahhabi’ trials following soon 
afterwards.28 A split in the movement emerged in 1860’s between those who thought all legal 
schools were equally valid and those who thought they were all equally useless; the latter group 
formed one of Deoband’s archrivals, the Ahl-i Hadith.29 However, in many ways, even though the 
military aspect of the mission dissolved, in some ways it was channeled into the reformist project 
of Deoband. In his masnavi-style poem, Jihad al-Akbar, Hajji Imdadullah uses militaristic 
language to describe the struggle against the ‘lower self’ (nafs). Imdadullah, of course, had fought 
in the 1857 rebellion against the British, and his poems seem to internalize the military struggle 
that had failed.30 
Perhaps no early Deobandi internalized this reformist mission more than Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi. In the Fatawa-yi Rashidiyya, Gangohi praises Muhammad Isma`il’s Taqwiyyat al-Iman 
in no uncertain terms: “Taqwiyyat al-Iman is a magnificent, utterly true work, strengthening and 
reforming the faith (quwwat o islah-i iman), and the entire meaning of the Qur’an and hadith is 
contained in it.”31 Gangohi uses Sufi appellations to extol Muhammad Isma`il, declaring him one 
of the ‘friends of God’ (wali Allah) and averring that the Taqwiyyat al-Iman contains the “essence 
of Islam” (`ayn-i Islam).32 Despite his unqualified praise, other fatwas in the collection reveal just 
how controversial Muhammad Isma`il’s propositions were. Several people requesting them 
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29 Freeland Abbott, “The Transformation of the Jihad Movement,” Muslim World 52, 4 (1962): 288-295. 
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32 Ibid., 78. 
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inquired whether it was permissible to call Muhammad Isma`il an ‘unbeliever’ (kafir),33 and in 
fact several prominent `ulama’ under the guidance of Fazl al-Haqq Khairabadi (d. 1861) did 
exactly that.34 Gangohi, expectedly, condemns declaring Muhammad Isma`il an unbeliever with 
the justification that he is a saint (wali). He echoes his intellectual predecessor in still other ways, 
defending the controversial notion that God is capable of lying (imkan-i kizb) and that God could 
create other prophets on par with Muhammad (the notion of imkan-i nazir), offering the 
explanation, like Muhammad Isma`il, that God is capable but would never do so.35 And like 
Muhammad Isma`il he steadfastly denies that Muhammad had ‘knowledge of the unseen’ (‘ilm-i 
ghaib), a staple of Sufi perceptions of the Prophet as a man of unparalleled knowledge of this 
world and the next.36 Gangohi endorses as well the polarized vision of divine sovereignty found 
in the Taqwiyyat al-Iman. In clarifying the meaning of a passage from Taqwiyyat al-Iman in 
which Muhammad Isma`il likens the difference between God and humankind as that between a 
king and a member of the lower castes (chamar, a tanner) Gangohi makes a similar comparison: a 
potter can create the pot but also has the power to break it at will.37  
A story is widely told of Sayyid Ahmad’s sojourn in Deoband long before the madrasa 
was founded there in 1866. Sayyid Ahmad happened upon Deoband en route to the northwest to 
wage jihad against the Sikhs, and upon reaching the very spot where the madrasa was later built, 
a trash dump at the time, Sayyid Ahmad proclaimed, “Here I smell the fragrance of knowledge 
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‘Aziz. Khairabadi defended the notion of saintly intercession against Muhammad Isma`il’s assertions that 
believing in intercession was tantamount to shirk. He also vilified Muhammad Isma`il for his alleged 
slandering of the Prophet Muhammad. See Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008, 80-81. 
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(`ilm ki khushbu).”38 The veracity of the tale is largely irrelevant; what it signifies is a mythology 
that links the advent of Deoband as an intellectual institution to the reformist impulse with which 
Sayyid Ahmad energized the Muslims of north India. In some ways, Sayyid Ahmad’s political 
jihad was channeled into an intellectual and moral jihad. Ultimately, Muhammad Isma`il’s strict 
interpretations of tawhid and shirk appealed to Indian Muslim scholars who had recently suffered 
the indignities of England’s severe reaction to the unsuccessful 1857 revolt. The British may have 
demonstrated their superior might politically and militarily, but India’s Muslims could still 
prevail spiritually, and strengthen the Muslim body politic in the process of doing so.  
 
Mawlud: How Ought One Love the Prophet? 
 Among the most contentious issues that early Deobandis addressed in this ‘moral jihad’ 
was veneration of the Prophet Muhammad on his birthday (mawlud). This has been a 
controversial issue within Islamic history since at least the thirteenth century, and remains so 
today; arguments for and against mawlud proliferate in fatwas, in scholarly studies, and on 
polemical websites.39  
Mawlud festivities did not exist in the era of the Prophet Muhammad; the earliest 
documented celebrations of the mawlud are from the twelfth century, though they may have 
existed prior to this.40 Marion Holmes Katz’s extensive study of mawlud shows that form of 
devotional piety was intimately linked to Sufi practices, especially musical assemblies (sama`), 
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and narratives of the Prophet’s birth often centered around the mythology, sacred to Sufis, of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s existence as the primordial Light (nur) alongside God prior to creation.41 
 Deobandi scholars of the nineteenth century were by no means the first to criticize 
mawlud festivities; even in the twelfth century, one critic bemoaned “the taking of hashish, the 
gathering of young men, the rejection of the singer if he has a beard, the singing of [songs] 
arousing longing for worldly pleasures,” and so on.42 In the sixteenth, the legal legitimacy of 
qiyam - standing in honor of the Prophet - was debated, with critics denying its legal legitimacy 
but supporters asserting it as a natural display of love and emotion for the Prophet.43 One of the 
greatest premodern treatises on mawlud was surely Jalal al-Din Suyuti’s (d. 1505) Husn al-
Maqsad fi ‘Amal al-Mawlid (The Good Intention of Celebrating Mawlud), which defended the 
mawlud as a ‘good innovation’ (bid`a hasana) provided that it remained within certain normative 
parameters.44 Naturally, Muhammad `Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) opposed the practice, but his 
views on mawlud and other alleged innovations did not become entrenched in the Hijaz until long 
after his death; even in the late nineteenth century, as Deobandis such as Gangohi were issuing 
fatwas against the practice of standing in reverence of the Prophet (qiyam) during the mawlud, a 
Hanafi mufti of Mecca issued a polemic in support of mawlud, insisting remarkably that not 
standing for the Prophet was sinful.45 Mawlud remains eminently contested across the Muslim 
world, with renowned institutions such as al-Azhar issuing their own edicts on the practice.46 
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 Understanding Deobandis’ views on the mawlud require understanding how Hajji 
Imdadullah attempted to intervene in these debates, and how later Deobandis adopted a stricter 
stance than his. Born in 1817 to a scholarly family in Thana Bhavan, Hajji Imdadullah traveled to 
Delhi in 1833 to study in the circles of Maulana Mamluk `Ali and Maulana Muhammad Ishaq 
Dihlawi, a pupil of Shah `Abd al-‘Aziz.47 He took his Sufi initiation from Nasir ad-din Dihlawi, 
grandson of Rafi` al-din Dihlawi, who was a son of Shah Wali Allah. Nasir al-din, a khalifa of 
Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, initiated Imdadullah into the Naqshbandi order. Another khalifa of 
Sayyid Ahmad’s, Mianji Nur Muhammad Jhanjhanawi (d. 1845), initiated Imdadullah into the 
Chishti Sabiri order.48 Imdadullah took up arms against the British in 1857 and fled to Mecca in 
1859, whence he continued to teach students from afar and where he lived out the rest of his life, 
until his death in 1899.49 From Mecca he maintained a prolific correspondence with his Sufi 
pupils back home and frequently received them in Mecca during the hajj. 
Even though he seemed unperturbed by Muhammad Isma`il’s incendiary work, 
Imdadullah was in fact firmly within the spiritual lineage of Sayyid Ahmad and his movement; 
Imdadullah’s Sufi master, Hazrat Mianji, was the pupil of Hazrat Shah `Abd al-Rahim who made 
a Sufi pledge (ba`iat) to Sayyid Ahmad directly.50 Imdadullah mentored virtually all of the 
earliest Deobandis, including the co-founders of the Deoband madrasa, Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, even going so far as to conceive his relation to 
Nanautawi in terms of Rumi’s relation to Shams Tabriz: “Allah Ta’ala grants to some of his 
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servants who are not technically `ulama’ the tongue [of another],” explained Imdadullah. “Thus 
the tongue granted to Hazrat Shams Tabriz was that of Maulana Rumi, who elaborated upon the 
knowledge of Hazrat Shams Tabriz in great detail. Similarly I have received Maulana 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi as my tongue.”51 By all measures, it seems he remained aware of 
his status as a non-`alim; Muhammad Zakariyya tells a story that once when Hajji Imdadullah 
was discussing issues amongst `ulama’, he said to them: “Brothers, I am ignorant. You are 
`ulama’. In my heart is only what has alighted there, and I have explained it thus; if there is any 
error in it, anything in conflict with the Qur’an and the sunna, please do not hesitate to tell me. 
Otherwise, on the Day of Judgment, I will say ‘I told them to explain it but they did not clarify 
the matter’.”52 A similar anecdote reveals much about how Gangohi viewed his Sufi master 
Imdadullah. Once a certain Muhammad A'la Ambetwi had just returned from the hajj and said 
that Hajji Imdadullah gave him permission to attend a sama` musical assembly. When Gangohi 
heard this, he said, “This must be incorrect. But if he is stating the truth, the Hajji Sahib is 
incorrect. In such matters it is Hajji Sahib’s duty to consult us. And in matters regarding the 
reformation of the self, it is our duty to follow Hajji Sahib.”53 The episode is revealing for 
comprehending not just Gangohi’s view of Imdadullah, a Sufi but not an `alim, but of Deoband’s 
view of the relation between Sufism and the `ulama’ generally. 
Imdadullah realized that a number of practices popular among Sufis had become 
contested in his time, and sought to intervene in these debates with his Decision on Seven 
Controversies.54 Imdadullah ranks the seven disputed issues covered in his treatise according to 
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the degree of controversy, placing mawlud first. We will see later on that mawlud remains, even 
today, the most contentious of devotional practices in contemporary South Africa, among 
Deobandis and others. Imdadullah begins his analysis of mawlud by noting that there are inherent 
virtues in remembering the Prophet’s birthday; the main point of contention for the `ulama’ is the 
practice of standing in respect of the Prophet (qiyam) during a certain point in the mawlud. 
Because of the contentious nature of qiyam, some `ulama’ maintain that mawlud as a whole must 
be prohibited as an improper innovation, but significantly, Imdadullah tells us “most permit it.”55  
Imdadullah took the task of combating such innovations (bid`a) seriously. He is credited 
with stating, “I never refuse to accept initiation (bai`at) from anyone, because they could be 
influenced by someone who commits bid`a. Then God would take me and ask, ‘He came to you 
and you rejected him. For this reason he has been taken away.”56 A crucial part of his analysis of 
mawlud is his definition of bid`a: “bringing into the religion (din) that which is not part of it.”57 
He follows this definition with a simple observation: honoring the Prophet on any occasion is 
praiseworthy, and even appointing a special time to honor him is acceptable and may earn one 
merit; however, believing it blameworthy not to participate is reprehensible. This will foreshadow 
the Deobandis’ criticism that some participants in mawlud festivals put pressure on others to 
attend, even suggesting that they must attend as a matter of personal religious duty to their 
beloved Prophet. 
Yet Imdadullah helped shape later Deobandi views that the worst transgressions arise 
from insisting on certain practices and criticizing those who do not participate, illustrating this 
point with his analysis of standing in respect of the Prophet Muhammad: 
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Some criticize those who do not stand in respect of the Prophet during mawlud. 
This is incorrect. In the view of the Shari`a, standing is not essential, and 
according to the jurists, even a praiseworthy (mustahabb) action becomes 
reprehensible (ma`siyat) when it is demanded … [Moreover] it is plainly 
objectionable to believe that one cannot attain merit (sawab) if a date for the 
mawlud is not appointed, or if standing in respect of the Prophet is not 
performed, or if sweets are not arranged. Such a belief is a transgression of the 
limits of the Shari`a, just as it is reprehensible to regard an accepted (mubah) act 
as haram. In both cases there is a transgression of limits.58 
 
Some claim that the mawlud will not have the same salutary effect if the congregants do not stand 
in respect of the Prophet. Ultimately - and this is a crucial point - this is an “internal” (batin) 
matter that involves the personal belief of individuals and attempting to resolve it in one way or 
another leaves us in the “realm of conjecture.”59 
In defending mawlud, Imdadullah cautions against those `ulama’ who would ban entire 
practices based on some contingency, such as “preachers using weak hadith” or the “mixing of 
men and women.” This is, he says, a bit like “burning one’s rug because of a single flea.”60 (In 
contemporary disputes over mawlud, Barelwi scholars put forth a similar defense of the practice, 
as we will see.) To believe that Muhammad graces the assembly with his presence is no different; 
contentious as it is, it provides no basis for rejecting mawlud as a whole. While some critics of 
mawlud even brand those who say Muhammad’s light (nur) graces the assembly as unbelievers, 
Imdadullah suggests not only that this is possible in terms of both intellect and revelation, but that 
in some instances it has actually taken place. The difficulty, though, is ascertaining when and 
under what circumstances. Moreover, one need not posit Muhammad’s “knowledge of the 
unseen” (‘ilm-i ghaib) to suggest that Muhammad’s spirit could be present at the assembly.61 
Imdadullah sums up his argument by evoking his own personal experience; he professes 
to attend the mawlud regularly as a means for acquiring divine blessings (barakat). In fact, 
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differences over issues such as qiyam are like disputes over the branches of law (fiqh), not its 
essentials, and both sides can marshal evidence from the legal sources to bolster their respective 
sides; thus divergent opinions should be treated no differently than differences between, say, 
Hanafi and Shafi`i schools of law.62 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Imdadullah’s Sufi pupil, came to strikingly different 
conclusions.63 Born in 1829 in the north Indian village of Gangoh, Gangohi was a Sufi of the 
Indian Chishti order.64 He went to Delhi in his youth to study hadith with Shah `Abd al-Ghani (d. 
1868).65 Both Gangohi and the co-founder of Deoband, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-
1877), studied Sufism at the feet of Hajji Imdadullah.66 According to one source, Gangohi 
progressed from the status of a pupil to one qualified to initiate others in a mere forty days, after 
which he returned to Gangoh where he sought to eliminate devotional practices at the tomb of his 
ancestor, the Sufi saint Shaykh `Abd al-Quddus Gangohi (d. 1537).67 According to some sources, 
he fought alongside his master Imdadullah at Shamli during the 1857 revolt, spent six months in a 
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British jail, and began a career teaching hadith after his release.68 Although not officially 
involved with Deoband until 1879, when he became chancellor (sarparast), from the outset 
Gangohi was intimately involved with shaping the mission and curriculum of the school, insisting 
on rigorous studies in the ‘transmitted’ sciences (manqulat) and deemphasizing the ‘rational’ 
sciences (ma`qulat), such as logic and philosophy.69 
Gangohi’s views on the mawlud are gleaned mostly from his collection of fatwas.70  On 
the issue of the mawlud, Gangohi is stricter than both Imdadullah and his contemporaries; indeed, 
he declines even to offer systematic reasoning for his decision to reject the practice outright. 
Several fatwas from Gangohi’s collection attest to this: 
Question: Is the milad festival permissible or not in the form in which it is known 
and customarily practiced in this age, including standing in praise of the Prophet 
(qiyam), the burning of censers of frankincense, the use of singing troupes and 
appointing a specific day for the festivities? 
 
Answer: This festival, which did not exist in the era of the Prophet Muhammad, 
in the era of the pious Sahaba, in the era of the Followers or the Followers of the 
Followers, or in the era of the mujtahidin, which was invented some 400 years 
later by a king whom most historians regard as immoral (fasiq), is an assembly of 
evil innovation (bid`a zalala). Previous `ulama’ have already written about its 
illegality and nowadays many fatwas have been printed on the subject. There is 
no great need for a detailed rationale (dalil) [for this verdict]. The rationale for 
ruling it illegal is simply that it was not practiced in the first generations of Islam, 
and that great evils are witnessed during it.71 
 
A similar fatwa offers a few additional reasons to reject mawlud, including standing up to honor 
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the Prophet and certain practices’ resemblance to Hindu religious piety: 
The customary mawlud gathering is bid`a because a mix of reprehensible matters 
is extremely detestable (makruh tahrimi). Standing in respect of the Prophet 
especially gives it the burden of being a bid`a, and having children sing songs 
brings about discord (fitna). The custom of reading the Fatihah [during the 
mawlud] is also bid`a, in addition to resembling actions of the Hindus. Muslims’ 
imitation (tashabuh) of other peoples (qaum) is prohibited … It is not permissible 
to attend such merry-making events that contravene the Shari`a, and any money 
[earned or spent in the preparation of the mawlud] is haram.72 
 
One individual who sought a fatwa states that Shah `Abd al-`Aziz participated in mawlud and 
`urs and wants to know if the sort of mawlud and `urs sanctioned by that great predecessor to the 
Deobandis remains legitimate. Gangohi responds without acknowledging Shah `Abd al-‘Aziz at 
all, mentioning only that `urs once was permissible but no longer remains so.73 
 In Gangohi’s fatwas, the detail of his response was in proportion to the detail of the 
inquiry to which it responds. And in the case of a short inquiry, Gangohi typically offered a terse 
response that illustrates his tendency to condemn a practice with minimal reasoning: “Question: 
According to sound hadith, is participating in a mawlud gathering acceptable if it is free of 
standing in respect of the Prophet, or not? Answer: Holding a mawlud gathering is not 
permissible in any condition.”74  
Once some people asked Gangohi if it is possible to give a lecture on the birth of the 
Prophet Muhammad without invoking any of the deviant customs associated with the mawlud 
festival. Gangohi replied that this is indeed possible, to which they requested that he demonstrate 
what such a ‘mawlud’ would look like. Gangohi agreed, so he sent Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri to 
a home where the interested parties gathered. Muhammad Zakariyya describes the gathering: 
After the mawlud began, Khalil Ahmad read the ayat ‘The Messenger has come 
to you’ and explained it. He then explained some statements and deeds of Hazrat 
‘Abd al-Quddus [Gangohi] and the bid`a therein and exposed the false Sufis of 
today. After expounding on some events and details of the Prophet’s birth from 
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Tarikh-i Habib Allah then the mawlud was finished … Many were very 
displeased towards the owner of the house, saying ‘You invited us to your home 
and then you disgraced us’. But in reality, this mawlud was beneficial. Some of 
the people present thought that those who reject the mawlud reject every aspect 
of it, but many were disabused of this notion.75 
 
This short anecdote is striking for what it reveals regarding Gangohi’s view of a ‘proper’ mawlud: 
one leading the mawlud should read some verses of the Qur’an, discuss some narrations about the 
Prophet’s birth, and explain why certain Sufi practices are bid`a. In a sense, the Deobandi critique 
of Sufism is here embedded didactically in the very structure of the mawlud. 
Ashraf `Ali Thanawi offered the most systematic early Deobandi treatment of the 
mawlud. Thanawi was born in 1863 in Thana Bhavan, a small north Indian town not far from 
Deoband. His father managed the estate of a wealthy landowner in Meerut but wanted a religious 
education for his eldest son and sent Thanawi to the madrasa at Deoband, where he began his 
studies in 1878.76 Thanawi made his first hajj pilgrimage in 1884, where he took on Hajji 
Imdadullah as his Sufi master, and later settled at the Sufi lodge at Thana Bhavan where 
Imdadullah had lived and taught his disciples before his post-1857 exile.77 From Thana Bhavan, 
Thanawi met with hundreds of disciples in person, maintained a prolific correspondence with 
many more via post, issued fatwas and wrote numerous scholarly treatises on topics ranging from 
law, ethics, Sufism and even women’s rights. Above all, Thanawi sought to chart a public role for 
the twentieth century Indian `ulama’, and conceived of educating the masses on the rights and 
wrongs of Sufism as an integral part of that pursuit. 
Reform of Customs (Islah-i Rusum) is a short treatise that Thanawi wrote in order to 
expose the dangers of numerous widespread customary practices in his time. Thanawi begins 
Reform of Customs with the admonition that “in this age, most Muslims see … that carrying out 
necessary and compulsory religious duties has not been lost, but customs (rusum) have been 
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given a no less equal status.”78 The first chapter advises readers to abstain from seemingly 
innocuous activities such as dancing and singing, chess-playing, and the use of fireworks, and 
warns readers not to trim the beard, wear ‘English’ hair styles, or sport trousers below the ankles. 
The second chapter, following a slightly different tack, examines impermissible habits 
surrounding events in everyday life, such as birth, marriage, circumcision, and so on. Here I will 
concentrate on the third chapter, in which Thanawi goes into great detail in analyzing the 
problems with certain customary practices, but also offers a sort of hermeneutic basis for his 
critiques.  
His analysis of mawlud is particularly germane to the shape of later debates within 
Deobandi circles. For Thanawi, there are three kinds of mawlud: the first is completely 
permissible, the second completely impermissible, and the third, an intermediate form, is 
permissible within certain parameters. From this, Thanawi extrapolates several general 
propositions about the boundaries of bid`a and sunna. 
The first kind of mawlud assembly, Thanawi tells us, is permissible without any 
reservations whatsoever. This is a case in which some individuals gather “by chance” to discuss 
the life, birth, and virtues of the Prophet Muhammad. “The Prophet explained his own life and 
perfections in this way,” says Thanawi. They have not been forced or compelled to gather for this 
mawlud, and they do not engage in any prohibited acts.79   
The second kind of mawlud is the polar opposite of the first: in this gathering, “sweet-
voiced” boys sing fabricated tales, bribes and other forms of haram money is exchanged, the 
organizers spend enormous sums for food and lighting in the pursuit of local fame and prestige. 
Moreover, participants pressure others to attend and ridicule those that do not, often skip the 
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compulsory daily prayers, and believe the Prophet Muhammad to be literally present at the 
gathering.80 
 Significantly, while Thanawi concedes that not all mawlud gatherings of this type contain 
every one of these iniquities, he insists that such a gathering is completely impermissible if even 
one of them is present. We have already seen how, with Gangohi, the presence of one impurity 
infects the whole: “This type of assembly is impermissible because of these unlawful elements, 
and participating in it is also unlawful. Nowadays most mawluds are of this type. If perhaps not 
all of these unlawful elements are present, by necessity, some of them are, and a single unlawful 
element renders the whole unlawful, as is obvious.”81 
 The third kind of mawlud is described as follows: 
There is neither the informality of the first kind nor the forbidden elements of the 
second kind. Although this form also has stipulations, they are halal and 
permissible (mubah). For example, the stories told are sound (sahih) and reliable, 
the storyteller is trustworthy and is not seeking fame, and the money involved is 
halal as well. There are no decorations and money is not wasted. The dress of the 
participants and the ablutions are in accordance with the shari`a, and if by chance 
something contrary to the shari`a happens then the lecturer refuses it on the basis 
of ‘commanding the good’ and explains necessary rules in accordance with the 
situation. If there is poetry, it is not set to music and its subject matter remains 
aligned with the shari`a and is not excessive. There is no hindrance in 
completing the required acts of worship, and the intention of the organizer is pure 
and only for the sake of seeking blessings and love for the Prophet … The 
attendees do not consider the Prophet to be omnipresent and a knower of the 
unseen (`alim al-ghayb). This assembly, in which such caution is taken, is rare.82 
 
Thanawi leaves his true judgment on this final type of mawlud somewhat ambiguous. He states 
that it is neither completely permissible nor completely impermissible. 
Next, Thanawi presents his hermeneutic framework for these verdicts. In other words, he 
asks, what are the theoretical constraints that Islamic law places upon events such as the mawlud? 
These theoretical observations inform Deobandi reasoning about Sufi devotional practices at 
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almost every level. We will see these arguments rehashed in contemporary polemical works, 
albeit without the nuance with which he presents them here.  
First, it is expressly forbidden to “consider an unnecessary matter necessary or to act on it 
with the same or higher degree of persistence that one accords to necessary and obligatory acts, or 
to consider it blameworthy to forego this action or to censure those who do.”83 The shari`a 
forbids “restricting, stipulating, specifying, or making necessary” any particular belief or action if 
it simulates or mimics the normativity of the law. This is a succinct formulation of the same 
principle that appears in both Imdadullah and Gangohi: to perform any action with the same 
degree, consistency or intentionality that one is expected to grant sunna acts is prohibited. For 
example, Thanawi relates a hadith in which Ibn Ma`sud observed the Prophet occasionally 
leaving his prayer from the left side, even though he had said leaving from the right side was 
recommended. The point, Ibn Ma`sud says, is that one ought not extrapolate from something 
merely recommended that it is a commandment.84 
Secondly, Thanawi reasserts the principle of a metonymic relation between an illicit part 
and otherwise licit whole; even one violation of the shari`a renders an otherwise legitimate action 
reprehensible. “A permissible (mubah) action,” he writes, “in fact, even a praiseworthy 
(mustahabb) one, becomes unlawful and prohibited if combined with an unlawful action.”85 
Thanawi offers the example of attending a dinner when invited; a sunna and even a praiseworthy 
act in principle, it becomes repugnant if haram activities take place.  
 Thirdly - perhaps the most important point for understanding Deobandi social 
interventions into Sufi practices - “As it is a commandment to save other Muslims from harm, if 
the elect (khawass) engages in some unnecessary action that corrupts the belief of the masses 
(`awamm) then this action will become reprehensible and prohibited for the elect as well. The 
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elect should abandon such an action.”86 The inference here is that the elite, who are supposed to 
understand the rationale behind what is prohibited and what is accepted, must be cautious 
regarding what they say and how they conduct themselves in public view. We have seen how 
both Gangohi and Thanawi advanced the importance of protecting the masses from their own 
ignorance.  
 The fourth principle introduces a temporal relativity into what is permissible: that which 
was appropriate for past generations may no longer be appropriate for contemporary ones: “It is 
possible for something that was once lawful is no longer to be regarded as such; for, at that time 
there was no reason to deem it reprehensible, but now a reason to deem it reprehensible has 
arisen. Or something that is permitted in one place may be prohibited in other.”87 In some ways, 
this is the most surprising of Thanawi’s claims; to what extent does this introduce a dangerous 
relativity into the normative maintenance of the shari`a? Could Sufis in other locales argue along 
these lines that shari`a allows, say, the death anniversary celebration of a Sufi saint even if there 
are compelling reasons to prohibit it in the subcontinent? 
 The fifth and final point concerns one of the most oft-cited justifications for a particular 
action in terms of shari`a: whether it has some ‘benefit’ to the masses. Thanawi approaches this 
logic with extreme caution. “If an action contrary to the shari`a has some benefit or public good 
(maslaha),” he argues, “but attaining this benefit or good is not necessary in terms of the shari`a, 
or there are other means of it, or these actions are done with the intention of attaining the benefit, 
or after seeing the benefit then the masses will not stop such an action - then it is not 
permissible.”88  
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So, for example, if someone attends a lecture on the Prophet’s life and teachings and, say, 
feels an urgency to donate food, money or clothing to the poor, or perhaps even becomes so 
emotionally overwhelmed that he or she stands up, there is no harm in this so long as it does not 
become a habit and one is not doing it solely for the ‘benefit’ of aiding the poor but only for the 
pleasure of God. It is not that Thanawi opposes helping the poor, to be sure, but doing so for that 
reason is objectionable, since the only motive for such a gathering should be worship. And one 
ought not appoint a time for it, nor insist that others do it; it must be a purely spontaneous thing.89 
Motives for pursuing any such action must be solely for God’s satisfaction. Thanawi rejects the 
utilitarian calculus of ‘social goods’. In subsequent polemics, we will see Deobandis reject 
arguments for the mawlud based on the principle of maslaha, especially those that claim mawlud 
increases love for the Prophet among the masses or that `urs attracts non-believers to Islam. For 
the Deobandis, there can be no ulterior motive for honoring the Prophet or the Sufi saints. 
  
Grave Danger: Commemorating Sufi Saints’ Death Anniversaries  
In the collected sayings (malfuzat) of Mahmud Hasan Gangohi - a pupil of Muhammad 
Zakariyya and one of the Deobandi scholars most instrumental for taking Deoband to southern 
Africa - someone asks him about the proper etiquette of visiting the grave of one’s parents. 
Mahmud Hasan replies: 
When one goes to the grave, he should think of the high positions they held, the 
buildings they owned and the houses they once owned. They possessed orchards 
and cars. Some of them had children; some had extensive knowledge, and today 
all of them are in their graves. They had not taken anything of the world along 
with them into the grave. The only thing that they had taken along was their 
actions. If their actions were good then they will be in a good condition, and if 
their actions were evil then they will be in a miserable condition. May Allah 
Ta`ala shower His mercies on these people. Reflect over this in order that your 
love for the world decreases.90 
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This excerpt from Mahmud Hasan’s teachings encapsulates the Deobandi approach to gravesites. 
Visiting graves is for one purpose, and only one: namely, to remind the living of the reality of 
death, to prompt reflection on the evanescence of this world and the eternity of the next. The 
early scholars of Deoband recognized the deep and subversive attraction that gravesites held for 
the Muslim masses. They were by no means the first to critique the practice of making 
pilgrimages to tombs; Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Jawzi were among the most vocal critics in the 
Islamic middle period.91 Muhammad `Abd al-Wahhab devoted a sizeable portion of his Kitab al-
Tawhid to the condemnation of visiting graves for any purpose other than to be reminded of the 
reality of death.92 Yet Deobandis’ critiques are especially powerful, and have reverberated 
beyond scholarly texts into popular polemics, and are perhaps at least partially at the root of 
contemporary violence at Sufi gravesites in the subcontinent. 
Hajji Imdadullah’s discussion of `urs is brief. The contention concerns whether the 
shari`a sanctions setting aside a specially appointed day for Muslims to come together at the 
tomb of a saint to honor him.93 Besides giving an opportunity for pleading for the mercy of the 
dead, Imdadullah explains how `urs provides a means for Sufis to meet one another and for 
Muslims to find potential Sufi teachers. He submits that this is clearly a social good (maslaha).94 
Citing a hadith, “Do not make my grave a site for an Eid,” he says some `ulama’ argue that it is 
forbidden to have fairs and festivities at the tomb and to decorate it with pomp and display. These 
`ulama’ believe that the purpose of visiting tombs is recollection of the afterlife, but the meaning 
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of this hadith, explains Imdadullah, is not that gathering at a tomb is forbidden, otherwise the 
caravans to Madina for visiting the Holy Cemetery would also be forbidden: “The truth is that 
visiting tombs, whether individually or in a group, is permissible, as well as conveying merit 
upon the dead through Qur’an recitation or [distributing] food, and it is established that this is a 
social good (maslaha).”95  
In the distant past, for Gangohi, celebrations such as `urs may have been permissible 
when Muslims’ collective morality was more secure, but today the ‘corruption of the time’ (fasad 
al-zaman) dictates a stricter demarcation of permissible and impermissible acts.96 In one fatwa 
responding to a query about the legality of `urs, Gangohi writes that many things that were once 
permissible must now be forbidden.97 
 Stories describe Gangohi’s repugnance at the `urs festival. In one such story, Gangohi 
felt powerless to stop the `urs taking place at the tomb of his own predecessor, `Abd al-Quddus 
Gangohi. When the `urs was being held in Gangoh, he would become ornery. One of Gangohi’s 
most beloved students, Muhammad Salih Jalandhai, had come to visit him in Gangoh, but 
accidentally came during the `urs. Gangohi snubbed him, and Jalandhai was nonplussed as to 
why he received such treatment. When he finally realized the `urs was the reason behind 
Gangohi’s irritability, Jalandhai said, “Master! I have no attraction to following `urs and the like. 
By God! I did not come to Gangoh for this reason and I had no idea that `urs is being celebrated 
here nowadays.” Gangohi replied, “Although your intention was not to participate in the `urs, 
there were two men on the road coming to the `urs and you were the third. According to the 
Prophet, whoever supports a gathering is among them.”98  
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Thanawi, likewise, believed that the most pernicious popular devotions are those that 
surround gravesites. On the surface, there is some utility in visiting graves in general, as visiting 
tombs reminds the visitor of his or her own mortality.99 But Thanawi knew all too well the 
emotional tug of the dead and its threat to tawhid. In Heavenly Ornaments (Bihishti Zewar), 
Thanawi lists tomb-based devotions first in his catalogue of impermissible innovations, which, he 
explicitly states, is arranged in order of their danger to public moral order: 
To hold fairs with great to-do at graves; to light lamps at graves; for women to go 
to graves; to offer shawls to cover the grave; to build a permanent monument at a 
grave; to revere graves excessively in order to please elders; to kiss or lick 
ta`ziyas or graves; to rub their dust on your face; to circumambulate them; to 
prostrate yourself or perform the canonical prayer in front of graves; to make 
offerings of candies, pudding (halwa), sweetcakes, and so forth; to keep ta`ziyas 
and flags and salute them or offer them halwa and cake.100 
 
Thanawi is firm in that one cannot attend `urs gatherings without being adversely affected by the 
moral corruption that pervades them; even if one attends with the best of intentions, it will 
introduce in them a “propensity towards sin” (mailan-i ma`siyat).101  
Thanawi lists off several other factors that, combined, shape his judgment against `urs. 
He submits that among the worst kinds of `urs are those that entail musical assemblies (sama`), 
and that these are “never, ever permissible according to the statements of the great Sufi 
masters.”102 Thanawi also rejects the common practice of traveling to a tomb for the sake of 
fulfilling some oath.103 Covering tombs with shrouds or decorating them with lights is equally 
repugnant, as is making offerings of food or other items near the shrine.104 But what of those who 
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make the argument that shrine-based offerings actually benefit the poor, who are able to partake 
of the food offered? Thanawi rejects this notion immediately as a “ruse” (hila) since, he submits, 
the real intention of those who offer such things has nothing to do with feeding the poor; their 
intention is solely to glorify the shrine and its saint. If they really want to feed the poor, why do 
so at a Sufi shrine? The same logic, as we saw previously, informed his views on mawlud. 
 Besides the presence of morally corrupting forces, the real dangers are, as with the 
mawlud, in appointing some time or place for the `urs with such regularity that it intrudes on the 
normative space of the shari`a, and in believing that the saints are able to intercede with God on 
behalf of those who visit. If the sense of intercession (tawassul) that one has in mind when 
visiting a tomb is that saints have some direct leverage over the mechanics of the universe, this is 
a polytheism no different from the idol worship that God sent down the Qur’an in order to 
abolish.105 But what if the sense of intercession is not about the saint’s power, but rather about the 
saint’s knowledge? The masses visit these tombs with the expectation that the saint will be able to 
bestow on them some insight into the future, for example, whether their children will reach a 
certain age. This, too, is deeply problematic for Thanawi. If one implies that the saint is 
essentially omniscient, then this is plainly shirk. But if one implies, by virtue of the proximity that 
the saint has to God, that somehow God conveys this knowledge to the saint, perhaps that is not 
shirk, says Thanawi, but such a view is unnecessary. In the latter case, why not just go directly to 
the source of such knowledge - in other words, to God?106  
This encapsulates the particular theology and ontology to which Deobandis ascribed; they 
actively sought to flatten the hierarchies of the medieval Sufi cosmos, so that individual Muslims 
could, at least in theory, commune directly with God without any mediators. For centuries, Sufis 
had varied roles in the spiritual lives of their pupils, but Deobandis opposed the role of what 
Arthur Buehler called the ‘mediating shaykh’. As the “sole intermediary between Prophet and 
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disciple,” the mediating shaykh stands in contrast to the ‘directing shaykh’, who guides “the daily 
lives of initiated disciples.” As Buehler explains, “While the activities of a directing-shaykh 
enable disciples to arrive near God themselves, the mediating-shaykh ‘transmits’ the disciples’ 
needs to Muhammad, who then in turn intercedes with God.”107  
Kelley Pemberton has argued that Deobandis “sought to undercut the intercessory role of 
the Sufi shaykh by making access to fundamental texts, teachings, and tenets of Islam available to 
all, and simultaneously encouraging the idea that on the basis of such knowledge each individual 
must develop the ability to make informed decisions about what constituted ‘correct’ and 
‘incorrect’ matters of faith, rather than relying solely upon the dictates of spiritual guides.”108 I 
believe she is correct for the most part, but I would qualify her claim by noting this replacement 
of the Sufi shaykh with the morally edifying text is a process that reaches its zenith only with the 
Tablighi Jama`at. Overall, with the Deobandis, the mediating role of Sufi shaykhs disappears 
entirely, while the directing role is amplified dramatically, to the extent that the Sufi master’s 
primary role becomes perfecting the ethical lives of their pupils.109 It is to this ethics, and its roots 
in the Qur’an and the Prophetic model, that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
What Sufism Is: Deobandi Sufism and the Ethics of the Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Deobandi projects of reforming the self and reforming society are interwoven at 
every level, and Deobandis mobilized the ethical vocabularies of Sufism to advance both. This 
chapter begins by briefly placing Deobandis’ emphasis on ethical reform in the context reformist 
currents in the broader Islamic world. The dominance of ‘reform’ (islah) as a term and concept is 
something relatively novel in South Asian Islamic history, particularly in discourses on Sufism; 
the absence of an entry for ‘islah’ in a major nineteenth century Indian dictionary of Islamic 
‘technical terms’ (istilahat), published just a few years prior to the founding of Deoband, suggests 
the relative novelty of Deobandis’ use of the term.1 Deobandis’ invocation of islah is linked to the 
broader currents of ‘reform’ and ‘renewal’ (islah and tajdid) that pervaded the Muslim world 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but I will stress how the connotations of ‘reform’ in 
Deobandi discourses differ distinctly from its connotations in Middle Eastern contexts. 
 In continuity with the previous chapter, this chapter examines the works of Hajji 
Imdadullah, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and Ashraf `Ali Thanawi to discern how early Deobandi 
scholars reconceived Sufism in terms of its grounding in Islam’s sacred texts, which I posit here 
is at least partly an apologetical effort to defend Sufism against increasingly vocal critics during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when these three figures were composing their 
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treatises. Imdadullah is significant not only in the contrasts and continuities between himself and 
later Deobandis, but equally in that he is scarcely concerned with ‘defending’ Sufism against its 
critics. I also show that, unlike Gangohi and Thanawi, he also sees the grave as a legitimate, and 
even beneficial, site for carrying out Sufi devotional rituals. Gangohi’s tone is more defensive, 
and he endeavors in his fatwas to explain the mutually reciprocal and overlapping nature of 
Sufism and shari`a and the importance of Sufism in the purification of the self. Thanawi, finally, 
is the most systematic in presenting Sufism in all its mutual imbrications with the shari`a and 
ethics, as well as a full-scale defense of Sufism as not only legitimate in terms of Islamic legal 
normativity but quite literally essential for each and every Muslim. 
 Finally, the last section of this chapter provides a transition between the textual plane of 
Deobandi works on Sufism to the social plane of their very public polemics against illicit 
devotional practices. Deoband’s critical and constructive projects were implicitly public from the 
beginning, with Gangohi taking advantage of new readerships in his fatwas. These scholars 
debated the roles of the `ulama’ among Muslim publics and how to implement their vision for 
reform. This debate about how to engage with Muslim publics informs subsequent Deobandi 
approaches to educating these publics and the roles of public assemblies (majalis) for shaping 
ethical lives, debates that will become supremely important for understanding South African 
Deobandis. 
 
Purifying the Self, Purifying Society: Islah and Tajdid  
Islah, typically translated as ‘reform’, is an ubiquitous term in Deobandi writings on 
Sufism. Thanawi’s The Reform of Customs (Islah-i Rusum), discussed below, is a prominent 
example, but the word occurs throughout the work of Gangohi and others. One of Thanawi’s 
collected works of reformist treatises, for example, is titled The Reformist Program (Islahi 
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Nisab).2 The scope of reform includes not just the social, as in Thanawi’s call to reform customs, 
but also the self, as in Gangohi’s call to reform the heart (islah-i qalb).3 Indeed, both senses 
capture the Deobandi reformist belief that the moral health of the individual is inseparable from 
the social health of the Muslim body politic. 
The semantic root, s-l-h, resonates with some of the most positive and cherished values in 
the Qur’an, connoting peace and reconciliation (sulh), what is right and proper (salah), and what 
is sound, virtuous or devout (salih). The Qur’an aligns islah closely with the Prophetic mission 
through history; the Prophet Shuayb, for instance, tells those to whom he was sent that he has 
come to implement islah on behalf of God. Not all who do islah are prophets; the Qur’an 
repeatedly praises the ‘muslihun’, those who work towards islah.4 Generally, ‘islah’ connotes acts 
of correction, restoration, and improvement, but I choose to translate it as ‘reform’ because of 
how it is used in Deobandi discourse, namely in the sense of ‘reforming’ customs or Sufi 
devotions that have become corrupted, decadent or immoral. 
 ‘Reform’ is a loaded term that demands clarification. Parsing precisely what ‘reform’ 
means in various contexts is difficult. As a case in point, Fillipo and Caroline Osella recently 
attempted to distinguish between several broad, activist trends of the last two centuries: ‘Islamic 
modernism’, according to their view, “refers to projects of change aiming to re-order Muslims’ 
lifeworlds and institutional structures in dialogue with those produced under Western modernity;” 
‘Islamism’ “insists upon Islam as the heart of all institutions, practice and subjectivity - a 
privileging of Islam as the frame of reference by which to negotiate every issue of life,” and 
finally, ‘reformism’ denotes “projects whose specific focus is the bringing in line of religious 
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4 John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in John L. Esposito, ed. Voices 
of Resurgent Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 33. 
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beliefs and practices with the core foundations of Islam, by avoiding and purging out innovation, 
accretion and intrusion of ‘local custom.”5  
Global movements such as Deoband blur the boundaries of this tripartite division: while 
they fit only marginally within the rubric of ‘Islamic modernism’ as defined here, and while they 
are principally a ‘reformist’ institution according to this definition, Deoband evinces even 
distinctly ‘Islamist’ impulses. The `ulama’ of Deoband and its offshoots, such as the Tablighi 
Jama`at, would eagerly assert that Islam is, at least ideally, the core of all their “institutions, 
practice and subjectivity.”6 Another problem arises when the Osellas juxtapose ‘reformism’ with 
‘traditionalism’. The juxtaposition is immediately qualified; they point out that ‘reform’ and 
‘tradition’ are not stable categories, of course; but Deoband is an institution that is simultaneously 
both reformist and traditionalist. One could say Deoband is as much a reformist movement within 
a traditionalist framework as a traditionalist movement within a reformist framework. 
A few key ideas have animated transnational Muslim discourses on islah: a belief that 
worship had to be ‘restored’ to its ‘original’ and uncorrupted form; the elimination of practices 
that did not seem to have any origination during the era of the Prophet and his immediate 
successors, such as the recitation of the Qur’an at tombs or the Prophet’s mawlud celebration; 
transcending the divide between the various schools of Muslim law; and overcoming the historic 
                                                       
5 Fillipo Osella and Caroline Osella, “Introduction: Islamic Reformism in South Asia,” Modern Asian 
Studies 42, 2/3 (2008): 247-257, at 248. 
 
6 Throughout this dissertation, I am examining how the uniquely Deobandi form of Sufism is articulated 
and transmutated in various texts and contexts. The Osellas’ article criticizes the problematic but all too 
common juxtaposing of ‘good’ Sufi Islam and ‘bad’ reformist Islam, noting how this sort of rhetoric (1) re-
inscribes the dichotomy between scripturalist and local Islams, which does not do justice to ways that both 
‘reformists’ and ‘traditionalists’ reference and engage with scripture; (2) suggests that ‘reform’ and 
‘tradition’ are stable categories, rather than rhetorical positions formed in the context of polemics and 
public debate; (3) implies the particularism of Indian practices that are not at all particular to South Asia, 
and (4) implies Sufi practices are marked by fluidity and openness while reformist practices are marked by 
closed-mindedness and lack of creativity. As the Osellas put it, “In South Asia as elsewhere much 
ethnographic work celebrates sufi-inspired forms of Islam as tolerant, plural, authentic and so on, against a 
maligned Other of reformist Islam. The latter is often regarded as a threat to what are argued to be 
culturally specific forms of South Asian popular Islam.” See Fillipo Osella and Caroline Osella, 
“Introduction: Islamic Reformism in South Asia,” 249. 
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divide between Sunnis and Shi`as.7 Though Deobandis initiated one of the most important calls 
for ‘reform’ (islah) in the previous two centuries, academic discussions of islah almost invariably 
focus on reformist movements in the Middle East; South Asian movements, and Deoband in 
particular, have received very little scholarly attention. As a concept in modern Islam, islah has 
been associated above all with the Salafi movement of the Middle East, and particularly with the 
names of Jamal al-Din Afghani, Rashid Rida, Muhammad Abduh and other nineteenth and 
twentieth century reformers associated with the Salafi movement.8 
Yet the Deobandis too, as we will see, made frequent use of this concept in their writings, 
and disagreed with the Salafis on numerous points. The fact that Salafis and Deobandis could 
press the same concept into the service of vastly different ends points to the flexibility and 
polyvalence of ‘islah’. This is no place for an exhaustive comparison, but some of the differences 
are as striking as the similarities. To take one example, Salafis abhorred commitment to a single 
legal school (taqlid) as a servile dependence on past scholars, and advocated returning directly to 
the scriptural sources to form independent legal judgments (ijtihad).9 Deobandis have regarded 
adherence to a single Islamic legal school as a fundamental part of their ideology (maslak) and 
typically regard ‘modernist’ opposition to taqlid - as in Abduh’s call to “liberate thought from the 
shackles of taqlid”10 - as anathema. To take another example, for its exponents in the modern 
                                                       
7 A. Merad, “Islah,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. The Encyclopedia of Islam entry for islah lists such 
factors as: the influence of Wahhabism, greater access to printing, reactions to encroaching Western 
culture, reactions to the liberalization of Ottoman society, and others. In the subsection for “India-
Pakistan,” Aziz Ahmad mentions none of the traditionalist `ulama’, concentrating instead on the 
subcontinent’s counterparts to the Middle East’s reformist intellectuals-namely Karamat Ali Jaunpuri, 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Iqbal and similar figures. One senses that the traditionalist `ulama’, 
whether of Deobandi or Barelwi inclinations, are simply off the radar because their version of islah does 
not conform to the standard one. 
 
8 See Mark Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh, Oxford: Oneworld, 2010 for a recent introductory study of 
Muhammad Abduh. 
 
9 For the Salafi approach to taqlid and ijtihad, see, among other studies, the introduction to Roel Meijer, ed. 
Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 4-6.  
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Middle East, islah was typically an outwardly political project. What is striking about the 
Deobandi approach to islah, on the other hand, is how overwhelmingly apolitical it strives to be, 
concentrated almost exclusively on the self rather than politics or society writ large. Of course, 
some Deobandis have become intimately involved in politics;11 what I wish to underscore here is 
that their use of ‘islah’ is almost always in the context of their works on reforming individual 
morality, works that are implicitly, if not explicitly, apolitical. 
Deobandi scholars have largely avoided invoking a term that is nearly synonymous with 
islah in especially Middle Eastern contexts: tajdid, ‘renewal’. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, the term tajdid is closely linked to an important concept in Deobandi thought, that of 
the mujaddid, the ‘renewer’ who, according to a well-known hadith, would arrive at the 
beginning of every Islamic century to renew the global community of Muslims.12 Deobandis 
widely claimed Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) as the ‘renewer’ of the second millennium, while Shah 
Wali Allah later presented himself as the mujaddid of the twelfth Islamic century. In fact, tajdid 
and ijtihad often went hand in hand; the advocate of tajdid has generally “claimed the right to 
make his own judgment based directly on an independent analysis of the Qur’an and Sunna. The 
mujaddid has not felt bound by the interpretations and ideas of the teachers and schools that 
emerged after the times of the Prophet and his companions.”13 
                                                                                                                                                                  
10 Quoted in Albert Hourani, Islamic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, 140. See also Mark Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh, Oxford: Oneworld, 2010, 117-
121. 
 
11 The prominent example, of course, being Husain Ahmad Madani. See Barbara Metcalf, Husain Ahmad 
Madani: The Jihad for Islam and India’s Freedom, Oxford: Oneworld, 2009. I am personally unaware 
whether Madani used the term ‘islah’ in his own works, but Metcalf’s study does not mention islah at all. 
 
12 The hadith in question is found in the Sunan of Abu Da’ud: “Truly, God will send to this umma at the 
turn of every century one who will renew religion” (Inna allah yab’ath li-hadhihi al-umma ‘ala ra’s kul 
mi’a sana man yujaddid laha amr diniha). Ella Landau-Tasserson, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’: A Study of the 
Mujaddid Tradition,” Studia Islamica 70 (1989): 79-117, at 79. A thorough study of premodern Arabic 
sources on the mujaddid traditions, this article does not address tajdid and the mujaddid in the Indian 
subcontinent at all, unfortunately. 
 
13 John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” 37. 
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A second reason may be that tajdid was associated, like islah, with sweeping Islamist 
political projects that the Deobandis abhorred, for example in its use by Syed Abu A’la Maududi 
(d. 1979). Maududi mobilized the language of tajdid towards his view that “the Islamic system of 
law … needs for its enforcement in all its details the coercive power and authority of the state.”14 
As Seyyed Vali Nasr has stated, “In Maududi’s formula, although individual piety featured 
prominently, in the final analysis, it was the society and the political order that guaranteed the 
piety of the individual.”15 Deobandis inverted this approach; one had to reform the individual to 
reform society, a principle that becomes especially salient in the Tablighi Jama`at. For Maududi 
and others who advocated tajdid, one reformed society first, and reformed selves would follow. 
 Deobandis saw the defense of both taqlid and Sufism against the attacks of Salafis and 
Ahl-i Hadith as part of the same broader traditionalist program. In fact, Thanawi’s nephew, Zafar 
Ahmad Uthmani (d. 1974), composed a massive, 21-volume work - I`la al-sunan - to do just that. 
While most of the volumes focus on defending Hanafi jurisprudence from the attacks of the Ahl-i 
Hadith, the final volume on Sufism demonstrates the extent to which Deobandi recast Sufism as 
ethics.16 Defining Sufism as “entirely adab,”17 Uthmani regards it as a “branch of the Sacred Law 
[fiqh]” and conceives it entirely in terms of adab and akhlaq. “Good character traits may be 
present in some cases by innate disposition and nature. More commonly, however, they must be 
acquired by accustoming oneself to performing good works, observing those of good works and 
                                                       
14 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996, 57. 
 
15 Ibid., 56-57.  
 
16 The very fact that an English translation of the final volume of I’la al-sunan was titled Sufism and Good 
Character points to this. See Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, Sufism and Good Character: prophetic guidance on 
the spiritual path, Santa Barbara: White Thread Press, 2004. For a discussion of the I’la al-sunan generally, 
see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The ‘Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 41-49. 
 
17 Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, Sufism and Good Character, 7. 
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keeping their company. They are the worthy associates and brethren in godliness, for natures 
acquire both good and bad from the company one keeps.”18 
  
Hajji Imdadullah: Sufism before Apologetics 
 Deobandis like Zafar Ahmad Uthmani were all too aware that Sufism was under attack in 
other parts of the Muslim world from Salafis and Ahl-i Hadith alike, and became among the most 
ardent defenders of Sufism’s place in Islam, at the same time that they endeavored to reform it 
from within. Today, an explosion of Deobandi literature has emerged that opposes Salafi Islam 
not just because of its rejection of taqlid, but also because of its antipathy to traditional Sufism. 
The impulse to defend traditional Sufism against these external attacks runs through nearly all of 
the Deobandi discourses on Sufism. Hence a common trope cycles throughout their works: that 
Sufism cannot be separated from, and is coterminous with, the shari`a. This view that Sufism is 
not only compatible with Islam as a whole, but is positively integral to it, is one that is repeated 
so often by Deobandis that it becomes, in a sense, apologetical in tone. 
 It is easy, at first glance, to gloss over the shari`a/Sufism equation in the writings of 
Gangohi and Thanawi, which I will examine below. However, we can appreciate the significance 
of this equation by noting its absence in the work of Hajji Imdadullah. Imdadullah did feel 
compelled to ‘defend’ Sufism in the way that his successors did. He did not theorize Sufism, or 
Sufism’s relationship to shari`a, in a way that is as explicit as it is in his successors’ work. His 
essays make little effort to ‘justify’ Sufism in terms of the Qur’an or hadith. As we will argue 
below, the effort to do so for Gangohi and Thanawi hinges at least partially on their wider, more 
directly public audiences, whom they believed it was their duty to guide and direct, such that the 
average Muslim could become, in the words of a later Deobandi, a “perfect believer” (mu’min-i 
kamil).19 
                                                       
18 Zafar Ahmad Uthmani, Sufism and Good Character, 30. 
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Written in Mecca after the abortive 1857 revolt, Imdadullah’s essay “The Brilliance of 
Hearts” (Ziya’ al-Qulub) is a manual for the performance of Sufi zikr. Defining zikr as 
“remembering God and forgetting all else, drawing the heart near to the presence of God,”20 the 
bulk of this treatise offers detailed accounts of postures and ways of regulating the breath. The 
basic technique articulated here is the regulation of the breath (pas-i anfas), defined as “drawing 
in the breath and exhaling the breath, silently or loud, while performing zikr, saying ‘ila Llah’ 
during the inhale and ‘la ilaha’ during the exhale.”21 Means of controlling the breath are linked 
closely to the anatomy of the human body, suggesting Imdadullah’s attempts to incorporate new 
‘modern’ knowledge of human physiology into these meditative techniques.22 As with later 
Deobandi writings on Sufism, eradicating negative moral traits from oneself is key to 
Imdadullah’s essay, which he describes as a manual for curing “diseases of the heart” such as 
jealousy (hasad), greed (bukhl), pride (ghurur), and spite (kinah).23 Imdadullah recognizes, 
however, that each spiritual illness demands a unique cure, hence the zikr formulas enumerated 
here can be prescribed for specific ailments. From the outset Imdadullah notes that the zikr 
techniques of the various Sufi orders have begun to merge in some ways, prompting him to draw 
on multiple lineages here and entrusting the Sufi masters to tell the difference when necessary.24  
Three aspects of this text are relevant to understanding later Deobandi understandings of 
Sufism, especially the works of Gangohi and Thanawi that I will examine subsequently in this 
                                                                                                                                                                  
19 Manzur Nu’mani, Islam kya hai, Lucknow: Kakori Offset Press, 2008, 11. 
 
20 Hajji Imdadullah Kulliyat-i Imdadiyya, 13. 
 
21 Ibid., 18-19. 
 
22 Ibid., 23. The ‘heat’ generated by retention of the breath, says Imdadullah, actually dissolves the “fat” 
(charbi) and “moisture”  (rutubat) gathered in the heart, which he compares to Satanic “whisperings”.  
Scott Kugle sees evidence here of Imdadullah’s position at the cusp of Western scientific medical 
knowledge and classic Islamic views of the body. See his chapter, “Body Revived: The Heart of Hajji 
Imdadullah,” in Sufis and Saints’ Bodies: Mysticism, Corporeality and Sacred Power in Islam, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
23 Ibid., 9-10. 
 
24 Ibid., 8. 
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chapter. First, as I have mentioned, there is a direct continuity between Imdadullah’s focus on 
purging the self of negative qualities and later works. And yet, secondly, unlike later texts by 
Gangohi and Thanawi, this essay is not at all concerned with the defensive apologetics of 
defining how Sufism relates to shari`a. Third, Imdadullah sees no potential trouble in allowing 
zikr to take place in the precincts of Sufi tombs. For instance, the latter half of this treatise focuses 
substantially on istikhara, sleeping or meditating, in a mosque or often in the precincts of a tomb, 
for the purpose of gaining knowledge and guidance in the form of the veridical dream (ru’ya). 
Reformists have typically rejected this technique even though Sufi icons such as Ruzbihan Baqli 
advocated it.25 Moreover, this practice has a long pedigree in Chishti Sufi circles; Shah 
Kalimallah Jahanabadi of Delhi (d. 1729), often credited with ‘reviving’ the Chishti silsila in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by making it more palatable to the `ulama’, was an advocate 
of certain techniques of istikhara. In his Kashkul-i Kalimi Shah Kalimallah recommended zikr at 
Sufi saints’ graves as a means for disciples to communicate with the souls of saints.26 Similarly, 
Imdadullah offers concise prescriptions for effecting a vision (kashf) through meditative practices 
and sleeping near the tombs of Sufi saints. Oral recitation of prescribed formulas is an essential 
ingredient in effecting the desired vision. One formula proposes: 
The devotee should emphatically recite via a thousand rhythmic beats (zarb): 
“Praise be to God” to his right, “O Holy God” to his left, “Lord of the Angels” 
towards the sky, and “O Soul” towards his heart, and then facing the intended 
direction, he will meet the intended soul or spirit. This meeting will take place by 
means of a thousand recitations, whether awake or while dreaming.27 
 
Another formula recommends explains how to acquire knowledge about or from a deceased Sufi 
master: 
First, say “O Lord” for twenty-one rhythmic beats, and then recite “O Spirit” 
towards the sky, “O Spirit” over the tomb and “O Spirit of the Spirit” on the 
                                                       
25 T. Fahd, “Istikhara,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., 259-60. 
 
26 Nile Green, “The Religious and Cultural Roles of Dreams and Visions in Islam,” Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 13, 3 (2003): 287-313, at 307.  
 
27 Hajji Imdadullah, Kulliyat-i Imdadiyya, 44. 
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heart. God willing, in dreaming or in wakefulness, you will gain knowledge of 
the state of the deceased. There is an additional way. First, after sitting near the 
tomb, recite the Fatiha over the deceased and then say “Bring a vision, O Light” 
towards the sky, and say “Bring a vision, O Light” towards the heart, and over 
the tomb, and then face in the direction of the heart.28 
 
Elsewhere Hajji Imdadullah prescribes “A Method for Discovering a Spiritual Link with a Living or 
Dead Saint” (ahl-i Allah): 
This method is as follows: If he is alive, then sit together with him, and if he is 
dead, sit together with his tomb. Then empty yourself of all spiritual bonds and 
then pray in the palace of the Knower of the Unknown, saying “O Omniscient 
One! O Knowing One! O Manifest One! Make me knowledgeable and tell me of 
his inner states.” And facing in the direction of his spirit, after a moment, your 
own spirit will be given over to his.29  
 
Comparing Imdadullah’s work to the teachings of a later Deobandi scholar, Hakim 
Muhammad Akhtar, underscores how differently later Deobandis approached the issue of graves, 
particularly those of deceased Sufi masters. For Hakim Akhtar, after a Sufi master’s death, one 
must find a living one. “After the demise one’s shaykh, one could meditate by his grave one 
hundred thousand times and [even then] reform (islah) will not be forthcoming,” he writes. “He is 
unable to remove himself from the well of the lower self’s desires. It is necessary to have a living 
shaykh in order to attain freedom from the lower self and achieve its reformation.”30   
Later Deobandis reject the sort of meditative practice at Sufi tombs that Imdadullah 
advocates. While Imdadullah’s work is a precursor for later Deobandis’ emphasis on Sufism as 
principally a matter of personal self-perfection and morality, what we do not find in Imdadullah’s 
work is an explicit need to defend Sufism from external attacks, to justify Sufism in terms of the 
Qur’an or sunna. This does not suggest that he does not believe that Sufism is integral to Islamic 
piety; rather, this is so obvious that it is not something that must be stated outright. With 
Gangohi, this is no longer the case. 
                                                       
28 Ibid., 45. 
 
29 Ibid., 55. 
 
30 Muhammad Hakim Akhtar, Manazil-i Suluk, Karachi: Kutub Khana-yi Mazhari, 1992, 42. 
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Rashid Ahmad Gangohi: Sufism is/as the Law 
Even in his earliest writings, Gangohi had already assimilated Sufism to ethics. As with 
Zafar Ahmad Uthmani much later, Gangohi asserted that Sufism could be reduced to ethical 
demeanor (adab). One of Gangohi’s early works states:  
The Sufi’s knowledge is that of the inner and outer aspects of the religion and of 
the power of divine certainty (yaqin). This is highest form of knowledge. The 
Sufi’s reality is in the rectification of ethics and in remaining perpetually turned 
towards God. The realities of Sufism are to be adorned with God’s ethical 
characteristics, the eradication of one’s will, and absorption in seeking the 
satisfaction of God. The Sufi’s ethics are identical to those of the Prophet 
Muhammad … The entirety of Sufism is in fact adab.31 
 
Unlike Imdadullah, Gangohi seems to initiate an apologetic strain in Deobandi works, 
equating Sufism and shari`a in response to Salafi and Wahhabi critics who were beginning to 
reject Sufism wholesale. Gangohi subscribed to the notion that knowledge of Sufism was 
completely synonymous with knowledge of proper, ‘orthodox’ belief and practice. Knowledge of 
the Sufi path (tariqa) and knowledge of normative Islamic practice (shari`a) are, for Gangohi, the 
very same thing; the former is simply an internalization of the latter: “Both [tariqa and shari`a] 
are one. Outwardly, it is a matter of performing the shari`a. When the rules of the shari`a enter 
the heart, naturally they will remain. This is tariqa. Both are derived from the rules of the Qur’an 
and hadith.”32  
One of the longest fatwas in his collection, “On the difference between Sufism and 
shari`a,” demonstrates this point well. Here, the one requesting the fatwa repeatedly inquires why 
Sufis and `ulama’ have come to represent dueling, competing cultures of Muslim piety. It begins 
with the following question: 
Are shari`a, which some call ‘knowledge of the book’ (ilm-i safina), and Sufism, 
which some call ‘knowledge of the heart’ (ilm-i sina), one and the same thing, or 
two different things? If they are one, then why not say that ‘purification’ 
(tazkiya) comes only through external knowledge (ilm-i zahiri) and, why not 
stipulate that every `alim is a Sufi and every Sufi an `alim? As for one who is a 
                                                       
31 Quoted in Muhammad Zakariyya, Tarikh-i Mashaikh-i Chisht, 292-293. (emphasis added) 
 
32 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fatawa-yi Rashidiyya, 214-217. 
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mujtahid of external knowledge [i.e. fiqh] why can't he engage in ijtihad within 
Sufism?  
 
The author wants to know, if indeed Sufism and shari`a are the same, why are there divisions of 
religious labor, so to speak, in the first place, divisions that distinguish between Sufis and 
`ulama’? Even more provocatively, he asks, why not apply the language of ranks in Islamic law 
(e.g. mujtahid) to Sufism, and vice versa, so that a Sufi like Mu`in al-Din Chishti is a ‘mujtahid’ 
of Sufism? His question for Gangohi continues: 
In fact, some `ulama’ completely deny the existence of Sufism … Within Sufism, 
there exist thousands of `ulama’ and great scholars who have a lineage within 
Sufism, yet among the throngs of `ulama’ there is no knowledge of this, and that 
includes Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim Muhaddith, who were great scholars in 
their hadith criticism. But there was no Sufi order that we can trace back to them.  
 
Gangohi’s lengthy response reasserts his basic argument that Sufism is shari`a internalized; what 
this means on a practical level is a complete unification of right knowledge and ethical action: 
Knowledge of shari`a and knowledge of Sufism are the very same thing, and 
shari`a and Sufism are also the same … To perform a duty or necessary deed 
against the will of the lower self (nafs) is called an action in line with shari`a. 
When sincerity (ikhlas) and love for the reality of God completely encompass the 
depths of the heart, that is called Sufism. So long as knowledge and practice are 
in conflict with one another, shari`a will dominate. And when the conflict 
dissipates, that is Sufism … Likewise, the master jurists were involved in Sufism. 
But they did not involve themselves in the investigation of this field of 
knowledge. The external form of the shari`a was an obligation, so they 
understood its explanation to be more important. Yet they were complete experts 
of Sufism, because Sufism is substantiated by and derived from the hadith, and 
most masters within Sufism were `ulama’, but were not busy with investigating 
shari`a. It was sufficient that they be part of a group of `ulama’ who wrote about 
the internal explanations of shari`a. Some Sufis possessed enough knowledge 
about fiqh but were also specialists and scholars of the subtleties of Sufism, and 
thus they did not involve themselves in both fields of knowledge. Similarly, some 
of the `ulama’ were major scholars of both fields of knowledge.33 
 
In his response, Gangohi does not assimilate shari`a to Sufism; he assimilates Sufism to shari`a. 
In positing a higher synthesis between the two, he implicitly privileges the normative moral order 
of shari`a, regarding Sufism as an intensification and interiorization of its ethos. True Sufism, for 
Gangohi is so intertwined with proper ethical conduct that the very possibility of attaining a 
                                                       
33 Ibid. 
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mystical state (hal) “depends entirely on the piety and morals of the individual in question.”34  
 
 Ashraf `Ali Thanawi: Sufism, the Qur’an and the Hadith 
By the time Ashraf `Ali Thanawi began his literary career in earnest, Muslim modernists, 
on the one hand, and Salafis and Wahhabis on the other, had leveled vicious accusations against 
Sufis and Sufism. No longer was there a need merely to advise and caution Muslim publics over 
the nuances of Sufi practice, though that need certainly remained; now, Thanawi and other 
Deobandis found themselves having to defend ‘Sufism’ as a whole, navigating a narrow path 
between their own ongoing critique of Sufism from within and their defense of Sufism as integral 
to the Islamic experience from without. 
Thanawi, therefore, understood that he had to demonstrate that Sufism is rooted firmly in 
the Qur’an and sunna if he hoped to counter Sufism’s most hostile critics; Salafis and Wahhabis 
vociferously denied that Sufism was anything but an accretion that had no basis in the scriptural 
sources of Islam. One way of defending Sufism was to show meticulously how the Qur’an and 
hadith are wellsprings of Sufi ethics; the corollary to this approach was to show how other 
cultural accretions associated with ‘Sufism’ were in fact antithetical to it. The first is what I am 
calling, throughout this dissertation, Deoband’s ‘constructive’ project: fashioning and advancing 
a Sufi ethics derived from the Qur’an and sunna. The second is what I am calling the ‘critical’ 
project: purging and purifying Sufism from the inside out while policing its boundaries. 
The aim of Thanawi’s Shari`a and the Sufi Path (Shari`at o Tariqat) is to demonstrate 
that Sufism is firmly grounded in Islam’s scriptural sources. Thanawi begins by defining both 
shari`a and tariqa at length before proceeding to discussion of Sufi initiation (bai`at), relations 
between a Sufi master and disciple, and spiritual exercises for Sufis. But the bulk of the treatise 
comprises elaborations on Sufi ethical traits, followed by a list of technical terms (istilahat) 
                                                       
34 Ibid., 227. 
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pertaining to Sufism.35  
 He begins by asserting like Gangohi that Sufism is no more and no less than the 
internalization of the Shari`a:  
Shari`a is the name for the collection of rules from which all inward and outward 
actions derive. In the terminology of the ancients the word ‘fiqh’ had a meaning 
synonymous with shari`a.  … Then in the terminology of the present, the part of 
Shari`a connected to outward actions became ‘fiqh’ and the part connected to 
inward actions became ‘Sufism’, and the paths for these inward actions is called 
‘tariqat’.36 
 
To disabuse the reader of the notion that this is simply self-evident, Thanawi notes with a good 
deal of irony that ‘wayward Sufis’ and ‘superficial’ `ulama’ (khushk `ulama’) actually both 
uphold the same erroneous notion: that Sufism is not to be found in the Qur’an and sunna:  
The roots of Sufism exist in the Qur’an and the hadith but people seem to 
understand Sufism as something absent from the Qur’an and hadith. Of course 
this is erroneous. Wayward Sufis and superficial `ulama’ alike believe that 
Qur’an and hadith are free of Sufism. But both these views are in error. The 
superficial `ulama’ say that Sufism is nothing but this is delusional. The wayward 
Sufis say that the Qur’an and hadith contain only external rules, that Sufism is 
knowledge of the internal, and believe - God forbid! - Qur’an and hadith are not 
necessary. In short, both groups believe that the Qur’an and hadith are devoid of 
Sufism … But that which is not in the Qur’an and hadith is not Sufism.37 
 
It is one thing to say that Sufism is ‘based on’ the Qur’an and Hadith, but Thanawi is making a 
stronger claim; if it does not exist in the Qur’an and Hadith it cannot be related to Sufism.  
A paramount concern for Thanawi, in this and other works, is the popularization of Sufi 
ethics; in his view, “every believer” (har mu’min) should adopt the teachings of Sufism into their 
lives, and all even have the opportunity of becoming ‘saints’ (awliya’). Thanawi even provides 
the felicitous phrase, ‘mass sainthood’ (wilayat-i ‘amma), to describe this idea. Only two aspects 
of Sufi ethics are necessary to enter this level of ‘sainthood’: faith (iman) and consciousness of 
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the disputed devotional practices to which Imdadullah gave so much attention. 
 
36 Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Shari`at o Tariqat, 34-35. Cf. Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Malfuzat-i Hakimulummat, Vol. 
6, Multan: Idara-yi Ta’lifat-i Ashrafiyya, 2003, 247-248. 
 
37 Ibid.  
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God (taqwa). At the “lowest” level of attaining these two traits, one has reached ‘general 
sainthood’, unattainable without “interior reform” (islah-i batin); at the “highest” level, when 
one’s faith and consciousness of God has been “perfected,” then one has attained ‘sainthood of 
the elect’ (wilayat-i khaas) and can properly be called a ‘saint’ (wali).38 
The bulk of the text is concerned with outlining the ‘stages’ (maqamat) of ethical self-
improvement, which entails both the acquisition of positive traits and the removal of negative 
ones. Internal ethical reform (islah) is the goal of pursuing these stages.39 In a comprehensive 
chart displaying the interconnections of stages on the Sufi path, Thanawi proposes a fundamental 
division between the ‘volitional’ (maqsud) and the ‘non-volitional’ (ghair maqsud) aspects of the 
Sufi journey. The ‘volitional’ aspects comprise those actions over which the Sufi has some 
control, whereas the ‘non-volitional’ are due entirely to the beneficence of God; they happen to 
the traveler along the Sufi path. The ‘non-volitional’ dimensions consist largely of ‘states’ 
(ahwal) and ‘stations’ (maqamat). 
First, the ‘volitional’ dimension is divided into (1) ‘actions’ (`amal) comprising the 
acquisition of noble virtues (akhlaq-i hamida) and the divestment of evil virtues (akhlaq-i razila), 
as well as (2) ‘benefits of association’ with other Sufis. The ‘unintentional’ dimension is divided 
into three parts: (a) the ‘means’ by which one can facilitate these involuntary states, including 
classic Sufi ascetic techniques such as sleeping, speaking, eating and associating with others as 
little as possible, as well as (b) meditative techniques, which Thanawi further divides into those 
which are potentially hazardous (tasawwur-i shaykh, ishq-i majazi, and sama`) and those which 
are not (zikr, shugl, muraqaba).  
The states are divided into those that are harmless (firasat-i sadiqa, wahdat al-wujud, 
fana’ o baqa’, ilham, ijabat-i du’a, ru’ya-i saliha, wajd) and those that can be harmful 
(mushahida, karamat, qabz o bast, tasarruf, istigharaq, kashf-i koi, kashf-i ilahi, and wahdat al-
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wujud ma`a sukr). Finally, he lists the five ‘obstacles’ to the Sufi’s progress: worship of beauty, 
haste in the Sufi path, hypocrisy, opposition to the Sunna, and opposition to one’s shaykh.40 
What should we make of this systemization of Sufi experience? Several points are worth 
observing here. First, even though the involuntary states depend solely on the grace of God, the 
Sufi will only receive these graces after disciplining the mind (through meditations) and 
disciplining the body (through physical deprivations). Second, and more germane to the argument 
I am making here, the entire edifice of Sufi experience depends on the initial feat of purging the 
self of negative qualities and adorning the self with the noble virtues. 
Thanawi’s Issues in Sufism in Light of the Hadith (Masa’il-i tasawwuf Ahadis ki Roshni 
Men) demonstrates how the hadith can cast light on issues that Sufis face in their day to day lives, 
a kind of ‘self-help’ reference manual for Sufis.41 Crucially, by the time Thanawi formulated this 
collection of issues, those that Imdadullah treated in Decision on Seven Controversies have all but 
disappeared. Here Thanawi’s treatise, written for fellow Sufis, mentions nothing of issues such as 
mawlud and `urs, and very little having to do with pilgrimage to Sufi saints’ tombs. These are 
simply not addressed, the implication being that Sufism as such has nothing to do with the 
controversies treated by Imdadullah.  
The central idea here is that Sufism is not only grounded in, but can literally be derived 
entirely from, the Qur’an and hadith. For Thanawi, all the most prized ethical traits of the perfect 
Sufi are contained in the Qur’an and the hadith: 
After correcting beliefs and reforming actions, it is an obligation of all Muslims 
to reform (islah) one’s internal states. Innumerable verses in the Holy Qur’an and 
endless narrations in the hadith clearly attest to this essential precept. Yet most 
superficial people are forgetful of this, bound by sensory desires. Who does not 
know that the Qur’an and hadith stress acquiring virtues such as asceticism 
(zuhd), contentment (qana’at), humility (tavazo’), patience (sabr), gratitude 
(shukr), love of God, acceptance of fate, trust (tawakkul), surrender to God 
(taslim), and expressly forbids qualities such as love of the world, greed (hirs), 
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41 The full title is Realities of the Sufi Path from the Elegance of the Sunna: Issues within Sufism in Light of 
the Hadith (Haqiqat al-Tariqat min al-Sunnat al-Aniqa, ma`na Masa’il-i Tasawwuf Ahadis ki Roshni Men). 
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pride (takabbur), hypocrisy (riya), lust (shahvat), anger, envy (hasad), and 
contempt? … This is the meaning reforming one’s internal actions and the 
fundamental purpose of the Sufi path (tariqa), and it is proven without the 
slightest doubt that this is a required duty [of all Muslims]. Alongside this, 
experience attests to the fact that this reform revolves around being in the 
presence of Sufi masters - who have already experienced reform - and by serving 
and obeying them, and when this presence is not easily attained, then studying 
their lives, tales and teachings will be, to a certain extent, a sufficient substitute.42 
 
As Thanawi further explains, not only is the ‘presence’ of a Sufi master - or failing that, his 
teachings43 - essential to becoming a morally complete human being, the presence of the morally 
corrupt precludes this possibility.44  
Here Thanawi derives core Sufi ethics from an analysis of three hundred and thirty 
individual hadith narrations. Each is labeled with several categories depending on the particular 
“moral” (fa’ida) that the narration offers.45 The gamut of issues Thanawi treats here ranges 
wildly, from how to shake hands when undergoing Sufi initiation, to whether some Sufis go too 
far in eating too little. To provide a sense of how the text works, the following is a sample 
passage, in which Thanawi derives a ruling against prostration towards tombs from a hadith. He 
provides, first, the Arabic hadith, then an Urdu translation, and then the moral of the hadith for 
issues in Sufism: 
Hadith # 114 
Abu Hurayra said that the Messenger of God said: God cursed the Jews and the 
Christians for taking their prophets’ tombs as places of prostration. 
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43 In fact, elsewhere Thanawi taught that mere study (mutali`) of Sufism was not sufficient to reform one’s 
character, and stated that many benefits of the Sufi path would be difficult to attain without the presence of 
an expert (mahir ki sohbat) in Sufism. See Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, Malfuzat-i Hakimulummat, Vol. 2, 285.  
 
44 Hence the need to create and maintain an ethically ‘sanitized’ space, which will become crucial when we 
discuss how madrasas seek to maintain an ethical ‘sensorium’ in later chapters. 
 
45 These categories are common words in the Sufi lexicon, but Thanawi clarifies the meaning of each for 
the purposes of his treatise, giving some of the categories nuances they would not otherwise have. 
Sometimes a single hadith applies to multiple categories. They are: ethics (akhlaq), non-volitional states 
(ahwal), practices (ashghal), instruction (ta`limat), virtues (faza’il), widely accepted beliefs and habits 
(‘adat o adab), cultural practices that may be acceptable but not necessary (rusum), issues or problems that 
require clarification (masa’il), other special explanations (tawjihat), and matters that require reform (islah), 
and miscellaneous matters (mutafarriqat). Ibid., 53-54. 
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The moral of this hadith: 
Reform - forbidding prostration at tombs. The reforming lesson of this hadith is 
that this action of prostrating towards the tombs of Sufi saints, which today is 
propagated by ignorant Sufis, is kufr and shirk if the intention is worship, and 
exceedingly close to kufr if the intention is salutations [towards the dead].46 
 
In short, here Thanawi mobilizes individual hadith narrations to execute both the ‘critical’ and 
‘constructive’ projects of Deoband. While Deobandi scholars embarked on these dual and 
intersecting projects through their texts, they also reflected on how to extend these projects into 
the public realm, the subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
Sufi Devotions, Sufi Ethics and Public Morality 
One of the great twentieth century Deobandi scholars, Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, tells a 
story about Shah Muhammad Ishaq of Delhi, grandson of Shah `Abd al-'Aziz, who is revered 
among Deobandis as an immediate predecessor to their movement. One of his students had been 
living in Ajmer, site of the largest `urs celebration in the world, that of Khwaja Mu`in al-Din 
Chishti. He learned of Muhammad Ishaq’s impending plans to undertake a long journey and 
wrote to his teacher asking him not to come to Ajmer, because he had been teaching the locals in 
Ajmer not to make pilgrimages to saints’ shrines based on a certain hadith that a special journey 
should not be undertaken anywhere except for a journey to one of three places: Mecca, Medina, 
or Jerusalem. The student worried that if his master came to Ajmer, even for reasons having 
nothing to do with the shrine of Mu`in al-Din, the locals would assume he had made a special 
pilgrimage there, and this would nullify the lessons he had preached. Muhammad Ishaq 
responded: “I will not make Ajmer my intended destination. But as Ajmer is on the way, and as 
Khwaja Sahib [Mu`in al-Din] is one of our great masters, I will not be able to pass through and 
not visit him. When I come to Ajmer, give a sermon in which you explain that I am in error in 
coming to Ajmer and that there is no need for this sort of action. Say this in front of me and don’t 
think I won’t be able to endure it. I will admit my error and you will avoid doing the harm that 
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worries you so.” Muhammad Ishaq’s response is striking in suggesting that his personal 
veneration of Mu`in al-Din should override the fact that it would still appear to the locals that he 
made a special pilgrimage to the shrine. As a compromise, he offered himself as an example by 
which to teach the locals what not to do.47 
What is odd, though, is that the next story in Mahmud Hasan’s anthology seems to 
contradict the ethos of this one. If the tale of Shah Muhammad Ishaq suggests that occasionally 
one can be exempt from certain normative restrictions, especially when borne out of genuine love 
for a fellow Sufi, Mahmud Hasan’s commentary on the next tale states that adherence to the law 
must trump love and reverence for one’s Sufi master. He tells of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi visiting 
Hajji Imdadullah in Mecca. The latter invites Gangohi to attend a mawlud, and Gangohi replies, 
“No, Master, I cannot go. In India I prevent people from going to this. If I participate, the people 
back home will say that I gladly went to a mawlud here.” Mahmud Hasan offers his own 
interpretation at the end of the story: “Now, look! Who could be more beloved and honored than 
one’s Sufi pir? Yet among the followers of the religion (din), its preservation is more essential 
[than love or honor]. When there is a contradiction between the two, preference was given to the 
religion.”48  
Juxtaposing these stories reveals how the Deobandis negotiated occasional contradictions 
between their adherence to the shari`a and their love of their own Sufi masters, as in the story of 
Gangohi and Imdadullah, and contradictions between their love of Sufi saints and their need to 
educate Muslim publics on these delicate matters, as in the story of Muhammad Ishaq and his 
student.  
The early scholars of Deoband became increasingly invested in the task of educating 
Indian Muslims on a mass scale in what they believed were the basics of orthodox belief and 
practice. As I argue elsewhere, in the twentieth century, scholars of Deoband would extend this 
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effort even further than their predecessors, publishing enormously popular, pamphlet-sized 
summaries of Islamic belief and practice. To some degree, the Tablighi Jama`at was borne of this 
very mission to extend Deobandi teachings to Muslim publics. We can discern the origins of this 
engagement with Muslim publics in the works of the earliest Deobandis. 
Naturally, Hajji Imdadullah influenced the debate within Deobandi circles over the nature 
of this engagement even as his successors disagreed somewhat with his conclusions. Imdadullah 
provides an impassioned call for keeping divisive issues beyond the purview of the Muslim 
masses. There is compelling evidence to support both sides of specific issues - like the possibility 
of God lying and of creating other prophets on the scale of Muhammad. Thus with so much 
conflicting information, debate (qil o qal) and argument (guftugu) are pointless, and in fact can be 
positively dangerous when the untutored, untrained masses engage in it. Imdadullah even 
suggests that dreams are really one of the best ways to gain insight into issues that so transcend 
the bounds of intellection. On the other hand, if one insists on discussing the possibility that God 
could lie or create other prophets, as we saw in the work of Muhammad Isma`il, he or she should 
do it in private conversation (zaban-i khalwat) and never before a public audience. But if 
someone is absolutely determined to write about these issues, Imdadullah admonishes them to do 
so in Arabic, lest the masses read it and feel the need to debate these issues amongst themselves.49 
Imdadullah believed he could assuage fissures in the Indian Muslim community by 
urging non-specialists to avoid debating the issues publicly, and by asserting that, for the most 
part, the controversies were merely semantic ones: 
These days, different opinions have arisen on issues (masa'il) within the branches 
of Islamic law. Turmoil has arisen over minutia, and among both the specialists 
and the masses, religion is being destroyed, even though most of the matters 
concern mere semantic distinctions (naza' lafzi). Because seeing the state of 
things is such a shock to Muslims generally, and especially to those linked to me, 
a desire to publish something that would temper this quibbling and fighting 
entered the heart of this humble author.50 
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He adds that his “intention is not to engage in a disputation (munazara),” the traditionally 
agonistic and confrontational form of intellectual exchange typical of interreligious debate in 
colonial India.51  
Avoiding strife is paramount in Imdadullah’s hermeneutic. The factions opposed to one 
another on the question of the mawlud, for instance, should still meet one another, exchange 
letters, greet one another and continue to respect one another, but especially avoid criticizing and 
debating each other in the presence of the common folk as it is contrary to the vocation of 
`ulama’: 
Scholars should refrain from issuing fatwas on these controversies or signing off 
on documents pertaining to them. They should show favor to one another; for 
example, if a supporter of standing in respect of the Prophet is in a gathering of 
those who oppose it, it is better for him not to stand so as not to cause any 
discord (fitna). If an opponent of standing is at an event where standing is taking 
place, it is better for him to participate. If the general public engages in any 
excessive or extreme practices, the `ulama’ should gently forbid these acts … 
The public should not read books or study treatises about such subjects, as this is 
the work of `ulama’ and doing so breeds suspicion towards the `ulama’ and 
doubts about these controversies.52  
 
He closes by noting his conclusions are valid for other controversies as well: the `ulama’ must 
avoid controversies when possible but above all foster mutual respect when controversies are 
unavoidable, and attempt to keep such controversies out of public view. Imdadullah shows a keen 
sensibility for preventing divisive issues from poisoning the Muslim public; later Deobandis, 
Gangohi included, preferred a different tack: they endeavored to arm the Muslim masses with the 
‘correct’ stance on controversial issues such as mawlud, the basis of what I will later call 
Deoband’s ‘critical project’. If Imdadullah was hesitant to involve a nascent mass-Muslim public, 
later Deobandis conjure these very same publics by virtue of calling them towards their normative 
ideals. 
Imdadullah emerges here as a kind of steward of public order, protecting the Muslim 
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masses from issues they are not equipped to understand. His approach may indeed strike us as 
patronizing and even infantilizing, but it is essential to understand the worldview that compelled 
him to take this approach, one that emerges out of a classic intellectual division of labor in 
Islamic history, in which the `ulama’ claimed an intellectual monopoly on certain domains of 
scholarship that demanded years of difficult study. Alternatively, it may seem equally 
patronizing, in Gangohi’s case, to declaim the ‘truth’ to the masses but be unwilling for 
individual Muslims to discover the same truth on their own terms. In either case, the moral state 
of the Indian Muslim public is of paramount concern. 
 
Fatwas fill the Void: Law and Muslim Publics in the Nineteenth Century 
As a mufti, Gangohi was trained to issue fatwas to individual Muslims who solicited 
them, and seemed to have viewed his fatwas as a means of educating Muslims about correct 
belief and practice. The changing shape of how fatwas were issued during the nineteenth century 
sheds light on the early Deobandis’ engagement with Muslim publics. This engagement was a 
direct reaction to British attempts to recast Islamic law as they deemed it appropriate. A quick 
overview will allow us to situate Deobandis’ work in this shifting historical context. 
The British sought to recast the institution of Islamic law in India in the image of British 
common law, relying principally on ‘canonical’ texts. In 1772 the Regulating Act of the British 
East India Company determined that in “civil” matters of law, the judicial system would adhere to 
the “law of the Koran with respect to Mahomedans.”53 However, because the Company regarded 
the traditionally fluid and context-specific nature of the judgments of Muslim legal scholars to be 
fickle and unreliable, they followed the advice of William Jones (d. 1794) in seeking to create a 
“complete Digest of Hindu and Mohammedan laws” that would render the “Pandits and 
Maulavis” superfluous.54 For their purposes, the Hedaya of Marghinani, a text on Hanafi law, 
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formed almost the sole foundation of what the British called ‘Anglo-Muhammadan law’. In 
Charles Hamilton’s introduction to his 1791 translation of the Hedaya, Hamilton posited, at once, 
the immutability of Islamic law’s textual sources and the fickle caprice of the Muslim jurists who 
interpret it: 
[I]t is impossible, in the infinite variety of human affairs, that the text of the 
KORAN, or the traditionary precepts of the Prophet, would extend to every 
particular case, or strictly suit all possible emergencies. Hence the necessity of 
Mooftees, whose particular office it is to compound the law and apply it to cases. 
The uncertainty of this science, in its judicial operation, is unhappily proverbial 
in all countries. In some, which enjoy the advantage of an established legislature, 
competent at all times to alter or amend, to make or revoke laws, as the change of 
manners may require, or incidental occurrences render necessary, this uncertainty 
arises pretty much from the unavoidable mutability in the principles of decision. 
Of the Mussulman code, on the contrary, the principles are fixed; and being 
intimately and inseparably blended with the religion of the people, must remain 
so, as long as they shall endure.55 
 
As Scott Kugle has aptly stated, “British scrutiny of Islamic law consisted of a two-fold dynamic: 
first, the British assumed that law exists in a formal code which they could administer, and 
second, if such a code did not exist, they assumed the right to alter legal practices in order to form 
one.”56 
The practice of issuing fatwas on a mass scale developed in British India to fill the gap 
that the British colonial system had created in the administration of Muslim personal law.57 By 
first decade of twentieth century, virtually every Muslim political organization had a dar al-ifta’. 
The Dar al-‘Ifta at Deoband claimed to have issued over 100,000 fatwas.58 By Gangohi’s era, the 
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mid- and late-nineteenth century, muftis began to issue legal opinions on the authority of a 
particular madrasa, and issued fatwas in substantially larger numbers than previously through 
widespread use of the incipient technology of printing in India.59 The Fatawa-yi Rashidiyya is 
one such compilation, and it is in this shifting legal environment in which we must locate 
Gangohi’s text.60 By and large his fatwas were solicited by individual Muslims, responding to 
their questions about proper belief and practice. As Metcalf writes, “Fatawa in a Muslim state 
were traditionally given by a court official, the mufti, for the guidance of the qazi or judge. Now 
in India they were given directly to believers, who welcomed them as a form of guidance in the 
changed circumstances of the day.”61 And unlike muftis of the past, Gangohi and his generation of 
muftis rarely cited works of fiqh, and often gave their fatwas without any explanation of their 
legal reasoning at all, typically providing nothing more than a relevant quotation from the Qur’an 
or hadith. One could argue that the very lack of juristic reasoning in these fatwas points to its 
broad audience, who would, presumably, have little use for it. The use of the fatwa as a tool of 
mass moral reform is also salient here, becoming “a form of the care of the self,” with its success 
in linking “selves to the broader practices, virtues, and aims” of Islamic tradition.62 
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Gangohi believed that the popularization of Sufi devotional practices distracts the masses 
from the shari`a, even as he fully acknowledges the efficacy of certain practices, including those 
that take place in the vicinity of tombs. This is a position that he shared with Imdadullah; 
however, whereas Imdadullah simply wants to caution non-specialists from discussing these 
contentious issues at all, Gangohi wants to draw boundaries and dictate rules that would keep the 
masses from even attempting these practices. This is partly due to the state of widespread 
corruption and moral decline that Gangohi diagnosed in the Indian body politic; many Sufi 
practices may have been permissible at one point, but the political and social context of British 
rule and perceived decline of Muslim vitality dictate that contemporary Muslims shun such 
practices.  
For instance, Gangohi affirmed the existence of saintly miracles (kharq-i ‘adat, karamat) 
but the masses, for Gangohi, have an innate tendency to misinterpret these events, assigning the 
agency to the saint rather than to God.63 Likewise, Gangohi denounced the gullibility of the 
masses in believing just about any miracle tale of the great Sufi saints: “Ignorant people often 
misunderstand the tales of the great ones, and even if some of them are true, they do not 
understand those and might be made to say ecstatic utterances (shathiyat) the meaning of which 
they do not know.”64  
While many Sufi ritual actions were proscribed, Gangohi did not deny their efficacy. In 
fact, he believed they must be regulated all the more diligently precisely because of their efficacy. 
Gangohi believed strongly in the mysterious powers of ‘effulgence’ (faiz) that emanate from the 
tombs of saints, but objected that the masses do not have the insight to understand the nature of 
these powers and tend to mistake the spiritual rewards of pilgrimage as something that comes 
from the saint himself rather than from God alone, a form of shirk. Thus one inquirer wishes to 
know whether ‘effulgence’ “can be acquired at the shrines of the saints, and if so, in what form?” 
                                                       
63 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fatawa-yi Rashidiyya, 105. 
 
64 Ibid., 107. 
 91 
Gangohi replies that these powers “can be experienced at the shrines of saints, but it is never 
permissible to sanction this for the masses.” One can learn about these mysterious powers 
according to one’s spiritual capabilities and intellect, but “for the masses, to explain these matters 
is only to open up the door to idolatry and polytheism.”65 
 
Hardening Religious Boundaries: Gangohi on ‘Resembling’ Religious Others 
Another means of safeguarding public piety for Gangohi entails educating Muslims to be 
aware of a perceived influence of ‘Hindu’ or ‘Christian’ elements in their devotional practices. 
Here he extends the reasoning found in Muhammad Isma`il’s work that articulates perceived 
cultural distinctions along ‘religious’ lines, so that the act of a Muslim wearing ‘Hindu’ clothing 
becomes anathema. Gangohi often reasons that such acts are shameful because of their  
‘resemblance’ (mushabbah) to Christians’ and Hindus’ practices. Explaining his position on 
‘resembling’ Christians and Hindus in a fatwa on the circumambulation of tombs, relying yet 
again on the logic that formerly permissible practices are now too risky to be acceptable because 
of their ‘resemblance’ to non-Muslim practices, he writes: 
Circumambulation of the tombs of pious ancestors or the saints is bid`a without 
the slightest doubt because its occurrence is not found in the past. But these days, 
the contestation concerns whether this bid`a is of the permissible or the forbidden 
variety … In some works of fiqh, it is considered permissible, but the correct 
juridical ruling is that it is not, since it necessitates resemblance with the idol-
worshipers, who engage in the same activity around their idols. Furthermore, 
according to the legal norm (shari’), circumambulation has been specified for the 
Ka`ba and to suggest a resemblance between the grave of a saint and the Ka`ba is 
reprehensible.66 
 
Gangohi uniformly equates lighting candles at shrines with polytheism and Hindu idolatry,67 and 
regards leaving food at tombs in most cases and setting up lights at tombs as haram.68 Gangohi 
                                                       
65 Ibid., 104.  
 
66 Ibid., 82. See a similar judgment on 69, where he also prohibits kissing tombs. 
 
67 Ibid., 142-143.  
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specifically forbids leaving food at tombs on an appointed day or a specific occasion, a line of 
reasoning similar to Muhammad Isma`il’s belief that anything done with a prescribed time 
encroaches upon the sunna: “Distributing food on an appointed day is without the slightest doubt 
an innovation, even though one may still incur divine favors, and a fixed `urs is against the sunna, 
and therefore an innovation. Distributing food only at an unappointed time is permissible."69 
 Gangohi lived through a period of increasing ‘objectification’ of Indian religiosity that 
created rigid, ossified boundaries between religious communities.70 His disdain for popular 
interpretations of Sufi practices arises in part through their alleged adulteration by Hindu and 
Christian influences. One can argue that the Deobandis internalized the modern reifications of 
‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ along sectarian lines.71 Indeed, Gangohi wrote and taught in an agonistic 
sectarian milieu, one typified by the many heated public debates between Deobandis and 
Christian missionaries, Hindu nationalists and various sectarian leaders that hardened religious 
boundaries.72 A famous debate (munazara) in 1876-77 between Gangohi’s colleague Muhammad 
Qasim Nanautawi and representatives of the Arya Samaj, a Hindu reformist movement, reveals 
                                                                                                                                                                  
68 Ibid.. 
 
69 Ibid., 166. 
 
70 The literature on this process is vast, and Western discourses on Indian religions both reflected and 
reinforced the process. See for instance Richard King’s Orientalism and Religion: postcolonial theory, 
India and the ‘mystic East’, London: Routledge, 1999, especially his fourth and fifth chapters. Harjot 
Oberoi examines the formation of Sikh identities in this period and summarizes this process in a broad 
sense: “Religion, as a systematized sociological unit claiming unbridled loyalty from its adherents and 
opposing an amorphous religious imagination, is a relatively recent development in the history of the 
Indian peoples. Once such a tidy cultural construct surfaced, probably sometime in the nineteenth century, 
it rapidly evolved, gained wide support, and became reified in history. Out of this reification it easily turned 
into something separate, distinct and concrete: what we now recognize as Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Sikhism.” See Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in 
the Sikh Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 17. Of course Islam had a certain reflexive 
identity long before this period, but locating Gangohi’s and other Deobandis’ work against the backdrop of 
this proliferation of isms is important. 
 
71 See the introduction to David Gilmartin and Bruce Lawrence, eds. Beyond Turk and Hindu: rethinking 
religious identities in Islamicate South Asia, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 
 
72 As previously mentioned, Avril A. Powell’s Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India, London: 
Curzon, 1993, examines the role of the munazara in the formation of sectarian religious identities in the 
nascent Indian public sphere prior to the explosion of print-based interreligious polemics. 
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the extent to which these identities had become objectified.73  
Gangohi discouraged Muslims even from doing business with Hindus, urged Muslims not 
to attend Arya Samaj lectures and rallies, and criticized Muslims who retained trappings of 
‘Hindu’ culture and lifestyles, whether in dress, hair styles or even in the use of brass instead of 
copper for containers.74 He was by no means the first to proclaim such stark warnings about 
Muslims interacting with non-Muslims; one story tells of Sayyid Ahmad reprehending 
Muhammad Isma`il for attending a Hindu fair (mela).75 But in Gangohi, these warnings become 
charged with a sense of urgency that Indian Muslim scholars had to make a concerted effort to 
purify Islamic practice on a mass, public scale. 
This aversion to all things Hindu included Christians and Jews as well. One of Gangohi’s 
fatwas rejects the practice of kissing tombs, ostensibly not because kissing tombs is forbidden 
from an Islamic legal standpoint, but because “Kissing tombs is the practice of the Jews and 
Christians, and is thus haram.”76 One fatwa not only prohibited Muslim parents from sending 
students to English schools where they may sing patriotic British songs or Christian hymns, but 
declared that singing such songs and hymns is an act of kufr.77 A similar fatwa banned the 
wearing of ‘Hindu’ and English clothing.78  
A final, and immensely important, point about Gangohi’s relation to Muslim publics must 
be mentioned. Imdadullah wrote mostly for an elite audience of fellow Sufis such as the circle of 
those he had personally initiated. In contrast, as we have seen, Gangohi’s fatwas reached a wide 
readership concerned with issues relevant to the belief and practice of the Muslim public, for 
                                                       
73 See Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Mubahisah-yi Shahjahanpur, Karachi: Dar al-Sha`at, 1977. 
 
74 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, 153. 
 
75 Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, Hudud-i Ikhtilaf, 118. 
 
76 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fatawa-yi Rashidiyya, 69. 
 
77 Ibid., 54-55. 
 
78 Ibid., 70. 
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whom he regarded idolatry and unbelief as perennial temptations. In other words, if Imdadullah’s 
literary persona is an intimately private one, Gangohi’s is eminently public. This contrast is 
brought into clear relief by comparing his fatwas to Gangohi’s treatise Imdad al-Suluk. Written in 
Persian for a comparatively small group of fellow Sufis, long after Persian had ceased to be the 
lingua franca of educated Muslims, this treatise contains almost no discussion of the tomb-based 
practices that occupy such a prominent place in the fatwas, nor any formulas of the kind we see in 
The Brilliance of Hearts. Rather, Imdad al-Suluk explains stages in the Sufi path, enumerates 
conventional zikr techniques, and offers advice on the pir-murid relationship and characteristics 
of the ideal shaykh. Quoting widely from early Sufi masters Abu-l Qasim al-Junayd (d. 910) and 
Sahl al-Tustari (d. 896), he predictably identifies shari`a as the first stage (maqam) in the Sufi 
path, and the goal of the Sufi path as the complete “reformation of the heart” (qalb ki islah) 
through a regimen of disciplinary techniques.79 These conditions of the Sufi journey include 
being in a state of ritual purity, refraining from food beyond what is necessary to live, refraining 
from excessive talk, seclusion (khalwat), mastery of zikr, and commitment to a Sufi master.80 
What is remarkably absent from this treatise, compared to the fatwas, is any lengthy treatment of 
legal matters pertaining to, or dangers inherent in, popular shrine-based Sufism. The only hint at 
such issues here is advice to shun “ignorant Sufis” who purport to know more than they really do 
and repeated warnings that Satan is always waiting to dupe and deceive those on the Sufi path.81 
But the very absence of discussion of popular Sufi practices signals Gangohi’s notion of what 
Sufism is: a striving to purify the self in the journey towards God (sair ila Llah).82 Composed in 
                                                       
79 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Imdad al-Suluk, 99. It makes sense that Gangohi would take Junayd as his 
principle source of inspiration in this treatise. Among early Sufis, Junayd emphasized purification of the 
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80 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Imdad al-Suluk, 78-140. 
 
81 Ibid., 57-58. 
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Persian and translated into Urdu only at a much later date, Imdad al-Suluk was, by default, 
written for a far smaller audience of like-minded Sufis who, unlike the masses, had the 
knowledge to proceed cautiously and prudently along the Sufi path. 
To say that Deobandis conveyed one message to the masses and another to the 'elite' is 
not to accuse them of hypocrisy; rather, they knew that they had to convey a simpler and stricter 
message publicly, without disclosing the complex reasoning behind the decisions, whereas the 
'elite' Sufis among them in theory already knew the rules, as it were. In subsequent chapters, in 
fact, we see how this dual approach to audiences reverberates in South African Deobandi 
writings, where the most contentious aspects of the Deobandi critique of Sufism become the 
movement's public face. Virtually all of the most vocally critical Deobandi literature in South 
Africa stems from one of two (closely linked) publishing sources: the Majlisul Ulama of Port 
Elizabeth and the Young Men’s Muslim Association in greater Johannesburg. Crucially, the bulk 
of their publications are anti-‘grave worshipping’ screeds aimed for a mass readership, and for 
this reason The Majlis journal and its primary author, Ahmed Sadiq Desai, are widely derided 
among the Cape’s Muslims. In other words, Deobandis’ critical project is an eminently, and 
perhaps inherently, public one. Conversely, South African Deobandis’ work on Sufi ethics, 
perhaps like Gangohi before them, tends to have a narrower audience in mind. The Deobandi 
constructive project would seem to have a more circumscribed readership (or listenership, for that 
matter, given new ways that Deobandi scholars have used new forms of media to project their 
message, as we will see). 
 
Ashraf `Ali Thanawi: Muslim Publics and Mass Sufism 
Thanawi also believed that he had a role in shaping Muslim publics in the South Asia of 
his day, that mass education in the ‘essentials’ of Muslim faith and practice was not only a right 
but a duty for all Muslims, regardless of their level of education or literacy. To this end, Thanawi 
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sought to abbreviate the traditional madrasa curriculum to make it more accessible to a mass-
Muslim audience: 
If one has a desire (shawq) for Arabic but has little time, one can read only the 
necessary books. After a curriculum has been abbreviated according to this 
necessity, what once entailed ten years will only take two and a half. Don’t be 
alarmed at this novelty and don’t say earlier `ulama’ were wasting their time 
since what now takes two and a half years used to take ten. For my intention is 
not that the very same instruction that was ten years now will be two and a half, 
but we can conclude that a man, after such instruction, will become firm in his 
religion (din) and can become a scholar (maulvi) of moderate skill. Of course his 
knowledge will not be vast, but if he so desires, he will have the ability to expand 
it.83 
 
To confront a rapidly advancing Western modernity, traditional Islamic learning had become a 
“binding duty” (fard `ayn) upon all Muslims individually.  
In Heavenly Ornaments (Bihishti Zewar), Thanawi links the moral health of the 
individual with the moral health of the Muslim body politic in explicit terms. One of the most 
widely printed books in South Asia, Heavenly Ornaments is a primer for women to learn basics 
of the faith as well as traditional adab, etiquette and comportment. This treatise neatly combines 
Thanawi’s critical and constructive projects, while packaging both in the language of a lay 
audience. Here Thanawi brought his critique of ‘culture’ to the widest possible audience available 
at the time. One can see the logic by which he links individual and polity in the following: 
Thanks to divinely granted insight, experience, logic, and learning, I realized that 
the cause of this ruination is nothing other than women’s ignorance of the 
religious sciences. This lack corrupts their beliefs, their deeds, their dealings with 
other people, their character, and the whole manner of their social life … Beyond 
that, their words, their thoughts, and their style of behavior take root in the hearts 
of the children whom they nurture in their very laps. So the children’s religion is 
ruined, and their daily life grows vapid and tasteless. The reason is that faulty 
belief leads to faulty character, faulty character to faulty action, and faulty action 
to faulty dealings that are the root of the disquietude of society.84 
 
At the same time that he critiques participation in the mawlud and tomb-based devotions, he also 
advocates widespread initiation into Sufism and adoption of Sufi ethics in everyday life. In a 
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section on “the relation of master and disciple,” he lists the ethical traits which all Sufis must seek 
to attain - tauba, khauf, sabr, bharosa, mahabbat, raza, sidq, muraqaba, and so on - and, 
crucially, asserts that this is “the way in which every disciple - indeed, every Muslim - should 
live.”85 
Thus, in the Deobandis’ critique of Sufism, there was a clear disparity between a 
somewhat flexible, conciliatory stance on controversial Sufi devotions when writing amongst 
themselves, and a far stricter stance on the same devotions when writing for a popular audience. 
The Deobandis envisioned their roles as guardians of public morality and as beacons in the quest 
to educate the Indian Muslim masses on the rudiments of the faith. There is, in short, a kind of 
‘elitist’ tolerance of participating in these devotions when the participant is educated in the 
nuances of Muslim belief and fully circumspect about the inherent dangers in certain practices. 
Gangohi, Thanawi and other scholars of the Deobandi tradition positioned Sufism at the 
nexus of legal and ethical discourses, and it is this Sufism that they project in their public 
writings. At the same time, we must exercise diligence to avoid projecting our own notions of 
what these categories - ‘law’, ‘ethics’ and ‘mysticism’ - mean onto Deobandis’ own works. This 
chapter has shown how these categories are so mutually imbricated within Deobandi discourses 
as to be indistinguishable. Sherali Tareen has insightfully expressed the need to avoid ascribing 
“contemporary categories such as ‘law’ and ‘mysticism’ onto historical subjects who did not live 
out their lives under the confines of such neat binaries.”86  
Finally, as their critique relegates Sufi devotions to the impure domain of ‘culture’ it 
leaves behind what Deobandis viewed as the kernel or essence of Sufism: ethical self-fashioning. 
The Deobandi self is an ethical work in progress, consummating in complete self-mastery, 
perfection of character and the adoption of virtuous character traits (akhlaq-i hamida) - God-
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consciousness (taqwa), gratitude (shukr), patience (sabr), love (muhabbat), asceticism (zuhd), 
fear of God (khushu’) and others, as enumerated in Thanawi’s Shari`at o Tariqat - that Sufis have 
expounded for centuries. This, for the Deobandis, is the ultimate aim of Sufism; accordingly, this 
view explicitly shuns those worldly devotions, which, alongside the pursuit of akhlaq, equally 
laid claim to being an essential part of Sufism for centuries before they became major points of 
contention. By consigning public devotions to the domain of ‘culture’, the Deobandis produced 
an interior, private Sufi discourse. Yet it is a private discourse that became eminently public in 
Deobandis’ teachings, writings and public sermons. 
 
 
.
  
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
How a Tradition Travels: Deobandi Scholars, Texts, and Institutions in South Africa 
 
 
 
 
That Islam is a global religion is obvious; what is less obvious is precisely how. This 
chapter inquires into Deoband as one particular manifestation of Islam’s global reach, attending 
to its arrival in South Africa and to how scholars from the subcontinent and their students 
established Deoband as a presence - ideologically and institutionally - in South Africa. It attends 
closely to ways that South Africa became, more than any other region outside of the Indian 
subcontinent, essential to the Deobandi experience ‘abroad’. The dual projects of Deoband - 
reforming Sufi devotions and reforming the self - take root in South Africa textually through 
Deobandis’ writings and institutionally through the development of the Tablighi Jama`at and the 
founding of madrasas. 
 This chapter begins with a brief overview of Islam in South Africa in order to set a scene 
for the gradual emergence of Deoband, beginning with Deobandi `ulama’ councils in the 1920’s, 
the beginnings of the Tablighi Jama`at in 1960, and culminating with the first Deobandi madrasa 
in 1973. It then sets forth how two Deobandis - Masihullah Khan and Mahmud Hasan Gangohi - 
were the teachers and Sufi masters to generations of South African Deobandi scholars and were 
instrumental in establishing a Deobandi presence in South Africa. Through their repeated visits to 
South Africa and their Sufi initiations of scores of South Africans, many of whom went on to 
establish or teach in Deobandi madrasas there, Masihullah Khan and Mahmud Hasan Gangohi 
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are responsible for forming the closest links between Deoband in the Indian subcontinent and 
southern Africa. Mahmud Hasan is particularly instrumental in forming and maintaining a South 
African Tablighi presence, while Masihullah Khan took with him, above all else, Thanawi’s Sufi 
ethics and reformist project. It was also through these two that Deobandi scholars of South Africa 
understood themselves as continuing a Sufi chain that reaches back to Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and beyond. By detailing these links, the chapter advances one of this 
dissertation’s central arguments: that the global Deobandi ‘network’ is configured primarily 
through Sufi initiations between master and disciple. These scholars and their students advanced 
Deoband’s Sufi ethics through their writings, to which I attend in detail, and through their 
advancement of tabligh.  
And as I will further explain, the Tablighi Jama`at forged an ideological presence in 
South Africa with the first Tablighi gatherings taking place in 1960, long before the first 
Deobandi madrasas were established in the 1970’s. I will discuss how individual graduates of the 
Dar al-`Ulum Deoband intersected with the founding of the Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa on 
multiple levels, as well as discern how in this period, public debates about the Deobandi critique 
of Sufism had not yet emerged, and would in fact not emerge until the 1970’s, which saw a 
fateful combination of four factors: the institutionalization of Deoband in the form of madrasas, 
the increasing influence of the Tablighi Jama`at, the rise of Barelwi organizations and madrasas, 
and perhaps most crucially, a restive Muslim public that interrogated ‘Deoband’ itself for its 
allegedly retrogressive politics and arcane theological cavils. 
The chapter ends with an overview of the major Deobandi madrasas in South Africa to 
illustrate different dimensions of the institutionalization of Deoband. Almost all of these 
madrasas’ founders were students of either Masihullah Khan or Mahmud Hasan Gangohi. As I 
will show, these madrasas illustrate key features of the local Deobandi network, ranging from the 
intersections of madrasas and tabligh to the role of the internet for extending Deobandis’ mission 
to educate Muslims into new spheres.  
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Islam(s) in South Africa and the Arrival of Deobandi Scholars 
 The three-and-a-half century old story of Islam in South Africa has been told and retold 
by a growing number of scholars, so I will offer only the barest overview here and concentrate on 
the features of this history that are most relevant to the formation of South African Deoband.1 
Previous studies have established two trends in early Islamic history in South Africa that are 
particularly relevant to my discussion here. First, Sufism was an ever-present feature of Cape 
Islam from the beginning, and several early leaders of the Muslim community were also 
prominent Sufi shaykhs whose tombs (kramats) are still visited on pilgrimage by Muslims today. 
Second, though slaves of Indian origin were among the many Muslims who arrived in the Cape as 
prisoners, Indians did not begin to migrate to South Africa en masse until the mid-nineteenth 
century, when they brought to its shores Sufi traditions different from the older ones anchored in 
the Cape.  
In 1652 the Dutch colonial administrator Jan van Riebeeck established Cape Town as a 
waystation for Dutch ships traveling between the Netherlands and Dutch trading posts in the East 
Indies. Situated along a natural harbor at the tip of southern Africa, Cape Town was settled 
immediately by Dutch farmers and merchants who relied on slave labor. From the outset, the 
Dutch imported slaves from other parts of its empire to work in the Cape, many of whom were 
Muslim.2 They came from all parts of the empire, but at least 36 percent of the slaves arriving in 
the Cape between 1652 came from India, until 1808 when the British formally abolished the slave 
                                                       
1 Early landmark studies of Islam in South Africa included, for example, Achmat Davids, The Mosques of 
the Bo-Kaap: A Social History of Islam at the Cape, Cape Town: South African Institute of Arabic and 
Islamic Research, 1980 and Suleman Dangor’s A Critical Biography of Shaykh Yusuf, Durban: Centre for 
Research in Islamic Studies, 1983. Also see Ebrahim Moosa, “Islam in South Africa,” in Martin Prozesky 
and John de Gruchy, eds. Living Faiths in South Africa, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995; Abdulkader 
Tayob, “Race, Ideology and Islam in Contemporary South Africa,” in R. Michael Feener, ed. Islam in 
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Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, eds. The History of Islam in Africa, Athens, Georgia: Ohio 
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2 See Kerry Ward, Networks of Empire: forced migration in the Dutch East India Company, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, especially 127-178.  
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trade in its colonies.3 The Dutch had no tolerance whatsoever for practicing Islam openly in its 
colonies; a decade earlier, in 1642, the Governor General in Batavia, Anthony van Diemen, had 
issued the Statuten van India rendering the public practice of Islam a capital offense.4 
The Dutch imported Muslim slave-soldiers, known as Mardyckers, from the Molucca 
islands beginning in 1658, to protect the colony from the indigenous Khoi-San, but the arrival of 
Shaykh Yusuf aboard the Dutch ship De Voetboeg in 1694 marks the emergence of the first 
major figure in Cape Muslim history, though even in the era of Shaykh Yusuf there was no 
substantial Muslim community in the Cape. Exiled by the Dutch for fomenting unrest and 
fighting against the Dutch in Indonesia, Shaykh Yusuf was forcibly settled at Zandvliet outside of 
Cape Town where he wrote treatises on Sufism in Malay, Bughanese and Arabic.5  
It was another political prisoner, Imam Abdullah ibn Kadi - popularly known as Tuan 
Guru - who worked to institutionalize Islam in the Cape. Imprisoned until 1793 on Robben 
Island, the island off the coast of Cape Town where the apartheid regime would later send its 
most prominent political prisoners, Tuan Guru established the first madrasa in Cape Town the 
year of his release. Tuan Guru also wrote a treatise on Ash`ari theology and wrote a copy of the 
Qur’an by hand while imprisoned, which he later used to teach students at the madrasa on Dorp 
Street. After the British took over control of the colony and liberalized some restrictions on 
                                                       
3 Yusuf Da Costa and Achmat Davids, Pages from Cape Muslim History, Cape Town: Naqshbandi-
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5 Suleman Dangor, Critical Biography of Shaykh Yusuf and Yusuf Da Costa and Achmat Davids, Pages 
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Muslims, a free black slave established the first mosque in South Africa in 1795, known as Auwal 
Masjid, still in use today. Tuan Guru served as the first imam.6  
In 1795 the British took Cape Town as part of a larger campaign to secure global trade 
routes during their war with Revolutionary France. The Dutch reclaimed Cape Town in 1803 and 
granted religious freedoms to Cape Muslims the following year when the Statuten van Indien was 
overturned. The British once again seized the Cape in 1806 and ceased the import of slaves in the 
following year, effectively ending the import of Muslim slaves.7 With their new freedom to 
practice Islam openly (albeit with some restrictions), one of the first acts of the Muslim 
community was to build a cemetery, the Tana Baru in the present-day Bo Kaap neighborhood, 
along with a number of small madrasas.8  
The period from 1770 to 1840 saw a sharp growth in the Muslim population of the Cape, 
and by 1840, Muslims were one-third of the Cape population of roughly 20,000.9 There is 
inconclusive but suggestive evidence that the Sufi rites practiced at this time offered a sense of 
communitas for freed slaves, who were generally barred from Christian congregations, thereby 
swelling the ranks of the Cape’s Muslims.10 The Afrikaans language was also forged within the 
Muslim community during this period, as they transitioned from speaking Malay to speaking the 
Dutch of their overlords; some of the first extant written forms of Afrikaans are in Arabic script, 
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known as Arabic-Afrikaans.11 At this point there was still nothing resembling a unified body to 
represent Cape Muslims, even as powerful imams emerged to lead individual mosques.12  
The Cape Muslims - or Cape ‘Malays’ as some would later call them13 - developed along 
a trajectory that would eventually intersect in numerous ways with another trajectory, that of the 
Muslim Indians who began to arrive on the shores of Natal, then a British colony on the East 
coast. In the nineteenth century, the British sent millions of Indians to work in far-flung parts of 
its empire, which became the engine of the modern South Asian diaspora. Indians first arrived in 
Natal as indentured servants in 1860, and the first ‘passenger’ Indians began to arrive shortly 
thereafter, so called because they paid for their own passage to Africa as opposed to indentured 
Indians whose passage was paid by their employers in exchange for a fixed (and often brutal) 
labor contract. Beginning in the 1880’s, both indentured and passenger Indians began to fan out 
across southern Africa, entering the Boer-controlled Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (later the 
Transvaal) and the British-controlled Cape. Between 1860 and 1911, when importation of Indian 
labor ceased, over 150,000 Indians entered southern Africa.14  
Significantly, among those on the first ship to arrive was the Sufi Hazrat Badshah Peer, 
whose biography is shrouded in myth but who is nevertheless regarded as the founding saint of 
Indian Sufi traditions in South Africa. Another Sufi, Hazrat Shah Goolam Muhammad, known as 
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Soofie Saheb, is credited with establishing Badshah Peer’s legend.15 Habib Ali Shah of 
Hyderabad sent the young Soofie Saheb, his initiate in the Chishti Sufi order, to Durban to 
propagate Islam in Africa. Upon arrival in 1895, according to narrations of Soofie Saheb’s 
students, he intuitively knew that a great ‘holy man’ had recently died and sought out his grave. 
After finding the site along the banks of the Umgeni river in Durban, he established a shrine, 
mosque, and Sufi retreat (khanqah) that remains today.16 
Of the passenger Indians, almost 80 percent were Muslim.17 Many hailed from Gujarat 
and were roughly divided into two ‘ethnic’ groups, Memons from Kathiawar and Bohras from 
Surat. Accordingly, wealthy Gujarati Muslims founded mosques along largely ethnic lines in the 
1880’s. In 1881 a Memon merchant financed Durban’s Grey Street Masjid, still today the largest 
mosque in the Southern hemisphere. Surti traders financed the West Street Masjid in 1885.18 The 
trustees that managed the mosques were also defined in terms of ethnicity; Memons exclusively 
oversaw the Grey Street Masjid until 1905, after which the board comprised five Memons, two 
Surtis, one Kokan and one “colonial born,” the latter referring to a descendant of indentured 
servants. These mosque committees wielded enormous influence in establishing new mosques 
and defining their ideological slant. In the Transvaal they were typically elected, and in Natal 
often appointed for life, allowing the patronage of wealthy Muslims to shape religious 
infrastructure.19 
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These ‘ethnic’ divisions also constituted divisions over normative Islamic piety. The 
Memons were more inclined towards popular Sufi devotions, tracing their origins to a descendant 
of `Abd al-Qadir Jilani and maintaining close links to the annual `urs of Mu`in al-din Chishti at 
Ajmer, India.20 They began observing `urs and mawlud almost immediately upon arrival; in 
March 1877, they petitioned the government for exemption during the “period of the Moulood 
Sharif” from the evening curfew that applied to all Indians.21 The Surtis, on the other hand, were 
“giving up their former spiritual guides and transferring their reverence to the new preachers who 
have become the leaders in religious matters,” preachers described as “Wahhabi,” in the words of 
a contemporary observer.22 These divisions, while far from seamless, presaged the ethnic 
contours of Deobandi/Barelwi polemics in later decades, and more specifically, the efforts of 
‘Deobandi’ and ‘Barelwi’ mosque committees to exclude the other from prayers at their 
respective mosques, a topic to which I return in the fifth chapter. 
 Indian Muslims spread into the interior, especially after the discovery of gold in the hills 
of the Witwaterstrand in 1886, prompting a massive influx of labor into what would become 
Johannesburg. Indians in Natal and the Transvaal (roughly corresponding to the current province 
of Gauteng) faced severe restrictions on their religious practice. The Boer-governed Orange Free 
State, centered at Bloemfontein, completely prohibited any Indians from living in its borders, 
while the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek, centered at Pretoria, forbade non-whites from owning land 
except in rare circumstances.23 Mohandas Gandhi established the Natal Indian Congress in 1894 
to petition the government on behalf of Indians, and later developed his philosophy of satyagraha 
at Phoenix, near Durban, in 1906, in an attempt to redress some of these wrongs through civil 
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21 Ibid., 317. 
 
22 Quoted in ibid., 317. 
 
23 Abdulkader Tayob, “Race, Ideology and Islam in Contemporary South Africa,” 258-259.  
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disobedience.24 The ‘Indian Question’ became even more vexing after the 1910 formation of the 
Union of South Africa, based on a political compromise between Boers and the British. Almost 
immediately the leadership imposed a detailed racial hierarchy upon all aspects of economy, 
society and political life in South Africa. Most whites favored repatriation for so-called 
‘Asiatics’; D. F. Malan’s Asiatic Bill of 1925 declared Indian properties and businesses 
‘unsanitary’ and advocated Indians’ return to India.25  
 Despite these restrictions, Indian Muslims continued to seek ways to build new mosques. 
Some migrated to Cape Town, where they enjoyed relatively more freedom; the first Quawatul 
Islam Mosque was the first Indian mosque in Cape Town, built in 1892.26 A second wave of 
Indians to came to the Cape directly from Bombay, mostly Kokani speakers who tended to share 
the Shafi`i legal school with the majority of the Cape’s Muslims. Even after Indian immigration 
in Natal and Transvaal ceased in 1911, the Cape continued to allow Indians to immigrate.27 It is 
during the interwar period, and especially in the 1920’s, when we first began to discern the 
beginnings of a Deobandi presence in South Africa. 
  
Early Deobandi History in South Africa: Jamiatul `Ulama’ Transvaal, Waterval 
Islamic Institute, and the Advent of South African Tabligh 
Deoband has been a global phenomenon nearly since its inception. Whether through high 
profile figures such as Hajji Imdadullah teaching scores of Deobandis in the Hijaz or through 
graduates of Deobandi madrasas fanning out over the British empire, Deobandis moved, like 
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25 Rehana Ebr-Vally, Kala Pani: Caste and Colour in South Africa, Colorado Springs: International 
Academic Publishers, 2001, 83. 
 
26 Abdulkader Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 57. Tayob does not indicate whether this mosque 
was Surti or Memon in its makeup, or neither or a combination thereof. I have been unable to find this 
information elsewhere. 
 
27 Ibid., 57-58.  
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millions of other Indians, through the global networks established by the British empire. India 
became a “nodal point from which peoples, ideas, goods, and institutions - everything that 
enables an empire to exist - radiated outward.”28 While there were centuries-old networks that 
linked coastal cities that surrounded the Indian Ocean, creating what some have called an Indian 
Ocean sphere, the advent of the steamship and the regularization of British shipping lines in the 
mid-nineteenth century facilitated new movement of vast numbers of people between India and 
Africa.29 
The first institution founded by a Deobandi in South Africa was the Jamiatul Ulama 
Transvaal. In 1922 a group of `ulama’ formed the Jamiatul to provide Islamic guidance on 
religious and Islamic legal matters to local Muslims in the Transvaal. In its creation, Tayob posits 
an effort by Transvaal `ulama’ to assert their authority against increasingly powerful mosque 
committees.30 However, in its first incarnation the committee was ineffectual for the most part. 
Some years later in 1935, a young graduate of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, Mufti Ebrahim Sanjalvi (d. 
1983) revived it. Sanjalvi arrived in Durban from Bombay in 1932 and migrated to Johannesburg 
in 1934. Sanjalvi announced in the Gujarati-language Indian Views that his organization would 
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field questions from Muslims on matters of Islamic belief, ritual and law. In 1935 he also began 
teaching Arabic and, the following year, appointed a Persian instructor.31 
The Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal was primarily an advisory body of `ulama’ who worked to 
standardize local madrasa curricula and provide consultations on issues such as zakat, prayer, 
fasting, and so on. It did not engage in Deobandi polemics nor identify self-consciously as a 
‘Deobandi’ organization. It identified its mission as to “promote, develop and maintain religious, 
cultural, educational, social, economic, charitable services, and general upliftment of people at 
large” as well as to “establish, protect and maintain madaris, masajid, Jama`at khanas, awqaf and 
other Islamic institutions of the Muslim community” and “render Islamic guidance and services 
in prison, hospitals and other institutions.”32 
 The Jamiatul Ulama was closely linked to the Waterval Islamic Institute at Mia’s Farm 
outside of Johannesburg; the latter was founded in 1940 by Maulana Muhammad bin Musa bin 
Isma`il Mia. To this day, it has served as a major source of English translations of Deobandi texts, 
especially the Tablighi literatures of Muhammad Zakariyya,33 and has also facilitated the 
construction of mosques and madrasas for younger students in the former-Transvaal region (now 
roughly corresponding to the province of Gauteng).34 The Jamiatul Ulama eventually integrated 
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the ‘Tablighi Nisab’ (the Tablighi Curriculum) into its basic curriculum for these local 
madrasas.35  
Maulana Muhammad Mia’s father, Musa ibn Isma`il, migrated from Simlak, Gujarat to 
South Africa for business, and sent Maulana Muhammad Mia to Dar al-`Ulum Deoband for 
study. At Deoband, Muhammad Mia studied with Anwar Shah Kashmiri, leaving the Waterval 
Islamic Institute in the care of Maulana Muhammad Ibrahim Sahib and his brother, Maulana 
Mufti Ahmad Mia.36 He would later convince Anwar Shah Kashmiri to relocate to Jamia’ 
Islamiyya at his ancestral home of Dabhel. Maulana Ibrahim Sahib departed for Deoband some 
years later in 1960, taking Sufi initiation with Muhammad Zakariyya, and subsequently his 
brother Maulana Ahmad Mia also left for Deoband in 1965, studying with Mahmud Hasan 
Gangohi and becoming a khalifa of Muhammad Zakariyya.37 
Even though the founders and `ulama’ associated with the Waterval Islamic Institute 
studied at Deoband, it is difficult to say exactly to what extent this was a ‘Deobandi’ institution. It 
was, for one, not a Dar al-`Ulum, meaning they were not preparing students to become `ulama’; 
they taught, for example, the Mishkat collection of hadith but did not teach the six canonical 
collections, mastery of which is the culmination of a Deobandi education. In another sense, the 
public seems not to have associated the institute directly with Deoband. A May 1963 obituary of 
Maulana Muhammad Mia, Waterval’s founder, does not mention his time at Deoband at all.38 
 The Mia family maintained close links to the man who would eventually establish the 
first Dar al-`Ulum in South Africa, Qasim Sema. Moulana Qasim Sema was born in South Africa 
in 1920. Maulana Muhammad Mia of the Waterval Islamic Institute encouraged him at a young 
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age to pursue advanced Islamic studies in India. He arrived in Dabhel to study at Jami`a 
Islamiyya39 with Yusuf Binnori. Moulana Mia secured Qasim Sema employment at Majlis Ilmi at 
Simlak, near Dabhel, which Moulana Mia founded.40 Interestingly, after one trip to Deoband, 
Sema traveled to the Nizamuddin district of Delhi, the historic center (markaz) of the Tablighi 
Jama`at, so that he could seek a Sufi initiation with Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the Tabligh 
Jama`at. However, Ilyas refused, saying that he preferred for `ulama’ to spend seven chillas 
(forty days) doing tabligh because, as he put it, Sufi initiation was concerned only with oneself, 
while inviting others to Islam helped the Islamic community as a whole.41 This, in a few words, 
encapsulates the tablighi approach to Sufism.  
Sema finally returned to South Africa in 1944, where he became a founding member in 
1955 of the Jamiatul Ulama Natal, designed to provide for Muslims in Durban services similar to 
those of the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal.42 More importantly, he also became a tireless advocate for 
the Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa, and especially noteworthy for wanting to extend da`wah to 
the black African populations of southern Africa, significant insofar as proselytizing to non-
Muslims generally falls out of the ambit of what the Tablighi Jama`at does. He produced a Zulu 
translation of the Qur’an, and his biographers emphasize how Sema was accosted and intimidated 
by apartheid police for his work in the townships. He emphasized the need to practice da`wah 
among the black population in his address at a Tablighi gathering in 1960, possibly the first in 
Southern Africa. In fact, the precise dates for the origins of the Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa 
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are difficult to discern. Moosa locates the first ijtima` in Ladysmith in 1961.43 Cilliers, one of the 
first to investigate the early history of the movement in South Africa, placed the first nationwide 
ijtima` in 1966.44 Among those credited with bringing the Tablighi Jama`at to South Africa was 
the Gujarati businessman Goolam Mohammed ‘Bhai’ Padia, who attended the lectures of 
Muhammad Shafi`, Deoband’s grand mufti at the time, when Muhammad Shafi` lectured in South 
Africa in 1966.45 
Sema arranged an ijtima`, called the First All African Tablighi Ijtima`, on 30 October 
1960 at Wasbank in Natal. In his address, Sema commented on “The Importance of Missionary 
Work in Islam,” stating rather provocatively that “propagating Islam is also equally obligatory … 
as Namaaz, Rozah and Haj,” basing his claim, as many Tablighis have, on the Qur’anic 
injunction in 3:109 that Muslims must “enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong” (al-amr bi-
l ma`ruf wa nahy al-munkar).46 A second “All African Muslim Ijtima” would later be held on 28 
October 1962, also at Wasbank. We know that future Tablighi assemblies grew substantially in 
size; Lenasia became on the largest sites for these events, with an estimated 15,000 men in 
attendance at one ijtima` in 1981.47 
From the outset there was a close link between the founder of the Tablighi Jama`at in 
South Africa - Hajji Bhai Padia - and the founder of the first Deobandi Dar al-`Ulum - Qasim 
Sema. In December 1960, Bhai Padia invited Sema to Durban where the two instigated the 
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formation of the first jama`at in South Africa, with Goolam’ Bhai’ Padia, Hajji Yusuf Patel 
(father of Yunus Patel), Moulana Suleiman Koloa of Stanger and others as charter members.48 
Sema approached Hajji Suleiman Seedat, custodian of the Soofie Saheb mosque in Ladysmith, 
for permission to have the first ijtima` at that site. Soofie Saheb had arranged the construction of 
this mosque, Ladysmith’s first, before he settled in Durban.49 It is an incredible historical irony 
that the Tablighi Ijtima` at Ladysmith in 1961 took place at the renovated Soofie Saheb Masjid. 
In future decades, as we will see, relations between the Barelwi-inclined Soofie family of Durban 
and the Tablighis would not remain as cordial.  
The Tablighi Jama`at made inroads into the Cape as well in the early 1960’s. In 1963, 
Qutbuddin Kagee, one of Cape Town’s great `ulama’ of the late twentieth century, returned to 
Cape Town after studying at Nadwa in Lucknow and praised the Tablighi Jama`at. “I must 
particularly mention the Tablighi Jammat,” he proclaimed, “with whom I traveled through 
Northern India visiting villages, and the work they are doing spreading Islam and its teachings 
amongst the people … I was very much moved by their devotion to revive the Sunnat of the 
Prophet.”50 Curiously, though, Maulana Kagee was most involved throughout his career as an 
imam at the Habibia Soofie Masjid in the Athlone district of Cape Town, a mosque that is among 
the most supportive of Barelwi Sufi devotionalism than any in the Cape.51 It is also unclear 
whether Maulana Kagee continued his work with the Tablighi Jama`at in the Cape. 
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 However, in 1966 Goolam ‘Bhai’ Padia and a certain Pakistani, Mufti Zayn al-`Abidin, 
initiated a Cape Town Tablighi Jama`at, and two years later in 1968, an ijtima` was held at the 
Muir Street Mosque, which remains today the center of Cape tabligh. Abu Bakr Najjar was first 
Cape `alim to openly welcome the Tablighi Jama`at to Cape Town, and there is ample evidence 
that by the late-1960’s the Tablighi Jama`at was firmly established in the Cape.52 One report 
describes their work in the black townships,53 while another gives a list of dates and times when 
Jama`ats visiting from Durban would be visiting the Cape’s mosques.54 By the end of the decade, 
a public discussion had formed around whether the Tablighi Jama`at’s methods were appropriate 
for the task of proselytizing in a country where Muslims comprised such a tiny minority.55 The 
fact that one of these letters complains that their methods turn away non-Muslims suggests, at 
least, that they were in fact proselytizing among non-Muslims, not a traditional method of the 
movement. 
It is important to note here that the rise of Tablighi activity in South Africa is part of a 
larger global expansion of the movement during the mid-century. It is in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
when the Tablighi Jama`at became a truly global movement, and it is not a coincidence that the 
first consciousness of ‘Deoband’ in South Africa dates to this same period - even though 
individual graduates of Deobandi madrasas had been in South Africa for at least several decades. 
Muhammad Yusuf, son of the movement’s founder Muhammad Ilyas, became the second leader 
of the Tablighi Jama`at upon his father’s death. He soon determined that the movement should 
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spread beyond South Asia, a decision that Gaborieau traces to an ijtima` held in 1945, with the 
first preaching parties traveling to Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. In the mid-
1950’s Tablighi preaching parties began to make inroads into southern Africa.56  
Up to this point in South African Islamic history, even though there were individual 
graduates of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband and affiliated madrasas in India and a fledgling Tablighi 
movement, there was little consciousness of a ‘Deobandi’ identity. The polemics that would 
divide South Africa’s Muslims in the 1970’s and 1980’s had not yet emerged. For instance, an 
organization known as the Universal Truth Movement, supported largely by Deobandi `ulama’, 
collaborated with Barelwi scholars and even endorsed local mawlud celebrations. Founded in 
1958 by Ismail Abdur Razzack and Qasim Sema,57 the UTM had the primary purpose of 
translating the Qur’an into African languages and printing pamphlets introducing Islam to a wide, 
mostly non-Muslim audience. The founders of the Universal Truth Movement recognized the 
power of printing local pamphlets and booklets in the service of spreading their message: 
Though the voice of preachers may reach the ears of many millions, thoughts 
emanating from the pens of authors travel farther to reach the eyes of many more. 
On looking closely at the immense power wielded by the ordinary daily 
newspapers, one finds that newspapers flash their messages across many oceans 
and deserts, countries and continents in a relatively short time, for the benefit of 
readers scattered on the surface of the globe. A similar effect is obtained when 
booklets, pamphlets and handbills containing religious material are published and 
distributed widely amongst the people. Islam, being the Universal Truth, must be 
propagated by every Muslim for any non-Muslim to read, understand and ponder 
about.58 
 
They also raised funds for sending South African students to Deobandi Dar al-`Ulums in India 
and Pakistan; during Qari Muhammad Tayyib’s visit to South Africa in 1963, the UTM 
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beseeched him to set up special language training in Urdu and Persian for African students at 
Deoband.  
 But significantly, the UTM translated and published a major Barelwi scholar’s 
introduction to Islam: Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui’s Elementary Teachings of Islam. 
Moreover, they even hosted an annual mawlud program that they viewed as an opportunity for 
interreligious discussion and reflection: “Everywhere in the country Muslims hold the 
Mouloodun Nabi. The significance of the Prophet Day Celebrations held by the U.T.M. lies in the 
fact that prominent speakers from all races and religious denominations are given an opportunity 
of expressing their view on the Holy Prophet’s life. The value of this interchange cannot be over-
emphasized for it brings in its wake true harmony and tolerance amongst different people.”59 
What are we to make of this, an ostensibly ‘Deobandi’ organization - co-directed by the man who 
is widely regarded as the forefather of Deoband in South Africa, Qasim Sema, and which hosted 
Deobandi scholars and raised money for Deobandi students - that sponsored an annual mawlud?  
 There is other suggestive evidence that ‘Deoband’ had not yet become the contentious 
‘brand’ that it would later become, at least in South Africa. Coverage of Deobandi rector Qari 
Muhammad Tayyib’s monumental visit to South Africa in 1963, just over a month after Maulana 
Muhammad Mia died, mentioned little about his connection with Deoband and nothing about the 
controversies that would accrue around the Deobandi ‘brand’ years later. Qari Muhammad 
Tayyib made his first trip to South Africa with great fanfare. He visited Johannesburg first, 
receiving an official reception from the city’s mayor, J. F. Oberholzer. Coverage identified him as 
“Chancellor of the Deoband Madressa” and “one of the most learned and powerful Alims today 
in the Indo-Pak sub-continent.”60 He then visited Cape Town on 4 August 1963 with his son 
Maulana al-Haq Muhammad Salim. He was welcomed by hundreds of Muslims at a ceremony 
that featured speeches by the mayor of Cape Town and Sheikh A. Najaar of the Muslim Judicial 
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Council, who delivered a lengthy panegyric upon Tayyib’s arrival. Tayyib gave his first lecture at 
the Habibia Mosque in Athlone, which was then, and remains now, a ‘Barelwi’ mosque.61 The 
article does not mention Tayyib in relation to any ‘Deobandi’ identity or ideology, even though 
this is the very man who was at that time most responsible for articulating that same ideology.62 
 Muslim News reprinted a letter from Tayyib, in which he praised Cape Muslims for their 
“steadfastness” in Islam and observed that a “deep resentment and dislike could be seen among 
the staunch Muslims towards the Quadiani [sic] menace,” referencing Deobandi antagonism 
towards the Ahmadiyya movement. Tayyib notes that Yusuf Karaan, then of the Muslim Judicial 
Council, was a graduate from Deoband. Yet astonishingly, on the very same page is coverage of a 
mawlud on August 11, where Yusuf Karaan was billed as the main speaker (though interestingly 
it does not say that Tayyib attended).63 
 In seeking out a key moment when widespread public awareness of ‘Deoband’ as an 
institution emerged among South Africa’s Muslims, one could point to 1966, when the Dar al-
Ifta’ at Deoband issued a fatwa declaring South Africa an ‘Abode of War’ (Dar al-Harb) so that 
the normal rules governing the taking of interest would no longer apply. The Deoband fatwa was, 
by all measures, a scandal for many South African Muslims, with Muslim newspapers in Cape 
Town, Johannesburg and Durban registering the negative sentiment. “Alas, with a reckless 
disregard for the preservation of pure, unadulterated Islam, the Muftees of Doeband [sic] have 
issued a Fatwa decreeing that South Africa is Darul-Harb,” complained one letter in the Muslim 
News. “How has the amorphous entity called public opinion reacted to this Fatwa?” asked 
another. “Alhamdulillah! The Muslims have treated it with scorn … Doeband must take note that 
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any assault by them to thwart the holy spirit that rages within the Muslims here in South Africa 
will discredit them forever.”64 
 Fatima Meer, at the time a prominent sociologist and scholar of Islam in South Africa, 
regarded the fatwa as a “dangerous pronouncement, capable of producing serious and damaging 
moral, material and political consequences for South African Muslims and to the cause of 
Islam.”65 Meer challenged Tayyib’s use of the concept of dar al-harb, arguing that the concept 
has “not the least authority either in the Quran or in the Hadith.”66 As far as Meer is concerned, 
Tayyib defined dar al-harb as such solely because Muslims are not the “ruling majority” in South 
Africa, and not “on the grounds of its governmental policies of inequality and racial 
discrimination which conflicts with the fundamental Islamic concept of universal brotherhood.”67 
Meer's analysis, it seems, accords with the high-modernist approach to the Qur’an and 
sunna that was popular among mid-century South African Muslim intellectuals, for example 
those involved in the Arabic Study Circle. Features of this approach included criticism of the 
authority of `ulama’, and the promotion of movements to read and understand the Qur'an directly 
as a source of authority. She is not critical of Deobandis specifically, but of `ulama’ in general. 
Ultimately she states, “Muslims believe that the best is in the Quran and the Quran makes riba 
unlawful (haram).”68 For Meer, “by adopting the fictitious division of the world into dar-ul-Islam 
and dar-ul-harb the Fatwa presents a false image of Islam and it thereby offers a challenge to the 
basic Islamic message of peace for humanity.”69 
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Thus, in multiple respects, we must note that there was little self-conscious awareness of 
a ‘Deobandi’ presence in South Africa at least until the visit of Qari Muhammad Tayyib, 
appropriate given Tayyib’s own work in ‘marketing’ Deoband, and more specifically, with the 
subsequent fiasco surrounding the Deobandi fatwa on interest, which was widely rebuked. 
Ultimately ‘Deobandi’ identity is a two-way street: on the one hand, it was imported self-
consciously by graduates of these madrasas in South Africa, but also ascribed to individuals and 
institutions as well, as in the largely positive reaction to Qari Muhammad Tayyib’s high-profile 
visit and the negative reaction to the Deoband fatwa on South Africa as an ‘abode of war’. 
  
Mahmud Hasan Gangohi and the South African Tablighi Jama`at 
 I will now turn to the roles of two pioneering Deobandi scholars, Mahmud Hasan 
Gangohi and Masihullah Khan, in forging a Deobandi presence in southern Africa. First, 
Mahmud Hasan Gangohi’s imprint on South African Deoband is measured largely through his 
role as a stalwart of the Tablighi Jama`at, and in fact his work is largely responsible for helping to 
justify tabligh among prominent Deobandi `ulama’, such as Qari Muhammad Tayyib, who were 
at first skeptical of its conformity with the shari`a. His Sufi initiates have included major South 
African Deobandi scholars, such as Ebrahim Saliji of Madrasa Ta`lim al-Din in Isipingo Park, 
near Durban; Ebrahim Desai of Madrasa In’aamiyya in Camperdown; Fazlur Rahman Azmi of 
Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville; and Yunus Patel of Madrasa Sawlehaat in Durban. One of the smaller 
Deobandi madrasas in South Africa, Jami`a Mahmudiyya in Springs, is named in his honor.70  
Mahmud Hasan’s legacy in the Tablighi Jama`at centers, in part, on his efforts to 
convince other Deobandi scholars that an organized tabligh effort was both worthwhile and 
permissible in Islamic legal terms. Initially, several high-profile Deobandi scholars regarded 
organized tabligh is an ‘innovation’ (bid`a) and especially asked whether, even if one rejects the 
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notion that it is bid`a, does it not merely repeat the religious work that is already carried out in the 
madrasas and Sufi lodges (khanqahs)? I will show here how Mahmud Hasan’s defense of tabligh 
is a direct extension of Deobandis’ reconceptualization of the public role of the `ulama’. It was no 
longer adequate merely to train students at madrasas or reform their character in Sufi lodges; 
instead, he sought to bring the religious education of the one and moral reform of the other 
directly to the Muslim public. I will also show how his fervor for tabligh energized the South 
African Tablighi Jama`at and, by extension, laid the groundwork for the subsequent 
institutionalization of Deobandi thought in the form of madrasas.  
Mahmud Hasan Gangohi was born in July 1907 in Gangoh.71 His biographers note that he 
was born on the very day in 1907 - 8 Jumada al-Thani - on which Rashid Ahmad Gangohi died 
two years earlier.72 His father, Maulana Hamid Hasan, studied at Deoband with ‘Shaykh al-Hind’ 
Mahmud Hasan, Deoband’s first student, and became a Sufi disciple of Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi.73 Mahmud Hasan Gangohi entered Mazahir al-Ulum in Saharanpur in 1923 and later 
entered Deoband in 1930.74 There he studied hadith under Husain Ahmad Madani.75 By 1955 he 
was the senior lecturer in hadith at Jami` al-Ulum in Kanpur.76 Finally, in 1964 he was appointed 
Chief Mufti at Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, where his collected fatwas were published under the name 
Fatawa-yi Mahmudiyya,77 and in 1966 he became rector of Mazahir al-`Ulum.78 Mahmud Hasan 
Gangohi became a senior khalifa of Muhammad Zakariyya, with whom he took initiation while at 
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Deoband.79 He made numerous visits to South Africa for the purpose of lecturing and accepting 
Sufi initiations, making an extended stay from 1984 to 1986.80 Mahmud Hasan engaged in public 
debates with Barelwi scholars in South Africa, most notably Muhammad Shafee Okarvi.81 He 
died on 2 September 1992 while in South Africa, where he came frequently to advise his many 
followers and give public lectures.82 He is buried in Johannesburg’s Elsberg Cemetery.  
 Mahmud Hasan was involved with the Tablighi Jama`at from its inception, 
accompanying Muhammad Ilyas on some of his initial preaching expeditions in Mewat.83 
Mahmud Hasan also took credit for ingratiating Qari Muhammad Tayyib to the Tablighi Jama`at, 
the latter being skeptical of the group at first.84 Other prominent Deobandis did not warm up to 
the Tablighi Jama`at as easily as Tayyib. There was a dispute between Mahmud Hasan and 
Maulana Abdul Bari Nadwi while Mahmud Hasan was in Lucknow for an ijtima`. The contention 
concerned Thanawi’s view of the Tablighis, which came to head in an argument. A friend of 
Mahmud Hasan’s believed, in Thanawi’s view, that there must be an order in which reformation 
takes place: first oneself, then one's household, then one's village, and only then should one go to 
reform others outside one's village. Mahmud Hasan replied, “This view is incorrect. Hazrat 
Thanawi wrote Islah al-Rusum, Bihishti Zewar, and traveled to various locales to preach. Did he 
first reform his own neighborhood (mahalla) and town (qasba)? Did he only take to reforming his 
own home? Is there a custom that was not also widespread in Thana Bhavan? Hazrat Thanawi’s 
wife was the aunt of my close relative; I know all about their home.” His friend replied, “I was 
not aware the Tablighi Jama`at could influence the Grand Mufti of Deoband to such an extent.” 
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Mahmud Hasan replied, “On the contrary, the Tablighi Jama`at gave the Dar al-`Ulum [Deoband] 
a mufti. The Dar al-`Ulum required a mufti, so they asked the Tablighi Jama`at to give them one. I 
am a Tablighi first and foremost, and a mufti second.”85 
Mahmud Hasan aligns the mission of the Tablighi Jama`at in the same tradition of public 
engagement that Rashid Ahmad Gangohi advocated for the `ulama’. Mahmud Hasan identifies 
the tablighi gathering as a third site, after the madrasa and the khanqah, for disseminating 
religious knowledge and fashioning moral selves, a view that had a deep impact on South African 
Deobandis’ public writing and preaching and their advocacy of tabligh. Not everyone has the 
time or intellectual capacity to study books or sit with a Sufi master, taught Mahmud Hasan, but 
through the Tablighi Jama`at, Deobandi `ulama’ sought to bring those insights, in a simplified 
form, to the masses: 
The fundamental point is that learning the din is required of everyone. To this 
end, books are written and published, madrasas are established, a syllabus is 
formulated for them and its system of study is arranged, khanqahs are 
established, preachers are provided to lecture at gatherings, and libraries are 
founded. Various methods are chosen to make it easy to acquire the din, on the 
condition that none of them violates the shari`a. One of these is the Tabligh 
Jama`at. Not every person is able to acquire the din from a madrasa, nor does 
every person have time to read through an entire syllabus, nor does every person 
even have the intellectual capacity to do so. The same situation applies to the 
khanqah. Not every person is able to acquire the din through books … Among 
the countless (karor) Muslims, how many are able to benefit from the madrasas 
and the khanqahs? And those who benefit from gatherings and sermons are even 
less in number. Religiousness (be dini) is so prevalent (‘amm) that it was 
necessary to find a method of promoting din that could also be both prevalent and 
simple.86 
 
At the same time that the Tablighi Jama`at complements the work of the madrasa and khanqah, it 
also important to note that it does not replace it: “Those involved in the Tabligh parties have a 
responsibility to grant the utmost respect to the madrasas and khanqahs and to consult with them 
                                                       
85 Ibid., 17-18. 
 
86 Ibid., 31. Compare a similar statement: “The work of the madrasas and khanqahs is very important and it 
is misguided to say that they are useless. Yet it is true that one enters a madrasa or a khanqah after the 
desire enters the heart, and until that desire comes, one will not enter, and most people are without that 
desire. The Tablighi Jama`at goes out to these people without that desire, just as the Messenger used to do.” 
Ibid., 115. 
 123 
in their own reform (islah).”87 
 Mahmud Hasan saw this educational mission as the central strategy in combating the 
proliferation of illicit innovations (bid`a). And in fact, his biographer identifies South Africa as 
the site where the advocates of bid`a have been most successful and, thus, where the Tablighi 
Jama`at is most needed: 
When the sunna is alive, surely bid`a will be finished. So many proponents of 
bid`a have repented of their innovations and have been overcome by a passion 
for following the sunna. So many of those who commit bid`a in the name of the 
Sufi saints at their tombs and their nonsense have been stopped. In India, after 
the era of bid`a was ended, the proponents of bid`a established their center in 
South Africa … where they attempt to make bid`a commonplace. But the great 
scholars (akabir) of Deoband, and particularly Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, are 
bringing an end to their influence by means of their travels abroad.88  
 
Mahmud Hasan helped define the Tablighis’ ethos of political disengagement and 
detachment from conflict. His student Fazlur Rahman Azmi, the senior instructor in hadith at 
South Africa’s Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville, compiled a collection of his master’s statements 
pertaining to tabligh. Azmi narrates that several of Mahmud Hasan Gangohi’s followers came to 
him during one of this South African tours with complaints about the vociferous criticisms of the 
Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa. They singled out a particular `alim, unnamed in Azmi’s text. 
Mahmud Hasan's advice to his students was simple: stay away from conflict with him and do not 
engage the `alim’s critics publicly: “My opinion is that you should need not say anything to him. 
You will continue with your work and he will continue with his, believing it to be a duty. The 
more you try to prevent him, the more he’ll persist. Continue with your work and let him continue 
with his.”89 
Mahmud Hasan’s book The Limits of Difference (Hudud-i Ikhtilaf) exemplifies this 
Tablighi ethos of avoiding conflict whenever possible (even though, as we will see in later 
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chapters, Tablighis in South Africa did not always live up to their lofty ideals).  The title is meant 
to connote how Deobandi scholars differed amongst themselves, but that they knew the 
appropriate ‘limits’ in asserting these differences; in other words, at least in its own idealized self-
narrative, there is healthy room for disagreement and debate within the Deoband movement. 
Drawn from Mahmud Hasan’s own sayings and excerpts from other Deobandis’ works, 
this text consists almost entirely of exemplary tales of the adab of Deobandi `ulama’, revolving 
around their irenic, patient means of quelling disputes or dealing with criticism, and the many 
disagreements that formed among themselves. Several, for example, narrate how Deobandi 
scholars maintained mutual respect and courtesy amidst major differences over how, if at all, the 
`ulama’ should be involved in politics.90  It may also serve implicitly as a foil to the vitriol of 
Deobandis’ most vocal critics, such as Ahmed Reza Khan. In some ways it complements 
Tayyib’s Maslak-i `ulama’-yi Deoband, with its notion that Deobandis adhere to a ‘middle’ path, 
avoiding extremes in belief or in practice. 
 One of the most crucial chapters in The Limits of Difference asks, “What should the 
masses do when the `ulama’ differ?” drawing on the statements of Mufti Muhammad Shafi’i and 
Muhammad Zakariyya.91 Muhammad Shafi`i notes the tendency for people to take disagreement 
among the `ulama’ as license for listening to none of them. But he asks, if someone consults two 
or more doctors for a treatment but is not satisfied with any of them, does he then simply ignore 
the illness? Likewise, Muhammad Zakariyya reiterates, in blunter terms, the importance of 
consulting the `ulama’ for the public, and of the `ulama’ guiding the public in religious matters: 
The masses have made it their business to form opinions of their own on 
religious controversies (masa’il). Why do they find it necessary to arbitrate over 
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differences among the men of knowledge (ahl-i `ilm), over intellectual issues and 
reasoning, when they lack the capacities to do so? In such arbitrations and 
decisions, they ought to follow the true `ulama’ whose sound beliefs and piety 
are borne of experience and whose credentials as men of God are established. But 
this is not their intention. Their intention is to engage in disputes. In such 
assemblies, in such public discourses, the masses find no gratification unless 
others are reviled, unless others are criticized, unless others are publically 
disgraced. The masses find assemblies in which religious topics are explained in 
a straightforward manner to be dull (phika) and insipid (be maza).92 
 
We can discern Mahmud Hasan’s impact on South African Deoband, to sum up, in at least three 
forms: in advocating tabligh as a means of bringing both rudiments of madrasa education and 
reformed Sufi ethics to the masses, in strategizing about how Deobandi scholars should engage 
with reforming Muslim publics, and in shaping the apolitical ethos of Deobandi `ulama’ that 
many South African Muslims maligned in the 1980’s, as I explain in the fifth chapter. 
 
Masihullah Khan: Imprinting Thanawi on South African Deoband 
Muhammad Masihullah Khan Sherwani is arguably the single Deobandi scholar who has 
had the most direct and sustained influence on South African Deobandi thought and writing. 
Thanawi personally selected him as among his most esteemed and spiritually talented Sufi pupils, 
and throughout Masihullah’s writings the imprint of Thanawi is abundantly evident. Some of his 
more prominent South African Sufi pupils include Ebrahim Saliji of Madrasa Ta`lim al-Din in 
Isipingo Beach; Ahmed Sadiq Desai of The Majlis in Port Elizabeth; Siraj Desai of Dar al-`Ulum 
Abu Bakr in Port Elizabeth; Ismail Mangera of Johannesburg, author of numerous collections and 
commentaries on Masihullah’s teachings; Mufti Hashim Boda of Ashraf al-`Ulum in De Deur; as 
well as Qasim Sema, the aforementioned founder of Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle who played an 
enormous role in implementing the Tablighi Jama`at in South Africa.  
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Muhammad Masihullah Khan was born in 1910 at Bariah, near Aligarh.93 He hailed from 
the Sherwani clan of Pathans, some of whom participated in Sayyid Ahmad’s jihad in Kashmir.94 
Thanawi considered him one of his highest ranked khalifas. He became a Sufi initiate of Thanawi 
while studying at Deoband. At Deoband he also studied under Husain Ahmad Madani. Thanawi 
introduced Masihullah Khan to Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the Tablighi Jama`at, instigating 
Masihullah’s involvement in the Tablighi Jama`at. In 1937, Thanawi directed Masihullah to go to 
Jalalabad and establish a madrasa there, called Miftah al-`Ulum. Thanawi in fact laid the 
foundation stone for the madrasa, acting as its spiritual patron.95 Masihullah also established a 
khanqah near the madrasa for advising his many disciples. While he concentrated his energies on 
his many students and on those who came to his khanqah seeking spiritual advice, he also found 
time to write. He is the author of Faizul Bari,96 a popular commentary on Bukhari; Risala-yi 
Taqlid wa Ijtihad,97 a defense of traditional taqlid against Salafi critics; Risala-yi Ihtimam-i 
mashvarah,98 a treatment of the basis of ‘consultation’ (shura) in Islam and its application to 
contemporary madrasas, and Shari`at o Tasawwuf,99 which will be the focus here, as well as 
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other texts. He saw his work as merely an elaboration upon his master’s, Ashraf `Ali Thanawi; 
Masihullah prescribed a reading list for his khulafa’, consisting of Thanawi’s Bayan al-Qur’an, 
Imdad al-Fatawa, Bihishti Zewar, Tarbiyat al-Salik, Islahi Nisab, Ashraf al-Sawanih, as well as 
his own Shari`at o Tasawwuf and Majalis Masih al-Ummat.100  
Masihullah’s connections with South Africa were deep; South African students at the 
madrasa Miftah al-`Ulum, of whom there were many, were sizeable enough to have their own 
separate dormitory and even collected funds to expand the sitting area where Masihullah would 
deliver his popular majalis.101 Masihullah Khan traveled to South Africa five times over the span 
of thirteen years, making his first trip in 1970 and his final trip in 1983.102 His followers have 
driven Deobandi Sufism’s global reach, establishing themselves in South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere. His khulafa’ in South Africa numbered at least ten out 
of approximately sixty khulafa’ in total.103 
Many of his students now direct and teach madrasas in South Africa. Like Mahmud 
Hasan Gangohi, Masihullah Khan sees the relationship between the madrasa and the khanqah as 
synergistic and mutually supportive. The role of the khanqah is to translate theoretical knowledge 
gained in the madrasa into ethical practice: the madrasa educates through instruction (ta`lim), 
while the khanqah educates through moral training (tarbiya) in ethics (akhlaq).104 Elsewhere, he 
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explains, “Academic knowledge will be acquired in the madrasa, but the practical application of 
that knowledge will take place in the khanqah.”105  
Shari`a and Sufism (Shari`at and Tasawwuf) is essentially Masihullah’s own anthology 
of Thanawi’s most essential teachings on Sufism, drawing from Thanawi’s Bavadir al-Navadir, 
Shari`at o Tariqat and other works.106 Part commentary, part oral discourses (malfuzat), the text 
is a sort of extended homage to his master. Like many Sufi works, it is discursive, moving deftly 
from topic to topic with little sense of overarching organization. Roughly the first half covers the 
nature of Sufi initiation, the need for a shaykh and how to identify a qualified one, the ‘rights’ 
(huquq) of the shaykh and the murid, the four forms of ‘striving’ on the Sufi path (mujahidah): 
reducing one’s speech, one’s food, one’s sleep, and one’s association with other people. The 
second half is devoted entirely to Sufi ethics. As with Thanawi, ethical self-perfection is a dual 
process of divesting oneself of specific negative attributes (akhlaq-i razila) and cultivating noble 
ethical virtues (akhlaq-i hamida). Collectively, this process is known as ‘self purification’ 
(tazkiyat al-nafs).  
Masihullah begins Shari`a and Sufism succinctly affirming three major facets of 
Deobandi Sufism: its basis in ethics of the self, the apologetic tone that seeks to defend Sufism as 
aligned with the shari`a, and the notion that all Muslims should avail themselves of Sufi ethics. 
For Masihullah, Sufism not only revolves around “adorning” the self with ethical virtues, but is in 
fact the very "purpose of life:”  
Sufism is the soul of the religion (din ki ruh) and its perfection. Its goal is to 
purify the interior self (batin) of the negative attributes such as lust, calamities of 
the tongue, anger, envy, jealousy, love of the world, love of fame, stinginess, 
greed, pretence, show, vanity, and pride, and to adorn the interior self with the 
noble ethical virtues such as repentance, patience, gratitude, fear of God, hope, 
asceticism, the unity of God (tawhid), trust, love, desire for God (shauq), 
sincerity, honesty, meditation (muraqaba), taking account of oneself (muhasiba), 
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and contemplation. Thus a regard (tavajjoh) for God is cultivated, which is the 
very purpose of life. Sufism and the Sufi path is therefore not at all contrary to 
the religion and the shari`a. In fact, it is incumbent for every Muslim to become a 
Sufi. Without Sufism, in reality, one cannot truly be called a complete Muslim.107 
 
In one of his majalis, Masihullah Khan reiterates the Deobandi notion that Sufism is necessary for 
the ethical rectification of the entire Muslim public and that anyone can become a ‘saint’ (wali). 
Speaking to a public majlis, Masihullah announced:  
You are all saints. Yes! You are all saints … A person is inclined to persons with 
temperaments similar to his …Where does a buffalo stay? Amongst buffalos! 
Where does a goat stay? Among goats! Where does a camel stay? Amongst 
camels! Whose company does a thief keep? Thieves! In what circle does royalty 
move? In royal circles! This coming of yours clearly points to you being of the 
Ahlullah.108 
 
Thus Masihullah fully appropriates both Thanawi’s ‘democratization’ of Sufism as well 
as the apologetical approach to Sufism typical of Deobandi critiques. The legitimacy of Sufism is 
clearly a ‘controversy’ in need of address. In fact, Masihullah spills a substantial amount of ink 
dismissing the exaggerated claims that some make for Sufism and which have tarnished its 
image; it does not sanction amulets or talismans for achieving worldly success, he says, nor does 
it portend the future or promise that Sufis will experience ecstasy, dreams and visions.109 
Masihullah’s Shari`a and Sufism illustrates the intertextual and interwoven discourses of 
Deobandi Sufism. Borrowing liberally from Thanawi’s Shari`a and the Sufi Path and other 
works, Masihullah lifts entire passages from his teacher and predecessor, integrating Thanawi’s 
work seamlessly into his own formulation of the Sufi path. And just as Masihullah Khan used 
Thanawi’s writings on Sufi ethics as a basis for his work, one of Masihullah Khan’s most 
prominent khalifas in South Africa, Ismail Mangera, uses Masihullah’s work as the basis for his 
Good Character. Here, Mangera translates the serial list of good and bad ethical qualities into 
contemporary parlance, imbuing it with a sort of ‘self help’ approach readily accessible to South 
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African Sufis today.  
An example will illustrate the relation between Thanawi’s and Masihullah Khan’s work, 
and in turn, between Masihullah Khan’s and Ismail Mangera’s work. To see how this discourse 
develops from Thanawi to Masihullah to Mangera, it will be helpful to trace how each wrote of a 
single ethical characteristic. Here I will choose hirs, ‘greed’. What becomes evident is that 
Masihullah Khan offers a nearly literal translation of Thanawi's entry on hirs, while Mangera 
extrapolates from Masihullah to tease out the moral implications of his reasoning. I begin with 
Thanawi’s explanation of greed, then continue to Masihullah Khan’s. I have highlighted in bold 
font the phrases where their texts differ: 
An explanation of greed (hirs): 
 
Allah Ta’ala says: Do not raise your eyes towards the glitter of the worldly life, 
which We have granted to various groups among them. 
 
The Messenger says: The son of Adam ages while two things of his grow 
younger: greed for wealth and greed for a longer life. 
 
The realities of greed: Greed is defined as attention (tavajjoh) and inclination 
towards the world, in other words when the heart is consumed with money and 
the like. If one turns his attention in another direction it will [still] be towards the 
world, and naturally, the more one regards that thing, the more one will be 
compelled to do so and the more this attention towards the world will be 
strengthened. So keep your attention turned towards God; the more one turns 
towards God, the less one will turn towards the world. 
 
Greed is the root of all maladies. It is such a malady that one could call it the 
mother of all maladies because all strife and conflict arises from it. If one does 
not have greed for money, he will respect the rights of others. The basis of evil 
deeds is taking pleasure in greed. The basis of all evil attributes (akhlaq-i razila) 
is pride and pride is a desire for status. Thus the origin of pride, too, is greed. It is 
human nature that if a man owned two forests where gold and silver were as 
abundant as water, he would want a third. The more a desire is satiated, the 
stronger it becomes. The more you scratch a rash, the worse it gets. God 
proclaimed:  ‘Does humankind not have everything he desires?’ The virtuous 
man will be able to fulfill all his desires, but the greedy man knows no solace and 
nothing can quench the desire in his belly.  
 
Desire for the things of this world / 
Are quenched only by the dust of the grave. 
 
A single desire has no end; it leads to another, and another. One is then not 
content with fate (taqdir) but is overwhelmed with desires too difficult to fulfill, 
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leading to worry upon worry. Whether its more money or more children, it will 
always cause worry in the heart of the greedy man. 
 
The remedy for greed: Decrease what you spend. Do not worry about your 
income nor worry about the future. Reflect on the baseness of greed and desire. 
Continue pondering this explanation of the love of the world. God willing, it 
will be of benefit to you.110 
 
Masihullah’s version reads as follows: 
An explanation of greed (hirs):  
 
Allah Ta’ala says: Do not raise your eyes towards the glitter of the worldly life, 
which We have granted to various groups among them. 
 
The Messenger says: The son of Adam ages while two things of his grow 
younger: greed for wealth and greed for a longer life. 
 
The realities of greed: Greed exists when the heart is consumed with money, etc. 
Greed is the root of all maladies. It is such a malady that one could call it the 
mother of all maladies because all strife and conflict arises from it. If one does 
not have greed for money, he will respect the rights of others. The basis of all 
evil attributes (akhlaq-i razila) is greed. The mystics (`arifin) have said that the 
root of all evil attributes is pride and pride is a desire for status. Thus the 
origin of pride, too, is greed. It is human nature that if a man owned two forests 
where gold and silver were as abundant as water, he would want a third. The 
more a desire is satiated, the stronger it becomes. The more you scratch a rash, 
the worse it gets.  God proclaimed:  ‘Does humankind not have everything he 
desires?’ ’ The virtuous man will be able to fulfill all his desires, but the greedy 
man knows no solace and nothing can quench the desire in his belly. A single 
desire has no end; it leads to another, and another. One is then not content with 
fate (taqdir) but is overwhelmed with desires too difficult to fulfill, leading to 
worry upon worry. Whether its more money or more children, it will always 
cause worry in the heart of the greedy man. 
 
The remedy for greed: Decrease what you spend. Do not worry about your 
income nor worry about the future. Reflect on the baseness of greed and desire.111 
 
The only differences are two: Masihullah omits a Persian couplet in Thanawi’s version along with 
a few other words, and adds that these teachings about greed are derived from Sufi ‘mystics’ 
(‘arifin).   
 Finally, note how Ismail Mangera’s abbreviated version in English attempts to distill the 
essential ideas in Thanawi and Masihullah, drawing on contemporary terminology: 
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Hirs - Greed 
 
Definition: The total attachment to, and engrossment in, materialism. 
 
Dangers and Consequences: Greed has no end point. Like a fire raging more and 
more as additional fuel is fed into it, a person with greed desires more and more 
irrespective of how much he has already attained. Greed in various guises is the 
root of all ills. Immorality is nothing but lust for pleasure; arrogance is greed for 
fame. The effects of Hirs can be seen in features like dishonesty, strife, needless 
lawsuits, mental anguish, spiritual stunting and a host of other debasing features 
seen in society.  
 
Prevention:  
(i) Recognize and admit that Hirs is despicable - a greedy person is 
contemptible. Make a resolution not to be controlled by greed. 
(ii) Assess one’s priorities and necessities in life - strive to fulfill 
these but curb the desire for anything in excess. 
(iii) Be contented with what Allah Ta’ala, the Best Provider, has 
granted, i.e. count one’s blessings. 
(iv) Avoid obsession with events in the unseen future. 
 
Treatment:  
(i) Cut down on expenses - check extravagances and avoid luxuries. 
(ii) Act against one’s nafs, contrary to one’s desires - abstain not 
only from everything haraam, but also from certain items which 
may be halaal but non-essential. This is termed Mujaahidah.112 
 
This sort of translation of Deobandi Sufi rhetoric into pragmatic language is typical of 
many of the local Deobandi texts in South Africa, as we will also see in the oral discourses of 
Yunus Patel. More importantly, this juxtaposition of three passages on the same issue of Sufi 
ethics illustrates the direct continuities in Deobandi Sufi discourse from Thanawi, through his 
pupil Masihullah Khan, and to Masihullah Khan’s pupil Ismail Mangera. This is merely one way 
that Deoband in India and South Africa is linked not just institutionally but textually as well. 
Just as these texts reduce Sufism to its ethical dimensions, Masihullah Khan’s living 
pupils continue these teachings in their daily lectures. To take one example, Hashim Mohamed 
Boda, or ‘Mufti Boda’ as he is known locally, studied at Miftah al-`Ulum in the late 1970’s and 
then stayed at Masihullah Khan’s khanqah in Jalalabad. He is now the director of Ashraf al-
                                                       
112 Ismail Mangera, Good Character: Compiled from the Teachings of Maseehul Ummat Hadhrat Maulana 
Muhamed Maseehullah Khan Saheb, Benoni: Young Men’s Muslim Association, 1992, 5-6.  
 133 
`Ulum, a small madrasa south of Johannesburg where he gives weekly Thursday evening lectures 
on topics related to Sufism. 
For Mufti Boda, the import of Masihullah’s teachings is that even the ritual components 
of Deobandi Sufism, especially zikr, become expendable. In his view, Masihullah’s teachings on 
Sufism were “99% majalis for the akhlaq and 1% for zikr,”113 and the objective of Sufism is 
“embedding tawhid in the heart” and “bringing one’s daily ‘amal into total conformity with the 
Shari`a.” The Sufi orders, on the other hand, have strayed from this simple objective and have 
become a kind of “cult.” The only essential aim of Sufism is to advance personal ethical traits, 
and “if someone does not make a single zikr, but achieves these traits otherwise, he has achieved 
the purpose of tasawwuf.” The early generations of Muslims did not need zikr, according to Mufti 
Boda: “The sahaba did not need zikr, but today we need it because of ghaflat [heedlessness].” 
The implication of his attitude towards zikr is that if one can attain absolute moral perfection, 
then zikr becomes unnecessary; it is a means, not an end. 
 For him, out of all the negative ethical attributes that must be expelled, anger is among 
the most crucial. To illustrate the Sufi approach to tempering one’s anger, he recounted a story 
from the life of `Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam’s fourth caliph. 
When `Ali was on the battlefield, just as he lifted his sword to kill an enemy, the enemy spit in his 
face. `Ali put down his sword and refused to kill him, explaining that he had previously been 
acting solely for God, but the anger generated from being spat upon would have meant he acted 
through his anger, which he refused to do. Mufti Boda’s message was clear: anger is perhaps 
inevitable, but acting on it is not. “Your eyes will always stray,” he explained, “but tasawwuf is 
about teaching the heart never to stray.” He then speculated on the ‘ikhlas’ of contemporary 
jihadis who act, in his view, largely out of anger. “The harm done to the Afghans by themselves 
[because of their anger] is worse than the harm done by the Soviets,” he reflected. Mufti Boda 
sees Sufism as the cure for political Islam; “patience, sincerity, etc are traits that jihadis don’t 
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have.”114 In short, Mufti Boda is one living example of how Deoband’s Sufi ethics, as articulated 
by Thanawi and transmitted through Masihullah Khan, becomes embodied in the everyday 
teachings of a single South African Deobandi scholar. 
 
Understanding Deobandi Madrasas in South Africa 
This chapter concludes with brief notes on Deobandi madrasas in South Africa, using 
each one to illustrate a key point about contemporary Deobandi identity. On the whole, Deobandi 
madrasas have acclimated to the South African context in novel ways that may be unknown 
elsewhere among Deobandis ‘abroad’, particularly in teaching the Shafi`i legal tradition in order 
to accommodate the proclivities of local ‘Malay’ Muslim populations, in teaching languages 
other than Arabic and Urdu, and in extending da`wah to African populations. 
There are at least nine Deobandi Dar al-`Ulums in South Africa: Dar al-`Ulum Zakariyya 
in Lenasia, outside of Johannesburg; Madrasa In`aamiyya in Camperdown, between Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg; Madrasa Arabia Islamia in Azaadville, outside of Johannesburg; Dar al-`Ulum 
Newcastle at Newcastle, between Durban and Johannesburg in the Natal Midlands; Dar al-`Ulum 
Abu Bakr in Port Elizabeth; Dar al-`Ulum al-Arabiyya al-Islamiyya in Strand, Qasim al-`Ulum in 
Mitchell’s Plain, Madrasa Ta`lim al-Din in Isipingo Beach, Jami`a Mahmudiyya in Springs, and 
Ashraf al-`Ulum in De Deur. I will briefly examine three of these: Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle, 
Qasim al-`Ulum in Mitchells Plain, Cape Town, and Madrasa In’aamiyya, in Camperdown. 
  
 Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle 
The first Deobandi madrasa in South Africa was Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle, founded in 
1973 by Moulana Qasim Sema (d. 2007). As previously mentioned, Qasim Sema has become a 
legendary figure within the South African Deobandi community for his work in building 
madrasas, training `ulama’ and advancing Islamic charitable organizations. Dar al-`Ulum 
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Newcastle illustrates several crucial points about Deobandi madrasa in South Africa. First, from 
the outset, Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle was closely aligned with the Tablighi Jama`at, as discussed 
previously. Second, soon after being established, the administration of Newcastle found it 
necessary to accommodate the Shafi’i madhhab in its teachings, since a large number of non-
Hanafi, non-Indian students began to enroll from the Cape. Whether or not other Deobandi 
madrasas outside of South Asia have had to make these accommodations is, to my knowledge, 
unstudied. Historically, all Deobandi madrasas have taught only Hanafi fiqh texts in their 
curricula, but whether or not Deobandi madrasas outside of the Indian subcontinent should teach 
the legal madhhab of the local majority Muslim population is an issue they must address. 
Newcastle, as the oldest Deobandi madrasa in South Africa, was also the first to grapple with 
teaching Shafi`i fiqh. Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle is located in the Natal highlands, southeast of 
Johannesburg, in a region where most of the Muslims were, and remain, of Indian origin. The 
Hanafi madhhab has always been the dominant legal school in this region. However, the prestige 
of being the first Dar al-`Ulum in South Africa drew students from the Cape region, where the 
Shafi`i madhhab has historically dominated, deriving largely from the centuries-old links with 
Southeast Asia.115 
 
 Qasim al-`Ulum: In the Orbit of Newcastle 
Just as Newcastle was established in the orbit of the original Deoband madrasa so Qasim 
al-`Ulum was established within the orbit of Newcastle, and its founders conceived it as 
essentially an extension of the latter. Qasim al-`Ulum is to Newcastle, in a sense, as Newcastle is 
to Deoband. Two features of Qasim al-`Ulum illustrate the expansion of the Deobandi network in 
novel ways. First, the students are almost exclusively Coloured Muslim (‘Malay’) students from 
the Cape, rather than of South Asian origin; second, the madrasa teaches Shafi`i law in addition 
to Hanafi law in order to accommodate the legal preferences of local Muslims. This is in spite of 
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the fact that Deobandi scholars define Hanafi law as an essential part of the Deobandi maslak. As 
a former student and current instructor explains, “We broke from the Indian tradition … The 
Muslims of Cape Town are a bit of a different breed. We changed that system to fit local needs. 
Our graduates are meant to serve the local community.”116 
The latter feature particularly signifies the adaptability of the Deobandi model outside of 
a South Asian context where the Hanafi legal school predominates. Much of the madrasa’s 
literature revolves around defending adherence to one legal school at the same time that it 
promotes the equality of all four.117 The current director of the madrasa credits Qasim Sema with 
introducing instruction in more than one legal school to South Africa.118 In terms of curriculum, 
the madrasa teaches Shafi`i commentaries on each of the six canonical hadith collections. 
The name Qasim al-`Ulum was carefully chosen; it is meant to honor ‘three Qasims’: the 
Prophet Muhammad, whose name was Abul Qasim; the founder of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, 
Qasim Nanautawi; and Qasim Sema.119 Situated outside of the Cape Town city center in the 
mostly Coloured township of Mitchells Plain, Qasim al-`Ulum was founded by a group of 
Deobandi scholars, mostly graduates of Newcastle, who registered the property under the Majlis 
ud Da`wah wal Islah on 8 January 1997.120 The Majlis ud Da`wah wal Islah was a body of 
`ulama’ that offered legal and marriage counseling for local Muslims, and published small 
educational tracts in Afrikaans and Arabic.121 Four of its members founded the madrasa and 
worked as instructors. The founders of the mosque display a handwritten letter from Qasim Sema 
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after his visit to the construction site in 1998, where the madrasa was in the process of being 
built. Sema concludes the letter with an injunction that is a sort of de facto mission statement of 
the madrasa: to remember the public role of the madrasa, one that extends into the 
administrators’ strong advocacy for local tabligh. Sema writes:  
In conclusion my sincere advise to you is: Hold fast to this Hadith. The 
Messenger of Allah said: Learn the knowledge of Deen and teach it to the people. 
Learn the Laws of inheritance and teach them to the people. Learn the Quran and 
teach it to the people, because I am a person who will be taken away. And 
knowledge will diminish and fitnas (discord and dissension) will appear 
everywhere to such an extent that two persons will disagree on an obligatory 
command and no person will be found to give a conclusive judgment.122 
 
With this emphasis on da`wah, Qasim al-`Ulum continues the tradition of Qasim Sema in 
preaching directly to the black populations of southern Africa, through direct da`wah and through 
various charity programs. The madrasa makes the link with Qasim Sema palpable through 
reprinting hand-written letters from Sema in its annual reviews and including short biographies of 
Sema in its newsletters.123 Sema was consulted on every aspect of the madrasa’s establishment, 
construction, and curriculum. 
 Despite the indebtedness to Qasim Sema and Newcastle, the administrators express little 
in the way of ‘Deobandi’ allegiance. The rector, Ismail Alie, stated his view as such: “I am not a 
‘Deobandi’. I have not seen Deoband with my own eyes. I am a student of the din,” and goes on 
to elaborate that Deoband is the most “comprehensive” of the approaches to Islam, and the one 
with the least accretions, and that the Barelwis are part of a “school” whereas Deoband is not.
 The administrators may not identify directly as ‘Deobandi’ but they do advance  
Deoband’s project of Sufi critique, if on a very modest and highly localized scale. In terms of 
local Sufi practices, the madrasa has spoken out against the widespread practice among Cape 
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Muslims of visiting the kramats before embarking on hajj.124 Purification of the nafs is not 
‘taught’ in the madrasa per se, but is taught through “sohba,” being in the presence of one’s 
shaykh and observing his character, his adab, his moral demeanor. This sohba results in the 
“indirect, subtle transformation of the morals,” according to Maulana Adams. Purification of the 
self is inseparable from the knowledge that one acquires in the madrasa: “It’s a package deal.”  
 
Madrasa In`aamiyya: Deobandi Sufism on the Web 
Madrasa In`aamiyya was founded in 1994 in Camperdown, a small town between Durban 
and Pietermaritzburg. Its notoriety comes from the presence of Mufti Ebrahim Desai. Ebrahim 
Desai (b. 1963) is one of the most well known Deobandis in South Africa because of his popular 
website www.askimam.com. He first studied at the Deobandi madrasa Jami`a Islamiyya Ta`lim 
al-Din in Dabhel, a coastal town in the Indian state of Gujarat. In Dabhel he studied with ifta’ and 
other subjects with Mufti Ahmad Khanpuri, one of the senior Sufi pupils of Mahmud Hasan 
Gangohi. Mufti Desai spent eight years at Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, from 1980 to 1988. During his 
third year at Deoband, he took initiation with Mahmud Hasan Gangohi and began to spend all of 
his time away from studies in the presence of Gangohi in his khanqah at the Chatta Masjid in 
Deoband.125 
For Mufti Desai, “Muhammad had three missions. The first was to educate the people in 
the shari`a. The second was to convey tawhid and the third was tazkiya, purification of the soul.” 
He explained that the three missions were, in his view, complementary and comprehensive of the 
ethical injunctions of Islam. The first points to the public nature of Muhammad’s, and by 
extension, Desai’s own teachings, while the latter suggests the application of these teachings to 
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one’s own interiority. “Shari`a is inclusive of tasawwuf,” he clarified. “But every act of tasawwuf 
must be in conformity to the shari`a. The shari`a is the measuring stick.”126 
Mufti Desai encourages but does not require his students to undergo initiation with a Sufi 
shaykh. While the madrasa does not incorporate Sufi texts directly into the curriculum, he 
encourages students to read authors such as Ghazali outside of normal curricular work. He 
endeavors to bring Sufism into all his public lectures, particularly what he views as Sufism’s 
ethical core: humility before God. “When a person loves position, he cannot reach the heights of 
Sufism,” he explains. “When we look at the political situation around the world, people are 
looking for position … [Sufism] is about deflating yourself, recognizing your weaknesses … The 
more you regard yourself to be insignificant, the more you recognize the being that is 
powerful.”127  
Desai maintains a website that is singularly devoted to advancing Sufism, 
www.darulmahmood.com, named after Mahmud Hasan Gangohi. The website is geared towards 
those who have little to no knowledge about Sufism and is part of Mufti Desai’s extensive public 
outreach, the other being his website www.askimam.com. His views reiterate his teacher 
Mahmud Hasan Gangohi’s view that Sufism and tabligh are mutually constitutive and essential 
facets of a complete ethical life; on his website, he asks the rhetorical question, “If someone is 
involved in Tasawwuf, is it ok if he does not do the effort of Dawah & Tabligh?” He answers: 
All these efforts are needed and have to be done simultaneously in order to create 
a better individual and a more religious society. One who is concentrating on 
Tasawwuf should not neglect the effort of Da`wah and Tabligh but should try 
and create a balance in his life. For example, weekly, if a person attends the 
halaqah [circle] of a certain Buzurg [Sufi elder] on a Thursday, then he should 
participate in the Ghusht and Jawla128 programmes on Monday and Wednesday. 
In other words, we need to make some type of adjustments to our daily lives and 
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routines in order to facilitate all these efforts of Deen …We should refrain from 
becoming totally one sided, biased and neglecting some of these efforts and 
doing only some.129 
 
Desai’s web presence evinces the dual roles that Deobandi scholars have played in the South 
African Muslim community; on the one hand, his website, www.askimam.com is almost 
exclusively oriented around educating Muslims in basic matters of belief (`aqida) and on issues 
such as marriage, divorce, zakat, salat, ritual purity (taharah), fasting, inheritance, and so on; on 
the other, his www.darulmahmood.com website is concerned exclusively with Sufism. This 
division of labor is telling; for decades, beginning with the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal, Deobandi 
scholars have been, first and foremost, `ulama’, and fulfill the roles that `ulama’ fill, offering 
religious advice to individual Muslims. Broadly speaking, the subjects here are similar to those 
that Gangohi’s own fatwas addressed, but there is a notable absence of questions and answers on 
contentious matters (masa’il); www.askimam.com does not address issues such as mawlud or 
`urs, or other matters that previous Deobandi scholar invested so much energy in critiquing. 
When I asked Desai about this absence, he replied triumphantly that “Muslims today have little 
need to inquire into these controversies,” even though, as the final chapter will show, these 
controversies are still widely discussed within the Muslim community, particularly in the Cape. 
 To sum up, this chapter has traced the emergence of a Deobandi institutional presence in 
South Africa, in the form of `ulama’ councils, the Tablighi Jama`at, and Dar al-`Ulums. 
Muhammad Masihullah Khan and Mahmud Hasan Gangohi established the most direct and 
palpable connections between South Africa and Deobandis in the Indian subcontinent, 
particularly connections to Thanawi and the advancement of tabligh. While Deobandi institutions 
were founded by graduates of the Dar al-`Ulum Deoband and other Deobandi madrasas, there 
was little sense of these institutions self-identifying as ‘Deobandi’. And during most of this 
history, Deobandi scholars were not actively involved in executing their critique of Sufi 
devotions. As I show in the fifth chapter, the first notable public clashes over these practices 
                                                       
129 http://www.daralmahmood.org/tasawwuf.html (last accessed 16 August 2010). 
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emerged only in 1970, beginning with the lecture tour of a popular Barelwi scholar in Cape 
Town, but Deoband’s ‘critical project’ in South Africa would only reach its zenith in the 1980’s, 
when it fatefully clashed with a mass mobilization of Muslims against apartheid. Before 
proceeding to that history, the next chapter will delve more fully into the problem of how 
Deobandi discourses on Sufism relate to the madrasa as an institution and its curriculum, and 
show how students locate themselves within these discourses.
  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Madrasa and the Majlis: Locating Deobandi Sufism 
 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses a problem in understanding the Deobandi approach to Sufism: 
Sufism has pervaded the Deobandi movement from its origins, but particularly as a textual 
tradition, Sufism is completely absent from the curriculum of Deobandi madrasas. If Sufism is 
essential to Deobandi ideology, and madrasas are the institutional basis of the global Deobandi 
movement, where then is Deobandi Sufism ‘located’? How is the Deobandi understanding of  
Sufism, in both the critical and constructive projects I outlined in the previous chapters, 
reproduced beyond the circulation of texts? The present chapter locates the circulation of 
Deobandi Sufism outside of texts, namely in the daily life of Deobandi madrasas in South Africa 
and in the oral discourses of the Deobandi majlis (pl. majalis), a gathering that combines informal 
sermons and Sufi meditations (zikr). In these public gatherings Deobandi scholars bring Sufi 
teachings to a mass audience. 
Despite the centrality of Sufi discourses throughout Deoband, Sufism is not integrated 
into the curriculum of Deobandi madrasas, either through the teaching of Sufi texts, the history of 
Sufism, or the formal incorporation of Sufi ritual practices, such as communal zikr. This chapter 
explores the reasons for this absence, and attempts to pinpoint where, then, Sufism is located 
within the Deoband ideology (maslak). Among other things, this chapter argues, based on 
fieldwork at a Deoband madrasa in South Africa and interviews with students and faculty, that 
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Deobandi Sufism is instantiated in coterminous, overlapping relationships between teachers and 
students and Sufi masters and disciples; that these relationships are built on and perpetuate the 
Deobandi understanding of Sufism as ethical self-formation; and that Deobandi scholars advance 
their interpretation of Sufism through the majlis, an extension of Deoband’s mission to bring its 
Sufi ethics to a mass Muslim public. This chapter will pose, but can by no means fully answer, 
larger questions pertaining to the relationship, past and present, between Sufism and the madrasa 
as an institution. To what extent do the epistemologies and pedagogies of the two overlap or 
remain distinct? Does the mere act of posing these distinctions rely on old dichotomies between 
the legalist and the mystic, or between the epistemological dichotomies of Sufi revelatory insight 
(kashf) and discursive ‘book’ knowledge (‘ilm)? 
The chapter begins with a discussion of how the scholars of Deoband conceived Sufism 
to be essential to their tradition yet did not integrate Sufism formally into the Deobandi 
curriculum. I illustrate this by comparing the curricula of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband and 
Johannesburg’s Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville to foreground both the absence of any formal 
‘instruction’ in Sufism in the madrasa itself and Azaadville’s efforts to cultivate a sense of 
Deobandi identity and locate itself in the broader continuity of Deobandi history. Next, the 
chapter examines the madrasa at Azaadville in depth, using extensive fieldwork to discern how 
Sufism and ethics are mutually imbricated in the daily lives of the students and how they seek to 
cultivate and maintain a pure ‘sensorium’ - a space where oral Sufi teachings, bodily 
comportment, and the self-transforming power of Sufi zikr coincide. 
The chapter continues with discussions of my fieldwork at multiple Deobandi majalis. 
Through the majlis, Deobandi scholars have made their Sufism ‘public’, in a form where Sufi 
ethics exists in its plainest, most distilled form. Many participants in the majalis are not Sufis at 
all, nor do they need to be to learn from the ethical ruminations of the South African Deobandi 
scholars who preside over them. I use the discussion of the majlis as a point of departure for 
theorizing how Deobandi scholars engage with Muslim publics in South Africa. 
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Qari Muhammad Tayyib on Sufism and the Deobandi Movement 
 Qari Muhammad Tayyib’s The Ideology of the Deoband School (Maslak-i `ulama’-yi 
Deoband) is perhaps the seminal theoretical statement of what constitutes  ‘Deobandi’ tradition 
and what comprises its central tenets.1 For Tayyib, Deoband is not a “sect” (firqa) but is the very 
essence of Sunni Islam, the “Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jama`at.” The two main arguments in Tayyib’s 
treatise are that the Deoband ideology is comprehensive, unifying all aspects of traditional 
Islamic law, theology and Sufism, and that it avoids any ‘extremes’, tracing a middle path 
between, for example, those who indulgence in the excesses of Sufi piety and those who reject 
Sufism indiscriminately and as a whole. On “comprehensiveness” (jami’yyat), Tayyib writes that 
Deoband’s ideology derives itself seamlessly from the fundamental teachings of the sunna and 
the moral rectitude of the Companions, teachings that are channeled through the Sufi chains of 
initiation that originate with the Prophet: “The Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat adopted the very same 
path of comprehensiveness [as the Companions] … This comprehensiveness was transmitted, link 
by link, until … it passed on to the Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, which in turn transmitted it Deobandi 
`ulama’. This [comprehensiveness] became their distinctive trait.”2 It also strives to avoid any 
form of “excess” (tafrit) or “extremism” (ghuluw) and is consistently “balanced” (mu`tadil) in all 
respects. Tayyib’s use of these words does not, of course, connote the way in which these 
rhetorically loaded phrases - such as ‘moderate Muslim’ or ‘extremist’ - are used today. Rather, 
for Tayyib, Deoband situated itself between, for example, the anti-Sufi stance of the Salafis and 
Wahhabis, and the ‘excessiveness’ (tafrit) of certain antinomian, heretical strains in Sufism.   
                                                       
1 Qari Muhammad Tayyib was rector of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband for over half a century, from 1929 to 1982, 
and grandson of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, founder of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband. He received initiation 
into Sufism (bai’at) from Husain Ahmad Madani and then subsequently from Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, who 
designated him as a khalifa. He is, perhaps more than any other twentieth century Deobandi scholar, 
responsible for articulating a coherent Deobandi ‘identity’ in his works. He wrote the most direct statement 
of what defines ‘Deobandi’, Maslak-i `ulama’-yi Deoband, Lahore: Tayyib Publishers, n.d. Both texts are 
available in multiple printings. 
 
2 Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Maslak-i `Ulama’-yi Deoband, 15-16. 
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 In his treatise, Tayyib begins his discussion of the centrality of Sufism to the Deoband 
school with the standard conceit that we have seen on many occasions elsewhere: Sufism is, in its 
very essence, a matter of personal character and inner purification, and cannot be separated 
theoretically or practically from the shari`a: 
The Deobandis believe that perfecting one’s ethics (takmil-i akhlaq) and 
purifying one’s self via taking initiation and being in the presence of Sufi 
shaykhs are beneficial and necessary forms of spiritual guidance. However, the 
Sufi path (tariqa) is not a path different from shari`a, which is transmitted from 
one heart to the next. The Sufi path is simply the internal and ethical dimension 
of the shari`a, the path of reforming the heart (islah-i qalb), principles of which 
are firmly established by the Qur’an and sunna.3 
 
Sufis go astray, Tayyib submits, when they forget the stipulations of the shari`a and become 
mired in ‘excessive’ practices.  
In the view of the Deobandi maslak, the holy saints among the esteemed Sufis 
are like the spirit (ruh) coursing through the ummat from which it derives its 
inner life (batini hayat), which is the very root of life. Thus the Deobandi maslak 
understands that love and respect for the saints is vital to preserving faith (iman), 
but extremism (ghuluw) in love for them or in certain beliefs must not result in 
their deification. It understands that honoring the saints is a legal (shari’) duty 
but this does not mean worshipping them, prostrating towards or 
circumambulating their graves, taking oaths on them or making sacrifices for 
them.4 
 
 For Tayyib, ‘Deobandi’ identity was above all a certain ‘disposition’ (mizaj) - a word that 
could also be rendered as‘ taste’ or even as ‘humour’, in the medieval sense of the word - a 
‘disposition’ that the most pious Deobandis would naturally internalize in the process of self-
purification. It is a ‘disposition’ that one embodied through learning at the feet of one’s Sufi 
master and emulating the pious precedents of one’s elders and, above all, of the Prophet’s sunna. 
It is a disposition that one acquires not only through reading texts (though texts certainly contain 
a wealth of knowledge that can guide one towards perfected piety) but also through person-to-
person relationships, the relationships that, this chapter will show, are key to how Deoband 
coheres as a global movement and institution: “The Deobandi maslak is steadfast to its principles. 
                                                       
3 Ibid., 30. 
 
4 Ibid., 28. 
 146 
It neither idolizes people, nor regards mere religious education as sufficient in and of itself; 
neither people, nor books, nor pure intellection is sufficient on its own, nor reliance solely on the 
words and deeds of persons.”5  
This ‘disposition’, according to Tayyib, permeates every aspect of life; for students in a 
madrasa, exemplary ethical models are everpresent, but not in the form of texts. Sufism, it may 
be said, is in the madrasa but is not of it. It is not a formal part of the madrasa curriculum, but it 
pervades madrasa studies on an informal level. I will discuss this ‘pervasiveness’ of Sufism in 
the lives of madrasa students below; first, however, it will be important to outline exactly how 
and why Sufism is not a formal part of the Dar al-`Ulum curriculum.  
 
Sufism and the Dars-i Nizami  
The Dars-i Nizami, upon which contemporary Deobandi madrasas have based their 
curriculum in a truncated, modified form, did not incorporate any Sufi texts when it was first 
devised, nor does it today.6 Here I suggest at least two reasons for this. The first has to do with 
the traditional mode of transmitting Sufi knowledge orally between teachers and disciples, and 
not via texts.7 The second reason has to do with the historical particularities of the Nizami 
curriculum at its origins. The Dars-i Nizamiyya was created in the early eighteenth century by 
Mulla Nizam al-Din, descendant of a learned family of Lucknow to whom the Mughal emperor 
                                                       
5 Ibid., 16. 
 
6 Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, 46-52. 
 
7 Many scholars have made note of Sufism’s ‘orality’ and have linked this phenomenon to the broader 
dynamics of transmitting knowledge in Islam; just as Sufi knowledge is traditionally transmitted orally and 
Sufis’ pious dispositions are adopted through observing the exemplary conduct of one’s masters, 
knowledge within the madrasa itself is transmitted in a similar fashion. Thus the modes by which 
knowledge is transmitted and ethical dispositions are learned follow similar patterns in traditional Sufism 
and traditional Islamic education. See, for example, Carl W. Ernst, “The Textual Formation of Oral 
Teachings in Early Chishti Sufism,” in Jeffrey Richard Timm, ed. Texts in Context: Traditional 
Hermeneutics in South Asia, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. More general treatments 
include, among many others, Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in 
a Muslim Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, and Dale F. Eickelman, Knowledge and 
Power in Morocco: the Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985. 
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Aurangzeb had given a palace called Farangi Mahall, so-called because it had been previously 
occupied by a wealthy French (farang) merchant.8 Mulla Nizam al-Din gave far more emphasis 
to the ‘rational’ sciences (ma`qulat) such as rhetoric, logic and philosophy, and far less to the  
‘transmitted’ sciences (manqulat) such as hadith and Qur’an commentary. By stressing the 
rational sciences, argues Francis Robinson, Mulla Nizam al-Din sought to prepare young `ulama’ 
for work as scribes in the late-Mughal administration. Like the ‘transmitted’ sciences, Sufism was 
extraneous to the exigencies of training courtly scribes. As Robinson notes, “the emphasis of the 
Dars on training capable administrators for Muslim states rather than specialists in ‘religion’ per 
se may explain the dropping of mysticism from the course.” He goes on to clarify that “the lack 
of books on Sufism certainly did not mean any opposition on the part of Mulla Nizam al-Din and 
his family to the spiritual dimensions of Islam … [T]hey were, almost without exception, devout 
Sufis and no student could have sat at their feet without being aware of this.”9  
Mulla Nizam al-Din had, in fact, innovated an earlier curriculum that Shah Wali Allah 
Dihlawi developed as a teacher in Delhi’s Madrasa Rahimiyya. This curriculum did include the 
formal study of Sufi texts. J. M. Baljon goes so far as to state that “without doubt the chief 
attention in [Madrasa Rahimiyya] was given to mystic literature.”10 Yet in the post-Mughal era, 
Deoband had largely retreated from the task of creating literate and loyal government 
functionaries. If Robinson is correct in believing that Sufism was no longer germane to this 
administrative task, would not Sufism reappear in Deoband’s curriculum, as it apparently did at 
Farangi Mahall in the late nineteenth century?11 If we may speculate why it did not, it seems that 
                                                       
8 Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, 44-46. 
 
9 Ibid., 53-54. 
 
10 J. M. Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah, 1703-1762, Leiden: Brill, 1986, 4-5. See also 
Ghulam Sufi, Al-Minhaj: Being the Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational Institutions of 
India, Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Dihli, 1977, 69-70. The Madrasa Rahimiyya assigned students to read 
Suhrawardi’s (d. 1234) Awarif al-Ma`arif and multiple works by Jami (d. 1492) including his Sharh al-
Ruba’iyyat, his Naqd al-Nusus (a commentary on the Nusus of Qunawi, one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s students), and 
his commentary on the Lama`at of Iraqi (d. 1289). 
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textual and mystical pedagogies overlapped in earlier madrasa traditions, like Madrasa 
Rahimiyya and Farangi Mahall, precisely because they were based on familial ties. By way of 
contrast, Deoband was, in the words of Muhammad Qasim Zaman, borrowing from Anthony 
Giddens, “disembedded” from the patronage networks of Muslim emperors and local princes, the 
familial networks of a dynasty like that of Farangi Mahall or the Wali Allah line, and networks of 
Sufi pirs and their shrines.12 Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi explicitly sought to establish the 
Deobandi madrasa through patronage and support from individual Muslims, seeing government 
patronage as compromising intellectual and political independence, and seeing familial patronage, 
like that which governed Farangi Mahall, as antiquated and limiting.    
Ironically, one of the foremost living Deobandi scholars, Mufti Taqi Usmani, has called 
for a return to Sufism in the madrasa curriculum as part of a larger project of reform. In Our 
Educational System (Hamara Ta`limi Nizam), Taqi Usmani submits that Sufism was not part of 
the Deobandi syllabus because of a simple reason: the moral nurturing that comes from the 
presence of a Sufi master was once easy to obtain, but the moral decadence of the present day has 
thoroughly compromised the ability to gain this nurturing through sitting in the ‘presence’ 
(sohbat) of a Sufi alone. Hence he calls for re-introducing Sufi texts to madrasa syllabi: 
Sufism and ethics (akhlaq) were not included in madrasa coursework because 
the very environment of the madrasa trained one in ethics and the Sufi path, and 
for anything else attachment to a Sufi master would be sufficient. Nowadays it 
seems necessary that books on Sufism and ethics should be included into the 
foundations of madrasa coursework. To this end, select parts from Ghazali’s 
Hidaya al-Hidaya, Arba’in, and Ihya al-`Ulum, Suhrawardi’s Awarif al-Ma’arif, 
Thanawi’s Al-Takashshuf, and so on can be incorporated at different levels of 
coursework.13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
11 Robinson cites Altaf al-Rahman Qidwa’i, Qiyam-i Nizam-i Ta`lim, Lucknow, 1924 in making this 
observation of a return of Sufi texts in the Dars-i Nizamiyya at the Farangi Mahall, but qualifies the claim, 
noting “current Farangi Mahall tradition suggests, however, that the teaching of tasawwuf in the Dars was 
reserved for members of the family.” Francis Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic 
Culture in South Asia, 54, n. 13. 
 
12 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf Ali Thanawi, 9. 
 
13 Mufti Taqi Usmani, Hamara Ta`limi Nizam, Deoband: Maktaba-yi Dar al-`Ulum, 1998, 99. 
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Among the most necessary reforms, Usmani submits that “every madrasa [should] make Sufism 
and moral excellence (ihsan) part of the curriculum … The teachers and administration of every 
madrasa should establish a spiritual link with a Sufi shaykh for the purpose of reform and 
training.”14 He further recommends reading groups to study the lives of Deoband’s great Sufi 
scholars: 
Teachers and students should be required to meet together even once a week to 
study the sayings and lives of the great elders of the din, especially the great 
`ulama’ of Deoband. In this way, Hazrat Thanawi’s Arwah al-Salasa, the 
Tazkirat al-Rashid, Hayat-i Qasimi, Tazkirat al-Khalil, Hayat Shaykh al-Hind, 
Ashraf al-Savanih, Aap Biti, should be studied collectively to yield their 
benefits.15 
 
Taqi Usmani’s call to reincorporate classic Sufi texts and biographies of Deoband’s founding 
figures into madrasa curricula reveals an anxiety about whether Deoband’s traditional approach 
to teaching Sufism - by ‘example’ rather than by text - is effective. As we will see below, this 
anxiety arises partly through the fact that, without texts to anchor Sufi teachings, and without the 
ritual components of Sufism that the Deobandis have foresworn, Sufism amounts largely to a 
composite of abstruse and rarefied ethical teachings. 
 
Comparing Curricula: Deoband and Azaadville 
 We can best illustrate the absence of Sufi texts from the Deobandi curriculum, and 
appreciate the continuity of the Dars-i Nizami across time and space, by comparing the syllabi of 
Dar al-`Ulum Deoband and Madrasa Arabia Islamia at Azaadville.16 Besides the absence of Sufi 
texts, we will also see how Azaadville supplements the standard Deobandi curriculum with texts 
                                                       
14 Ibid., 94-95.  
 
15 Ibid., 95. These are the biographies of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Khalil 
Ahmad Saharanpuri, Mahmud al-Hasan, Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, and Muhammad Zakariyya, respectively. 
The latter is, to be precise, an autobiography. 
 
16 The source for all the details of Azaadville’s syllabus is Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Prospectus of 
Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Azaadville, South Africa: Madrasa Arabia Islamia, 2000. 
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on Deobandi history in order to instill a sense of continuity with earlier tradition among its 
students. 
Compared to the original Dars-i Nizami curriculum, the Deobandi curriculum 
incorporated far more works in hadith and law and far fewer in logic and philosophy. Azaadville 
shares this Deobandi emphasis on the ‘transmitted’ sciences (manqulat). At both Deoband and 
Azaadville, students study the biography (sira) of Muhammad, the Qur’an, Qur’anic exegesis 
(tafsir), Arabic grammar (sarf) and syntax (nahw), logic (mantiq), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
and its foundations (usul al-fiqh), Islamic beliefs (aqa’id), rules of inheritance, and some 
philosophy (falsafa).17 Both syllabi culminate with an extensive mastery of several collections of 
hadith, discussed below. But at Deoband, as well as at Azaadville and Zakariyya, no component 
of the syllabus deals directly with Sufism, whether defined in terms of personal character or 
devotional practices.18 
 A battery of core texts in Deoband’s classic adaptation of the Dars-i Nizami, emphasizing 
the manqulat over the ma`qulat,19 remains in place at Azaadville. This adaptation privileges the 
Qur’an and the Prophetic biography, and makes hadith the core and culmination of a Deobandi 
education. Azaadville differs somewhat in assigning simple introductory texts to transition 
                                                       
17 A concise syllabus of Dar ul-Ulum Deoband is available on the school’s website in both English and 
Urdu. Unfortunately, it does not provide unique URLs for each page on the website. On the Urdu page, 
http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/index.htm click on “nizam-i ta`lim” and on the English page, 
http://darululoom-deoband.com/english/index.htm, click on “System of Education” (last accessed 17 
August 2010). 
 
18 Though this section is primarily concerned with comparing Deoband’s and Azaadville’s current 
curricula, it may be useful to note the continuity of certain texts from the original Dars-i Nizami syllabus of 
Mulla Nizam al-Din and Azaadville. In fact, there are only six: Tabrizi’s Mishkat al-Masabih. Suyuti’s 
Tafsir Jalalayn, Baydawi’s Anwar al-Tanzil, Ubayd Allah bin Ma’sud’s Sharh al-Wiqaya, Allamah Mulla 
Jiwan’s Nur al-Anwar, and Marghinani’s Al-Hidaya. Manazir Ahsan Gilani (d. 1956), a graduate of 
Deoband who taught at Osmania University in Hyderabad and became an early advocate for madrasa 
reform, noted that continuity through the Dars-i Nizami was based on such a small number of texts that, he 
argued, the madrasa curriculum should, in fact, be extremely flexible, able to accommodate new 
intellectual and social needs. See Sayyid Manazir Ahsan Gilani, Pak o Hind men Musalmanon ka nizam-i 
ta`lim o tarbiyat, Lahore: Maktaba-yi Rahmaniyya, 1983. Muhammad Qasim Zaman discusses this point in 
“Bridging Traditions: Madrasas and their Internal Critics,” in Andrew Shyrock, ed. Islamophobia/ 
Islamophilia: beyond the politics of enemy and friend, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010, 123-
125. 
 
19 See Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, 101. 
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students into tackling the classic treatises. For example, in the study of the Qur’an, students at 
both institutions use Suyuti’s Tafsir Jalalayn20 and Baydawi’s Anwar al-Tanzil21 to cap the study 
of the Qur’an. But Azaadville also teaches an introductory text on the Qur’an in the first year, 
Maulana Mahfouz al-Rahman Nami’s Miftah al-Qur’an. In the principles of tafsir, both 
institutions use Shah Wali Allah’s Al-Fawz al-Kabir.22  
In the realm of hadith the two institutions display the most continuity, as mastery of 
hadith remains the linchpin of a Deobandi education. The two schools share a total of nine hadith 
texts. Students and Azaadville and Deoband both extensively learn the Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih 
Muslim, Jami` al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Abu Dawud, Sunan al-Nisa’i, Sunan ibn Majah - known as the 
‘six canonical collections’ (sahih sitta)23 - as well as Imam Malik’s Muwatta, Tabrizi’s Mishkat 
al-Masabih, and Sharh Ma’ni al-Athar. Again, however, Azaadville adds introductory materials 
to transition into higher hadith studies, including a student of Muhammad Zakariyya, Maulana 
‘Ashiq Ilahi’s (d. 2002) Zad al-Talibayn and Nawawi’s (d. 1278) Riyad al-Salihin.24 
 Likewise in Islamic jurisprudence, students at Deoband and Azaadville read almost 
identical texts: Shirinbali’s Nur al-Idah, Quduri’s Mukhtasar al-Quduri, Abdallah bin Mas`ud’s 
                                                       
20  Muhammad Jalal ad-din Suyuti (d. 1505) was an Egyptian polymath, prolific in nearly every field of 
traditional Islamic sciences. The Tafsir Jalalayn was begun by his teacher, Jalal ad-din Mahalli (d. 1459), 
and perfected by Suyuti. Jalal ad-din Mahalli, Tafsir al-Jalalayn, Cairo: Mu’assasat al-Mukhtar, 2004 is a 
recent edition, and a recent English translation is available as well: Tafsir al-Jalalayn, trans. Feras Hamza, 
Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2008. 
 
21 Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Baydawi was a late thirteenth-century Shafi`i commentator on the Qur’an. 
His Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta’wil is a work of tafsir that is largely derived from Zamakhshari’s Al-
Kashshaf. Baydawi attempted to purge his predecessor’s work of Mu’tazilite leanings. His success in this 
regard became a point of debate for later critics. See J. Robson, “Al-Baydawi,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd 
edition. 
 
22 Shah Wali Allah, Al-Fawz al-Kabir fi Usul al-Tafsir is a widely read and reprinted Qur’an commentary. 
See Al-Fawz al-Kabir, Deoband: Al-Maktaba al-Wahidiyya, 1974. It is also translated into English as The 
Principles of Qur’an Commentary, Islamabad: National Hijra Council, 1985. 
 
23 Though his focus is the sahihayn, the two authoritative collections of Bukhari and Muslim, Jonathan 
Brown’s The Canonization of Bukhari and Muslim also discusses the formation of a larger Sunni canon 
through the ‘sahih movement’. See The Canonization of Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function 
of the Sunni Hadith Canon, Leiden: Brill, 2007, especially 54-59. 
 
24 Nawawi is considered an authoritative source on Shafi`i fiqh and author of this simple primer on hadith. 
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Sharh al-Wiqaya, ‘Allamah Mulla Jiwan’s Nur al-Anwar, and Marghinani’s al-Hidaya. The latter 
is a compendium of Hanafi fiqh that had the single most widespread influence of any such texts in 
the Indian subcontinent.25 
 Yet beyond Qur’an, tafsir, hadith and fiqh, the curricula of Dar al-`Ulum Deoband and 
Madrasa Arabia Islamia at Azaadville share only a few texts in common: Tahawi’s Al-‘Aqida al-
Tahawiyya, Taftazani’s Sharh al-`Aqa’id, Sajavandi’s Sirajiyya for the study of Islamic 
inheritance, and two texts on logic: Janjuhi’s Taysir al-Mantiq and Khairabadi’s Mirqat. 
 What, then, are the primary differences between the two? First, the curriculum at 
Azaadville is abbreviated to six years rather than eight. Second, it incorporates more ‘modern’ 
material than the Deoband syllabus, with a curricular sub-focus on Islamic history and geography, 
the ability to learn languages such as Zulu for doing tabligh among local populations, and a 
module on ‘social issues’.26  
In all other divisions of Azaadville’s curriculum - contemporary jurisprudence, Arabic 
grammar and morphology, literature, rhetoric and eloquence, writing and composition, ‘general 
knowledge’, history and geography, calligraphy, ‘defense of Islam’, ‘biographies of great 
Muslims’, ‘exposition of the greatness of Allah in the study of nature’, and ‘social welfare’ - the 
Azaadville madrasa shares no texts with the Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, perhaps partly due to the 
fact that Dar al-`Ulum does not have some of the more contemporary divisions in its curriculum. 
And it is, by and large, in these supplementary fields of learning where the madrasa incorporates 
some key texts that work to solidify its participation in a ‘Deobandi’ tradition. For example, in the 
                                                       
25 Y. Meron, “Marghinani, His Method and His Legacy,” Islamic Law and Society 9, 3 (2002): 410-416. 
 
26 This example, among others, belies the common suggestion that madrasa education is thoroughly 
‘medieval’ in nature and makes no concessions whatsoever to addressing contemporary social needs. While 
I was unable to procure details on the ‘social issues’ component of the Azaadville curriculum, the 
prospectus states that “The Alim often has to fulfill the role of a social and welfare worker in his 
community due to the position of respect and leadership that he occupies. Basic training in the more 
common skills and demands of this role like counseling for marital problems, AIDS, drugs, arbitration, 
financial aid and assistance to the indigent and other social-welfare related issues are briefly covered in the 
fourth year. One period a week is devoted to this.” Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Prospectus of Madrasah 
Arabia Islamia, Azaadville, South Africa: Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 2000, 83. 
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field of `aqa’id, they read one of the core ideological treatises expounding ‘Deobandi’ thought 
and Deobandi-Barelwi differences, Yusuf Ludhianwi’s Ikhtilaf-i Ummat aur Sirat-i Mustaqim.27 
In its division on the ‘defense of Islam’ (al-dafa` ‘an al-Islam), students read one of Ashraf `Ali 
Thanawi’s texts, Ashraf al-Jawab, which arms students with readily accessible answers to 
common polemical questions put towards Islam and Muslims.28 Students also read essays by the 
second amir of the Tablighi movement, Ihtisham al-Hasan, such as “Muslim Degeneration and its 
Only Remedy,” that is part of the Tablighi vade mecum, Muhammad Zakariyya’s Faza’il-i 
A`mal.29 The madrasa also compiled and published a series of texts for students, such as Akabir-i 
Hind wa Idarat-i Islamiyya, described as “a life sketch of Shah Wali Allah and his spiritual 
progeny, the elders of Deoband.”30 It is only in Azaadville’s division of study on ‘biographies of 
great Muslims’ where we can find a text that has anything to do directly with Sufism: a 
publication by the madrasa itself, A’imma-i Tasawwuf, which, in its own words, “contains a brief 
life-sketch of the founders of the Salasil-e Arba’ah (four spiritual orders) and other great saints of 
Islamic History.”31  
 In short, Azaadville maintains the traditional Dars-i Nizami emphasis on hadith and fiqh, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent, conscientiously fosters a sense of students participating and 
                                                       
27 I have already mentioned the importance of this work as a polemical statement of ‘Deobandi’ identity. 
Students also read an English-language polemical work by a Maryam Jameelah, Islam versus Ahle Kitab, 
first published in 1968, that explores, in the words of Azaadville’s Prospectus, “the imminent dangers of 
Christian missionary strategies and Zionist malevolent designs on Muslims and the Muslim world.” Islam 
versus Ahl al-Kitab, Lahore: Mohammed Yusuf Khan, 1968. 
 
28 Thanawi’s apologetical treatise responds to common accusations against Muslims, offering in some sense 
a snapshot of Western biases against Muslims from his day, some of which are no longer as relevant today, 
others that are still common stereotypes. He trains his readers to field questions pertaining to issues such as 
whether Islam was ‘spread by the sword’, European opinions of Islamic law and jihad, whether Muslims 
‘worship’ the ka`ba, fate and predestination (qadr o qimat) in Islam, and so on. See Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, 
Ashraf al-Jawab, Saharanpur: Maktaba-yi Thanawi o Deoband, 1990. 
 
29 Although this essay is included in the Faza’il-i ‘A’mal, it is a translation of an Urdu essay, Musalmanon 
ki Maujuda pasti ka wahid `Ilaj. The students at Azaadville actually read the text in English as part of their 
training in English, one of the required languages of study. 
 
30 Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Prospectus of Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 80-81. I was unable to locate a copy 
of this text. 
 
31Ibid., 80.  
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continuing a specifically ‘Deobandi’ identity. But there are no texts in the Deobandi syllabus or 
the Azaadville syllabus that engage explicitly with Sufism, whether the great corpus of ‘classic’ 
works of Sufism or works composed in modern South Asia. 
 
Sufi Ethics ‘in’ and ‘of’ the madrasa: Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville 
 Where, then, ‘is’ Sufism in a Deobandi madrasa, if not in its texts? At Madrasa Arabia 
Islamia, informally known as Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville, Sufism, especially in its ethical 
configurations, ‘colors’ the act of learning itself. Learning is a pious act intricately and intimately 
bound up with embodiment of Sufi ethics in daily life and the pedagogies of the madrasa. Yet 
this Sufism, arguably like Deobandi Sufism as a whole, is so diffuse and dispersed that it is 
difficult to ‘locate’ it in any precise sense. To the extent that Deobandi Sufism is in a sense at 
once ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’, one may speculate whether there is an acute lack of ritual or 
devotional elements to ground Deobandi Sufism in a tangible form. The ‘everywhereness’ of 
Deobandi Sufism should not come as a surprise; Deobandis assimilate Sufism to ethics and ethics 
to Sufism, because ethics are indistinguishable from the carefully crafted piety that Deobandis 
find in the Prophetic sunna. This is the sort of Sufism that Mohammed Akram Nadwi ascribed to 
a fellow student at Nadwa: “He is a very practical person. Although he may not be conversant 
with the philosophy of Sufism, he is no less than a Sufi in practice. He is characterized by piety, 
virtue, honesty, truth, purity and discipline.”32 
 This section of the chapter looks first at some limitations to the fieldwork I conducted at 
Azaadville; it then proceeds to consider how students’ understanding of their place in a 
‘Deobandi’ tradition is inseparable from the Sufi initiations they have taken with their teachers, 
especially the principal Abdul Hamid Ishaq and the Shaykh al-Hadith Fazlur Rahman Azmi; next 
                                                       
32 Mohammed Akram Nadwi, Madrasah Life: A Student’s Day at Nadwat al-Ulama, London: Turath 
Publishing, 2007, 9. 
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I explore some debates that I had with the students that illuminate their engagements with Sufi 
ethics. 
 
Limitations on fieldwork in madrasas 
My fieldwork at Azaadville relied both on active conversation with students and teachers 
and passive observance of daily life in and around the madrasa. On some occasions the 
conversations were directed; for formal interviews, I asked a series of questions (see Appendix A) 
but very quickly realized that these serial lists of questions, which I had conceived even before 
arriving in the field, would be of limited value. I also encountered resistance to recording 
interviews; from the outset, interviewees were discomfited by the presence of a recorder, such 
that I eventually stopped attempting to record interviews. I opted for recording copious interview 
notes by hand, along with quotes. As I discuss below, students and faculty both seemed to find 
the interview process somewhat stilted; the natural give-and-take of informal conversations with 
students was far more illuminating.  
There is very little work that can be justifiably called ‘ethnography’ in a madrasa.33 On 
the one hand, scholars have commented on difficulties of conducting fieldwork in madrasas as an 
‘outsider’.34 On the other, one can find useful depictions of madrasa life by madrasa students that 
                                                       
33 A few noteworthy anthropological studies of madrasas have emerged in recent years. See for example, 
Arshad Alam, “The Enemy Within: Madrasa and Muslim Identity in North India,” Modern Asian Studies 
42, 2/3 (2008): 605-627; Masooda Bano, “Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in 
Pakistan,” Journal of Islamic Studies 18, 1 (2007): 43-68; Sophie Gilliat-Ray, “Closed Doors: (Not) 
Accessing Deobandi dar ul-uloom in Britain,” Fieldwork in Religion 1, 1 (2005): 7-33; Humayun Kabir, 
“Replicating the Deobandi model of Islamic schooling: the case of a Quomi madrasa in a district town of 
Bangladesh,” Contemporary South Asia 17, 4 (2009): 415-428; and Marieke Winkelmann, From Behind 
the Curtain: A Study of a Girls’ Madrasa in India, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005. Farish 
Noor’s The Qur’an and Cricket: Travels through the madrasahs of Asia and other stories, Kuala Lumpur: 
Silverfish Books, 2009 is a somewhat less conventional approach to the subject, based on the author’s first-
hand experiences at Deoband and elsewhere. 
 
34 See for example, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, “Closed Worlds: (Not) Accessing Deobandi dar ul-uloom in 
Britain,” Fieldwork in Religion 1,1 (2005): 7-33. Gilliat-Ray attempted, unsuccessfully, to gain entrance to 
several British Deobandi madrasas for an extended study of the students and their motivations for taking 
up religious study. Here she reflects on taking rejection from a field site as a legitimate form of data in and 
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are immensely insightful, but such works do not typically engage with the concepts and 
problematics of contemporary work in the social sciences or religious studies.35 When I first 
conceived this project, I had hoped to spend a significant amount of time observing a single 
madrasa. I quickly realized this would not be a viable option, short of literally becoming a 
madrasa student.  
On the occasion that I spoke with students informally about their experiences as students 
and as Sufis, initially they typically referred me to speak with their teachers, who often acted as 
their Sufi master as well. There was an implicit presumption that students’ own experiences in the 
madrasa - intellectual, pedagogical, ethical - were of little consequence to me and that, rather, I 
was there to gain some ‘knowledge’ about Islam, Sufism or the Deobandi tradition, so why 
should the students attempt to answer my queries if their teachers could do so far better than 
they? It was difficult at first to disabuse students of this approach to my presence.  
Another difficulty is that madrasas remain highly suspicious, for obvious reasons, of 
outsiders purporting to ‘study’ them, having been subject to intense and often unwarranted 
scrutiny for the last decade. As I have noted in the introduction to this dissertation, critics of 
madrasas, ranging from journalists and foreign policy analysts to bloggers, have vilified them for 
all sorts of reasons. My interlocutors were all too aware of this coverage. The Dar al-`Ulum 
Azaadville even published a short pamphlet, Propaganda Against Religious Institutes, which 
states in no uncertain terms how numerous forces had aligned, in the author’s view, to regard 
madrasas as supremely suspect. The text notes the strength of the Deobandi network of 
madrasas, surmising that students of “the Deobandi school of thought number in excess of nine 
hundred thousand,” and states, referring primarily to Deobandi institutions in Pakistan:  
                                                                                                                                                                  
of itself. Luckily, I did gain access, but my access was not without certain anxieties on the part of my 
interviewees. 
 
35 For example, see Mohammad Akram Nadwi’s Madrasah Life: A Student’s Day at Nadwat al-Ulama, 
London: Turath Publishing, 2007. The original Urdu account was published as Nadwe ka ek din, Karachi: 
Majlis-i Nashriyyat-i Islam, 2006. 
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The English media … have once again started their full onslaught against the 
Dini Madaris [religious schools] … Everyone knows that the Taliban were 
graduates of Dini Madaris. If the enemies of Islam think that they can convince 
the present military government of targeting the religious institutes, they are 
dearly mistaken because our army protects the beliefs and ideologies of the 
country just as it safeguards the borders.36 
 
My interlocutors were, therefore, nonplussed at best as to why a white, non-Muslim American 
wished to do ‘fieldwork’ inside their institutions, and my attempts to disabuse them of their 
suspicions usually began by explaining the very notion of ‘fieldwork’. What do I want to learn 
from them, and why can’t I find this knowledge in books about Islam? Who would be reading my 
dissertation? Why am I interested in madrasas and in Deoband particularly? I framed my interest 
in Deoband, accurately and sincerely, in terms of resisting and interrogating the dominant 
conversation about Deoband within journalistic circles, an approach that I believe helped them to 
see my approach as sympathetic and nuanced.  
There are many aspects of quotidian madrasa life that I do not cover here, in an attempt 
to stay as focused as possible on the way the Deobandi appropriation and critique of Sufism 
informs the personal and intellectual lives of the students. This is not to say the quotidian lives of 
students are not interesting or significant. One of the more endearing portraits to emerge from 
Muhammad Akram Nadwi’s recollections of madrasa life in Lucknow account is that students in 
the madrasa are still students, after all, and act accordingly. Nadwi shows young men doing what 
young men do: waking up late, dozing off in class, expressing boredom with certain subjects 
(especially grammar), or indulging in friendly rivalries with other students.37 But I did not witness 
this side of the madrasa. I have no doubt that it exists, at Azaadville, at Newcastle and elsewhere, 
just as it does at Deoband itself; in my own experience at Deoband some students were quite 
‘playful’ in their approach to a truly novel stranger, sometimes gathering in small groups to 
                                                       
36 Muhammad Mazhar Saheb, Propaganda against Religious Institutes, Azaadville: Madrasah Arabia 
Islamia, 2000, 30 and 4-5. The author is a Pakistani Deobandi scholar of the Ashraful Madaris madrasa in 
Karachi. What is especially striking is the date; this pamphlet was written a year before 2001 and the 
barrage of anti-madrasa journalism that came in its wake. 
 
37 See especially James Piscatori’s introduction to Mohammed Akram Nadvi, Madrasah Life, xiii-xiv. 
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whisper in each other’s ears and nod subtly in my direction. And then again, there were those 
students at Deoband who could not have possibly seemed less concerned about my presence. In 
contrast, students I encountered in South Africa, and at Azaadville in particular, seemed careful 
and deliberate in representing only their most dignified selves to an outsider. This was a sort of 
adab - granted, not the stylized respect and deference (ikram) that one shows another Muslim; for 
instance, one of Azaadville’s students refused to shake my hand in the Western fashion, 
preferring the two-handed sunna handshake (musahafah), but since I am not a Muslim he would 
not extend this form of greeting to me. I learned this, rather awkwardly, by extending my hand in 
the ‘Western’ fashion, only to have it rebuffed, and then on a second occasion, thinking I had 
simply erred in not shaking with both hands, attempted that and had that gesture rebuffed too. 
 
Azaadville’s Madrasa Arabia Islamia (Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville) 
 Azaadville is a small Indian neighborhood, about nine square kilometers, created under 
the Group Areas Act about 30 kilometers west of central Johannesburg. The name ‘Azaadville’ is 
somewhat cynical insofar as azaad is an Urdu word meaning ‘freedom’; the city was created 
under conditions that were anything but free. Situated next to the black township of Kagiso, and 
between the larger Johannesburg suburb enclaves of Krugersdorp and Randfontein, Azaadville is 
populated by a mix of primarily Muslim and Hindu middle-class Indian families, much like the 
substantially larger and better known Indian township of Lenasia to the south. Both Lenasia and 
Azaadville formed in the wake of forced expulsion of Indians from central Johannesburg after the 
Group Areas Act of 1950.38 One of the most striking aspects of Azaadville’s landscape is that, 
                                                       
38 For the effect on this act on the development of Indian townships in Durban, see Brij Maharaj, 
“Apartheid, Urban Segregation, and the Local State: Durban and the Group Areas Act in South Africa,” 
Urban Geography 18, 2 (2010): 135-154. A. J. Christopher’s The Atlas of Apartheid, London, New York: 
Routledge, 1994 remains a landmark study of apartheid urban geography. Surprisingly, to my knowledge, 
there is no published work on the expulsion of Indians from central Johannesburg into townships such as 
Lenasia. One of the few works to address the effect of apartheid social planning on Indians is M. W. 
Swanson, “The Asiatic Menace: Creating Segregation in Durban, 1870-1900,” International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 16, 3 (1983): 401-421. 
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upon approaching it after driving through the cluttered and crowded township of Kagiso, one 
notices how it is surrounded by an undeveloped green belt at least one kilometer long on each 
side. Whether or not this is a deliberately planned racial ‘buffer’ or an accident of urban 
development is unclear, but the brutal logic of apartheid-era urban planning seems evident even 
here, on Johannesburg’s easternmost edge; Azaadville is the outcome of apartheid government 
efforts to separate the South Africa’s Indians along generic racial lines, ignoring ethnic, linguistic 
and religious differences among them.  
 I conducted fieldwork at Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville madrasa between October 2009 and 
January 2010. On the first occasion, I visited the bookstore and spoke informally with madrasa 
administration; during the next series of visits, I visited classes and interviewed students, both 
formally and informally. On the final visits I attended Tuesday-evening majalis for students and 
the public with Abdul Hamid Ishaq, the principal. It was clear from the beginning that students 
perceived me with a mixture of curiosity, courtesy, suspicion and opportunity - in the latter case, 
as a potential convert to Islam, which I address below in light of the students’ understanding of 
Sufism. I had numerous conversations over the course of my fieldwork - at times vexing but 
always illuminating - on subjects ranging from the contemporary state of Sufi piety, Islam and the 
media, whether there is a Deobandi ‘movement’, what it means to be doing ‘Islamic studies’ in 
the secular academy, and on the very purpose of a religious knowledge. As I discuss below, these 
issues illuminate how Azaadville students conceive of themselves as ethical Muslims and as 
Sufis. In all of these conversations, students drew widely from the moral and intellectual 
resources of their madrasa educations and Sufi initiations, seeing both as mutually 
complementary dispositions. 
Madrasa Arabia Islamia was conceived in 1981 by several `ulama’ staying in the Sufi 
khanqah of Muhammad Zakariyya in Saharanpur, India. By 1982, the madrasa had been 
 160 
established at Azaadville with eight students in the `alim course.39 Today the madrasa houses 
some seven hundred to eight hundred students, boasting a distinctly international mix; one student 
surmised that slightly less than half of the students were from outside of South Africa. I met, for 
example, black students from other parts of southern Africa, white European students, and 
American students of Indian descent. A few students with whom I spoke had initially hoped to go 
to Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, but were unable to procure student visas; since 2001, India has become 
stricter in issuing visas for madrasa study to non-Indians. All with whom I spoke knew about the 
reputation for learning and piety that Azaadville represented in the global Deobandi community. 
The medium of Madrasa Arabia Islamia at Azaadville is a mixture of Arabic, English and 
Urdu,40 and teaches mainly Hanafi fiqh but attempts to offer an overview of Shafi`i fiqh for its 
non-Indian students.41 The madrasa itself is a large, three-story brown brick facility that 
surrounds a spacious green courtyard. Palm trees and flowers grow copiously along the edges, 
where a covered arcade leads to dorms and classrooms. To the right of the entrance is the 
bookstore and mosque, topped with a large green dome and open to local Muslims for prayer and 
on Friday’s for jum`a prayers. A mosque with an imposing green dome overlooks the courtyard. 
In the middle of the courtyard stands a large green water tower. The madrasa includes an 
attached mosque, a section for teaching Qur’an memorization, for teaching hadith and for 
teaching the issuing of fatwas (ifta’), twenty classrooms, a library, kitchen, laundry, dining hall, 
and printing press. The latter produces numerous publications by the madrasa’s faculty as well as 
a periodic newsletter, An-Nasihah, for the general Muslim public that is distributed in the 
madrasa’s mosque and other nearby Muslim centers. On certain occasions, especially during 
Ramadan, the masjid is used as an informal ‘khanqah’ where local Muslims can stay for long 
                                                       
39 Ebrahim Muhammad, A Guide to Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 6-7. 
 
40 In terms of language abilities, the two criteria for entry into the madrasa are proficiency in English and a 
basic ability to read and recite the Qur’an. Most entry-level courses are conducted in English, with 
instruction rapidly switching to Urdu. Arabic is the medium for some upper-level courses. 
 
41 Ibid., 5. 
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periods to pray and meditate. 
 
Who is a ‘Deobandi’ anyway? 
 As I discuss in the introduction, because there is no official certification for madrasas 
that are part of the Deobandi network, defining precisely what or who is ‘Deobandi’ becomes 
problematic. One interviewee, in a separate context, flatly asserted that there is “no Deobandi 
movement.”42 This sort of assertion emerges, I would suggest, out of the belief that Deoband 
represents, as we have seen with Qari Muhammad Tayyib, a comprehensive version of Sunni 
Islam, the very ‘essence’ of Sunni piety as it were. 
Here I will show how the notion of ‘Deoband’ at Azaadville is configured partly through 
supplementary readings about Deobandi scholars of the subcontinent and their achievements, and 
partly through the Sufi chains of initiation (silsila) between teachers and their pupils that stretch 
back to the subcontinent; often in fact, for the students at Azaadville, one’s instructor in hadith is 
likely also to be one’s Sufi master. Teacher-student relationships such as this one are equally as 
constitutive of the global Deoband network than any abstract allegiance to ‘Deoband’ as a place, 
movement, or institution. And precisely because these relationships are most often between Sufi 
masters and their disciples, the centrality of Sufism within Deoband becomes part of how 
students form a sense of identity. 
One paradox that emerges in attempting to identify a madrasa such as Azaadville’s as 
‘Deobandi’ is that even though its principal and senior scholars may be graduates of the Dar al-
`Ulum Deoband and closely linked madrasas of the subcontinent, it is ultimately an institution 
that is open to all; there is no ideological test for becoming a student at the madrasa at 
Azaadville. Ideally, they serve any student who wishes to study there, provided he is a Muslim, 
has a strong command of English (the lingua franca for the first couple of years, until one masters 
Urdu and eventually Arabic), and is willing to abide by the strict codes of conduct (being asleep 
                                                       
42 Interview with Muhammad Alie Moosagie, Cape Town, 24 June 2009. 
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by a certain hour, prompt attendance at communal prayers, shunning television even if visiting 
one’s parents, and so on).  
 The students at Azaadville are well aware that the principal, Abdul Hamid Ishaq, is a 
khalifa of Hakim Muhammad Akhtar, who in turn studied closely with Ashraf `Ali Thanawi. 
Students spoke proudly of being a mere two ‘links’ in the chain from Thanawi, the greatest 
Deobandi scholar of the twentieth century. In this way, students at the madrasa do have a distinct 
comprehension of themselves as continuing a certain ‘Deobandi’ tradition. All with whom I 
spoke knew of the contributions of Deoband’s founders, such as Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, and were conversant with ideas and contributions of Thanawi. 
Thus students do have a strong sense of the prestige of their institution and its place in Deobandi 
history. Yet this too generates a certain tension; students expressed pride in continuing a 
Deobandi tradition, at the same time that their engagement with Sufism trains them to diminish 
their pride (kibr) altogether.43 
 Sufi moral discipline informs pedagogies outside the classroom. Students will typically 
go to their teachers for moral advice and training regardless of whether they have a formal 
initiation with them. One of the students who studies hadith with Abdul Hamid Ishaq explains 
that not all the students who go to him are initiated Sufis. This student frequently consults Abdul 
Hamid Ishaq for advice on self-reformation but is not technically speaking his initiate.44 This sort 
of relationship hints at the informality of Sufi pedagogy, even among students in the madrasa; 
more broadly, as we will see below, it characterizes the way the general public who attend Abdul 
Hamid Ishaq’s majalis relate to him. Just as Fazlur Rahman Azmi, Azaadville’s Shaykh al-
Hadith, kept a ‘reformative relationship’ (islahi ta`alluq) with Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, students 
                                                       
43 Hakim Muhammad Akhtar’s work is particularly concerned with eliminating pride as among the most 
essential tasks of the Sufi path. Pride (kibr) is opposed to gratitude (shukr) towards God, the most cherished 
of traits. See Hakim Muhammad Akhtar, Ilaj-i Kibr, Karachi: Kutub Khana-yi Mazhari, 47. 
 
44 Confidential interview, ‘Qasim’, 2 December 2009. 
 163 
maintain similar relationships with their teachers, even if they are not technically their initiates.45 
The ‘reformative relationship’, which resonates with the Deobandi emphasis on ‘reform’ (islah) 
in all aspects of personal and social life, is crucial in understanding how teachers guide the moral 
development of their students, even those who are not their Sufi pupils. 
 One student, whom I will call ‘ Qasim’, described the Sufi relationship that he keeps with 
Abdul Hamid Ishaq and the place of Sufism in the madrasa. He stated, “Here we study fiqh and 
hadith. We do not ‘study’ Sufism. But, we try to make Sufism part of what we study. Sufism is 
really about cleansing yourself inside, cleansing your heart.” He continued, “Sufism is taqwa 
[repentance]. There is no difference [between the two].” He described his own experience with 
Abdul Hamid Ishaq, a khalifa of Hakim Muhammad Akhtar as well as an initiate of Muhammad 
Zakariyya. While he and other Sufi initiates are free to consult Maulana Abdul Hamid between 
‘asr salat and maghrib salat on most days of the week, Qasim prefers to write letters to his 
master “even if he is next door.” This method is “considered more respectful and it is easier to 
formulate your thoughts.” Qasim explains that communications between Sufi master and disciple 
transpired via hand-written letters for hundreds of years. He does not criticize the digitalization of 
Sufi correspondence, but he does not have an email address of his own. The personal nature of 
hand-written correspondence continues a tradition that actively maintains the proximity and 
spiritual intimacy between master and disciple.46  
Another way that the madrasa cultivates conscientiousness of a larger Deobandi tradition 
is through publishing short biographical pamphlets on major Deobandis - including Hajji 
Imdadullah, Gangohi, Nanautawi, Husain Ahmad Madani, Thanawi, Muhammad Zakariyya, and 
                                                       
45 Fazlur Rahman Azmi took initiation with Muhammad Zakariyya and maintained a ‘reformative 
relationship’ (islahi ta’alluq) with Mahmud Hasan Gangohi. Mufti Atiqur Rahman Azmi, A Brief 
Biography of Shaykh al-Hadith Fazlur Rahman Azmi, Azaadville: Madrasah Da’watul Haq, 2008, 77-79. 
 
46 One could compare how Masihullah Khan maintained a detailed correspondence with his disciples and 
insisted on the virtues of hand-written letters in fostering islah. He believed, for example, that when his 
disciples wrote him seeking islah-related advice, they must leave a large margin on both sides of the page 
so that he could write individualized commentary in the letter. Because of the volume of letters he received, 
he eventually limited his disciples to two letters per month, which had to be a maximum length of two 
pages each. Muhammad Faruq, Zikr-i Masihulummat, 68. 
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others - that `ulama’ at Azaadville compose in English for students and for local Muslims who 
visit the bookstore. These biographies praise the achievements of early Deobandi scholars and 
foster a sense of pride and place for Azaadville’s students.47 Written in simple English for young 
readers, they advance a few key narratives about Deoband and Azaadville’s place within a 
Deobandi network: first, that Deoband was an utterly unique development in Indian Islamic 
history; second, that the Deobandis’ struggle against the British was a noble act, an exemplary 
model for contemporary struggles; and third, that its origins were humble and that its founders 
were motivated solely by God’s worship. This latter sentiment is echoed in the prospectus, which 
states that the Deobandi `ulama’ pursue religious knowledge for its own sake, not as an accessory 
to modern ‘career’ advancement: “There were many Ulama of Deoband who did not even take a 
certificate after qualifying as this was not their aim. Religious institutes are built upon the pillars 
of sincerity, piety and the enthusiasm to serve mankind.”48 
The introduction to an Azaadville-published biography of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi 
highlights the Deobandi network as it is configured through students and teachers:  
In India there is a Madrasah where every year people from far off places come 
and study the knowledge of din as well as other aspects of religion … The 
students of this madrasah are the students of Allah and the Rasuls (messengers). 
You may ask how? The Ambiya, alaihimus salam, taught their close associates 
and in turn they taught others. One scholar produced other scholars. In this way 
knowledge spread far and wide and it reached us. Whenever students of this 
madrasah convey Rasulullah’s advices and teachings, they mention their 
teachers’ names who taught them. This link (chain) is from the time of 
Rasulullah. Are they not then the students of Rasulullah?49  
                                                       
47 The five biographies are all written by Maulana Maqbul Ahmad Sewharwi (b. 1883), a scholar who 
wrote short primers for girls’ education in India (see Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery, Craig Jeffrey, 
“Islamization, Gentrification and Domestication: ‘A Girls’ Islamic Course’ and Rural Muslims in Western 
Uttar Pradesh,” Modern Asian Studies 38 (1) 2004: 1-53, at 4), and also composed a biography of Sayyid 
Ahmad, Imam-i Tabligh Hazrat Sayyid Ahmad Shahid, Delhi: Al-Jami’yat Book Depot, 1971. The five 
short biographies published by Azaadville are: Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, Azaadville: Madrasa 
Baqiyatus Salihat, 2004; Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Azaadville: Madrasa Baqiyatus Salihat, 2004; 
Muhaddith Gangohi, Azaadville: Madrasa Baqiyatus Salihat, 2004; Hadrat Haji Imdadullah Sahib, 
Azaadville: Madrasa Baqiyatus Salihat, 2005; Shaikhul Hind Hadrat Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi, 
Azaadville: Madrasa Baqiyatus Salihat, 2007.  
 
48 Ebrahim Muhammad, A Guide to Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 6. 
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The madrasa also supplements the Dars-i Nizami curriculum with supplementary readings on 
Deobandi history. While Azaadville does not make sectarian distinctions between Deobandis, 
Barelwis, Ahl-i Hadith and others a regular part of the curriculum, it does incorporate a handful 
of texts that impart a certain degree of knowledge about where Deoband fits into the wider Sunni 
world. They read, for example, Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianvi’s Ikhtilaf-i Ummat aur Sirat-i 
Mustaqim, a popular polemical treatise outlining the major differences between Deobandis and 
Barelwis.50 
 
On ‘studying’ Islam 
 Students at Azaadville often used the language of Sufism to describe not just 
relationships with their teachers but the very purpose of studying in a madrasa. This orientation 
to their studies first became obvious in a number of conversations about the nature of Islamic 
education and, indeed, the goals of knowledge itself. 
When I first met ‘Qasim’, we were exiting Mufti Azmi’s ifta’ course on a cool afternoon 
in November. Most of the students seemed diffident about my presence; ‘Qasim’, on the other 
hand, accosted me directly to inquire about what I was doing, who invited me to come, what I 
hoped to get out of my visit, and so on. In giving an account of myself, naturally I first produced 
my business card. I had given little thought to the phrases that I used to describe myself on my 
card - ‘College of Arts and Sciences’, ‘Ph.D. candidate’, and most problematic for my purposes 
here, ‘Islamic studies’. I could not have expected that this simple interaction would lead to a 
series of conversations in the coming weeks in which we worked together to parse, in the most 
precise terms possible, what exactly I claimed to be doing in doing ‘Islamic studies’. Nor could I 
                                                                                                                                                                  
49 Maulana Maqbul Ahmad Sewharwi, Maulana Qasim Nanotwi, Azaadville: Madrasa Baqiatus Saalihaat, 
2004, 3-4.  
 
50 Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Prospectus of Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 45. See Muhammad Yusuf 
Ludhianvi, Ikhtilaf-i Ummat aur Sirat-i Mustaqim, Lahore: Maktabah-yi Madania, 1992.   
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have predicted that this conversation would prompt us to call into question certain presumptions 
about the very purpose of knowledge. “What is all this knowledge you have? I mean what is it 
for?” asked another student, whom I will call ‘Dawud’; with his emphasis on the for, he 
intentionally seemed to draw into relief the false ‘utility’ of my ‘knowledge’ of Islam, in contrast 
to the sincerity of motivations that they claimed for their knowledge. In these conversations, he 
actively invoked the Sufi vocabulary of ‘sincerity’ of purpose, ikhlas.51  
Qasim, Dawud and others were puzzled by the notion of an academic approach to Islam. 
As I was asked many times, how I could be exposed to the message of Islam on a daily basis and 
not submit to it? What good is religious knowledge, after all, if it is not applied to oneself? I 
could have predicted least of all that my interlocutors at Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville would accuse 
my knowledge of being “dead,” “mere words on paper,” unless I allowed them to act to 
“penetrate my heart” as their learning had penetrated them. “What’s the point of all this learning 
if not to bring you nearer to God?” asked a student I will call ‘Rashid’. When Rashid spoke of 
bringing oneself “nearer to God,” he did not explicitly reference ‘nearness’ in the classic Sufi 
usage of the term (cf. qurbat, ‘nearness’ or ‘proximity’ to God, for example) but one student did 
draw a direct homology between the purity of one’s motivations in gaining religious knowledge 
in the madrasa and the sincerity one must find even to begin the Sufi path.52 At a later point, I 
discovered in Abdul Hamid Ishaq’s own work that “Zikrullah softens the heart.”53 During a long 
conversation with Rashid after one of Abdul Hamid Ishaq’s majalis, he referenced the ikhlas that 
one must bring to one’s studies, among the very first ‘stations’ (maqamat) in the Sufi path.54 Just 
                                                       
51 Confidential interview, ‘Dawud’, 22 November 2009. 
 
52 There are numerous discussions of the centrality of this concept in Sufism. For one, see William 
Chittick’s Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Texts, Albany: State University of 
New York, 1992, especially 6-12. 
 
53 Abdul Hamid Ishaq, The Reality of Tasawwuf and Ihsan, 10-11. Qari Muhammad Tayyib also used the 
language of ‘softness’ to describe the effect of zikr on the heart. Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Importance of 
Zikrullah, 2-3. 
 
54 Confidential interview, ‘Rashid’, 8 December 2009. 
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as one cannot embark on the Sufi path without ikhlas, he explained, so one cannot embark on a 
course of religious learning without the same disposition, and for the same reason. If fame, 
wealth, praise or any motive other than worship of God is present in the hearts of a student, then 
his task is compromised from the very beginning.55 
 But how do students manage the very real needs of providing for one’s family, paying 
one’s bills, and so on? Some students seemed outright discomfited by my questions about what 
they wanted to ‘do’ with their learning after they had graduated from the madrasa. The vocational 
prospects of a madrasa degree are tenuous yet, frankly, unimportant for the students with whom I 
spoke. This is not to say that they did not have practical plans; Qasim and Dawud wanted to work 
as imams in their local communities. Another student I will call ‘Muhammad’ wanted to teach 
hadith in a madrasa, perhaps even founding his own madrasa. Rashid, on the other hand, wanted 
to spend the rest of his life studying. The prospectus for the Azaadville madrasa exemplifies 
students’ approach to studying in a madrasa, opening with a quote from Muhammad Yusuf 
Binnori’s Dalil-i Jami`at al-`Ulum al-Islamiyya: 
The aim of these institutes is not to attain a degree and thereafter to be employed 
in some government department, educational faculty or to become an orator or an 
author. The primary aim of these institutes is to attain proficiency in the Islamic 
sciences in order to serve Din and to give one’s life for the service of Islam. The 
student should be courageous to proclaim the truth by attaining his true 
inheritance from the Ambiya [Prophets] without seeking secular wealth, position, 
the love of fame or the praise of the people.56  
 
The madrasa’s self-published Guide to Madrasa Arabia Islamia describes “self 
reformation” as a “department” of the madrasa.57 Likewise, a short treatise of Masihullah Khan, 
                                                       
55 One could cite Qushayri, for example, among others. See Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufism: Al-risala Al-
qushayriyya fi ‘ilm al-tasawwuf, trans. Alexander D. Knysh. Reading: Center for Muslim Contribution to 
Civilization, 2007, 220-222. Qushayri defined ‘sincerity’ here as “seeking closeness to God - praise be to 
Him - to the exclusion of everything else, such as making a show [of one’s piety] for other people, seeking 
their praise and taking delight in it.”  
 
56 Madrasah Arabia Islamia, Prospectus of Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 5-6. 
 
57 Ebrahim Muhammad, A Guide to Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 9. It points out, specifically, the majalis that 
are regularly held by Maulana Fazlur Rahman Azmi, Muhammad Saeed Motara, and Maulana Abdul 
Hamid Ishaq. “People from far and wide come to spend the entire month of Ramadan or shorter or longer 
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published in South Africa by the Deobandi Majlisul Ulama of Port Elizabeth, articulates a direct 
correlation between the Sufi emphasis on self-purification and the raison d’être of religious 
education, which must be pursued solely for the ‘pleasure of God’: 
The pursuit of Deeni knowledge for the obtainal [sic] of a degree, certificate, 
livelihood, for the acquisition of wealth, rank, post, fame, honour, etc. will be the 
consequence of corrupt motives. Any of these purposes will indicate that the 
intention underlying the pursuit of Ilm [knowledge] is corrupt and unwholesome 
… Thus the purpose of acquiring Deeni knowledge is nothing but the cultivation 
of Ridhaa-e-Haqq or the Pleasure of Allah. The way in which this purpose is to 
be attained is tazkiya-e-nafs [purification of the lower self] … The student 
should, prior to embarking on his academic career, engage in tazkiyah-e-nafs. 
Only then should he enter Path in quest of knowledge ”58 
 
The language of Sufi ethics is marshaled here in a striking way; purifying the inner self is not a 
result of religious learning but its prerequisite. And the purified self will have no ulterior motives 
in pursuing religious knowledge. Or as Qasim put it, invoking the principle of ‘trust’ (tawakkul) 
in God, “We are sustained by Allah. If you put your absolute trust in him, you have nothing to 
worry about. Nothing at all.”59 
 Some students spoke of translating ‘knowledge’ into ‘practice’ as the most essential 
purpose of Sufi training. This sort of language resonates with Thanawi’s concept of Sufism as 
embodied ethics, or ethical knowledge that unites both the ‘external’ (zahir) and the ‘internal’ 
(batin) demeanor, as we saw in the second chapter, and is especially salient in the madrasa’s 
emphasis on tabligh. One of the noteworthy features of Dar al-`Ulum Azaadville is the emphasis 
on tabligh as an integral part of a student’s overall education.60 Nearly every Sunday, the 
madrasa arranges student and teacher groups for gasht, making rounds in the province of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
periods in the Khanqah and they perform i’tikaf [staying in a mosque during Ramadan] in the Dar al-`Ulum 
Masjid for this purpose.” 
 
58 Masihullah Khan, Majlisul Ulama, trans. Ilm Madaris and Strikes, Port Elizabeth: Majlisul Ulama of 
South Africa, 1982, 14. 
 
59 Confidential interview, ‘Qasim’, 2 December 2009. 
 
60 Ebrahim Muhammad, A Guide to Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 8. 
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Gauteng and, occasionally, further afield. Students are also expected to do a ‘chilla’,61 a forty-day 
preaching tour, during holiday periods.62 Students often employed the same language for 
describing the purpose of tabligh as they did the purpose for having a Sufi shaykh. As a student 
attending a majlis in Durban explained when I asked about the links between Sufism and tabligh:  
The purpose of going out for tabligh is to help others correct themselves. You 
can’t help others correct their morals until you correct your own. This is why 
tasawwuf is important. You see how these connect? Tasawwuf helps you perfect 
yourself, and tabligh lets you take this out to the people. Not everyone has the 
time to sit with a Sufi.63 
 
Sufi meditations to ‘open the heart’: Lessons in self-fashioning  
It is now, of course, commonplace for scholars who conduct fieldwork to highlight ways 
in which their interlocutors approached their presence in the field, and how this mutual dynamic 
affects the production of knowledge. The field is never a space of passive or neutral 
‘observation’; it is a truism to state that one conducting fieldwork is simultaneously and 
necessarily both observer and observed.64 Here I will concentrate on how a series of talks with 
students at Azaadville brought the affective power of Sufi language into full relief. As I discuss 
below, over the course of several conversations, some students sought to open me to the 
possibility of becoming a Muslim through performing specific ritual actions alongside them and, 
more importantly, through giving me Sufi meditations (zikrs) to recite on my own. 
                                                       
61 Tablighis’ use of the Sufi term ‘chilla’ is illustrative of their adaptation of Sufi concepts for their own 
purposes. Denoting a forty-day spiritual retreat for Sufis, the chilla became a forty-day preaching excursion 
among the Tablighis. 
 
62 Confidential interview, ‘Qasim’, 2 December 2009. 
 
63 Majlis at Masjid un-Noor, Asherville, Durban, 12 November 2009. 
 
64 For a couple of examples, see Thomas A. Tweed, “On Moving Across: Translocative Religion and the 
Interpreter’s Position,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 70, 2 (2002): 253-277, and Anthony 
P. Cohen, “Self-Conscious Anthropology,” in Judith Okely and Helen Callaway, eds. Anthropology and 
Autobiography, London: Routledge, 1992. For a somewhat dated but still classic examination of 
ethnographic self-knowledge, see Dorinne K. Kondo’s “Dissolution and Reconstitution of Self: 
Implications for Anthropological Epistemology,” Cultural Anthropology 1, 1 (1986): 74-88.  
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In the course of my fieldwork, including the time I spent in India and South Africa, 
students politely asked that I conform my own actions to the sunna while in their presence. In the 
course of meals at Deoband, to take one example, I was asked to recite “bismillah” before eating 
and even to lick my plate clean in accord with the Prophetic sunna, as, I was told, it is sunna not 
to waste even a morsel of food. Before entering the mosque at Azaadville, I was asked, to take 
another example, to perform wudu’, even though those actions are typically not required of non-
Muslims entering a mosque. Initially I believed that conforming my actions to the sunna was 
merely a matter of maintaining some sort of ‘respect’ for my hosts. But this is not how the 
students and teachers with whom I sat, ate and talked seemed to understand my actions; rather, 
conforming to the sunna in one’s actions is, above all, a praxis-centered collection of physical 
dispositions, a sort of training not just for the body, one which they had embodied fully but which 
would benefit me as well, a non-Muslim. Students invited me to perform salah for similar 
reasons, an activity that, my interlocutors insisted, would condition my body for the “haqq” 
(truth) of Islam to penetrate my heart.  
How I became a sort of ‘project’ for my interlocutors was most palpable during 
interviews. Often they seemed vexed by the formality of the interview process. Typically we 
would share a meal or tea and talk informally about a myriad of subjects; some of my deepest 
insights into the lives of Deobandi scholars and students - their experiences as Sufis, their 
politics, how they see themselves as part of a larger ‘Deobandi’ totality - came out of these 
conversations. Often, upon formally beginning the ‘interview’, when I began to ask the list of 
generic questions that I had prepared even before reaching the field, the mood and dynamic 
shifted subtly, if not overtly, so that a casual give-and-take between two interlocutors became a 
one-way flow of ‘information’ from interviewee to interviewer. Some commented on the 
overweening formality of the interviews, and a few even used them to turn the flow of 
information in the other direction. A particular encounter will illustrate this well. In Johannesburg 
I interviewed a major disciple of Masihullah Khan at his home. Upon reading the part of the 
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assent form that states the interview will neither harm nor benefit him, he immediately asked me, 
with a wry smile, “It may be of no benefit to me, but how is it going to benefit you? And I am not 
speaking about your paper.” It was clear that he was speaking of my own ‘spiritual condition’.65  
I am all too conscious of certain invidious tropes about Muslims and the conversion of 
non-Muslims. As I took my fieldnotes, I grappled with the difficulties of how to discuss this 
essential aspect of my field experience without reiterating the trope of the zealous Muslim who 
sees every non-Muslim as a potential convert. I hope that I have succeeded in discussing this 
experience without doing so. Nevertheless, I found myself occupying a liminal space, 
representationally and ethically: while I was firm in asserting that I had no intention of becoming 
a Muslim, I realized the productivity of these conversations and wanted them to continue, and 
understood that rejecting these offers too explicitly might cause my interlocutors to close 
themselves off from me prematurely. In other words, continuing my fieldwork depended partly 
on continuing to serve as a ‘project’ for them as much as they were part of my own project. It is 
precisely in this liminal space where ethnography transpires, as in Susan Harding’s view: “The 
irony is that this space between belief and disbelief, or rather the paradoxical space of worship, is 
also the space of ethnography. We must enter it to do our work.”66 
Of all the students I met at Azaadville, ‘Rashid’ was particularly eager to speak with me 
about my own faith position. He gave me a copy of a book by a well-known South African 
Muslim evangelist, Ahmed Deedat’s The Choice: Islam and Christianity, which had compelled 
him to accept Islam.67 On a subsequent visit to the madrasa after we had talked about the 
                                                       
65 Confidential interview, ‘Ibrahim,’ 3 December 2009. 
 
66 Susan Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist language and politics, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000, 58. 
 
67 Ahmed Deedat (d. 2005), founder of the Islamic Propagation Centre in Durban, was a controversial 
South African Muslim preacher whose high-profile debates with the likes of Jimmy Swaggart earned him a 
wide international following among Muslims, though many traditional `ulama’ criticized his tactics. He 
professed to train Muslims in resisting the work of Christian missionaries. For scholarly assessments of 
Deedat, see David Westerlund’s “Ahmed Deedat’s Theology of Religion: Apologetics through Polemics,” 
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difference between merely ‘knowing the truth’ and internalizing it, between passive cognizance 
and active embodiment, we struck up this conversation once again. This time, among the students 
with whom I was speaking, sitting on the lawn of the madrasa courtyard, Rashid spoke up and 
said: “Tonight, before you go to sleep, I just want you to close your eyes and sit quietly, and try 
saying Allahu akbar thirty three times, Al-Hamdu Lillah thirty three times, and La ilaha ila Llah 
thirty three times. ” I replied, “But how can I use these zikrs if I am not a Muslim?” “You don’t 
have to be Muslim to benefit from zikr,” he replied. “And anyway, if you say these zikrs every 
night, in the correct way, they will open your heart to the truth.”68 Another student nearby cited 
verses from the Qur’an condemning hypocrisy (nifaq), pointing out in particular that among the 
worst of the hypocrites are those for whom there is a disconnect between belief and practice, 
between mere passive cognizance of the ‘truth’ and assenting to the truth actively and fully.69 
In the end, I did not use the zikr chants that the students at Azaadville suggested to me. 
But merely entertaining the idea in our conversations was crucial to allowing the students to 
explain the affective force of this language. It is not ‘ordinary’ speech; these are speech acts, to be 
sure, but not in the classic sense of ‘performative’ speech as John Austin defined it long ago.70 
They are more accurately defined as transformative speech acts. I sought to be open to the 
transformative power of this language in a way perhaps analogous to what Harding called 
‘narrative belief’: “standing in the gap between conscious belief and willful unbelief … opens up 
born-again language and makes available its complexity, its variety and creativity, and its agile 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of Religion in Africa 33, 3 (2003): 263-278, and especially Brian Larkin’s “Ahmed Deedat and the 
Form of Islamic Evangelism,” Social Text 26, 3 (2008): 101-121.  
 
68 Confidential interview, ‘Rashid’, 8 December 2009. 
 
69 Confidential interview, ‘Mahmoud’, 12 December 2009. 
 
70 I refer, of course, to his seminal essay How to do Things With Words. Austin’s classic formulation of the 
‘performative’ are those statements that “do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not 
‘true’ or false’,” but instead effect some change or alter the state of things. See How to do Things with 
Words, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 5. 
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force.”71 Harding speaks of ‘catching’ the language of her interlocutors, those who ‘witnessed’ to 
her about the power of the Gospel; to do so is not to ‘convert’, but it does entail participating 
willingly in a speech community. “The membrane between disbelief and belief is much thinner 
than we think,” writes Harding. “All I had to do was to listen to my witness and to struggle to 
understand him. Just doing so did not make me a fundamental Baptist born-again believer, but it 
drew me across that membrane in tiny ways so that I began to acquire the knowledge and vision 
and sensibilities, to share the experience, of a believer.”72 Another point of comparison here is the 
space of belief between “either” and “or” that Eve Sedgwick finds in her studies of Buddhism, a 
space where one may be “liberated by both possibility and impossibility, and especially by the 
relative untetheredness to self.”73 One need not rule out the affect of Sufi language nor embrace it 
uncategorically to comprehend how it works. I believe that this openness to the affective force of 
language is characteristic to the attitudes these students maintained towards the language of Sufi 
zikrs.  
 When I speak here of ‘self-fashioning’, what do I mean by self? I do not suggest that 
there is a singular, unchanging entity in need of fashioning; as Debbora Battaglia submits, “there 
is no selfhood apart from the collaborative practice of its figuration. The ‘self’ is a 
representational economy: a reification continually defeated by mutual entanglements with other 
subjects’ histories, experiences, self-representations; with their texts, conduct, gestures, 
objectifications.”74 The self that the students of Azaadville seek to discipline through the regimes 
of tazkiya al-nafs is entangled not only with the broader discourses of Sufi ethics but, more 
                                                       
71 Susan Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell, xii. 
 
72 Ibid., 58. 
 
73 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity, Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003, 179. 
 
74 Debbora Battaglia, “Problematizing the Self,” in Debbora Battaglia, ed. Rhetorics of Self-Making, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 2. 
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narrowly, with the specific Deobandi textual and interpersonal configurations of how a self ought 
to be disciplined.  
Recent scholars, among them Saba Mahmood, Charles Hirschkind and Hussein Ali 
Agrama, have commented on Western imaginaries of the liberal, and liberated, self in relation to 
perhaps well-meaning but misguided projects of recreating Muslim societies; for Agrama, this 
presumption is based on a series of ideals, namely “the familiar ideal that the true self is the free 
self; an understanding of freedom as the pursuit and realization of one’s interests and pleasures; 
and the belief that a free self is one that follows its own will only, and that wants to follow only 
its own will.”75 But the ‘self’ cultivated in the madrasa is not an emancipatory one. It is not, then, 
a classically ‘liberal’ self, and in this regard it is worth drawing a contrast here between the 
subjectivity of the madrasa and the liberal subject bound up in the phrase ‘liberal arts’, with 
which Western pedagogy defines a certain expectation about the emancipatory ends towards 
which higher education is a means.  
  
 Cultivating a pure sensorium: TV, radio and bodily demeanor 
 If Sufi ethics inform how students at Madrasa Arabia Islamia conceive of the ultimate 
purpose of their studies, and the language of Sufism in the form of zikrs works to shape their 
internal dispositions, the students also strive for a space that I will call a ‘pure’ ethical sensorium, 
one carefully and deliberately purified of ‘offensive’ visual and auditory stimuli. The result is an 
‘inhabited ethics’, an ethics in which one can dwell.  
 A couple of incidents brought this into stark relief. During one visit to Azaadville, when I 
was meeting with three students who were on their own for lunch since classes were not in 
session, I suggested that I could drive all of us into the town market to eat at a local restaurant. 
The students obliged my request and we all climbed into my car. As soon as the car started, the 
                                                       
75 Hussein Ali Agrama, “Ethics, Tradition, Authority: Toward an Anthropology of the Fatwa,” American 
Ethnologist 37, 1 (2010): 2-18, at 6. 
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radio came on. I had been listening to one of Johannesburg’s classical radio stations. Almost 
instantaneously, as a kind of reflex, one of the students reached for the radio and turned it off. 
The reaction was startling; there was no debate on whether or not to keep the radio on, no polite 
request to turn it off. I certainly did not mind, but sensing that I may perceive his action as odd or 
startling at best, the student explained that music of any kind is a threat to morality, a temptation 
that ensnares the heart and distracts one from the sole ‘recollection’ (zikr) of God in daily life. 
 Among these students, Qasim particularly saw no utility in radio whatsoever, even of 
Islamic radio stations that broadcast only sermons or Qur’anic recitations. This seems, as far as I 
can tell, a minority opinion, given that Johannesburg boasts a radio station in Lenasia, Radio 
Islam, supported by the Deobandi-affiliated Jamiatul Ulama Gauteng. We had a similar 
conversation on another occasion when we ventured into the local market. I voiced a desire to eat 
at a nearby café that I had visited alone during a previous trip to Azaadville. The fact that the café 
had a television in the corner, incessantly blaring cricket and soccer games, had not occurred to 
me as problematic. Qasim, however, knew the place and politely explained that he could not eat 
there because of the television. I asked Qasim and Dawud whether there are any circumstances in 
which television could be a social good, referencing the concept of maslaha, the notion that 
Imdadullah and others have cited to argue, for example, that the social good of mawlud 
(introducing people to the morally edifying tales from the life of the Prophet Muhammad) 
outweighs its potential harmful effects. The other way of reframing this question, I explained, in 
referencing Thanawi, is to ask if mawlud is permissible so long as certain conditions are met (e.g., 
there is no intermixing of men and women, the organizer is not doing it for personal gain, and so 
on). Can TV also, I asked, have certain merits if there are conditions on its content? Qasim said 
he was aware of the argument for maslaha that some Deobandis had used to defend mawlud. In 
this case, however, he argued that it is not possible to separate the medium and the message. 
“Nothing good can come out of television. It doesn’t matter if it’s an imam giving a bayan or 
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what. It’s just not necessary.” Ultimately he seemed to regard the medium, or even the very 
object, the actual television, as toxic in and of itself.76  
 The Prophetic sunna conditions every aspect of Azaadville’s students’ lives. But they 
also sought to make me open to its conditioning affect. This is similar to what Annemarie 
Schimmel called the “imitatio Muhammadi.”77 Cornell, building on Schimmel’s examples, noted 
the centrality in Sufism of imitating the Prophet’s “beautiful example” (uswa hasana) in all 
respects. In early Sufi texts like Sarraj’s Kitab al-luma` the imitatio Muhammadi entailed 
adhering to the “Prophet’s etiquette, his moral and spiritual states, and, whenever possible, his 
inner realities.”78 Oftentimes this affect is intrinsically physical. During one evening, after a 
majlis with Abdul Hamid Ishaq, I stayed to observe and speak with students who were studying 
in rows that wrapped around the central masjid in a semi-circle. As they read, students sit on the 
floor, with their feet under them, reading aloud from texts that are positioned on small stands, 
while rocking back and forth. I asked a student whom I had come to know, Mahmoud, whether or 
not they “learned” to read this way. He said it was not really a “conscious thing.” He added, “I 
don’t know where it comes from. But I know it helps us remember what we recite.”79 The careful 
postures were also evident while sitting in on classes, including Fazlur Rahman Azmi's ifta’ 
course, where students sat in a similar semi-circle.  
Scholars have addressed ways that such physical states are ‘contagious’. Teresa Brennan, 
                                                       
76 Brian Larkin has discussed the banning of cinema in the northern Nigerian state of Kano and argued that 
cinema wielded a certain “aura” above and beyond its form and content: “It is this excess, the immaterial 
experience of cinema emerging from the assemblage of built space, film, and social practice, that became 
the target of regulation.” See Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure and Urban Culture in 
Nigeria, Durham: Duke University Press, 2008, 1-2. I would argue that radio and television for these 
students bore a similar ‘aura’ that had less to do with the content on the television or radio (hence these 
students’ rejection even of ‘Islamic’ television), and more to do with its metonymic associations with illicit 
sexuality, violence, and the like.  
 
77 Annemarie Schimmel, Deciphering the Signs of God: a Phenomenological Approach to Islam, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1994, 90. 
 
78 Vincent Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism, Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1998, 199. 
 
79 Confidential interview, ‘Mahmoud’, 12 December 2009. 
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for instance, analyses how physical affect often precedes thought.80 Ebrahim Moosa similarly 
identifies several sensory modalities that are part of the goal of what he calls “optimizing the 
sensorium” in the madrasa.81 Students are trained in subtle embodied sensibilities (how to eat, 
how to pray, how to wash) and in auditory practices (reciting the Qur’an, zikrs, studying aloud), 
as well as in “regimes of the visual” including ways to understand visions and interpret dreams. 
As I have noted above, ‘optimizing the sensorium’ depends equally on purging it of dangerous, 
subversive or threatening forms of media and sensory stimuli.     
 
Pedagogy and Persuasion: Sufi ethics and the majlis  
One of Azaadville’s weekly gatherings is a majlis led by Abdul Hamid Ishaq, who speaks 
to students and the general public every Tuesday after isha prayers, as well as on the first Sunday 
of every Islamic month. Fazlur Rahman Azmi also leads a majlis every Sunday in the mornings, 
though his are attended mostly by students. The word majlis (pl. majalis) literally means ‘a place 
of sitting’ and has been used throughout Islamic history, usually to denote a religious and/or 
political assembly.82 Deobandis have adapted the notion of the majlis as a medium for 
disseminating spiritual instruction and moral advice, both to initiated Sufis and to the general 
Muslim public. A Deobandi majlis can have myriad forms. It can be a majlis-i zikr, a gathering 
for the purpose of reciting pious litanies in ‘remembrance’ of God; many are of this type, such as 
                                                       
80 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
 
81 Ebrahim Moosa, “Melancholic Traditions in Islam: Mullahs, Madrasahs and Militants in South Asia,” 
lecture at STIAS (Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies), Stellenbosch, South Africa, 25 March 2010.  
 
82 The word appears most often in the sense of an administrative, parliamentary or advisory body; in 
various incarnations, different majority Muslim countries have had institutions such as a majlis al-shura, a 
majlis al-mashwara, or a majlis al-ummah. W. Madelung, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, “Madjlis.” 
The word has also appeared in an Indian Shi`i context to describe assemblies that form during Muharram to 
mourn the events of Karbala. Munibur Rahman, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, “Madjlis.” For uses of 
the term in South Asian contexts, see also Meer Hassan Ali, Observations on the Mussulmauns of India, 
London: Parbury Allen, 1832. Oxford University Press republished this important document in 1974. 
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those at Lenasia’s Khanqah Masjid Shaykh Zakariyya83 under the direction of Maulana Ebrahim 
Mia.84  
However, the kind on which I will focus is the majlis-i bayan, a gathering for the purpose 
of lecturing on some topic, in most cases topics within the purview of Sufi ethics or in some cases 
- specifically in the majalis of Yunus Patel - matters related to improving Muslims’ lives and 
society (e.g. raising a family in a properly ‘Islamic’ manner, dealing with crime, keeping children 
away from drugs and alcohol, gambling, adultery, and so on). Furthermore, the majlis can take 
place in a variety of settings, from a madrasa, a mosque, a khanqah, or even a community lecture 
hall.  
The majlis combines elements of the traditional recorded ‘sayings’ (malfuzat) of Sufi 
masters, a genre especially associated with the Chishti Sufis of South Asia, and practical advice 
on relating Sufi wisdom to quotidian problems and concerns. As a pupil of Masihullah Khan 
describes the majlis: 
A majlis does not follow the pattern of a lecture. A lecture on a subject will have 
a systematic explanation of aspects of that subject. A majlis, on the other hand, is 
an informal talk. There may or may not be a theme around which the talk 
unfolds, but the topics discussed may change from minute to minute. The object 
of the talk is to provide answers to the problems faced by those attending the talk 
… Those attending have come in search of answers leading to their self-
rectification (islah). As the answers may appear at any moment, and may appear 
                                                       
83 Majlis, Khanqah Masjid Shaykh Zakariyya, 24 November 2009. Maulana Mia’s majalis are held 
Tuesdays and Thursdays about 45 minutes before isha prayers in the evening. 
 
84 Maulana Mia studied at Dar al-`Ulum Deoband alongside Yunus Patel in the early 1970’s. He was born 
in 1947 in Mpumalanga but refers to Dahbel in Gujarat, a geographic focal point for many South African 
Deobandis, as his ancestral homeland. He became a khalifa of Muhammad Zakariyya in 1972 while 
studying at Deoband, and spent years in the presence of his shaykh at Deoband, Saharanpur and in Mecca. 
Perhaps of all those I interviewed, Maulana Mia was the most fervently explicit about his affiliation to and 
allegiance towards Deoband. “All of my teachings are in accord with the Deoband school of thought” was 
one of the first things he said to me when I explained my project. Our conversation quickly diverted from 
his work as a Sufi shaykh and a disciple of Muhammad Zakariyya to Deobandi/Barelwi polemics. 
“Deobandis do not regard Barelwis as Muslims,” according to Maulana Mia, a statement that many, 
perhaps most, other Deobandis would contest. The main points of difference between Deobandis and 
Barelwis are, in his opinion, salaami and hazir-o-nazir, but I asked him about mawlud. Would mawlud be 
acceptable if all of the stipulations that Thanawi made in his analysis-namely, being devoid of qiyam, not 
entailing waste, not convened by someone seeking fame or praise, and so on? “No, there is no basis for 
celebrating mawlud at all,” he replied. Interview, Maulana Ebrahim Mia, Khanqah Masjid Shaykh 
Zakariyya, 22 November 2009. 
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in an expected way, each and every sentence uttered by the sheikh has to be 
listened to with the greatest concentration.85 
 
The majlis has been a staple of Deoband’s public face for generations. It is difficult to 
pinpoint when the earliest majalis took place, but we know at the very least that Thanawi held 
frequent majalis at his khanqah in Thana Bhavan. Many of these majalis were ‘recorded’ by 
students (meaning, in the absence of actual recording devices, they were most likely turned into 
prose from student notes). Deobandi publishers in South Africa have published transcribed 
majalis of prominent Deobandi scholars of the subcontinent, including those of Thanawi, 
Masihullah Khan, and Shah Abrar al-Haq, a khalifa of Thanawi and whose most prominent 
disciple is Hakim Muhammad Akhtar.86  
 Majalis have a standard format. They typically begin with recitations from the Qur’an or 
a series of Urdu na`ts. Patrick Eisenlohr has argued that the na`t, as a genre of South Asian 
devotional performance, is ‘claimed’ in a sense by Barelwis,87 yet each ‘Deobandi’ majlis that I 
attended featured Urdu na`ts. Following these recitations, a Sufi shaykh gives a talk, usually 
about an hour long, on a variety of topics. The gatherings typically conclude with members of the 
audience queuing to formally greet the shaykh and sometimes to ask him for specific moral 
advice. 
                                                       
85 Ismail Mangera, For Friends: Selected Discourses of Maseehul Ummat Hadhrat Maulana Muhammad 
Masihullah Khan Sahib, Brixton, South Africa, 1992, i-ii. 
 
86 For a few examples of Thanawi’s majalis that have been translated and published: Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, 
Love of the World, translated by Yusuf Gundiwala, Azaadville, South Africa: Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 
2006; Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, Union with Allah and Separation from non-Allah, translated by Yusuf 
Gundiwala, Azaadville, South Africa: Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 2002, based on a majlis on 8 January 1925 
and recorded by Zafar Ahmad Uthmani; and Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, Chattels of the World, translated by 
Yusuf Gundiwala, Azaadville, South Africa: Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 2001, based on a majlis on 1 
August 1912. Hakim Muhammad Akhtar recorded and collected his master Shah Abrar al-Haq’s majalis, 
which a publishing house near Azaadville has translated and published as Majalis-e-Abraar: Advice of 
Moulana Shah Abraarul Haq Saheb, Krugersdorp, South Africa: Akhtari Publications, n.d.   
 
87 Patrick Eisenlohr, “Na’t: Media Contexts and Transnational Dimensions of a Devotional Practice,” in 
Barbara D. Metcalf, ed. Islam in South Asia in Practice, Princeton and Chicago: Princeton University 
Press, 2009. Most often na`ts are poems in praise of the Prophet Muhammad, though may also be sung in 
praise of the great Sufi masters such as ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani (d. 1166) or Mu`in al-Din Chishti (d. 1235). 
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 One of the majalis that I witnessed took place at Azaadville in December of 2009.88 In 
attendance were students and members of the Azaadville community, about fifty in all, both men 
and children. Most were Muslims of South Asian descent, though a few black African Muslims 
listened as well. The lesson began, as usual, with Urdu na`ts sung by students. In this case, both 
were na`ts of Mahmud Hasan Gangohi, to whom Abdul Hamid affectionately referred as “Our 
Hazrat.”  
The message centered on the twin ideals of having gratitude (shukr) towards God for the 
bounties (rizq) that God provides, and tempering the lower self (nafs). The Muslims today, Abdul 
Hamid explained, are far too consumed with fighting perceived ‘enemies’, whether ideological or 
physical ones. Such actions naturally breed pride, the antithesis of gratitude and humility; rather, 
the greatest of all fights is the one against the nafs, “because all spiritual victories begin with 
mastering the nafs.” He concluded the lecture with a lengthy meditation on the reality of death 
and the futility of accumulating wealth in this life, underscoring the merit of giving one’s wealth 
for the sake of God through the traditional forms of Muslim charity (zakah and sadaqah). One is 
not merely spending that money but “transferring it from the account of dunya [this world] to the 
account of the akhira [the next world] … No one can rob the bank of the akhirah, it will never 
fold or go bankrupt.” 
Among the most popular Deobandi majalis in South Africa are Yunus Patel’s. When I 
met Yunus Patel at his office at Madressa Sawlehaat, an all-girls madrasa in the Asherville 
district of Durban, I waited for Maulana Patel behind a steady stream of followers who had come 
to him for both worldly and spiritual advice. He met Qari Muhammad Tayyib during his visit to 
South Africa in 1963 and decided later to attend Dar al-`Ulum Deoband, citing Tayyib as direct 
inspiration for his decision.89 Patel is one of the most spiritually connected Sufis in South Africa, 
having undergone Sufi initiation with Muhammad Zakariyya, Hakim Muhammad Akhtar, and 
                                                       
88 Majlis of Abdul Hamid Ishaq, Darul Uloom Azaadville, 8 December 2009. 
 
89 Interview, Yunus Patel, 12 November 2009. 
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Mahmud Hasan Gangohi. He is a khalifa of the latter two. He is quick to point out that his 
initiations link him to Hajji Imdadullah through his two most influential disciples: Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi and Ashraf `Ali Thanawi; the silsila through Mahmud Hasan Gangohi extends to 
Muhammad Zakariyya (d. 1982), then to Maulana Rashid Ahmad Saharanpuri (d. 1927) and 
finally to Gangohi, while the silsila through Hakim Muhammad Akhtar extends to Shah Abrar al-
Haq (d. 2005), then to Thanawi.90 Patel was briefly involved with the Tablighi Jama`at in the 
1970’s but “did not go into it exclusively,” as he put it, implying that some Deobandi scholars do. 
One scholar who knows Maulana Patel suggested to me that he has been “sidelined” by the major 
Deobandi jama`ats partly because of his lack of interest in tabligh and relatively accommodating 
views on some contentious Sufi issues.91 
Yunus Patel gives a majlis-i bayan on Thursday nights and a majlis-i zikr on Monday 
nights after isha prayers. An interesting feature of Maulana Patel’s majalis - and for the most part, 
Deobandi majalis in general - is that one need not be an initiated Sufi to participate or derive 
knowledge and spiritual benefits from attending. He lectures widely around South Africa and the 
world, but most of his lectures are held at Masjid un-Noor, which is nearby the girls’ madrasa in 
Durban, Madrasah Sawlehaat, where he serves as rector.  
I sat in on two of Maulana Patel’s majalis during November and December 2009, both 
majalis-i zikr, and supplemented my attendance in person with listening to recorded majalis 
available on Maulana Patel’s website. After a series of Urdu na`ts, Maulana Patel delivers his talk 
in English, with an occasional quotation in Urdu from the malfuzat of Mahmud Hasan Gangohi. 
Those in attendance are not passive recipients of Maulana Patel’s knowledge; members of the 
audience may echo the refrains of specific Urdu na`ts that they know by heart. Towards the end 
of the majlis, many of the participants chanted “Allah… Allah… Allah” and on both occasions 
                                                       
90 His silsila can be found at http://yunuspatel.co.za/myp-spiritualtree.php (last accessed 20 September 
2010). 
 
91 Interview, Ahmad Mukaddam, International Peace College of South Africa (IPSA), 21 May 2009. 
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that I attended in person, Maulana Patel ended his lecture with a tearful conclusion. It was 
difficult to discern - and perhaps irrelevant - whether or not his crying was ‘sincere’, but the scene 
invoked the well-known hadith from Ibn Majah: “Recite the Qur’an and cry. If you cannot cry, 
then make yourself cry.” The performative aspects of crying while reciting the Qur’an have been 
widely discussed;92 the affective and evocative power of Maulana Patel’s crying reverberated 
through his audience as they echoed his refrains in an increasingly plaintive mode. Afterwards a 
semicircle of attendants gathered in a queue for musafaha - a sunna style of greeting by shaking 
with both hands - with Maulana Patel. While his majlis-i zikr involves participants in a more 
direct way, in which they recite a litany of zikrs in unison, his majlis-i bayan also encourages 
active audience response and hardly conforms to what the word ‘lecture’ connotes.  
Maulana Patel’s majalis are known throughout, and beyond, South Africa for his socially 
and politically oriented messages on dishonesty, drinking, adultery, crime, and so on. He attracts 
a broad cross-section of Durban’s Muslim middle class. I spoke with an attorney who said, “I 
come to his talks to uplift my morals. I do not have time to go out on Tabligh, though insha’llah 
some day I can do that. We must work to uplift the entire ummah but it begins with each one of 
us.”93 Maulana Patel is not alone in advocating this Sufism for South Africa’s middle classes.  
Azaadville’s Abdul Hamid Ishaq advocates Sufi zikr as “the key to all of success,”94 while 
Muhammad Hakim Akhtar sees as the first sign that inner peace (sakina) has been attained that 
God’s light (nur) remains firmly entrenched in the heart whether one be in the mosque or “in the 
markets or in the factories or in London or Germany or Japan. God’s light must remain firmly 
                                                       
92 For discussion of emotion in relation to poetic practice in Arabic contexts, see Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled 
Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
Interestingly, Abu-Lughod notes that few men engage in the stylized ‘crying’ common in Bedouin 
mourning rituals except in the context of men singing poems at the tombs of Sufi saints, which they sing 
“in a quavering voice as they move from tent to tent.” See Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments, 198-199. 
The ‘quavering voice’ accurately describes the tone of participants in Patel’s majalis.  
 
93 Unidentified man at majlis, Asherville, Durban. 12 November 2009. 
 
94 Maulana Ridwaan Kagee, Virtues of the Zikr of Almighty Allah, Azaadville: Madrasah Arabia Islamia, 
2005, 15. 
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embedded in the heart.”95 
Maulana Patel’s lectures incorporate what we may, perhaps somewhat awkwardly, call 
‘Sufism beyond Sufi orders’, but which is an essential aspect of Deobandi Sufism; according to 
Patel, many of those who come to hear him are not initiated Sufis, but all are, in a sense, his 
students. Likewise, he uses the narratives and symbolic resources of Sufism to illustrate his 
messages. His lecture of 12 November 2009 used metaphors from contemporary technology to 
describe the invisible interconnections between Sufi saints: “We have no trouble believing in the 
invisible connections between computers, radios, etc. that transfer information, but we are 
skeptical of the transfer of love through the heart-to-heart technology of the awliya’ [Sufi 
saints].”96 He expanded this theme in his majlis at the same location on 7 December:  
Where is the connection? We don't see the connection with our eyes but there is a 
connection. Our cell phones, the message that is coming, there is a connection 
with the one who is sending the message. And that person’s cell phone has got a 
connection with wherever they are transmitting from, wherever the signals are 
coming from ... In everything there is a connection. This fan is working, the air 
conditioner is working, the lights are working. There is a connection. If there’s 
no connection with the powerhouse you won’t get anything here. But you don't 
see anything. We don’t see it. So we believe in all this kind of technology but we 
can’t believe that Allah Ta’ala says certain actions have certain reactions. We say 
where is the connection? Where is the connection that when someone commits 
adultery, his barakat [blessings] and his rizq [sustenance] will go away?97  
 
Maulana Patel described the Sufi saints repeatedly as “reservoirs of taqwa, reservoirs of 
ishan, reservoirs of sukr.” But the crux of his talk came through linking the saints’ moral lessons 
and those listening to his speech that evening. He continued, explaining to the crowd present that 
“Moral qualities are not the exclusive property of the awliya’.” In fact, for him, striving for such 
saintly morality is the duty of every pious Muslim.  
The ‘reality of Shaitaan [Satan]’ is a major theme in his discourses. Satan most crucially 
lacks, according to Patel, the element that makes one a kamil (perfect) Sufi: love for God. In fact, 
                                                       
95 Hakim Muhammad Akhtar, Nuzul-i Sakina, Karachi: Kutub Khana-yi Mazhari, n.d. 21. 
 
96 Yunus Patel, majlis at Masjid un-Noor, Asherville, Durban, 12 November 2009. 
 
97 Ibid., 7 December 2009. 
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as he explains it, Satan was once a perfect Muslim in nearly every respect; he had a flawless 
knowledge of the “madhhab and the din of all the anbiya [prophets].” He was, in a sense, a “very 
great `alim” knowing completely “the masa’il of the Shari`a.” He was also a perfect “`abid” 
(servant). There was one thing Shaitaan was not: “he was not an `ashiq,” a lover. He did not 
possess the rapturous love (`ishq) that true Sufis possess. For Maulana Patel, love is “farz,” 
obligatory - as necessary as every other quotidian Islamic injunction.98 
 One of Maulana Patel’s majalis was a lengthy commentary on the verse beloved by Sufis 
on the primordial covenant (Qur’an 7:172), in which God commands the progeny of Adam to 
bear witness to his lordship.99 He used a fairly routine discussion of the zahir/batin, or 
outer/inner, distinction as a point of entry to reiterate the Deobandi notion that Sufi ‘sainthood’ is 
open to each and all, so long as one purifies his or her inner self: 
Look at akhlaq-i hamida and akhlaq-i razila - good characteristics and bad ones. 
The person has to remove from his heart the akhlaq-i razila. All those traits, all 
those characteristics that are in the heart, of nifaq, that is hypocrisy, pride, 
arrogance, envy, greed, malice, jealousy - ah, what we have in our hearts! But we 
consider ourselves to be Muslims supreme. So to clear the heart of all that debris, 
all that muck, all that dirt and of all that filth that has embedded itself in our 
hearts. Now if we want walayat [closeness, ‘sainthood’] of Allah Tabarraka wa 
Ta’ala we’re talking about nisbat [connection] of Allah Tabarraka wa Ta’ala. So 
how will that nisbat come if that heart is already polluted with so much of filth? 
… There has to be in his life some time that has to be devoted and spent in X-
raying his heart, of checking his heart, of all that is in there that falls under the 
category of akhlaq-i razila. Without that there is no question of nisbat to Allah 
Ta’ala, no question of walayat. So to remove those evil traits and characteristics, 
and to build up in the heart taqwa, tawakkul, yaqin, trust and faith in Allah 
Ta’ala, sabr, shukr, zuhd, qana’at, contentment - all these type of traits to build 
up and develop. This type of person does both things, then he gets wilayat.100 
 
                                                       
98 Ibid., 10 October 2008. Accessed online at http://yunuspatel.co.za/audio-majlis.php. 
 
99 For a brief study of different interpretations of the verse, see Wadad Kadi, “Primordial Covenant and 
Human History in the Qur’an,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 147, 4 (2003): 332-338. 
The verse reads: “And when your Lord brought forth from the children of Adam…all their descendants, 
and made them bear witness against their own souls: Am I not your Lord? (alastu bi-rabbikum) They said: 
Yes! We bear witness. Lest you should say on the day of resurrection: Surely we had no knowledge of 
this.” 
 
100 Yunus Patel, majlis, 10 October 2008. Accessed online at http://yunuspatel.co.za/audio-majlis.php 
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Here Maulana Patel extends a trope typical of Deobandi scholars’ ‘public’ Sufism - namely the 
notion of a ‘sainthood of the masses’, which Thanawi termed waliyat-i ‘amma.101 Patel speaks 
loosely and matter-of-factly about the accessibility of ‘sainthood’ for his audience in Durban, 
connecting Deobandi discourse on purifying the akhlaq that emerges from the works of Gangohi, 
Thanawi, Masihullah Khan and others, with contemporary and quotidian metaphors (e.g. in this 
case, that of ‘X-raying’ the heart, or comparing the causality of moral interiority and external 
actions to the ‘connections’ between mobile phones and computers). 
 His discussion continues by invoking Qushayri and ends by tying up several themes in a 
commentary on the very purpose of the majlis as an institution for perfecting ethical lives: 
[Qushayri] said the wali [saint] is that person who fulfills on the one hand the 
rights of Allah Tabarraka wa Ta’ala, and on the other hand fulfills the rights of 
the creation of Allah Ta’ala. Both things he does. Huquq al-Lah and huquq al-
`ibad. Not just reading some wazifa [litany]. Not attendance of just some majlis. 
Not just sitting in a khanqah for a few days and thinking he became kamil 
[perfected]. Not just doing some work of da`wat and tabligh and thinking we are 
perfect. Not just sitting in some madrasa and thinking we have already attained 
the highest stages. These things everybody will have to develop, whether he is 
going to the khanqah, to the jama`at, to the madrasa, whether he is going for 
hajj, for umrah. Everybody will have to develop this because it's easy sometimes 
to go for hajj upon hajj, umrah upon umrah … So now these are the things we 
have to check, and as I have repeatedly mentioned, this majlis is not for the 
increase of knowledge. It is to increase that kaifiyyat. To increase our spiritual 
progress. To purify our hearts and our souls from all these evil traits and 
characteristics. That is the purpose.102 
 
For Maulana Patel, the majlis, as a religious institution, is especially equipped for the task of 
‘performing’ islah on individual Muslims, or more precisely, equipping them to perform islah 
upon themselves. Deobandi ethics are concerned, foremost and fundamentally, with self-
purification and self-perfection. It is a highly individualistic ethos, taking reformation of the 
individual Muslim as an ethical end; the means to this end include, but are not limited to, Sufism. 
In the quotation above, Patel neatly enumerates the sites and institutional locations where this 
                                                       
101 Ashraf `Ali Thanawi, Shari’at o Tariqat, 36. 
 
102 Yunus Patel, majlis, 12 February 2007. Accessed online at http://yunuspatel.co.za/audio-majlis.php. 
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ethical deliberation transpires: the masjid, the madrasa, the khanqah, and the majlis. There are 
multiple avenues towards the same goal; how one arrives is immaterial.  
 To conclude, the scholars of Deoband have often seen the madrasa and the khanqah as 
mutually complementary sites for moral reform, and because the madrasa does not incorporate 
Sufism formally into its curriculum, the Deobandi tradition must necessarily articulate its 
reformed Sufi ethics outside of it. This is where Deobandi Sufism is ‘located’: as we saw with 
Mufti Taqi Uthmani, the very atmosphere of the madrasa is, at least ideally, infused with Sufi 
moral persuasion, and individual relationships between Sufi master and student disciples offer 
both Sufi training and a sense of spatial and temporal continuity with an imagined Deobandi 
tradition. Deobandis’ Sufi ethics, like their Sufism as a whole, is not always inculcated in the 
formal relations of teacher/student and master/disciple, of course, even in the confines of the 
madrasa. But outside of the madrasa, in the space of the majlis, Deobandi scholars bring their 
reformist Sufi ethics to a larger audience. The content of these public oral discourses concerns 
almost exclusively what Deobandi scholars view as the essence of Sufism: its ethical core. 
Deobandis’ critical project rarely, if ever, forms a part of the majlis. In a sense, Deobandi scholars 
address one sort of public in their oral discourses, and a very different sort of public in their 
critical polemics; if the public of the majlis is far more circumscribed, confined to the immediate 
space of the mosque where these talks take place, the public of Deobandis’ polemics is broader 
and, as we will see, less receptive to the Deobandi critical project. The final two chapters examine 
the public reception of the Deobandi critique in South Africa, and show how a wide swath of 
South African Muslims rejected the Deobandi critique. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Deoband in Public: Polemics and Apartheid Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter examines polemics and counterpolemics over Sufi devotional practices in 
South Africa and discerns how apartheid-era political engagements informed these polemics. 
While many of these exchanges transpired largely in the domain of texts, this chapter asserts that 
we must move beyond the domain of texts to reconstruct the public reception of these ideas. To 
this end, in addition to textual polemics, this chapter analyzes public confrontations over Sufi 
devotions in South Africa, focusing on a number of key events: the clash in 1970 between the 
Tablighi Jama`at and the Barelwi Sufi scholar Maulana Khushtar during his speaking tour of 
Cape Town, fallout over the 1985 public lecture of the Deobandi scholar Ebrahim Adam on the 
“Barelwi Menace,” and Tablighis’ attack on a mawlud assembly at Azaadville in 1987.1 I use 
these key moments to illustrate the development of public debate over Sufi devotionalism and 
Deobandi identity. Perhaps minor events in the longue durée of South African history, these 
events reveal subtle dynamics of the public debate over Sufism and Deobandis roles’ in them. 
These confrontations are perhaps akin what Georg Simmel once called ‘snapshots’ 
                                                       
1 For a brief overview of these events and others, see Jacobus A. Naude, “A Historical Survey of 
Opposition to Sufism in South Africa,” in Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, eds. Islamic Mysticism 
Contested, Leiden: Brill, 1999. I am indebted to Naude’s overview for introducing me to this history early 
in my research project. I have returned to the original sources that he used, among others, and have 
endeavored to place these events in a broader context of Deobandi history, a context largely missing from 
his overview. 
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(Momentbilder), events that act as windows onto a larger social totality.2 My focus on these 
events is not to suggest that debates over Sufi practices ceased in the intervals between them; on 
the contrary, Deobandis and Barelwis continued their critiques and counter-critiques through a 
barrage of pamphlets and newsletters.  
In several of the clashes considered below, parties to the conflict used threats of violence 
or actual violence. Parties to a debate often described the other using dubious appellations that 
served to end debates rather than resolve them, or merely to antagonize opponents. Thus 
Deobandis often describe Barelwis as qabr parasti, ‘grave worshippers’, while Barelwis often 
described Deobandis as ‘Wahhabis’.3 Both of these appellations are deeply problematic to anyone 
who has studied the history of both movements; no Barelwi ‘worships’ graves, and Deoband’s 
links to the Arabian Wahhabi movement are tenuous at best. No side could claim ‘victory’ in the 
ongoing Deobandi-Sufi disputes. But what the records bear out is that the parties to the debate, 
the two opposing ‘sides’, became increasingly reified, each side representing the other as a 
caricature.  
 Polemics over Sufism were instrumental in fashioning South African Muslim publics. As 
a “space of discourse” constituted through the reflexive circulation of media, ‘publics’ include not 
only the debate’s participants but the onlookers as well, literally and figuratively.4 To the extent 
that we cannot fully understand the Deobandi critique of Sufism without understanding its public 
reception, in the South African case, the tenor of public debate over Sufism is inseparable from 
                                                       
2 See David Frisby’s discussion of Momentbilder within Simmel’s theory of modernity. Fragments of 
Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer, and Benjamin, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1986, 6. 
 
3 The use of ‘Wahhabi’ as a rhetorical attack has a long historical precedent and is alive and well in 
contemporary discourses, in South Africa and elsewhere. Marcia Hermansen has analyzed its use in 
nineteenth century India, in contexts that I explored in the first chapter. See Martha Hermansen, “Fakirs, 
Wahhabis and Others: Reciprocal Classifications and the Transformation of Intellectual Categories,” in 
Jamal Malik, ed. Perspectives in Mutual Encounters in South Asian History 1760-1860, Leiden: Brill, 
2000. For comparison, Alexander Knysh analyses the rhetoric of ‘Wahhabism’ in contemporary Central 
Asia, particularly in Russian language sources. See his “A Clear and Present Danger: ‘Wahhabism’ as a 
Rhetorical Foil,” Die Welt des Islams 44, 1 (2004): 3-26. 
 
4 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 67 and 90-91. 
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Muslim politics in the late- and post-apartheid eras. With the acceleration of anti-apartheid 
activism among Muslims in the 1980’s, public debates over Sufism increase both in frequency 
and in intensity.5 At least three salient trends animate the background of these debates. First, 
many came to see the Deobandi/Barelwi disputes as not only quibbles in which a majority of 
Muslims had no stake, but as a veritable distraction from, or even a hindrance to, the anti-
apartheid struggle; second, apposite to this, many South African Muslims came to view the 
`ulama’ in general, and Deobandi `ulama’ particularly, as politically reactionary and 
retrogressive; and third, there was a growing politicization of Sufism within anti-apartheid 
politics, in which the mawlud festival particularly became an occasion to extol the revolutionary 
force of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings, even as Deobandis defended their detachment from 
politics in the language of Sufism. 
 
 Deobandi and Barelwi Polemics: Textual Exchanges 
This section presents an overview of Deobandi-Barelwi polemics and counterpolemics in 
South Africa largely over mawlud, `urs, and the nature of ‘Deobandi’ identity, especially with 
regard to the pejorative appellation of ‘Wahhabism’. Here I will only present the gist of these 
exchanges with reference to a few key sources, since there are scores of these pamphlets. In the 
larger context of this chapter, I posit here that the ‘public’ clashes over Deoband’s Sufi critique 
that we will explore subsequently were more consequential than the circulation of polemical texts 
in changing the tone of local opinion towards this ‘Indian’ theological debate.  
                                                       
5 For general sources on Muslim anti-apartheid activism, see S. Sikard, “Muslims and apartheid: the theory 
and practice of Muslim resistance to apartheid,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 10, 1 (1989): 199-222; 
Farid Esack, “Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice,” Third World Quarterly 10, 
2 (1988): 473-498; Farid Esack, Quran, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective on Interreligious 
Solidarity against Oppression. Oxford: Oneworld, 1997; and Shamil Jeppie, “Amandla and Allahu Akbar: 
Muslims and Resistance in South Africa, c. 1970-1987,” Journal for the Study of Religion 4, 1 (1991): 3-
19. 
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Deobandi scholars engaged in a series of polemics with South African Barelwi scholars 
mostly during the 1980’s. We can make some broad observations about these texts and the 
exchanges that transpired between their authors.  First, they are largely disengaged from local 
politics or history; these texts typically rehash the contours of subcontinental Deobandi-Barelwi 
polemics. This disengagement is one of the reasons why many South African Muslims maligned 
Deobandis and Barelwis alike for carrying out these polemical battles during the height of 
Muslim anti-apartheid activism in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, as the chapter subsequently 
explains. Second, these polemical exchanges often condense the argumentation we saw in the 
work of early Deobandi scholars, though the nuance is typically lost; in translation especially, the 
rhetoric becomes a caricature of its forms in the Urdu literature. Third, both Deobandis and 
Barelwis adopt the rhetorical strategy of claiming to represent ‘Sunni’ Islam tout court. Both 
project themselves as the normative Muslim public from which the other is a deviation, 
attempting to be seen “not so much as in the public but rather as the public.”6 
Fourth - and very important for understanding the public reaction to these polemics - 
Deobandis’ critical texts have reached audiences much wider than what I’ve called their 
‘constructive’ texts, the latter dealing largely with Sufi ethics and directed towards an audience of 
fellow Deobandis; to take just one example, most Muslims in Cape Town are well aware of the 
invectives of The Majlis, but Ismail Mangera’s writings on Sufi ‘character’ or Abdul Hamid 
Ishaq’s sermons on the Sufi’s ‘sincerity’ (ikhlas) and other topics will typically be far less known. 
I submit that this is due to the nature of the polemics in question; Deoband’s critical project is one 
that is, perhaps inherently, directed outward, with the aim of reforming the customs and practices 
of local Muslims. We saw this divide as far back as Gangohi, in which he used his fatwas to 
reform Sufi practices for a wide audience while writing erudite treatises in Persian for a small 
audience of elite Sufis. Further, Deobandi scholars tend to ‘specialize’ in either critical or 
constructive texts. Durban’s Yunus Patel writes and speaks publically about Sufi ethics almost 
                                                       
6 Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, “Introduction,” 12. 
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exclusively, whereas Port Elizabeth’s A. S. Desai writes almost exclusively about contentious 
matters such as ‘grave worship’ as well as other issues beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
carrying out protracted polemics against Muslim Personal Law and halal-certification boards.  
 Barelwi rhetoric in these polemics tends to have several overarching features of its own. 
First, they often cite Deobandi scholars to advance their arguments, aiming to show how that 
these contentious matters, especially mawlud and devotional practices at saints’ graves, are far 
more complex than Deobandi rhetoric has made them out to be. If even certain Deobandi scholars 
have tacitly accepted mawlud with certain reservations, as this line of thinking goes, then surely 
the matter is far from settled. Whereas Barelwi authors cite Deobandis in support of their 
positions, the obverse is never the case; to my knowledge, no Deobandi author has cited Ahmed 
Reza Khan in support of his positions. Second, Barelwis link Deoband with the movement of 
Muhammad `Abd al-Wahhab, sometimes through careful rhetorical analysis and historical 
research, though as often, merely as a means of disparaging their opponents with a widely reviled 
label. Third, Barelwi polemics tend to be more ‘baroque’ in their language and argumentation 
than Deobandi polemics; it is not uncommon for their texts to put forth, as in one example, 
seventy two theses refuting Deobandi claims or defending their own practices.7  
 
Locating Polemics: The Majlisul Ulama and Barelwi Institutions  
Most of these polemical exchanges are produced by a fairly small number of publishing 
sources. The most important source of Deobandi textual polemics against Sufi devotional 
practices in South Africa is undoubtedly The Majlis. As a periodical, The Majlis is bitterly 
maligned by a large segment of Cape Town’s Muslims.8 It does, however, claim a large 
                                                       
7 See the lengthy defense of mawlud in Muslim Digest, January/February 1982, 2-63, further discussed 
below. 
 
8 During the duration of my stay in Cape Town, A. S. Desai and The Majlis newspaper were consistent 
objects of derision on radio stations such as Voice of the Cape, especially when he issued a blistering 
statement against SANHA, a widely respected halal-certification board. Several interviewees who are 
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readership in South Africa and overseas. In Cape Town, where most Muslims are far less 
sympathetic to this degree of conservatism, if at all, many regard The Majlis’ focus on the length 
of beards and trousers and its strong opposition to television and even radio as quaint at best, and 
dangerously reactionary at worst. On Muslim radio stations and on local chat forums, dismissing 
The Majlis as a ‘tabloid’ is common. 
The Majlis is published by the Majlisul Ulama of South Africa, a body founded in 1970 
in Port Elizabeth. Its original members consisted of Ismail Moosagie, who acted as president, 
Muhammad Hanif Ismail Moosagie, and Ahmed Sadiq Desai, who became the public face and 
principal writer of the group’s literature. All three studied at Miftah al-`Ulum in Jalalabad, India, 
with Masihullah Khan.9 A. S. Desai, a khalifa of Masihullah Khan, has published The Majlis 
regularly since 1976 and is also the principal translator behind the Majlisul Ulama of South 
Africa, and has published scores of original pamphlets and tracts alongside translations of 
Deobandi scholars’ writings through his link with the Young Men’s Muslim Association, now in 
Benoni, near Johannesburg. The Majlis prints excerpts in translation from numerous Deobandi 
scholars, especially Muhammad Zakariyya, Masihullah Khan, Manzur Numani, Mufti Taqi 
Uthmani, and most of all, Ashraf `Ali Thanawi. The topics overwhelmingly tend towards 
discussions of hadith, the proper form of salat, ‘proper’ Muslim attire, the inadmissibility of 
Muslims associating with ‘kufaar’, opposition to television and media generally, opposition to 
schools for women, opposition to Shi`as, Salafis and Ahmadis, strict objection to Muslims voting 
or involvement in democratic politics, and - most salient here - strong criticisms of “qabr parasti,” 
i.e. ‘grave worship’ and mawlud.  
 In line with the division of Sufism I have discussed in previous chapters, The Majlis also 
exclusively privileges the ethics of Sufism over its devotional aspects. Following Masihullah 
                                                                                                                                                                  
sympathetic to the ultra-conservative Islam that A. S. Desai is advancing also privately conceded that the 
author’s polemical tone probably does more harm than good for the interests of South Africa’s Muslims. 
The notion that he is all too ready to “pick a fight,” as one put it, is common. 
 
9 “Port Elizabeth gets second Ulema body,” Muslim News, 27 February 1970. 
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Khan, it asserts the purpose of Sufism is to “eliminate the bestial qualities in man and to supplant 
them with the high and virtuous qualities of angels.” The Majlis extends Thanawi’s and 
Masihullah Khan’s vision of Sufism as an obligatory feature of Islamic piety; it claims itself a 
proponent of “Tasawwuf, i.e. Qur’aanic Tasawwuf - the Tasawwuf which is Fardh [obligatory] 
upon every Muslim.”10 
The Majlis, like many Deobandi organizations, has positioned itself in the space between 
defending ‘traditional’ Sufism against its Salafi and Wahhabi critics and critiquing the alleged 
‘Sufism’ of ‘grave worshipping’ Barelwis, who are concerned only with fleecing the gullible 
masses: 
Tasawwuf is a misunderstood concept. Its true meaning and significance in the 
daily life of a Muslim are lost. Commercial ‘Sufis’ (men of guile who exhibit 
themselves as saints) are trading Tasawwuf as some mysterious cult of 
‘Mysticism’ apart from the Shariat and Sunnat of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi 
wasallam). They have reduced Tasawwuf to potions, talismans, incantations, 
empty rituals, and they have cloaked it with beliefs and theories of kufr and shirk. 
They have interwoven Tasawwuf with bid’ah and practices of corruption … 
Muslims who treasure their Imaan and Islaam have to be aware of such robbers 
of the Deen who are easily recognized by the high fees which they levy for 
spiritual initiation (ba’yt) into their ‘mystical’ paths, for their annual renewal 
fees, for their tabarruk charges and for their many other fees.11 
 
As with nearly all the polemics considered here, the veracity of these claims is irrelevant (and 
indeed, Barelwis challenged their veracity); the accusations arise not out of observing actual 
Sufis, but instead they are recycled from a litany of standard Deobandi tropes. 
The Majlis’ invectives did not take place in a vacuum of course. The institutionalization 
of Barelwi thought (in the form of madrasas and `ulama’ bodies) and a series of foreign Barelwi 
lecturers energized Barelwi production of these textual polemics, largely in response to the 
Majlisul Ulama’s screeds. These Barelwi organizations include the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, 
formed in 1978; Cape Town’s Ghousia Manzil khanqah, founded in 1980 to continue the 
                                                       
10 “What is Tasawwuf?” The Majlis, Vol. 4, Issue 12, 7. (emphasis added) 
 
11 Ibid. 
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teachings of the Barelwi Qadiri Sufi, Hazrat Sayyid Zainul Abidien.12 Foreign Barelwi dignitaries 
typically founded South African Barelwi organizations, or they were founded in their honor. The 
Dar al-`Ulum Aleemia Razvia, for instance, was named in honor of both Ahmad Reza Khan and 
Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, a khalifa of Ahmad Reza Khan, who visited South Africa in 1952. 
Opening in January 1983 at Chatsworth, near Durban, Dar al-`Ulum Aleemia Razvia hosted the 
prominent Barelwi scholar and son of Abdul Aleem, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani Siddiqui, 
who led a mawlud there on the occasion of its first graduation.13 Maulana Noorani had lectured 
throughout the country earlier, in 1981. The Ahl-i Sunnat wal Jammat in 1984, while in Pretoria, 
the Barelwi madrasa Dar al-`Ulum Pretoria was formed in 1990.14 The Sunni Ulama Council was 
founded in September 1993 to coordinate Barelwi activities in the country.15 
But the most significant source of polemics has probably been the Imam Ahmed Raza 
Academy. Its textual output suggests how these organizations impact the debate with Deobandis 
locally. The Academy formed in Durban in July of 1986.16 It publishes large numbers of 
pamphlets and books to bolster the presence of Barelwi argument in this crowded rhetorical field. 
Some incorporate standard Barelwi theological positions, such as the omnipresence of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his being “present and seeing everything,”17 or pamphlets outlining the 
performance of conveying merit (isal-i sawab) upon `Abd al-Qadir Jilani, known as giyarwi 
                                                       
12 Muslim News, 21 March 1980. 
 
13 Muslim Views, 28 January 1983, 9. Ahmad Noorani Siddiqui said at the commencement, “We are the 
followers of Hazrat Badshah Peer and Hazrat Soofie Saheb, and this Darul Uloom has been built to 
safeguard their moral preachings.” 
 
14 Interview, Mufti Akbar Hazarvi, Darul Uloom Pretoria, 1 December 2009. 
 
15 Muslim Digest, October/November 1993. 
 
16 Interview, Yunus Karim at Imam Ahmed Reza Academy, 9 November 2009. See also Mahida, A History 
of Muslims in South Africa, 132. 
 
17 See Muhammad Yunus Abdul Karrim Qadri, The Excellence in Reciting the Darood Shareef upon the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad, Durban: Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, n.d., especially 87-91. 
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sharif.18 One pamphlet published fatwas requested by South Africans from a Barelwi scholar, 
Muhammad Akhtar Reza Khan Azhari (d. 1942), the great-grandson of Ahmad Reza Khan, which 
forbids praying behind Deobandi imams.19 Large lists of the Prophet's miracles are also standard 
in these works. It is also common for these South African translations of Barelwi texts to place 
the Deobandi-Barelwi dispute in a local context.20 They also print works by Ahmed Reza Khan 
himself.21 
With respect to direct polemical encounters with Deobandis, perhaps the most significant 
Barelwi scholars were Muhammad Shafee Okarvi (d. 1984) and especially his son, Allamah 
Kawkab Noorani Okarvi. Muhammad Shafee first came to South Africa in 1976 and again from 
1979 to 1980, and Maulana Allamah Kawkab Noorani Okarvi came to South Africa six times 
between 1987 and 1991, establishing branches of the Maulana Okarvi Academy. In December of 
1988, Maulana Kawkab went to the Waterval Islamic Institute to challenge its “Deobandi-
Wahaabi-Tableeghi” `ulama’ to a public debate, even printing the invitation in a local newspaper. 
The invitation was not requited.22 Okarvi’s Deoband to Bareilly is an exhaustive rebuttal of 
Deobandi accusations, and though it was first published in South Africa, the text addresses almost 
nothing of local debates, typical of many polemics on both sides of the traditional Deobandi-
                                                       
18 Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, Qaseedah Ghousia and Khatme Qaadiriya Kabeer, Durban: Imam Ahmed 
Raza Academy, n.d. 
 
19 Shaykh Allama Mufti Mohammad Akhtar Reza Khan Azhari, Azharul Fatawa, Bareilly: Idara Sunni 
Dunya, n.d. This text is distributed in South Africa by Habibi Darul Ifta. 
 
20 Such as the preface to the South African translation of Imam Ahmad Reza Khan’s Tamheed-e-Imaan, 
Durban: Khanqah Qadria Razvia of Durban, 1987. In the preface by Mohammed Bana of Durban, Bana’s 
primary grievance with the Deobandis revolves around three alleged Deobandi claims about the Prophet 
Muhammad’s knowledge and God’s sovereignty: that Satan has more knowledge than the Prophet, that 
“the knowledge of the Holy Prophet of Islam is equivalent … to the knowledge of madmen, children or any 
four-legged animal (which includes pigs as well),” and that God is capable of lying. 
 
21 For instance, Imam Ahmed Reza Khan, The Validity of Saying 'Ya Rasoolallah', trans. Durwesh Abu 
Muhammad Abdul Hadi al-Qadiri, Durban: Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, n.d. 
 
22 Muslim Digest, December 1988/January 1989, 4. 
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Barelwi divide.23 
  
The contours of Deobandi/Barewli polemic in South Africa 
The Majlis is the most vocal interlocutor in Deobandi polemics. Like their predecessors 
Gangohi and Thanawi, The Majlis balances advancing Deoband’s ‘constructive’ and ‘critical’ 
projects. In its apprehension of Sufi ethics, The Majlis has stated, in terms that echo Thanawi’s 
apologetical defense of Sufism:  
Many people have misunderstood the meaning of Tasawwuf. Tasawwuf is not 
some mysterious cult apart from the Shariah. Tasawwuf is an integral part of 
Islam. Any conception of Tasawwuf which conflicts with the Shariah is a satanic 
delusion. Tasawwuf is that part of the Shariah which discusses moral purification 
and spiritual elevation in terms of the Qur’aan and Sunnah… Tasawwuf is not a 
theoretical branch of study. It is a practical endeavor to purify the nafs from the 
evil qualities and adorn it with the noble attributes.”24  
  
But The Majlis is overwhelmingly focused on Deoband’s critical project. “In South 
Africa,” The Majlis announces, “the Qabar Pujaaris are making frantic efforts to introduce and 
perpetuate their acts of grave-worship.”25 The Majlis lists the “worst aspects of this shirk” as 
prostration towards graves, circumambulation of graves, spreading cloths on graves, and the 
notion that God shares his power with the saints.26 It implores South Africa’s Muslims to be “on 
their guard against these semi-Shiah worshippers of graves:” 
Their religion of rituals consists of only the clamour of ‘Hubbe Rasool’ [love of 
the Messenger], the slogan of Takbeer, rituals of grave-worship, merry-making 
festivals, singing, dancing, qawwali headed by dagga-smoking qawwals 
                                                       
23 See Kaukab Noorani Okarvi, Deoband to Bareilly: The Truth, Lahore: Zia ul-Quraan Publications, 1996, 
as well as the same author’s White and Black: Deobandi-ism caught up in its own web, Durban: Maulana 
Okarvi Academy, 1991 and Truth wins: the full account of a historic challenge to establish truth as the 
truth and falsehood as the falsehood, Durban: Maulana Okarvi Academy, 1991. 
 
24 The Majlis, Vol. 11, Issue 6. 
 
25 Puja is of course a Hindu term, describing a wide variety of practices based on ritual reverence for Hindu 
deities. The Majlis is well aware that describing the devotional reverence of deceased Sufi saints as the 
‘puja’ of tombs is particularly offensive.  
 
26 “Qabar Pujari Shirk,” The Majlis, Vol. 6, Issue 8, 6. 
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(singers), feasting and skinning ignorant people of their money in the names of 
the dead Auliya.27 
 
The Majlis has taken particular aim at the Imam Ahmed Raza Academy, with whom it has 
debated the permissibility of even building tombs at all, much less visiting them.28 But in fact, 
most Deobandi-Barelwi polemics and counterpolemics in South African do not address `urs at 
all; in fact, they most often consist of Deobandi accusations of ‘grave worship’ (qabr parasti) and 
Barelwi responses to these claims. In some sense, one senses a shift in rhetoric from the nuance in 
debates about `urs to rather wooden and simplistic discussions of ‘grave worship’. Most of these 
polemics were published in the 1980’s, at the height of Deobandi/Barelwi conflict.29 
Beyond Deobandi-Barelwi polemics, the Majlisul Ulama has initiated intra-Deobandi 
contentions over visiting the dead in its Ziyarat of the Quboor. Its main grievance is lifting one’s 
hands during collective du`a, which emulates the “practice of the Ahl-e-Barailli.” There is a 
certain novel logic at work here: the Ahl-e-Bid`a perform a certain practice, in this case raising 
the hands during du`a at the gravesite, that is merely permissible but neither recommended or 
mandatory, but by virtue of their performance of that practice it becomes anathema.30 
The essence of The Majlis’ criticism of these practices is that they have no basis in the 
sunna: 
We see the Sahaabah rigidly clinging to the minutest details of Rasulullah’s 
Sunnah - even to such detailed acts which are not imposed on the Ummah by the 
Shariah. On the contrary we find the loud-mouthed grave-worshippers shunning 
almost every Sunnat act of Rasulullah. We find clean-shaven fussaaq - dagga 
smoking qawwals - singing the praises of Rasulullah with the accompaniment of 
haraam musical instruments. Are these fujjaar superior in love for Rasulullah 
                                                       
27 “The Curse of Grave Worship,” The Majlis, Vol. 7, Issue 9, n.d., 1. 
 
28 “The Graveworshippers and their Mausoleum,” The Majlis, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 7-8. 
 
29 However, some of these pamphlets are far more recent. Among the most caustic attacks against 
Deobandis are two texts published in recent years (the exact date is uncertain) by a Barelwi publisher called 
Sunni World, The Original Beliefs of the Wahabi/Deobandi/Tablighi Sect, Durban: Sunni World, n.d. and 
An Attack on Our Sunni Beliefs by the Wahabi/Deobandi/Tablighi Sect and Our Reply, Durban: Sunni 
World, n.d. These books are veritable encyclopedias of the Deobandi/Barelwi conflict. 
 
30 Young Men’s Muslim Association, Ziyaarat of the Quboor: Visiting the Graves and the Shariah, Benoni, 
South Africa: Young Men’s Muslim Association, n.d. 
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than the noble Sahaabah who offered their blessed bodies as shields to protect the 
mubaraak body of Nabi-e-Kareem from the spears and arrows of the kuffaar?31 
 
As with debates over ‘grave worship’, polemics and counter-polemics over mawlud 
transpired mostly between the Majlisul Ulama and various Barelwi scholars. These polemics are 
abundant.32 Here I will look at a few briefly. First, in 1981 the Durban-based Muslim Digest 
published a full issue devoted to Deobandi-Barelwi polemics. The issue juxtaposes a lengthy 
fatwa in support of mawlud, qiyam, and other contentious issues in roughly the first half of the 
issue with mocking reports of the internal discord that Deoband experienced during the early 
1980’s, even suggesting that the Deoband administration was basically passing out alim 
certificates to unqualified students after only a few years of study.  
In November of 1981, a prominent businessman in Pretoria submitted, in Urdu, a series 
of questions to Mufti Alli Aswari, asking about the permissibility of mawlud and specifically of 
qiyam, whether it is possible to prepare food for mawlud and distribute it among Muslims, and 
other issues. This fatwa extends the Barelwi strategy of arguing against Deobandis by citing 
them;33 one ‘proof’ narrates how Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi accepted “the Holy Prophet 
(peace be upon him) as ‘haazir’ and ‘naazir’ in front of him, calls for help thus: ‘Help me Oh 
kindness of Ahmad, for besides thee / There is no helper for Qasim, the helpless!”34 At the same 
                                                       
31 Young Men’s Muslim Association, Moulood and the Shariah, Benoni, South Africa: Young Men’s 
Muslim Association, n.d. 32. 
 
32 Barelwi pamphlets in support of mawlud include, for instance, Mufti Akbar Hazarvi’s Meelaad-un-Nabie 
Celebration in the light of Shariah, Laudium, South Africa: Soutul Islam Publications, 1999, published by 
and read at Darul Uloom Pretoria. Deobandi polemics include, for example, Majlisul Ulama’s, What is 
Meelaad? Young Men’s Muslim Association, 1988. There is little reference in these texts to the arguments 
about mawlud that took place among Imdadullah, Gangohi and Thanawi. More recently, other exchanges 
have included the Imam Ahmed Raza Academy’s response to Muhammad Taqi Uthmani’s (b. 1943) fatwa 
against mawlud (Uthmani’s fatwa is reprinted at http://www.albalagh.net/general/rabi-ul-awwal.shtml (last 
accessed on 10 December 2010). The Academy’s response is titled Mawlid: Celebration of the Birth of the 
Prophet. See Sheikh G. F. Haddad, Mawlid: Celebration of the Birth of the Prophet, Durban: Imam Ahmad 
Raza Academy, 2002. 
 
33 Moulana Muhammad Ali Aswari, “Fatawa Aswari, in Justification of: Meelad-un-Nabi, Meelad Feast, 
Qiyaam, Salaami, Dua after Taraweeh, Tarqiyah,” Muslim Digest, January/February 1982, 6-7. 
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time that they cite Deobandi scholars for their apparent support of certain beliefs, they criticize 
them vociferously for others; Gangohi is notably singled out here, with reference to Gangohi’s 
notion that God is capable of telling a lie.35 
 In terms of local debate over mawlud, two exchanges will illustrate how these texts 
engage one another. After reiterating the older Deobandi claims that mawlud is an invention of 
the middle period, as well as asserting their standard position on bid`a - “to regard a mustahab or 
a permissible act as compulsory” - the Majlisul Ulama’s Meelaad Celebrations then submits 
several factors which “make the customary moulood celebrations unislamic:” that supporters of 
mawlud regard it as “compulsory” and even more important than salat, engage in qiyam, organize 
qawwali performances, recite verses that “transgress the limits of legitimate praise, thus assigning 
a position of divinity to our Nabi,” allow the presence of immoral people, permit singing at these 
functions by young boys and girls, allow intermingling of the sexes, ignore salat, waste resources, 
imitate the nonbelievers (tashabbuh bil kuffar), ostracize those who do not participate, and regard 
the distribution of sweets as essential, and the belief that the Prophet presents himself.36  
In a response to the Majlis’ Meelaad Celebrations, Abdun Nabi Hamidi, a prominent 
Barelwi scholar of the Imam Ahmed Raza Masjid in Lenasia, took the Majlisul Ulama to task 
with Yes, Meelaad Celebration is Commendable. Hamidi provided a point-by-point refutation of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
34Ibid., 59. Gangohi wrote that “the Holy Prophet is ‘haazir’ and ‘naazir’ and standing with respect, hands 
clasped (as was his habit), and seeking assistance and help from the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), 
calls in the present: ‘Oh Muhammad Mustafa, I have need of thee / Help me! For Allah’s sake, Hazrat 
Muhammad Mustafa!” 57. 
 
35 “Fatwa by Majlisush Shura al Islami: Is it Possible for Allah to Speak a Lie?” Muslim Digest, 
January/February 1982, 69. It offers a rejoinder to the Deobandi vision of divine sovereignty outlined in the 
first chapter: “Therefore, should it be possible for Allah to tell lies, then the following should be taken into 
consideration: (a) He curses Himself. This then brings His character into degradation. (b) We know Him to 
be All-Wise. Then surely if it is possible for Allah to tell lies, then He is contradicting himself in many 
verses of the Holy Qur’an. It will then lead us to believe that our Holy Qur’an could possibly be made up of 
lies, which, as we know, can never ever be accepted. So much so that one who believes this to be even 
remotely possible, will fall out of the fold of Islam. Allah is all-Powerful. From this we learn that Allah’s 
power has no limit, but this does not mean that Allah’s power is used to make the impossible possible. 
Allah’s power is therefore not used unwisely.” 
 
36 Majlisul Ulama of South Africa, Meelaad Celebrations, Benoni, South Africa: Young Men’s Muslim 
Association, 1985, 9-16. 
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The Majlis’ pamphlet in order to prove that mawlud is mustahabb, ‘commendable’. First, he says 
no Muslim actually believes the mawlud to be compulsory. Qiyam, he says, and as I noted in the 
first chapter, was in fact practiced by Hajji Imdadullah, and no one has ever claimed it to be 
obligatory. And of the “hundreds” of mawluds Hamidi has attended in South Africa, he has never 
observed salat being neglected; even if one misses salat, it does not follow that one should 
condemn the entire institution of mawlud: “If a person traveling by car from Johannesburg to 
Cape Town misses a few of his Salaah or misses the Jamaat, will one pass a Fatwa that travelling 
in a car from Johannesburg to Cape Town is Haraam?”37  
It is the same with qawwali; Hamidi has never observed qawwali in South African 
mawluds, and even if this were the case, it is not a reason to ban the entire celebration. He rejects 
the notion that any verses of praise in the mawlud assign divinity to Muhammad. You cannot ban 
mawlud because of the presence of one sinner (fasiq), any more than you can ban Tablighi 
ijtima`s for that reason, nor can you ban mawlud because of the presence of ‘mature’ (baligha) 
youth any more than you can ban Dar al-`Ulums for that reason. If there is intermingling of sexes, 
he says, one must teach the participants the proper behavior, rather than banning mawlud outright. 
As for accusations of ‘waste’ (israf), if feeding the poor at a mawlud is a waste, then surely the 
money spent on Tablighis’ ijtima` tents and organizing those large events is even more so.38  
Other polemical exchanges took place over claiming the mantle of ‘Sunni’ Islam. The 
Young Men's Muslim Association’s Who are the People of Sunnah? is a prime example, arguing 
not only that Deobandis represent Sunni Islam but that Barelwis (‘qabar pujaaris’) are the greatest 
deviants:39  
                                                       
37 Abdun Nabi Hamidi, Yes, Meelaad Celebration is Commendable, Azaadville: Sunni Ulema Council, n.d. 
1-9. Hamidi has also responded to Deobandis’ critiques of loud zikr. See his Permissibility of Loud Zikr in 
the Masjid and Elsewhere, Johannesburg: Sarwari Qaaderi Publications, 2000. This is specifically a reply 
to Mufti A. H. Elias’ tract, Impermissibility of Loud Zikr in the Masjid. 
 
38 Abdun Nabi Hamidi, Yes, Meelaad Celebration is Commendable, 12-13. 
 
39 Young Men’s Muslim Association, Who are the People of the Sunnah? Benoni: Young Men’s Muslim 
Association, 1987, 2.  
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The sect of the Qabar Pujaaris have made the Ulama of Deoband and the 
Tablighi Jamaat their prime targets of attack and vituperation for the single 
reason that the Ulama of Deoband resolutely declare the falsehood of qabar puja 
and bid’ah. The Deobandi ulama teach you how to perform Salaat; they do not 
teach you to make sajdah and ruku’ to the graves. They teach you how to conduct 
your daily life in conformity with the detailed Sunnah practices of Rasulullah 
(sallallahu alayhi wasallam).40 
 
The notion that Deobandis represent the essence of Sunni Islam, which as we saw, Qari 
Muhammad Tayyib lays out in exquisite detail, amounts here to rejecting the very idea of 
Deoband as a ‘movement’: 
The grave-worshippers seek to convey the impression that the Ulama of Deoband 
are a new group or a sect which has arisen recently, hence they refer to the 
Ulama of the Sunnah as the ‘Deobandi Movement’. Deoband is merely the name 
of a town in India where the famous Darul Uloom is located. If the Deobandi 
Ulama’s beliefs and teachings are unacceptable to the grave-worshippers then in 
actual fact their dislike is for the beliefs and teachings propagated by the 
Sahaabah since the beliefs and teachings are in fact the Shariah of Islam which 
was handed to the Ummah by the Sahaabah of Rasulullah (sallallahu alayhi 
wasallam).41 
 
A Barelwi response, from the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, Confusion or Conclusion: Answer 
to ‘Who are the People of the Sunnah?’ attempts to subvert accusations of bid`a by turning it 
back upon Deobandi authors. If mawlud is an innovation, then surely Tablighi gatherings must be 
as well. Besides, it submits, Deobandi scholars such as Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri have given 
their qualified approval of mawlud.42 The text also reminds us that Hajji Imdadullah testified to 
participating in mawluds often, as I note in the first chapter.43 After reporting that Muhammad 
Qasim Nanautawi himself is said to have visited the Sufi shrine of Shaykh `Ali Sabir - originator 
of the Sabiri Chishti lineage - at Kalyar Sharif, the author asks, “One wonders how this practice 
                                                       
40 Ibid., 3. 
 
41 Ibid., 4. (emphasis added) 
 
42 Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, Confusion or Conclusion: Answer to ‘Who are the People of the Sunnah?’ 
Durban: Sunni Jamiatul Ulama, n.d. 2-3. It submits that, in Al-Muhannad, Saharanpuri claimed “God 
forbid, neither we nor any Muslim will ever condemn the commemoration of the birth of Rasulullah 
Sallallahu Alahihi wa Sallaam including the dust of his shoes, the urine of his donkey, as vile, as Bidate 
Sayyiah (evil bidat) or Haraam,” and even points out that Thanawi is a signatory to Saharanpuri’s Al-
Muhannad. 
 
43 Ibid., 3. 
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of the pagans - Qabar Puja - grave worship was embraced by the very founder of Darul Uloom 
Deoband.”44 
Some polemics against Deoband were not theological at all; the Muslim Digest went 
beyond criticizing Deobandi ideas to criticizing the entire institution in their coverage of internal 
discord that plagued the Dar al-`Ulum Deoband in the early 1980’s.45 An article in the same issue 
claimed an (unnamed) South African student at Deoband returned from the madrasa after the 
1981 conflict to describe an institution ravaged by chaos, where faculty were awarding `alim 
degrees to students after only two or three years of study, and even that Qari Muhammad Tayyib 
was a multi-millionaire who zipped around India in a private helicopter.46 Tayyib’s rival, 
Maulana Asad Madani, came to South Africa in September 1981, a mere month before the 
conflict at Deoband ensured, in order to raise money. Some South African supporters of the 
madrasa were incensed that Madani did not publicize the looming conflict at the time, but instead 
appears to have used the funds to undergird his own side, reaping nearly a million rupees from his 
South African trip.47 
Nor did all of the anti-Deobandi sentiment arise out of Sufi circles. The journal Al-
Balaagh, first published in Johannesburg and later Lenasia, is a case in point. Citing the 
                                                       
44 The pamphlet translates a passage from Savanih Qasimi, “It has come to me from my elders that when he 
[Nanautawi] used to visit Kalyar Sharif, he used to remove his shoes at Rorki, a few kilometers away from 
Kalyar. Entering the Mazaar at night and closing the door behind him he used to spend the entire night in 
seclusion.” Pg. 15. 
 
45 “Why Did Deoband Dar-ul-Uloom Close Down Recently?” Muslim Digest, January/February 1982, 72. 
The report alleges that rioting started on 31 October 1981, when the son of Qari Muhammad Tayyib, 
Moulvi Saalim, fired on students. Tayyib blamed Vice-rector Muhammad Uthman, and others for the riot, 
culminating with his decision to close the madrasa on 1 November 1981. 
 
46 Returning Deoband Student Speaks Out-Molvie Certificates Issued after 2 to 3 Years’ Study,” Muslim 
Digest, January/February 1982, 73. 
 
47 “Deoband’s supporters in South Africa having second thoughts,” Muslim Digest, January/February 1982, 
74-75. “The financial supporters of Deoband Darul Uloom in South Africa,” it continues, “are now having 
second thoughts and are all the more convinced that the call for the democratic running of the Darul Uloom 
by those who are demanding it is an absolute necessity for the institution to have its credibility restored in 
the eyes of the Muslims of the world.” “Deoband’s supporters in South Africa having second thoughts,” 
Muslim Digest, date or issue, 75. 
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modernist icons Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Abduh in nearly every issue, its articles 
assault both the Jamiatul Ulama Natal, the Majlisul Ulama of Port Elizabeth, as well as the 
Tablighi Jama`at. Its politics are anti-apartheid and pro-Iran, with the tagline “dedicated to 
expounding Islam in its PRISTINE PURITY.” Al-Balaagh is an, admittedly somewhat rare, 
example of a highly pro-mawlud view coinciding with a virulently anti-Sufi one. On the one 
hand, it celebrates mawlud as: 
perfectly in order - never mind what the Tableeghis and their Deobandi gurus say 
to the contrary! The entire Muslim world celebrates the GREATEST day in the 
history of mankind - the day that the RAHMATUL LIL ‘AALAMEEN was born! 
And according to the Hadith that “My Ummah will never be united in error,” it is 
obvious that all the Muslims inhabiting the globe (comprising the Ummah) 
CANNOT be wrong in celebrating Maulood. The Deobandis and Tableeghis are 
a negligible MINORITY whose objections are un-Islamic, captious, crass, 
fragile, feckless and of NO importance!48 
 
On the other hand, it is also firmly against what it calls ‘peeri-mureedi’, the pir-murid 
relationship at the core of Sufi initiations: “This ‘Peeri-Mureedi’ business is a CULT, cultivated 
by those Muslims who want EASY Islam. There are two kinds of Islam: The Islam of ACTION, 
and the other is the easy Islam of sitting on the musallahs, moving Tasbeeh (rosary beads), 
intoning wazeefahs and expecting Allah to reward us with many mansions in Jannat … We of 
AL-BALAAGH are the TRUE believers in the Awliya-Allah, because the Awliya we believe in 
NEVER claim to perform miracles and do things CONTRARY to Allah’s Fixed Physical 
Laws.”49 This is a classic Iqbalian critique of Sufism: Sufis represent inaction as opposed to the 
Islam of action; claiming ‘true’ Sufism for itself and separating the luminaries of Sufism from the 
ignorant masses.  
 
                                                       
48 Al-Balaagh, Vol. 12, Issue 4, November/December 1987, 6. One article, “Maulana Thanwi, the Moon 
and the Mullahs,” criticizes Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal for relying on Thanawi’s work for determining 
sighting of the moon in South Africa. Al-Balaagh, Volume 19/No. 2, May/June 1994. 
 
49 Al-Balaagh, Vol. 13, Issue 1, Feb/March 1988, 6. 
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Public Confrontation: Deobandis, Barelwis, and Apartheid Politics 
Most of these textual polemics and counterpolemics had a very small audience. Their 
principal readers were already invested in the debates themselves. When these polemics erupted 
into more public venues (e.g. lecture halls, radio, television) they often entailed not just rhetorical 
confrontation but physical ones as well, and their coverage in local media entailed the 
involvement of a larger audience.50 The events below brought Deobandi-Barelwi polemics under 
critical scrutiny. Opposition to Deobandi critiques became one of two general types: the standard 
opposition of Barelwi scholars and their sympathizers, on the one hand, and those who opposed 
the very nature of the debates, those who were not at all invested in Deobandi-Barelwi polemics 
and who found them to be damaging to South African Muslim society, on the other hand. In these 
confrontations, moreover, Deoband became inextricably bound up with public perceptions of the 
Tablighi Jama`at. As Moosa has noted concerning this relationship, “The mileage that the school 
of Deoband has gained out of its links with the Tablighi Jama`at in the South African context, in 
terms of its own spread and authority, is unmistakable. The fortunes of the Deoband School in 
this region will to a large extent follow that of the Tablighi Jama`at.”51 
 
Maulana Khushtar and the Tablighi Jama`at 
The first of these public events took place early in the history of Deobandi-Barelwi 
polemics. In 1970, a Barelwi organization, the Sunni Razvi Society, sent its founder and patron, 
Maulana Ibrahim Khushtar of Mauritius, to visit Cape Town and give a series of public lectures at 
town halls and mosques. As the third chapter explained, the period of the late-1960’s and early-
                                                       
50 I realize this is an inversion of the standard approach to the relation between print and its audiences, 
which posits print has having a much larger audience but one comprised of individual ‘private’ readers. It is 
also worth noting that, by calling the events discussed below ‘public’, I do not intend to suggest that textual 
polemics are somehow inherently ‘private’. 
 
51 Ebrahim Moosa, “Worlds ‘Apart’: The Tablighi Jama`at under Apartheid: 1963-1993,” 220. 
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1970’s coincides with the rise of the Tablighi Jama`at as a precursor to the establishment of 
Deobandi madrasas in South Africa.  
Emotions were especially raw as Maulana Khushtar’s visit came on the heels of that of 
Mohammed Palan Haqqani, a mysterious traveling lecturer who preached against bid`a in a tour 
of Southern Africa, leaving bitter controversies in his wake. The Arabic Study Circle of Durban 
hosted him there. Details of his lectures are scant, but in its wake, the Arabic Study Circle 
convened a meeting of community leaders at West Street Mosque in June 1970 to counter Palan 
Haqqani’s views on bid`a.52 
Maulana Khushtar (d. 2002) was a renowned Indian Barelwi scholar originally from 
West Bengal. His initiation in the Qadiri Sufi silsila extended back to `Abd al-Qadir Jilani (d. 
1166) through Imam Ahmed Reza Khan Barelwi (d. 1921), founder of the Barelwi movement and 
arch-nemesis of the Deobandi `ulama’.53 After graduating from the chief Barelwi madrasa of 
India, Miftah al-`Ulum, Khushtar migrated to Mauritius and established the Sunni Razvi Society 
in 1965.54  
From 29 June to 5 July 1970, Maulana Khushtar gave four lectures in Cape Town. This 
clash did not end in violence, as future clashes would, but did end with the threat of violence.55 
His first, at the Wynberg Town Hall, did not provoke any response from the Cape Town Tablighi 
Jama`at. But his second lecture took place the following Thursday at what was then the center of 
Cape Tablighi activity, the Khanamia Mosque on Muir Street. As if provoking the Tablighis 
directly, Khushtar lectured mostly in Urdu about the intercession (wasila) of the saints and 
                                                       
52 Views and News, June 1970. Also see Goolam Vahed “Contesting ‘Orthodoxy’: The Tablighi-Sunni 
Conflict among South African Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23, 2 
(2003): 313-334, at 318-319, as well as Shamil Jeppie, Language, Identity, Modernity: The Arabic Study 
Circle of Durban, Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2007, 71. 
53 On Ahmad Reza Khan, see the work of Usha Sanyal, most recently Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the 
Path of the Prophet, Makers of the Muslim World. Oxford: Oneworld, 2005. 
 
54 See http://www.sunnirazvi.org/society/index.htm (last accessed on 23 June 2009). 
 
55 “Cape Town Tablighi Jamaa Declares Itself Wahabi,” Muslim News, 17 July 1970, 1. 
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standing in honor of the Prophet when his name is invoked (salami).56 After Khushtar had already 
left, Shaykh Abu Bakr Najjar, spokesperson for the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), criticized the 
speaker in front of what remained of the audience. At the end of following lecture at the 
Chiappini Street Mosque, delivered on the same theme, the chairman of the MJC, Shaykh Omar 
Gabier, began an impromptu counter-lecture criticizing Khushtar’s main points. The president of 
the MJC, Shaykh A. Behardien, then took the microphone from Gabier and announced that 
everything Khushtar had said was not only true, it was the core belief of the “Ahl-e Sunnah wal-
Jama’a” and anyone who disagreed with part of the “Wahhabi sect.”57 During the final lecture, at 
the Woodstock Town Hall, members of the Tablighi Jama`at stormed the stage. Later a group of 
the Tablighis came to the home of the man who was hosting Khushtar in Cape Town; during a 
scuffle a member of the Tablighi party brandished a knife, although no one was hurt. 
In the coming weeks, most comments on this event concerned how to mend incipient 
fault lines within the Cape Muslim community, not to mention fault lines within the MJC itself. 
The Muslim Judicial Council had been founded in 1945 as a body of `ulama’ with the tasks of 
issuing fatwas to the Cape Muslim community, giving advice in Islamic legal matters, issuing 
halal certifications to food outlets, and the like - one without any particular ideological 
orientation be it ‘Deobandi’ or ‘Barelwi’.58 Yet some were concerned of an apparent ‘Wahhabi’ 
or ‘Tablighi’ infiltration of the MJC. This conflation of ‘Wahhabi’, ‘Tablighi’ and ‘Deobandi’ 
                                                       
56 Interview with Ahmed Mukaddam at International Peace University of South Africa (IPSA), 21 May 
2009. 
 
57 Muslim News, 17 July 1970, 12. The phrase ‘Ahl-e Sunnah wal-Jama’a’ literally means ‘The People of 
the Sunnah and the Community [of Muslims]’. Barelwis often describe themselves as ‘Ahl-e Sunnah wal-
Jama’a’ or simply as “Sunnis” to suggest that their believes are Sunni Islam in its essence, no more and no 
less. Of course this claim fiercely contested by Deobandis. Both, however, often cast their own historically 
and contextually specific approaches to Islam as ‘Islam’ per se. Similarly, ‘Wahhabis’ almost universally 
reject that appellation in preference for muwahhidun, the ‘monotheists’.  
 
58 Gerrie Lubbe, “The Muslim Judicial Council: Custodian or Catalyst?” Journal for Islamic Studies, 14 
(1994): 34-62. 
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would, in subsequent decades, become a major trope of anti-Deobandi polemics. Regardless, the 
resistance to the Tablighi Jama`at in the Cape was substantial.59 
In response to the events in Cape Town, the Sunni Razvi Society issued a pamphlet, “The 
Meaning of Bidat,” on 31 July 1970, in which they directly challenged the Deobandi rhetorical 
monopoly over defining the concept of bid`a. “The senseless conflict presently being witness in 
the Muslim community,” the pamphlet begins, “is the result of the misuse and incorrect 
interpretation of the word ‘Bidat’.”60  A simple premise animates the argument of the pamphlet: 
clearly it is impractical to condemn anything and everything that did not exist in the era of the 
Prophet and the Companions. Cars are ‘innovations’, as are madrasas, to take just two examples; 
neither existed in the early eras of Islam, so on what grounds should they exist now? “The 
Deobandi movement condemn [sic] Salam, Meelad, Urs, Fateha and label all these good deeds as 
Bidate Sayyia because it did not take place as it does today or in the present form during the time 
of the Prophet (SAW), the Sahabas, Tabaeen and Tabbae Tabaeens [the Righteous Companions, 
the Followers, or the Followers of the Followers],” it argues. It adds that if the Deobandi 
interpretation of bid`a is upheld, “then almost all aspects of Islam and daily life automatically 
become Bidat, because nothing is still done in the original manner.”61 
                                                       
59 Cilliers suggests that the strength of the mosque networks in the Cape inhibited the spread of the Tablighi 
Jama`at there, and that the movement had mass appeal to ‘Indians’ far more than to ‘Coloureds’. See 
Jacobus L. Cilliers, ‘Die Tabligh-Beweging en sy invloed in Suid-Afrika,” 71-72.  
 
60 “The Meaning of Bidat,” Durban: Sunni Razvi Society, 1970, 1. 
 
61 Ibid. In some ways, the Sunni Razvi Society’s intervention oversimplified Deobandi argumentation 
surrounding bid`a. As we saw in the first chapter, Deobandis submitted that mawlud and `urs, when 
performed with a frequency, intensity or intentionality reserved for commandments of the religion, are 
reprehensible precisely because they blur this boundary. The pamphlet submits a bifurcation of bid`a that is 
a common trope in texts that aim to counter Deobandi argumentation, one between ‘good’ innovations 
(bid`a hasana) and ‘bad’ innovations (bid`a sayyia), the former subdivided into bid`a wajib, ‘necessary’ 
innovations, bid`a mustahab, ‘beneficial’ innovations, and bid`a jaiz, ‘permissible’ innovations. The first, it 
says, includes things essential to the religion that did not exist in the time of the Prophet, such as inserting 
diacritical marks in the Qur’an. In the second category, significantly, the authors include mawlud and `urs. 
The third category includes things acceptable but not performed with the intention of gaining religious 
merit, i.e. going on hajj by automobile. Bid`a sayyia is subdivided into bid`a makruh, ‘reprehensible’ 
innovations such as excessive adorning of mosques, and bid`a haram, ‘forbidden’ innovations, such as 
introducing a new method of doing salat. 
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 Within a matter of weeks, the Khushtar controversy of 1970 largely subsided. Other 
clashes came in its wake at the end of the decade, but none that entailed a similarly public dispute 
over the nature of bid`a.62 The relative brevity of the Khushtar controversy stems from at least 
two factors. First, anti-apartheid activism, galvanized by events still half a decade away, had not 
yet altered the tone of the debate; at the center of the dispute was bid`a, but the political role of 
the `ulama’ or of the Sufis in abetting or resisting apartheid was not yet part of the public 
discourse. Second, the institutional presence of Deobandis and Barelwis was relatively minor. As 
we have seen in the third chapter, the first Deobandi madrasa, Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle, was 
established only in 1973.63 During the 1970’s the Deobandi reformist programme was carried out 
largely through the work of the Tablighi Jama`at. Many of the most prominent Barelwi 
organizations - such as the Ghousia Manzil in Cape Town,64 the Ahl-e Sunnat wal-Jama`at of 
Cape Town,65 and the Imam Ahmed Raza Academy of Durban - were established long after this 
event, in 1980, 1984 and 1986 respectively. Significantly, reactions to the Tablighi criticisms of 
Maulana Khushtar lacked the overtly political tone that these clashes would take in the 1980’s, 
when anti-apartheid activism escalated to a feverish pitch; it remained, rather, a dispute over 
doctrine and the role of the MJC. 
                                                       
62 On 27 April 1979, Imam Nazir Ahmed of Mooi River in Natal gave a khutbah in the mosque siding with 
the Tablighi view that one should not read salaami (devotional praises of the Prophet Muhammad) inside 
the mosque. He was accosted by a group of angry congregants and then beaten. Cape Herald, 28 April 
1979, 4. Another confrontation took place at the Grey Street Mosque in Durban on 22 September 1981. 
Three Muslim men were charged with assaulting seven others in a Tablighi-Barelwi dispute, but 
unfortunately the news article does not report which side committed the assault. Natal Witness, 23 
September 1981. 
 
63 “Republic’s First Darul Uloom,” Muslim News, 4 May 1973, 1. 
 
64 Muslim News, 21 March 1980, 2. The Ghousia Manzil was established as a spiritual retreat (khanqah) for 
Qadiri Sufis, the silsila that Hazrat Sayed Zainul Abedien established in Cape Town during his visit in 
1961. Many, if not most, Barelwi-oriented Sufis in South Africa are Qadiris, though many Chishtis and 
Naqshbandis are strong ideological allies. Speaking on behalf of the khanqah during its opening, Shaikh M. 
S. Dien vaunted the implicit political power of Sufism: “People in South Africa have the wrong idea of 
Tasawwuf and its power in propagation. Not only does the khanqah serve as a retreat but it is a centre 
where social and political activity is generated.” 
 
65 Muslim News, 25 January 1985. Barelwi Sufi leaders in the community met at Ghousia Manzil khanqah 
in November 1984 to establish the Ahl-e Sunnat wal-Jammat, with Maulana Ahmed Mukkadam in charge. 
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 Soon after Khushtar’s visit, another acclaimed Sufi scholar, Fazlur Rahman Ansari (d. 
1974) of Pakistan, gave a series of lectures in 1970 to rapturous praise, visiting a second time in 
1972.66 Writing and lecturing internationally and conversant in both Islamic theology and 
Western philosophy, Ansari’s work was typical of mid-twentieth century Islamic modernism;67 he 
theorized Islam as a comprehensive system, saw the Qur’an as a “comprehensive moral code,” 
and believed that Islam and science are complementary.68 In many ways, Ansari’s effect on Cape 
Muslims was far more profound and enduring than Khushtar’s; his lectures in Cape Town have 
been redacted into a popular volume69, recordings of which were played on Radio 786, one of the 
two major Muslim radio stations in Cape Town, throughout the late 1990’s.70 The Muslim News 
criticized the Muslim Judicial Council’s tepid reception of such a renowned scholar.71 While 
Ansari’s visit to Cape Town did not provoke any reaction from the Tablighi Jama`at, it did elicit a 
heated response from Tablighis based in Johannesburg.72 
 
                                                       
66 “Dr. Ansari Accorded a Tumultuous Welcome at D. F. Malan Airport,” Muslim News 25 September 
1970, 1. See also “Muslim Assembly Confers Life Patronage on Dr. Ansari,” Muslim News 9 October 
1970, 1. 
 
67 He may be usefully compared to Muhammad Iqbal, to take just one example, though his legacy is in no 
sense as far reaching or influential as Iqbal’s. 
 
68 See his Quranic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society, Karachi: World Federation of Islamic 
Missions, 1973 (reprinted in 1977, 1989 and 2008). 
 
69 Fazl al-Rahman al-Ansari, Islam to the Modern Mind: Lectures in South Africa, 1970 and 1972, Cape 
Town: Hidden Treasure Press, 1999.  
 
70 Muhammed Haron, “Da`wah Movements and Sufi Tariqahs: Competing for Spiritual Spaces in 
Contemporary South(ern) Africa,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25, 2 (2005): 261-285, at 275. 
 
71 “The Cape’s Shame,” Muslim News, 21 April 1972. 
 
72 Muslim News 19 May 1972, 8. An angry letter to the editor of Muslim News from A. S. K. Joommal, 
editor of the Johannesburg-based Muslim newsletter Al-Balaagh, noted that the Tablighis in Natal had 
actively campaigned against Ansari’s lecture there: “just before the arrival of Dr. Ansari at As-Salaam in 
Easter, the following announcement was made in some mosques at the behest of a number of Moulvis: 
‘Muslims are urged to assemble at Pietermaritzburg for the Tableegh Jamaat Ijtima. Here there will be talk 
of Allah and Rasool. And what will be the talk there? (meaning As-Salaam) - only of FOOTBALL and 
CRICKET!’ When Dr. Ansari was scheduled to speak in Lenasia, the faithful myrmidons of the Moulvis 
rubbed out the announcement of his lecture from the masjid blackboard FOUR times, until the mutawallees 
had to use forceful language to stop them from doing so.”  
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Anti-Apartheid Activism and Anti-`Ulama’ Sentiment 
By the middle of the 1970’s, the `ulama’ came under increased scrutiny for their failure 
to speak out against a spate of detentions and arrests by the apartheid regime, the most 
noteworthy of which, for Muslims, was the arrest and murder of Imam Abdullah Haron in 1969.73 
Criticism of the `ulama’ was coupled by a steady radicalization of South African Muslim politics; 
during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the major Muslim newspapers printed countless articles 
on the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, and covered the fate 
of Muslims in Lebanon, Palestine, Kashmir and elsewhere. Against this backdrop, the disputes 
among Deobandis, Tablighis and Barelwis appeared to many South African Muslims as 
increasingly parochial.  
This section explores the contours of anti-Deoband and anti-`ulama’ sentiment especially 
as it manifests in the textual record of Muslim newspapers in South Africa. While these are by no 
means the only source for reconstructing these debates, they are overwhelmingly the most 
prominent ones. It is crucial to note here that these sources – especially Muslim Views, Muslim 
News, Muslim Digest, Al-Qalam – were ‘biased’ in the sense that each had specific editorial aims, 
and all were embedded ideologically and institutionally in the Muslim anti-apartheid movement 
to varying degrees. They are, in other words, both the source for reconstructing these debates and 
partisans in the debates themselves. Thus they do not offer any sort of transparent ‘window’ into 
South African Muslim publics, nor do I represent them as such. Despite their own editorial slants, 
ultimately they are the principal venues for public debate among South Africa’s Muslims and 
writing the history that follows here would be impossible without them.  
                                                       
73 See Ursula Günther’s “The Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the 
Apartheid Struggle,” in Gordon Mitchell and Eve Mullen, eds. Religion and the Political Imagination in a 
Changing South Africa, New York; Munich: Waxmann, 2002. Haron’s death is still commemorated 
annually and his legacy as a pioneer of the anti-apartheid struggle is a potent symbol for South African 
Muslims, especially in the Cape. I attended a Sufi dhikr at Imam Haron’s grave in the Mowbray 
neighborhood of Cape Town on 27 September 2009, commemorating the fortieth anniversary of his death. 
The event attracted about three hundred mourners who recited verses of the Qur’an near the grave. Achmad 
Cassiem, leader of the Islamist organization Qibla, eulogized Haron’s principled commitment to social 
justice.  
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This period of anti-`ulama’ and anti-Deoband sentiment coincides with the emergence 
among South African Muslims of what George Marcus called an ‘activist imaginary’,74 which I 
will define for my purposes here as a strong, affective and politically charged ethical bond with 
an imagined, transnational ummah, the global community of Muslims. Recent scholars have 
explored the potential of ethical imaginaries in motivating individuals or groups to act on behalf 
of ‘others’, however disparate or geographically far-flung.75 In South Africa, the 1980’s 
witnessed an efflorescence not only of anti-apartheid activism but Islamic charitable and 
humanitarian organizations that acted independently of the main `ulama’ bodies, namely Jamiatul 
Ulama Transvaal, Jamiatul Ulama Natal and the Muslim Judicial Council. South African Muslim 
non-governmental organizations such as the Islamic Dawah Movement, Islamic Medical 
Association, and the South African National Zakah Fund (SANZAF) grew in part out of the 
Muslim Youth Movement’s activities; likewise, charities such as the Tuan Yusuf Foundation and 
the Mustadafin Foundation, both founded by Muslim women and which deliver emergency food 
assistance, emerged completely separate from the `ulama’ councils.76 
For the anti-apartheid activists of this era, there was simultaneously an identification with 
the suffering of Muslims globally and a local call for solidarity with fellow victims of apartheid 
across religious divides. As one scholar puts it, “the trans-national and universal community of 
Muslims had, among Cape Muslims, with good reason increasingly become defined as a religious 
                                                       
74 Marcus was concerned with mapping out the role of media technologies in the emancipatory politics of 
subaltern groups. My concern is different but I find the phrase useful. See his introduction to George 
Marcus, ed. Connections: Engagements with Media, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 4-6. 
 
75 Examining the early twentieth century, for instance, Leela Gandhi discusses ‘affective communities’ 
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colonized. See Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and 
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Devji posits structural similarities between the ethical imaginaries that motivate both terrorism and 
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76 Samadia Sadouni, “New Religious Actors in South Africa: The Example of Islamic Humanitarianism,” in 
Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayke, eds.  Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, New York: Palgrave 
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community of transnational suffering with which one is obliged to identify.”77 Deobandis and 
Tablighis were criticized for lacking this identification with the global ummah as well as 
eschewing both inter-religious and intra-religious solidarity among Muslims. Throughout the 
1980’s anti-apartheid activists increasingly dismissed Tablighi and Barelwi quarrels as ‘Indian’ 
debates irrelevant to South Africa at best, and at worst branded Tablighis as reactionary 
collaborationists with the apartheid regime. During this period, Muslims increasingly criticized 
the `ulama’ as a whole for their reticence on the detention of anti-apartheid activists; in this way, 
popular opinion of the Deobandi `ulama’ became bound up with criticism towards the `ulama’ 
generally, particularly as the most conspicuous `ulama’ bodies at that time - the Jamiatul Ulama 
Transvaal, the Jamiatul Ulama Natal - were controlled by graduates of Deobandi madrasas.78 
Muslim News, the most widely read and prominent Muslim newspaper in the Cape and 
possibly South Africa as a whole, first began to speak out in editorials against the `ulama’ for 
silence on the issue of detentions in 1974.79 “Our ulema and representative Muslim bodies have 
remained strangely quiet about the detention of almost 40 young people by the authorities,” read 
one editorial. Another proclaimed, “Of these detainees, some are students, Christian church 
bodies, and others concerned with the civil liberties have raised their voices in protest urging the 
authorities to bring those detained to court to face whatever charges laid against them.”80 A 
certain Farid Ahmed asked, “Why this tight-lipped silence by the Ulema and Muslims bodies in 
                                                       
77 Sindre Bangstad, Global Flows, Local Appropriations: Facets of Secularization and Re-Islamization 
among Contemporary Cape Muslims, ISIM Dissertations, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007, 
55. (emphasis added) 
 
78 See chapter 3, as well as the discussion in Abdulkader Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 66-67. 
 
79 Muslim News became increasingly politicized from the mid-1970’s onward. As with other Muslim 
papers, it straddled the line between general reporting and political advocacy. For an assessment of its 
impact on Muslim affairs in South Africa, see Muhammed Haron, “Muslim News (1973-1986): Its 
Contribution towards an Alternative Press at the Cape,” The Muslim World, 85, 3/4 (1995), 317-332. Haron 
shows how Muslim News’ editorial coverage was almost precisely balanced between international and local 
stories related to Islam and Muslims in the 1960’s, but gradually the scale tipped in the direction of local 
stories during the height of anti-apartheid activism, such that in the 1980’s nearly 80% of all editorial 
coverage concerned local issues. See pg 322. 
 
80 “Do We Not Protest?” Muslim News, 20 December 1974, 2. 
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South Africa over the spate of arrests and bannings of people who dared to speak the truth? The 
truth our Ulema are too scared to utter.”81 In 1975 the newspaper issued an impassioned call for 
South African `ulama’ to become more politically active.82 
But the Soweto massacre of 16 June 1976 was the single event that most quickly 
mobilized South African Muslims en masse against the apartheid regime during the 1970’s.83 As 
thousands of black school children marched through the Soweto township near Johannesburg to 
protest the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools, clashes between students and 
police escalated and the ensuing violence left hundreds dead, mostly children. Muslims applauded 
a statement from the Muslim Judicial Council in Cape Town condemning the massacre,84 but 
`ulama’ bodies in Natal and the Transvaal remained silent. Abdullah Osman of the Muslim Youth 
Movement issued a statement on the occasion of a mawlud in the aftermath of Soweto, a plea for 
Muslims to abandon what he considered to be an obsessive focus on the external trappings of 
Muslim identity and focus on the political core of the faith:  
The Muslims today unfortunately lack the true Islamic dynamism and spirit due 
to their lack of Islamic knowledge. We are too busy wrapped up in rituals and 
customs … If an outside observer had to analyze us he would be convinced that 
our Islam revolves around the keeping of beards, wearing of khurtas and the 
eating of dates … Let us push aside ritualistic Islam out of our lives and light the 
world too long in darkness with Muhammad’s (S.A.W.) true character and 
personality contained in the Holy Qur’an.85 
 
The editors of Muslim News declared: “The Ulama of the Cape and the various Muslim 
organizations who issued the statement on behalf of the Muslims on the current situation in the 
                                                       
81 Farid Ahmed, “An Open Letter to the Ulema and Muslim Bodies of South Africa,” Muslim News 31 
January 1975, 8. 
 
82 “Our Ulema and Injustice,” Muslim News 14 March 1975, 2. 
 
83 The literature on the Soweto uprising in substantial, but an academic perspective that places this 
watershed event in the broader history of anti-apartheid activism is Anthony W. Marx’s Lessons of 
Struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960-1990, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
84 See Gerrie Lubbe, “The Soweto Fatwa: A Muslim response to a watershed event in South Africa,” 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 17, 2 (1997): 335-343. 
 
85 Muslim News 18 March 1977, 6. (emphasis added).  
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country need to be complimented for the uncompromising stand they have adopted … At the 
same time it is sad that the Ulama and Muslim organizations in Transvaal and Natal have 
remained mute on this most basic issue of justice and freedom for all South Africans.”86 After 
Soweto, the allegedly apolitical stance of the `ulama’ in general and Deobandis in particular 
began to seem increasingly accommodationist. Statements condemning the violence, and the lack 
of `ulama’ response, came from several bodies, including Majlis Ashura Al-Islami, Institute of 
Islamic Shariah Studies and the Muslim Assembly, regarding the massacre during the Soweto 
uprising.87  
 Muslim News became particularly avid in its condemnations of the apartheid state, 
becoming banned on multiple occasions.88 It issued rousing calls-to-arms in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s, such as its “Message to the Oppressors and their Supporters” of September 1979, its  
“Islam’s Freedom Charter” of August 1980, and its “Revolutionary manifesto of the oppressed 
people” in August of 1983.89 In July 1982, the Muslim News expressed its vision of transnational 
solidarity with political movements elsewhere in the Muslim world, in activist language that 
South African Deobandis found abhorrent: 
We in South Africa must look at ourselves in the context of the brave 
Mujahideen of Afghanistan who are toiling under the yoke of Soviet 
Afghanistan. We in South Africa must look at ourselves in the context of our 
suffering under this ungodly regime. The people of Lebanon and Afghanistan are 
suffering yet they are actively striving and sacrificing in the face of the assault on 
their human dignity. Muslims in South Africa suffer the indignity of being 
reduced to non-people yet we do not fight back. The moment the oppressed 
people resolve to destroy the system of oppression and actively engage the 
                                                       
86 “Cape Ulama’s Stand,” Muslim News, 24 September 1976, 3. 
 
87 “Soweto: South Africa’s Tragedy,” Muslim News, 25 June 1976, 1-2. 
 
88 See Muhammed Haron, “The Muslim News (1973-1986): Its Contribution towards the Establishment of 
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oppressors then they no longer suffer because they have now resolved to 
sacrifice. In any struggle, sacrifice is a necessity. Sacrifice towards achieving 
martyrdom is a fundamental principle of Islam.”90 
 
Several other factors coalesced in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s to steer the course of 
debates on the role of Deobandis and Sufis in a changing South African political climate.  First, 
during this period Deobandi anti-Shi`a sentiment, long a staple of the Deobandi movement, led to 
Tablighi criticisms of the revolution in Iran; however, the allure of the Iranian revolution was 
substantial for many South African Muslims, who saw it as definitive proof that Muslims could 
be politically mobilized around an Islamic ideology to overthrow a repressive regime. 
Johannesburg-area Tablighis criticized Iran from the pulpit of area mosques and urged South 
African Muslim students not to support the revolution. The Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal even 
ordered South Africa’s Muslims not to travel to Iran after the revolution. Ten South Africans - 
among them one of Cape Town’s foremost anti-apartheid activists, Hassan Solomon - openly 
defied the Jamiat and flew to Iran to be a part of a ‘World Ulema Unity Week’. A spokesman for 
Qibla praised the Iranians and the decision of the South African `ulama’ delegation to Iran.91 
Meanwhile, student groups at the University of the Witwaterstrand in Johannesburg accused the 
Tablighis of accosting students for supporting Iran but failing to speak out against a litany of 
wrongs, including the Group Areas Acts, Zionism in Israel, and Saudi ideological control over 
Mecca and Medina.92 A group called the Black Students Society slammed the Deobandi Jamiatul 
Ulama and called their Tablighi supporters “sterile puppets:” The “Jamiatul Ulama did not have 
the guts to hit out at oppression, racism, Zionism and imperialism the way the Shi`a leaders in 
Iran are doing.”93 
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Second, Tablighis’ deliberate policy of skirting ‘politics’, narrowly conceived here as 
citizens in their relations to states - the very policy that has allowed Tablighis to avoid conflict 
with local authorities and the repression that Islamist parties have faced from suspicious 
governments  - lost them some support in South Africa, particularly in the Cape.94 As Moosa has 
stated, “Given their focus on eschatological matters and concern for personal salvation, the social 
and political ethos of Islam is not just neglected but ignored. In the South African context, except 
for the self-confessed right-wing religious groups, virtually all significant religious 
denominations and movements except for the Tablighi Jama`at demonstrated their abhorrence for 
the political system of apartheid.”95 Their ostensibly ‘apolitical’ stance began to appear outmoded 
to South African Muslims who called for a more direct confrontation with the ruling government. 
Cape Town’s Observer sent a letter to the Muslim News, professing “For the last twenty years we 
witnessed the Tabligh Jamaa establishing themselves in the country with an innumerable amount 
of their Maulanas from India telling Muslims what is Islam and what is not Islam.”96 Meanwhile, 
the mosques became increasingly polarized between whether the imam leading communal prayers 
was a Tablighi or a Barelwi, with the one often refusing to pray behind the other.97 Even in later 
years, the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal still gave preferential licensing to mosques that allow 
Tablighis.98 
But even if Tablighis in South Africa skirted political activism wholesale, their deliberate 
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engagements with doctrinal controversies challenge assumptions in much of the academic 
literature on the Tablighi Jama`at.99 However, the South African case offers an important 
counterexample, one in which Tablighis avoided ‘politics’ but never shied away from addressing 
contentious religious matters in public contexts.100 If we conceive ‘politics’ more broadly in terms 
of power, authority and subjecthood, the Tablighi Jama`at is eminently political. 
The Tablighi Jama`at is the engine of Deoband’s expansion, given the inherent mobility 
of jama`ats that allows them to move almost effortlessly across national borders. This spatial 
mobility works in tandem with what Metcalf calls its “typological” view of history, a “history 
without the nation-state and with no concern for worldly progress” and a vision of “nonlinear 
time created by patterns of moral significance.” In this apprehension of space and time, “All such 
moments are the same in essence, and contingencies of time and place are irrelevant.”101 As I 
argue here, their disengagements from ‘nation-state’ politics were indeed problematic in South 
Africa. I would suggest here that we not take Tablighis’ own idealized self-narratives of spatial 
mobility and moral history so seriously that we overlook how their project is received locally. 
Metcalf seems to do so when she claims that, in Tablighis’ mobility, what is at stake is “not 
space, the new place where they have chosen to live, but time, in which the past and future 
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converge in the present … Far from being on the periphery, they can make any place a center.”102 
While perhaps they can make any place a center, the vociferous opposition to the Tablighi 
Jama`at in South Africa during apartheid suggests, at the very least, that, like Deoband as a 
whole, local contestations of the Tablighis’ project cannot be overlooked in place of the 
Tablighis’ own idealized self-narratives. Farish Noor makes this point elegantly in arguing the 
Tablighi Jama`at is high on “bonding capital” but low on “bridging capital.” 103 In other words, 
the Tablighi Jama`at is arguably adept at bonding its members together, but is less adept in its 
ability to adapt to local contexts.  
On the opposite end of the political spectrum from the Tablighis were Qibla, founded in 
June of 1981, and Call of Islam, founded in June of 1984. Aligning itself with the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC), Qibla’s ultimate aim was an Islamic revolution in South Africa, far-fetched in a 
country with comparatively few Muslims.104 But their means towards this end - organizing local 
Muslim communities to share food and education, and seeing social, legal, political and economic 
justice exemplified in the Islamic doctrine of tawhid105 - electrified Muslims in the Cape, at least 
at first. “Islam is not only a message, but also a method” was one among several Qibla rallying 
cries.106 The arrest of Qibla’s leader, Achmat Cassiem, and his imprisonment on Robben Island 
burnished Qibla’s anti-apartheid credentials.107 Muslim News likewise issued a manifesto on the 
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occasion of Ramadan 1981 envisioning the physical and moral discipline of the fast as the 
ultimate preparation for total personal, social and political revolution: “Islam has as its main 
objective the liberation of man and ending the domination of man by man.”108  
However, many Muslims were repelled by the Islamist approach of Qibla, and the Call of 
Islam soon eclipsed Qibla in terms of community support. Aligned with the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), which had been formed in 1983 as a non-racial umbrella organization for groups 
opposed to the proposed tricameral parliament.109 The United Democratic Front (UDF) initiated a 
major boycott of white owned businesses and products in 1985.110 A popular flyer showed Dr. 
Allen Boesak and Hassan Solomon arm-in-arm as police officers whisked them away to detention 
for the crime of speaking at the funeral of a young man who died at the hands of security forces in 
the black township of Gugulethu, near Cape Town.111 Hassan Solomon decried `ulama’ who 
became mired in “mere rituals or deadening formalism” and thereby failed to materialize the 
“revolutionary thrust of Islam.” The `ulama’ of South Africa have “shown that they are incapable 
of leading the Ummah in the struggle.” When Solomon praised a protest where “true Muslims 
and Christians and activists joined hands and stood shoulder to shoulder,” he was implicitly 
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deriding The Majlis and the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal for their opposition to interreligious 
activism.112  
Far less Islamist than Qibla in their politics, Call of Islam campaigned with the UDF in 
South Africa and established links to the African National Congress (ANC) in exile; connections 
to the ANC remain strong among the former members of Call of Islam. But the leadership of both 
Qibla and Call of Islam was distinguished by the near-absence of traditionally trained `ulama’.113 
While Qibla and Call of Islam were busy mobilizing Muslims in protests and marches, the 
criticism of the `ulama’ continued unabated in Muslim public discourse. The editors of the 
Durban-based Al-Qalam claimed that divisive theological disagreements between Deobandis and 
Sufis played into the ruling regime’s strategy of dominance: “The time has come again for the 
ulema to emerge from the theological barracks into the field of active politics and shahaadah 
where they belong and where the ummah expect them to give the lead … The colonialists during 
the occupation of Muslim countries have made it part of their strategy to divide the ulema on 
petty theological issues. The ulema soon found themselves dissenting over minor issues of fiqh, 
while the colonialists were replacing Islamic shariah as a basis of government, with that of their 
own.”114  
 Another group contributed broadly to this anti-`ulama’ and anti-Deobandi discourse: the 
Muslim Youth Movement (MYM). Founded in 1971 as the movement’s mouthpiece,115 the 
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Muslim newspaper Al-Qalam was explicit in opposing Deobandi hegemony in Natal and the 
Transvaal. Growing in part out of the earlier Durban-based Arabic Study Circle,116 the Muslim 
Youth Movement first emerged in Durban in 1970. One of its agendas was especially vexing to 
the Deobandis: Arabic study groups for reading the Qur’an. The MYM believed that reading and 
understanding the Qur’an was an integral part of moral and political empowerment for Muslims; 
conversely, Deobandis dismissed the Arabic study groups as “modernist” contrivances that 
attempted to wrest authority of interpretation from the `ulama’, noting that few if any members of 
these circles had traditional madrasa training.117 
One of the Muslim Youth Movement’s strategies for mobilizing Muslim students was 
holding mass rallies. The MYM released a ‘rally manual’, Islam for All, Islam Forever, for one of 
these rallies held in 1983. It calls on students to resist “anti-Islamic forces” from within and from 
without; among the “internal” forces, it lists bickering between Muslims over “trivial matters” 
and the “Nafs - our own desires and self importance,” and among the “external” forces it lists 
“Jahili systems” such as Capitalism, Zionism, Marxism and governments that “oppress, exploit 
and discriminate.”118 Like other organizations that opposed apartheid - and they varied widely in 
how explicitly and directly they did so, the MYM often sluggishly - the MYM is, I would 
suggest, best understood in the context of political Islam’s peak during the 1980’s. They 
understood Islam as a comprehensive ‘system’: political, economic, social and ethical. This is 
perhaps most evident in the Muslim Youth Movement’s translation and publication of Abul A’la 
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Maududi’s Islamic Way of Life.119 The Majlis even suggested that the Muslim Youth Movement 
was attempting to import the “mazhab” (legal school) of Maududi.120 
 These myriad criticisms of the `ulama’ generally, and the Deobandi `ulama’ of Transvaal 
and Natal particularly, formed the backdrop against which we must understand the remaining two 
major public confrontations over between Deobandis and their antagonists during the 1980’s.  
  
Ebrahim Adam and the ‘Barelwi Menace’  
 Numerous tussles between Tablighis and Barelwis transpired in the 1980’s, precisely at 
the time when many South African Muslims were becoming particularly exasperated by the 
rhetoric from both sides. To take just a couple of examples, an imam in the Cape Town 
neighborhood of Mooi River was assaulted for siding with the Tablighi stance on giving salams 
to the Prophet Muhammad.121 In Verulam, a predominantly Indian suburb of Durban, mosque 
trustees arranged for armed men to block the entrance of some one thousand congregants who 
had gathered to celebrate mawlud on the premises under the aegis of the Barelwi Ahle Sunnat wal 
Jammat.122  
Then in January of 1985, Ebrahim Adam (b. 1938), a graduate of Deoband serving at that 
time on the Fatwa Committee of the Muslim Judicial Council, gave a lecture on Barelwis in the 
mosque at Bridgetown, a middle-class Muslim neighborhood in Cape Town.123 Titled “The 
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Barelwi Menace,” Adam’s lecture quoted the founder of the Barelwi school, Imam Ahmed Reza 
Khan, attempting to prove that Khan claimed the mantle of prophethood, citing excerpts from 
Khan’s Urdu poetry in praise of the Prophet. Accusing Khan of claiming prophetic revelation 
(wahy) was a grave charge; claiming prophethood not only rendered one an apostate for denying 
the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood but the charge was redolent of the Ahmadiyya, a 
Muslim movement that grew out of same South Asian milieu of the Deobandis and Barelwis and 
whose founder allegedly claimed to be a post-Muhammadan prophet.124 Barelwis and Deobandis 
alike find a common opponent in the Ahmadiyya. The implication, furthermore, was not only that 
Khan himself was outside of the fold of Islam, but as far as Cape Town’s Sufis were concerned, 
that anyone who follows Khan’s teachings was also outside the fold. Adam also impugned one of 
Khan’s foremost students, Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, who traveled and taught throughout 
South Africa in the 1950’s.125 He stated that Abdul Aleem Siddiqui regarded Ahmed Reza Khan 
to be a prophet, based on a statement of Siddiqui’s: “When I went to Arabia and envisioned it in 
scope and magnitude, I realized without a doubt that [Ahmed Reza Khan] was the Qibla of the 
non-Arab peoples.” Adam repeated the statement in his ‘Barelwi Menace’ lecture and gave the 
following gloss on its meaning: “[The Barelwis] say Rasulullah is a Prophet unto the Arabs and 
Ahmed Reza Khan is a Prophet unto the non-Arabs.”126  
Durban’s Muslim Digest called the lecture “the night that Molvi Ebrahim Adam made 
Allah a witness to his distortions, half-truths, lies and fabrications against great savants of Islam,” 
and reprinted a pamphlet issued by the Cape Town Ahle Sunna wal Jama`a in which Maulana 
Ahmed Mukaddam, a Barelwi in Cape Town, and Abdur Rauf Soofie, of the Soofie family in 
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Durban, “challenge MOULANA EBRAHIM ADAM to prove in public his derogatory statements 
that: Alal Hazrat Ahmed Raza Khan, Moulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, Shah Ahmed Noorani, 
together with the followers of the Qadiri Silsilah and all the SUNNIS, are KAAFFIR.”127 
Repeating the fears of a ‘Wahhabi’ infiltration of the Cape, the Muslim Digest commented:  
From the foregoing it becomes abundantly clear that Mr. Ebrahim Adam was 
bent on sowing the seeds of disunity in the Muslim community of the Cape. Mr. 
Ebrahim Adam should know that for 300 years there was no division in the 
Muslim Ummah here. They (the Muslims) of the Cape knew little about the 
Deobandi-Brelvi [sic] subject. But since the Deobandi Ulama, the like of 
Ebrahim Adam, had come to the Cape, the hymns of hate against the so-called 
Brelvis had begun. There are presently about 6 Deobandi Ulama in Cape Town. 
One wonders what will happen when more Wahhabi and Deobandi Ulama come 
to Cape Town.128 
 
 It is difficult to gauge the extent of popular anger towards this speech outside of Cape 
Town, but the Natal Mercury did report a violent clash, also in January 1985, at the historically 
Barelwi Grey Street Mosque in Durban. A member of the congregation told the police that 
members of the Tablighi Jama`at came into the mosque and proceeded to beat nine 
worshippers.129 The Grey Street Mosque had been the site of similar clashes prior to this date; in 
1981, three men were accused of assaulting eight other men in and around the mosque. A local 
paper reported the incident arose over disputes between “the traditionalists (Sunnis) and 
reformists (Tablighis)” but did not indicate whether the three accused were one or the other. The 
mosque permanently hired an armed guard to protect worshippers after the event.130  
 Local Barelwi Sufis convened a meeting on 4 March 1985 at the Ghousia Manzil, a 
Barelwi khanqah in Rylands Estate in Cape Town, inviting Adam to discuss the lecture publicly. 
Unsurprisingly, Adam did not show up at the meeting, perhaps fearing for his own safety. One of 
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the speakers, Maulana Ahmad Mukaddam,131 a Cape Town-based Barelwi scholar, shifted the 
focus away from Deobandi versus Barelwi to ‘Wahhabi’ versus ‘Sunni’, a rhetorical strategy that 
became increasingly common. “We are here to refute the allegations and show up his deliberate 
distortions,” he stated. “And it is not a question of Deobandi and Bareilly. It is purely a question 
of Wahabism and Sunnism.” A second speaker at the event, Maulana Abdur Rauf Soofie, 
summarized Barelwi claims against Deoband but ultimately dismissed the debate as a politically 
reactionary distraction from more pressing political matters in South Africa: “While bullets are 
flying in Crossroads and Khayelitsha,” referring to two black townships that bore the brunt of 
apartheid security forces’ violence, “and the world is looking at the [South African Defense 
Force] shooting innocent people, this man finds time to tell a group of people that there is a very 
big ‘Barelvi menace’ in this country.”132 In the following months, similarly, Al-Qalam printed a 
series of letters from across the country, all of whom, like Abdur Rauf Soofie, charged that 
contemporary South African politics left no room for ‘Indian’ theological quibbles. Amidst 
glossy color photos from Palestine and Afghanistan and articles on Malcolm X and Steve Biko, 
these letters assaulted the Deobandi `ulama’ for their allegedly misguided politics.  
 The principle of the Deobandi madrasa Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle wrote in defense of the 
Deobandi `ulama’: “These ulema and experts of Deen [religion] have acquired their sound and 
true knowledge of Deen from those ulama of deen who are experts in their field … until this line 
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of expert transmitters reached the Holy Prophet.” 133 In response a “Concerned Sister” in Port 
Shepstone replied: “The Ulama, leave alone guiding Muslim communities, have accepted the 
colonial system. In fact they are executing the colonial plan against Islam. By this I mean they tell 
us that Arabic is too difficult to learn. They have divided the community on minor issues in Islam 
… What guidance have they given us in the recent tricameral elections? What guidance have they 
given us in our haraam/kaafir banking system?”134 A community leader, Fatih Osman, gave a 
speech at the Deobandi Dar al-`Ulum Newcastle imploring the Deobandi `ulama’ directly to 
“stand up for justice” and entreating them not to let internal squabbles distract them from political 
causes.135 
Other letters declared that “infighting weakens the Muslim community” and called for an 
end to quarreling between Deobandis and Barelwis,136 and that “These ulama go about causing 
dissension and dispute among Muslims by declaring some Muslims as kafirs and others as 
bidatees. Have they not any important work other than fiddling with these issues?” 137 Reports of 
the time suggested the gravity of these claims; shooting deaths by security forces led to massive 
protests by Muslims throughout the Western Cape.138 The Kimberley Muslim Students 
Association released a statement for the `ulama’ to go “out of the shell of big talk and empty 
words and move to the realm of deeds and action … to stop the fruitless and worthless bickering, 
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trivialities and frivolities and move to the serious business of governance and dominance of 
Islam.”139 One exasperated Muslim in Durban sent “an open letter to the Jamiatul Ulema of 
Natal,” declaiming against the political neutrality of the Deobandi `ulama’ in humorous terms: 
You are the self-same Molvis who claim allegiance to the ulema of Deoband and 
bask in the glory of heroes like Sheikhul Hind [Mahmud al-Hasan] and Molvi 
[Husain Ahmad] Madani who courted imprisonment and torture during their anti-
British campaigns. You relish quoting such anecdotes while lacking the mettle to 
commit yourselves to universal justice … Looking at Rip van Winkles like you, 
obsessed with the computation of sawaab [religious merit] and marriage to the 
Hoors in Jannat [virgins in paradise], there is little wonder that Karl Marx 
scathingly referred to religion as the opiate of the masses … In conclusion, you 
are only fit to issue fatwas on Halal chickens and the sighting of the moon. The 
former could be attributed to your chicken-heartedness. As for the latter, you are 
indeed moon-struck.”140  
 
  
Murder in the Mawlud: Azaadville, March 1987  
For many South African Muslims, the outrage that met Ebrahim Adam’s lecture on the 
“Barelwi Menace” was minor compared to the reaction following disastrous events in 1987, a 
year that one major Barelwi scholar cites as the watershed year for Deobandi-Barelwi divisions in 
the country.141 On 7 March 1987 a group of Tablighis stormed into a mawlud assembly in the 
Johannesburg suburb of Azaadville and attacked the congregants.142 One man, Sheikh Mohideen 
Sahib, was killed and at least six others were critically injured. A week prior to the attack, 
madrasa students had issued pamphlets calling for Muslims to “unite against Bid`a” and not to 
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attend the upcoming mawlud assembly. After the event, police remained on high alert to the 
continued potential for violence among mosques in the Transvaal. In Lenasia, the Barelwi-
affiliated Saabrie Mosque retained a police presence in the weeks following the attack.143  
 The incident at Azaadville remains a potent symbol for many parties to Tablighi-Sufi 
clashes. Many viewed the attack not merely as an act of violence but as an almost sacred 
catastrophe; not only did Muslims assault other Muslims, but did so while the victims were in a 
state of ritual purity and while they performed zikr, the Sufis’ ‘remembrance’ of God.144 The 
immediate response was fierce. In Jan 1985, Al-Qalam had reported on a clash between Tablighis 
and Barelwis at the Grey St. Masjid in Durban and already predicted then that violence would 
ensue if the dispute were not resolved. After news of the Azaadville incident, Al-Qalam stated: 
The latest outbreak of violence between the Sunni [Barelwi] and the Tablighi 
Jamaats, has done violence to Islam, which stands for peace and tolerance. What 
can be more damaging to the spread of Islam in this country than the bad 
example of Muslims killing Muslims? In a country where inter-group violence 
has become rife, one would expect Muslims, by virtue of their faith which places 
great stress on brotherhood and unity, to set the example. Can we really afford to 
quibble while the country is burdened with greater problems which need the 
energies of the whole country, including Muslims? … The dispute between the 
Tablighi Jamaat and the Sunni Jamaat is more emotional than rational … The 
theological debate which grips the two groups has been imported from the Indian 
subcontinent. It has nothing to do with real Islamic issues and the dynamics of 
the South African situation. The sooner we export this divisive theological 
nitpicking back to the Indian subcontinent, the better our chances of getting on 
with the task of building our country into a land where all the children of Adam 
will be honoured and their rights upheld.145 
 
Other groups used the fiasco to call attention to the broader struggle against apartheid. Ebrahim 
Rasool spoke on behalf of the Call of Islam, decrying that the attacks came “at a time when the 
Muslims were able to galvanize themselves into a force to take on even the apartheid state.” A 
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community meeting at the Habibia Masjid in Cape Town ended with a resolution demanding that 
“Darul Ulooms, organizations and institutions of the Deobandi-Tablighi Movement that are 
responsible for such aggression must be exposed.”146 
 One angry letter from a Muslim in Overport blamed both Deobandis and Barelwis: “The 
highly politicized youth see no future in this sectarian and ideologically bankrupt Islam. The 
process of dawah to non-Muslims has been retarded considerably as nobody is attracted to this 
‘Indian’ version of Islam. It is truly amazing that both these groups claim to be practicing the 
‘sunna’ and yet none has challenged the illegal ‘kufr’ regime of Botha but each has declared Jihad 
on fellow Muslims. The Deobandi/Barelvi ‘schools of thought’ have so emasculated Islam that 
only an impotent shell remains … Ultimately the ulema of both factions are to blame.”147 The 
Muslim Digest likewise called for a resolution to “differences that have plagued for too long the 
Muslim community, especially the Deobandi and Bareilly groups.”148 
 A certain M. Ahmed of Rylands in Cape Town inquired, “Are the present generation [sic] 
of Deobandis, in the guise of Bidat, dismantling the love of Nabi Muhammad (SAW), thereby 
aiding and abetting the enemies of Islam?”149 A Sufi organization, The Saberie-Chisty Youth 
Society of Lenasia, took out a full-page banner in Muslim Views. “We condemn the mindless, 
barbaric atrocities perpetrated against fellow Muslims who were praising Nabi Muhammad 
(SAW) on 7 March in Azaadville,” calling for the administration of mosques in the Transvaal to 
be transferred to committees tolerant of non-Deobandi viewpoints.150 
 An editorial in Al-Qalam by the Deobandi scholar Yunus Patel of Jamiatul Ulama Natal, 
written in the aftermath of Azaadville, mentions neither Azaadville nor the anti-apartheid 
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struggle. Characteristically, Patel maintains that Muslims must heed the simple principle to 
“Strive to be kind, just and honest.” He beseeches Muslims to avoid allegiance to any ‘isms’ 
(communism, Marxism, capitalism, Zionism, Qadianism) as well as “casinos, cinemas, theaters, 
immoral films, drugs, money lenders, and alcohol,”151 but the lack of any direct engagement with 
the most pressing issue of the day would seem to corroborate the accusations that Muslims made 
against the local Deobandis. 
 
Politicizing Sufism: The Mawlud and the Halqa in the 1980’s and 1990’s  
At this key juncture in the middle of the 1980’s, in the wake of Ebrahim Adam’s lecture 
and the assault on a mawlud celebration at Azaadville, and as anti-apartheid activism was 
reaching its zenith, the public discourse on Sufism became imbricated with the discourse on 
politics and the role of the `ulama’. On the one hand, the Majlisul Ulama, Jamiatul Ulama and 
other Deobandis refused to participate in anti-apartheid politics and sometimes justified this 
position in terms of their vision of Sufi ethics. For the Majlisul Ulama in particular, they 
channeled Ashraf `Ali Thanawi’s rejection of overt political engagement through Masihullah 
Khan.152 Hence The Majlis compared South African Muslim participation in “politics of the 
kufaar” to Thanawi’s condemnation of Muslim participation in politics with Hindus in India.153 
The Majlis was opposed precisely to the very political upheavals that most enraptured 
South Africa’s younger Muslims. Its pages expressed almost no interest whatsoever in Palestine, 
probably the single political topic that most galvanized the Cape’s Muslims in particular. It 
lampooned the Muslim Youth Movement, accusing it of supporting the “mazhab” of “Maududi-
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ism.”154 There is, in fact, a clear shunning of politics in general, and most of all transnational 
Muslim political causes that end up pitting Sunnis and Shi`as together, or Muslims and non-
Muslims. The Majlis’ essay “Muslims and Politics” summarily listed ten criticisms against 
Muslim participation in ‘kufr’ politics.155 It is, of course, this avowed apolitical sentiment that 
compelled many Muslim anti-apartheid activists to regard The Majlis as indirectly culpable for 
apartheid itself. As The Majlis would often denigrate anti-apartheid politics as a form of 
‘tashabbuh bil kuffar’ (imitating the unbelievers) alongside articles advocating the centrality of 
proper beard length, it became readily parodied.  
A case in point is the Majlisul Ulama’s The Interfaith Trap of Kufr, written in response to 
an interfaith seminar in Port Elizabeth. Using Ibn al-Jawzi’s Talbis Iblis (Satanic Deception) as a 
starting point, the text insists that Satan is constantly setting ‘traps’ for even the most otherwise 
pious and upright `ulama’, and talk of ‘interfaith’ solidarity is among the most nefarious of these: 
Participation in a religious discussion with the kuffaar should be pure Tableegh 
and Da’wat. Muslims are not permitted to listen to the propagation of kufr. This 
is precisely what the inter-faith seminar involves. When a Muslim joins kuffaar 
preachers who propagate their baatil religions at the same gathering where the 
Muslim is supposed to propagate, and he sits with them on the same platform 
listening to their falsehood without having the right to refute it, then he aids and 
abets in the dissemination of kufr.156 
 
It then attempts to dismantle some of the central tropes of Muslim-Christian dialogue, rejecting 
the ecumenical interpretation of Qur’an 2:256 - ‘There is no compulsion in religion’ - that 
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suggests “religious beliefs of others should be accepted and not decried,”157 as well as the 
common citation of Abraham as a ‘father’ of Judaism, Christian and Islam.158  
What is especially noteworthy is The Majlis’ defense of this stance in the language of 
Sufism. At the same time that Deobandi scholars repulsed the call to become involved in anti-
apartheid politics, many also articulated this stance in Sufi terms: 
Those who clamour for Muslim participation in non-Muslim politics are short-
sighted. They lack true insight which is a quality of an Imaan adorned with the 
higher and beautiful angelic attributes which a Mu’min [believer] gains by 
companionship with Auliya [Sufi saints]. Those Muslims shouting for Muslim 
participation in kufr politics are in the majority the followers of lowly desires and 
despicable motives … they are swayed by mob-rule and mob-opinion.159 
 
In contrast, while activists assailed The Majlis, the Tablighi Jama`at and other Deobandis 
for their seemingly ‘apolitical’ hesitance to confront the apartheid regime, Sufis in South Africa 
organized along explicitly anti-apartheid political lines. In the wake of Azaadville, a letter 
submitted to Muslim Views reiterated the ‘rift’ between the `ulama’ and the Sufis: “When certain 
Muslim scholars (Ulama) were creating schisms and hatred in the Muslim polity, the Sufis were 
preaching love and harmony. When certain Muslim scholars indulged in declaring each other 
infidel, the Sufis converted infidels to the fold of Islam.”160 
Farid Esack issued a popular manifesto, But Musa Went to Fir-aun! seeking to answer 
Muslims’ common objections to involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle, taking particular aim 
at the apathy of conservative Deobandi `ulama’ over the issue of interreligious activism.  It is 
implicitly written as a rejoinder to A. S. Desai of The Majlis, who singled out Esack in a series of 
lengthy screeds.161 When Esack writes “you talk about ‘fighting under the banner of the kuffaar’ 
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then it is nearly as if you want to say that we have lost out Islam … In fact, it is because of our 
Islam that we are there,” the ‘you’ to whom he refers is A. S. Desai. Esack writes, “To date, not a 
single Muslim scholar or layperson has come out openly to support the apartheid system on the 
basis of Islam. That, however, is not enough.” He continues:  
Apartheid has not helped us to preserve out identity as Muslims but as Indians 
and Malays. It has ignored the fact that there are blacks who share our Islam with 
us but who are not allowed to share a complete identity with us ... If, on the other 
hand, our Islam is the most important thing in our identity, then Allah Himself 
has undertaken to protect it, and then we do not need [apartheid leaders] Botha, 
Malan, Rajbansi or Hendrickse to do it for us.162 
 
Fatima Meer’s foreword to Esack’s text captured the extent of exasperation with the conservative 
apoliticism of the `ulama’: 
In Iran the ulama (theologians) lead the people in the revolution against the 
tyranny of the Shah. In India, they took the forefront in the resistance against 
colonial oppression. In South Africa the ulama have a reputation for reaction, 
narrow orthodoxy, narrow conservatism, and rigidity. They are known for 
keeping their noses safely buried in ritual and avoiding any controversy that 
might result in the slightest confrontation with the state.163 
 
During this period the mawlud became politicized as the very devotional practices that 
Deobandis had critiqued became platforms for opposing apartheid. Just a few months before the 
Azaadville mawlud assault, an unnamed organization released a flier using a mawlud scheduled 
for 16 November 1986 at the Habibia Mosque as a rallying point for global Islamic revolution 
against oppression, both in South Africa and abroad, termed ‘World Islamic Unity Week’. It 
references a call from the Iranian Ayatollah Hussein `Ali Montazeri (d. 2009) for using the 
mawlud as an occasion to draw the worldwide Muslim community into a common mission. It 
beseeches South African Muslims to express solidarity with Muslims in Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
161 The Majlis detailed reply to Esack, “A Maulana’s Batil Opinion,” appeared in its Vol. 7, Issue 2 and 
Vol. 7, Issue 3. 
 
162 Farid Esack, But Musa Went to Fir-aun! A compilation of questions and answers about the role of 
Muslims in the South African struggle for liberation, Maitland, Cape Town: Clyson Printers, 1989, 2-5. 
 
163 Fatima Meer, in preface for Farid Esack, But Musa Went to Fir-aun! A compilation of questions and 
answers about the role of Muslims in the South African struggle for liberation, Maitland, Cape Town: 
Clyson Printers, 1989.  
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Afghanistan, with African American Muslims in the United States, and elsewhere. “Are not those 
who are languishing in detention without trial in apartheid South Africa, your and my brothers?” 
it asked of the mawlud’s supporters.164 This politicization of the mawlud accrued a powerful 
symbolic resonance, invoked in similar terms long after the end of apartheid, as we will see.165  
 World Islamic Unity Week was endorsed by Qibla, the Muslim Youth Movement, the 
Call of Islam, several Islamic aid organizations, and - significantly - the Barelwi organization 
Ahle Sunnah wa Jammat. Conspicuously absent were the Transvaal or Natal Deobandi `ulama’ 
councils. Similarly, a Cape `alim called for honoring the month of the mawlud, Rabi` al-Awwal, 
by working from personal reform to collective social reform: “Let us therefore endeavor - each in 
his own humble way - to reform ourselves, and then to bring about the Qur’anic Social Order 
based on the permanent values of freedom, tolerance, justice, equality, unity and brotherhood.”166  
Muslim Digest editors called for “a united observance by the Muslims of the world of the birth 
anniversary of the holy Prophet Muhammad.”167 South African Barelwis responded by organizing 
a ‘Meelad-e-Mustapha Conference’ in Durban – a conference in Durban organized by the Barelwi 
Ahle Sunnat wal Jama`at of South Africa from 14-16 January 1983. A report claimed over 10,000 
                                                       
164 “International Islamic Unity Week: Commemorating the Birth of the Greatest Benefactor to Mankind-
Nabi Muhammad (S.A.W.),” unpublished flyer. 16 November 1986. Islamic ephemera collection, African 
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165 Using the mawlud as a socio-political platform continues today. During my research, for instance, I 
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193. 
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Muslims attended the mawlud at the Soofie Saheb tomb at Riverside in Durban.168 Many also 
reacted strongly to a fatwa condemning mawlud from the Saudi `alim Shaykh Aziz Bin Abdullah 
Bin Baz, chairman of the Muslim World League who later became Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia.169 The Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal allegedly reprinted this fatwa in South Africa, and the 
Imam Ahmed Raza Academy promptly issued its own rebuttal.170 
Significantly, the Claremont Main Road Masjid, which had by this point become a major 
center of anti-apartheid activism in Cape Town, issued a booklet on the political ramifications of 
the mawlud celebration. The Claremont Main Road Masjid dates to 1854 and holds an immense, 
if often controversial, stature among Muslims at the Cape.171 Under the leadership first of Hassan 
Solomons, a towering figure in the anti-apartheid movement and later in the ANC, and later 
Abdul Rashied Omar of the Muslim Youth Movement, the Claremont Main Road Masjid was the 
locus of several intersecting strands of Muslim anti-apartheid activism.172 The booklet introduces 
the mawlud liturgy with the following statement rejecting the Deobandi criticism of mawlud as an 
illicit innovation, while acknowledging the effect of Deobandi critiques:  
Despite the attacks on such a customary practice as bid`a sayyi-a (evil 
innovation) by conservative puritanical movements, mauled [sic] celebrations 
continue to be a popular activity all over the Muslim world. Our position vis-à-
vis the debate has been a pragmatic one … We concur that neither the Prophet 
Muhammad nor his companions ever celebrated his birthday, and that it was an 
innovation which was introduced centuries after his demise. We believe, in 
                                                       
168 “Meelad-e-Mustapha Conference’ in Durban,” Muslim Digest, Jan/Feb 1983. 
 
169 See Marion Holmes Katz, The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad, 186-187 for a discussion of Baz’s fatwa 
against mawlud. 
 
170 I say ‘allegedly’ as I have not been able to see a copy of the fatwa myself. This claim comes from Sunni 
World, An Attack on Our Sunni Beliefs by the Wahabi/Deobandi/Tablighi Sect and Our Reply, Durban: 
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171 In August of 1994, the Claremont Main Road Masjid invited the female African-American Muslim 
scholar Amina Wadud to give a pre-khutbah talk on women’s rights in the mosque, becoming at that time 
the first mosque in the world to allow a female to address a mixed-gender audience. Many activists 
applauded the move, while `ulama’ almost uniformly condemned it. The issue was debated vociferously in 
the August and September 1994 issues of Muslim Views, The Majlis and Al-Qalam.  
 
172 Abdulkader Tayob, Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams, and Sermons, 56-58. 
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consonance with Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi however, that innovation in itself has not 
been a priori condemned by Islam … It is our considered view that mauled 
celebrations has [sic] been and continues to be a revitalizing institution for our 
local community, and as such can be classified as a good innovation (bid`a 
hasana). We need to be clear however that it is not an obligation, and that its 
format is pliable (subject to change and reform).173 
 
 In some ways, we might locate this politicization of the mawlud in what Schimmel called 
“a shift in the mystical and mythical orientation of the maulid celebrations, toward a more 
practical, timebound emphasis on Muhammad’s political and social achievements, his moral 
behaviour, and his intelligent way of organizing the communal life” that began in the nineteenth 
century.174 Regardless, here we see a devotional practice abhorred by the Deobandis become a 
platform for political engagements that they find equally abhorrent. 
During the same period in which the mawlud took on a political hue, activists called for 
organizing local ‘halqas’, literally ‘circles’, for the purpose of collective zikr and for discussion 
of activist strategies. While these local ‘circles’ did not always have explicit Sufi inflections, 
classically the halqa has been closely associated with Sufism.175 Predictably, as the popularity of 
South African zikr halqas peaked, The Majlis came down strongly against it, labeling it a practice 
of “Barelwi Bid`atis.”176  
In 1988 several Muslim leaders called for the creation zikr halqas for the explicit purpose 
of supporting those in held in detention by the apartheid government, specifically Achmad 
Cassiem, leader of Qibla, and Yusuf Patel. Calls for the zikr circles came from the president of 
the Muslim Judicial Council, Shaykh Nazeem Mohammed, and the director of the Muslim Youth 
                                                       
173 Claremont Main Road Mosque, “Mawlud an-Nabi: Poetry in Honor of the Prophet’s Birth,” Islamic 
ephemera collection, African Studies Library, University of Cape Town. 
 
174 Annemarie Schimmel, And Muhammad is his Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic  
Piety, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, 158. 
 
175 This is especially true in the Indian Sufi context. For a discussion of the halqa-i zikr among Sabiri 
Chishtis, see Robert Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-First Century 
Pakistan, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 194-196. 
 
176 “The Bid’ah of Halqah Thikr in the Musaajid,” The Majlis, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 8. 
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Movement, Ebrahim Moosa.177 A similar strategy for mobilizing Muslims along Sufi lines came 
from the Call of Islam. Farid Esack’s popular pamphlet “The Struggle” encouraged self-reflection 
and purification, the formation of activist halqas in the struggle against apartheid, and greater 
awareness of the intimate link between personal decisions and politics. The author describes an 
incident from his childhood when apartheid security forces asked him why he was not as 
politically quiescent as the Tablighis. “Years ago - when I was still in school - the Security Police 
wanted to know why I could not be as decent as ‘die ander mense met die kort jurkies en die lang 
baarde’ [‘the other men with the short tunics and the long beards’].”178   
Not unlike Deobandi discourses, Esack deploys the quintessentially Sufi vocabulary of 
tazkiya in linking self- and social-transformation; what distinguishes his approach from 
Deobandis’ is the entirely different approach to political engagement: “We are then called upon to 
become participants in history and instruments in the Hands of Allah,” he writes. “We must 
understand that this participation does not take place in an ideal environment or in a vacuum, but 
in a situation of conflict; a situation which has been reinforced by division, corruption, selfishness 
and hunger for power. Challenging this whilst struggling on the road to tazkiyyah (self 
transformation) will enable us to become subjects in history and not merely objects.”179   
 The Muslim Student Movement also recognized the power of the halqa in organizing 
against apartheid, calling for students to form activist circles (halaqat). For the MYM, the halqa 
was both the “epicenter of the Islamic Movement’s programme” and “the base for ideological 
training.” Like the Call of Islam, they linked disciplines of the self to personal transformation 
and, by extension, social transformation: “Effectively the Halqah is the base from which a change 
in the individual should lead to a change in society and the reconstruction of the entire social 
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order in accordance with the Islamic system of life.”180 
  
 Contesting Deobandi `ulama’ in the twilight of apartheid 
The early 1990’s were a euphoric period for many Muslims, as the ruling government 
unbanned political parties and released political dissidents, and South Africa’s Muslims prepared 
for their first democratic elections in 1994. The excitement of the first half of the 1990’s quickly 
gave way to the grim realities of ‘post’ apartheid South Africa; Muslim anti-crime vigilantism, 
largely in the form of PAGAD, dominated attention and Deobandi-Sufi clashes largely 
disappeared from view during this period.181 Even if public clashes subsided, debates about the 
politics of Deoband in South Africa continued unabated.  
A controversy at a mosque in Paarl near Cape Town erupted in 1991, involving at first, 
not disputed Sufi practices but the right of an imam to appoint officials in the committee 
administering the mosque. Evidently the dispute quickly devolved from one about executive 
power within the mosque committee to one about the imam’s views on politics in the ‘new’ South 
Africa. The imam, Shaykh Rafiek, had spoken out against Muslims’ activism alongside non-
Muslims, openly criticized Qibla and the Muslim Youth Movement branch in Paarl, and even 
banned his congregants from attending the annual death of Imam Abdullah Haron, the early 
activist who died at the hands of apartheid security forces in 1969.182 Taking this line had become 
common; The Majlis had previously rejected taking Imam Haron as a model, stating that 
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‘martyrdom’ for a ‘kufr’ cause is not martyrdom at all.”183 A certain Y. Abrahams of Paarl wrote: 
“These people want to change our deen [religion] and say Muslims must go to the townships and 
help the black kuffaar [unbelievers] and to tell our children to fight and make trouble against the 
government. They demand our Shaykh to talk about politics or things going on in the world, 
Israel and wherever. Israel has got nothing to do with us, a good Muslim do not [sic] concern 
himself with other people’s business ... Shaykh [Rafiek] was right in banning the Imam Haron 
commemoration. Today, Imam Haron, tomorrow Imam Khomeini to lead our youth astray.”184 
 In the ensuing debate, Cape Muslims unleashed a torrent of anti-Deobandi sentiment. “It 
is well known that the distorted Deobandi-Islam, backed by Fahd's American petro-rials has 
successfully penetrated Transvaal and Natal,” wrote a Muslim from Athlone. “However, I find it 
very disturbing that such ‘Islam’ is propagated in nearby Paarl ... The solution to stopping this 
menace has to be through the education of such Shaykhs, Imaams and the public and to warn and 
reveal to them how the Deobandis (with the aid of imperialists) are preventing Islam from 
successfully opposing injustices in this world.”185 A woman from the Cape township of 
Gugulethu noted that Y. Abrahams dared to call the blacks “kufaar” even “at a time when the 
white boers [Afrikaner farmers] have stopped calling us ‘kaffirs’,” the slang designation for 
blacks ultimately derived from the Arabic word kafir and which most South Africans consider 
offensive to the point of being nearly unutterable.186 She continues: 
I would like to advise you, my Muslim brother, please learn the real Islam and 
take it to the black people of this country. Why are we only good for you as 
customers in your shops, as servants in your homes but not as fellow oppressed 
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and fellow Muslims? We have been dehumanized for a very long time now, and 
it will only be through Islam that all people will really be liberated. Not the 
‘American Islam’, the Islam that says pray, fast, perform Hajj and keep quiet. 
NO! I am talking about the Islam that the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) practiced, 
the Islam that stood for justice, peace and love. In that order.187 
 
Thus, on the eve of South Africa’s transition to democracy, a wide swath of the country’s 
Muslims had aligned against the Deobandi `ulama’ and their perceived ineffectual response to the 
political exigencies of the time. Debates between Deobandis and Barelwis continued unabated 
throughout this period, but they did so against a growing surge of Muslims who felt disenchanted 
with the debates that they carried out in public view. Many Muslims saw ongoing feuds over 
mawlud and `urs festivities as bringing the South African Muslims towards an impasse. Pamphlet 
wars, meetings, lectures, and debates did not resolve these disputes; they only enflamed the 
tension between both sides. While many placed the onus upon the Deobandi `ulama’ for the 
social damage of these quarrels, some blamed the Indian `ulama’ as a whole. This chapter has 
attempted to trace the delicate contours of these shifting polemical positions. 
South Africa’s Sufi legacy was at stake in these polemics. Some Deobandis defended 
their aloofness from politics in terms of their Sufi ideals, while their detractors defended their 
political engagements in terms of Sufism as well. At stake also was Sufism itself: who claimed 
the authority to define it, and on what grounds? The final chapter will show how debates over 
Sufism changed in the post-apartheid period. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
New Rivalries, New Rhetoric: Sufism, Media and ‘Heritage’ after Apartheid 
 
 
 
 
 
On Sunday, 31 December 2000, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
screened a documentary on Muslims in the Western Cape.1 What made this documentary on Cape 
Muslims stand out among others was the portrayal of pilgrims at the shrine of the Sufi saint 
Abdurahman Moturu on Robben Island, the island off the coast of Cape Town on which the 
apartheid government kept its most important political prisoners and which remains today both a 
potent symbol of South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement and a popular tourist destination. The 
documentary depicted pilgrims placing their foreheads on the tomb as if in prostration. Such a 
seemingly insignificant gesture of piety sparked a firestorm that lasted for weeks, involved every 
major Muslim publication in the country and even one of its largest newspapers, the Cape Argus. 
The ensuing clash is a lens onto conflicting dynamics within the South African Muslim 
community over reverence for its Sufi saints, the political legacy of anti-apartheid activism and 
even the nature of monotheism itself. More than mere doctrine was at stake; competing interests 
among South African Muslims scrambled to claim a voice in a newly diversified post-apartheid 
mediascape. It was as much as clash over who could claim the authority to represent ‘Islam’ to a 
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media and major newspapers in the Cape. 
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post-apartheid South Africa as a clash over doctrine.2 The clash was certainly a “competition and 
struggle over the meanings of symbols,” but it was also a struggle over authority to decide what 
constitutes a symbol in the first place.3 The fact that some Muslims place their foreheads on Sufi 
saints’ tombs is not ‘news’; it became newsworthy precisely because of the circulation of this 
image in local media, and the ensuring battle over whether, and to what extent, the action 
represents normative Muslim piety. 
The visual and aural space of media compounds this struggle over defining symbols and 
gestures. In this context, as I will show below, participation in contested rituals takes on a sort of 
“performative reflexivity,” to borrow from Victor Turner.4 Indeed, many of the participants in 
Sufi devotions in the Cape are acutely aware of these contestations. While the Muslim who 
placed his forehead on the tomb of Abdurrahman Moturu unwittingly became a ‘performer’ of a 
contested practice, in a more quotidian sense, participants also perform their vision of devotional 
normativity every day that they attend local `urs events and engage in practices that they know 
are widely contested ones. Participating in these practices becomes a way of self-consciously 
reasserting the ‘cultural heritage’ of Cape Sufism, a means of claiming it from hostile critiques, as 
we will see. 
The post-apartheid proliferation of religious media, and the religious publics they call 
into being, enabled an expansion of the very parameters of participation in Deobandi-Barelwi 
debates over Sufism, to the point that community-wide debates over mawlud or ‘grave worship’ 
now involve individuals who were not traditionally partisans to them; in the Cape, for example, 
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debates over the legitimacy of mawlud occur annually in various media, and the principal 
antagonists are rarely identified as ‘Deobandi’, ‘Tablighi’ or ‘Barelwi’ as they often were in 
earlier polemics. In short, Muslims who, several generations ago, may have been unaware even of 
the existence of ‘Indian’ debates on Sufi devotional practices are now ‘expected’ to have opinions 
on them. This is especially ironic in light of the widespread call to ‘export’ these debates back to 
the Indian subcontinent during the apartheid era. 
This chapter reveals, moreover, new shifts in the ways Sufis in South Africa have 
defended their practices on the ground. As we saw a politicization of Sufism in the late apartheid 
era, in this chapter, we will see a largely post-apartheid reimagining of the Cape’s pioneering 
Sufis as essential elements of a composite South African Muslim ‘culture’ and as erstwhile 
‘freedom fighters’. As I explain below, the Deobandi critique of Sufi devotions as ‘culture’ takes 
on a new meaning as Sufis, particularly in the Western Cape, self-consciously reasserted the 
‘cultural heritage’ of Sufi sites. In the following, I will place this discursive shift in the context of 
post-apartheid constitutional frameworks that granted Muslims access to new media outlets and 
guaranteed their ‘cultural rights’.  
 
Media, Law and Muslim Publics: Before and After Apartheid 
To understand how new forms of media enabled new means of debating Sufi devotional 
practices, it is necessary to understand the restrictions on such debates under apartheid and, more 
broadly, the kinds of official ‘publics’ that the state authorized. During apartheid, the government 
rigidly policed any potentially subversive expressions of religious sentiment in public. To the 
extent that Muslim publics existed under apartheid, they are most accurately understood as 
counterpublics, manifest not through officially authorized venues but in subversive, unauthorized 
ones, ranging from manifestos distributed in mosques to Muslim newsletters constantly 
threatened with closure, from mass protests in the townships to the highly politicized funerals of 
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martyrs to apartheid’s aggression.5 Under apartheid there was no ‘religious’ radio or television 
aside from what the government-run South African Broadcasting Corporation deemed 
acceptable.6 
Religiously mobilized identities would have clashed with the officially sanctioned racial 
publics that the apartheid government went to great lengths to foster and maintain. We can 
witness this most prominently in the apartheid government’s policy of ‘separate development’.7 
The basic notion behind ‘separate development’ was that South Africa was comprised of multiple 
cultures that each possessed its own distinctive ‘essence’, an essence that should be nurtured but 
strictly prevented from intermingling with others. In the 1950’s, the doctrine of “separate 
development” began to make its distinct imprint on urban space and on forms of cultural 
expression, including media. 
One can see this most clearly in the government’s policy towards its Indian population. 
The government finally granted formal citizenship to Indians for the first time only in 1961 and 
subsequently sought to encourage the idea of Indians as a singular, unified and separate cultural 
enclave. It provided official venues for Indian music, dance, and film, and subsidized religious 
performances and the study of Indian classic texts at universities, such as the University of 
Durban-Westville, at the time reserved almost exclusively for Indians. The government even 
supported an Indian radio station, Lotus FM, with programming in Hindi, Tamil and Urdu that 
cautiously avoided nearly all forms of overtly religious programming.  
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The anthropologist Blom Hansen has argued that the policy of ‘separate development’ 
aimed to convert “race into space” and thereby create “practices whose alleged 
incommensurability would, in turn, justify the project of separation itself. In this way, apartheid 
sought to produce its own cause - that is, to make effective the distinctions the state claimed were 
natural.”8 Instead of allowing religious publics to flourish openly, apartheid assimilated religion 
to the larger taxonomies of race. Apartheid era censuses reflect the ‘natural’ conditions they 
sought to foster in the public domain and in urban space. While the government recorded the 
religious affiliations of its citizens, the totalizing racial schematic of the apartheid census renders 
religious affiliation nearly inconsequential in terms of the everyday exigencies of the state. Race 
became the arch-criterion according to which sub-criteria such as religious affiliation were 
quantified and arranged.9  
The demise of apartheid upended this project of ‘separate development’ and created new 
identitarian anxieties in its wake. By the 1980’s, these boundaries had already begun to fray. As 
Farid Esack stated: “Apartheid has not helped us to preserve our identity as Muslims but as 
Indians and Malays. It has ignored the fact that there are blacks who share our Islam with us but 
who are not allowed to share a complete identity with us.”10 With the end of apartheid, we 
witness an abrupt shift from subversive religious publics to officially authorized ones. Muslims 
began to mobilize in new forms of media not as Indians or Malays, but as Muslims. 
New legal dispensation and rights discourses enabled these post-apartheid Muslim 
publics to emerge. The post-apartheid South African constitution finally came into effect on 
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February 4, 1997 and replaced the Interim Constitution of 1993. There are two aspects of this new 
legal environment that are germane here. First, one of the key tasks of the post-apartheid 
government was reapportioning airtime in radio and television to reflect South Africa’s religious 
diversity.11 To this end, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, or IBA, was created in March 
1994 to distribute and regulate religious broadcasting licenses. In the coming years, numerous 
Muslim radio stations emerged through the IBA, including Voice of the Cape and Radio 786 in 
Cape Town, Radio Ansaar and Radio Azaania in Durban, Radio Islam and The Voice in 
Johannesburg, among others, that would become major sites for public debate over Sufi 
devotional practices.12 Second, the constitution ensured that “persons belonging to a cultural, 
religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right … to enjoy their culture, practise 
their religion and use their language.”13 Such broad language was used to great effect to protect 
Sufi saints’ tombs against destruction in the 1990’s, as I explain further.  
 
Mawlud on the Radio, ‘Grave Worship’ on TV: New Parameters of Religious 
Debate 
 Precisely because there was competition within the Muslim community to take advantage 
of the expansion of officially authorized religious media, there was a heightened concern among 
Muslims to represent their sectarian interests to a wider South African public. This new 
competition frames how we ought to understand a proliferation of public debate about Sufi 
devotions in radio and television.   
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African Muslims Making (Air)Waves During the Period of Transformation,” in David Chidester, 
Abdulkader Tayob and Wolfram Weisse, eds. Religion, Politics and Identity in a Changing South Africa, 
New York: Waxmann Publishing, 2004, 125-160. 
 
13 Constitution of South Africa, 1996, Section 31 (a). 
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Debating the legitimacy of celebrating the Prophet’s birth has become a standard feature 
of the month of Rabi` al-Awwal across South Africa. Here I will use one of these debates in 
March of 2010 to foreground how the frames of debate over Sufi devotions have expanded since 
the end of apartheid. The Voice of the Cape, one of two Muslim radio stations in the Cape, 
broadcast a debate over mawlud and the nature of bid`a on 25 March 2010. The debate had 
initially been planned as a live munazara-style discussion between Hafiz Fuzail Soofie of 
Durban, a representative of the Barelwi-inclined Chishti Nizami Habibi Order of 
Pietermaritzburg, and Faiek Gamieldien of Cape Town, a controversial Salafi-inclined graduate 
of Al-Azhar. I attended what many thought would be a live debate over mawlud at Masjid al-
Quds in Gatesville, Cape Town on 24 March. It turned out that Faiek Gamieldien refused to 
debate in person, and so his recorded rebuttal aired on Voice of the Cape radio the following day.  
Hafiz Fuzail located the celebration of mawlud in the very theodicy of Islam; the first sin 
of Satan was rejecting the birth of the Prophet Adam. It is an honor that a Muslim owes to all 
prophets and, he argues, firmly established in the Qur’an itself: 
If to commemorate, to honor, to salute the day in which a nabi is born is the 
sunna which is established by Allah Subhana wa Ta’ala in the Holy Qur’an, then 
to remember the milad, to commemorate the milad, to celebrate the milad, to 
observe the milad of the Holy Prophet (S) is in keeping with the mood, and the 
spirit, and the word of the Holy Qur'an. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
terminology of Shari`a, to speak about the mawlud, to remember the mawlud, to 
salute that day, to regard the day as important, cannot be a bid`ah from a Shari`a 
perspective, because it has its source, it has its roots, it has its origin in Qur’an.14 
 
Shaykh Fuzail then put forth two criteria for what constitutes “bid`a zalala,” an ‘illicit 
innovation’: it must, first, have no origin and no proof or precedent in the Qur'an and sunna, and 
must, secondly, contradict the Qur’an and sunna. The practice of singing praises of Muhammad 
during the mawlud, he added, is firmly established through God’s own praise for his Prophet in 
the Qur’an. What was remarkable about Shaykh Fuzail’s argument was how little it referenced 
the Deobandi-Barelwi arguments for and against mawlud and how much it relied on direct 
                                                       
14 Hafiz Fuzail Soofie, lecture at Masjidul Quds, Gatesville, Cape Town, 24 March 2010. The lecture aired 
live on Voice of the Cape. 
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reference to the Qur’an and hadith.  
Shaykh Gamieldien began his rebuttal15 with similar use of the Qur’an, referencing 
Qur’an 5:3 in his own words: “Today I have completed your din for you” so, he added, nothing 
can be “added or subtracted” from it, and mawlud is an addition to the religion. Gamieldien 
invoked Jalal al-din Suyuti’s fatwa on mawlud, stipulating only that it should consist, firstly, of 
recitation of parts of the Qur’an, secondly of excerpts from sirah, thirdly of account of wonders 
that took place during Prophet's birth, and fourthly, of a meal, after which everyone should 
disburse and nothing else should be done. He elaborated: 
I regard mawlud, which I have celebrated all my life, as a meritorious act if done 
properly and if it consists, first, a lecture on the biography and life of the Nabi (S) 
his beautiful birth and his beautiful ending, and the occasion is used to exhort 
Muslims to show their love of the Nabi by following the Qur'an and the sunna of 
our beloved Prophet ... The issue is not about the celebration of mawlud. The 
issue is about the excesses, the ghuluw, ‘extremism’, which has entered into our 
community in the celebration of mawlud, and ultimately in the name of Islam. 
 
The ‘extremism’ in question includes, among other things, the “wasting of money,” holding of all 
night vigil prayers, since the only “all-night tahajjud” (reading of the Qur’an) that Muslims are 
commanded to do, he explained, is night of laylat al-qadr during Ramadan, and speaking at the 
mawlud about issues that have nothing to do with Islam.16  
Significantly, Gamieldien strayed from mawlud to reflect more broadly on graves and 
their veneration, asserting that the Prophet Muhammad taught the height of a grave should not 
exceed “the span of a hand” in order to distinguish Muslims’ graves from those of idol-
worshippers. “Speak to Allah directly,” he pleaded. “In sujud [prostration], there is no screen 
between you and Allah Ta’ala.” How is it that Satan, he asked, spoke directly to God, asking for 
respite until the Day of Judgment, but we think that pious Muslims are unable do so? 
                                                       
15 Faiek Gamieldien, lecture on Voice of the Cape, 25 March 2010. 
 
16 For example, in Gamieldien’s words, that “the Prophet stuck his hand out of his grave and greeted 
somebody,” which speakers did actually discuss during a separate mawlud that I attended at Masjidul Quds 
in Gatesville on 26 February 2010. 
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In this debate, there was no mention of, and virtually no reference towards, classic 
Deobandi and Barelwi argumentation over mawlud. The issue of standing in respect of the 
Prophet (qiyam) did not arise, for instance. Debating the issue on the radio, moreover, expanded 
the parameters of debate beyond its traditional partisans; in the days following the debate, the 
chat forums of Voice of the Cape and other local websites buzzed with discussion about mawlud. 
To the extent that debates over mawlud are part of the popular discourse, it is perhaps inevitable 
that such debate will be articulated in terms that are easily accessible to Muslim publics. As 
Eickelman and Piscatori have suggested, the frame of these public debates incorporate not just 
`ulama’, but “self-ascribed religious authorities, secular intellectuals, Sufi orders, mothers, 
students, workers, engineers, and many others.”17 
A similar controversy brought new interlocutors into the purview of debates over ‘grave 
worship’, this one also involving Gamieldien. His central place in these debates, not as a 
Deobandi scholar but as a Salafi, points to the shifting terrains of participation in anti-Sufi 
polemics and counter-polemics. No longer the sole domain of Deobandi scholars and their 
‘Indian’ interlocutors, in the post-apartheid era, many who were not classical partisans in these 
debates became, in a sense, ‘obligated’ to have an opinion on them. 
The SABC documentary of 31 December 2001, mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, unleashed a fierce war of words among the Cape’s Muslims; at least forty letters 
criticizing or defending the Cape’s Sufi shrine devotions were printed in local newspapers.18 The 
controversy surrounding Shaykh Gamieldien was significant enough to elicit a response directly 
                                                       
17 Eickelman and Salvatore, preface in Public Islam and the Common Good, xii, quoted in Abdulkader 
Tayob, “Muslim Public Claiming Heritage in Post-Apartheid Cape Town,” Journal for Islamic Studies, 
24/25 (2004/5): 78-104, at 80-81. 
 
18 Wahbie Long and Don Foster did a ‘discourse analysis’ of 41 of these letters. See their “Dissension in the 
Ranks: The ‘Sufi’-‘Wahhabi’ Debate,” Journal for the Study of Religion 17, 1 (2004): 67-93. 
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from a major Sufi of the Alawi order with close ties to Cape Town, Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki, 
whose spiritual patronage is responsible for the creation of Cape Town’s Al-Zawiya.19 
 Here I will do a close reading of one of these venues, the Cape Argus, to tease out the 
plethora of overlapping positions and discourses at work in this controversy. The letter that 
initiated this war of editorials was Shaykh Gamieldien’s letter to the Cape Argus that, besides 
labeling these practices as shirk, militated directly against the post-apartheid re-envisioning of 
Sufism as ‘cultural heritage’ in the Cape, and sought to reclaim the anti-apartheid mantle from the 
Sufis. Unlike discourses of the apartheid era, when Deobandis’ critiques of Sufi devotional 
practices went hand-in-hand with their critiques of political engagement, critics like Gamieldien 
are cashing in on political capital that Muslims earned after the end of apartheid. Speaking of the 
image of Muslims at the `urs of Sayyid Moturu on Robben Island placing their foreheads on the 
tomb, he wrote: 
I wish to state clearly and categorically that this kind of ‘shrine-worship’ or 
‘shrine-honouring’ has absolutely nothing to do with Islam as a religion nor with 
its sense of spirituality. In fact Islam abhors such practices as shirk (ascribing 
partners to Allah) which is an unpardonable sin. Islam prides itself on its 
uncompromising monotheism and the absence of forms and figures in its sacred 
spaces. 
The erection of shrines to the dead and the veneration of such shrines are 
anathema to those fundamental beliefs. In fact the eradication of pagan beliefs 
and the physical destruction of all forms of idolatry were the central focus of the 
calling of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) … And to add further insult to injury 
the present shrine was constructed by the apartheid regime in 1969, two hundred 
and fifteen years after the death of Sayed Abdurahman Moturu, also known as 
Hadji Matarim, who is supposed to be buried there. This was yet another 
elaborate ploy by the apartheid regime to keep the Muslims in spiritual serfdom. 
Many are the Muslims, but few are those who have accepted Islam.20 
 
 Responses invoked the Cape Sufi ‘heritage’ that Gamieldien had indirectly denigrated. 
One called for “utmost respect for our forebears” and the “legacy left by our ancestors,” insisting 
that his reverence for the Cape’s Sufi saints is nothing but the most sincere kind: 
                                                       
19 http://www.sunnah.org/aqida/cape_town_wahabi/complete_refutation_shaykh_faiik.htm. 
 
20 Sheikh Faaik Gamieldien, “Islam prides itself on monotheism,” Cape Argus, 8 January 2001, 11. 
(emphasis added)  
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I am proud to continue the legacy by teaching my children about the Muslim 
political exiles and their successes in building a strong community. The shrines 
are the only remnants of a proud history that came under severe pressure by 
colonialism and apartheid. That the Muslim community survived, even 
flourished, bears testimony to the role played by these great and inspiring leaders. 
Let me be clear about one of the sheikh’s accusations. My attachment to the 
shrines has absolutely nothing to do with ‘shrine worship’ or compromising my 
belief in monotheism as his seems to suggest. The sheikh’s views are sad and 
small-minded. I urge him to rethink the link between the shrines and the Muslim 
community’s survival at the Cape under harsh and repressive conditions. I trust 
he will replace his puritanical condemnation with greater respect and 
understanding.21 
 
Such responses to Gamieldien reframed Sufi devotions as ‘cultural heritage’, in accord with the 
prevailing ‘cultural rights’ discourse that the post-apartheid constitution enshrined in 1996, and 
which Muslims used to defend Sufi gravesites, as I explain below. A letter from Nisaar Dawood, 
the editor of Al-Qalam, underscores this Sufism-as-culture argument explicitly:  
In his letter that appeared in the Cape Argus on Monday, January 8, 2001, Sheikh 
Faaik Gamieldien seems to demonstrate very little understanding of the 
interconnectedness between religion and culture. In his scathing criticism of 
people who visit and pray at the Karamats (Muslim shrines), he fails to 
understand that the expression of Islam and many of its rituals is fundamentally 
linked to the cultural heritage of the local population.22 
 
Other rebuttals to Gamieldien appealed to the notion, popular in Barelwi rhetoric, that visiting 
saints’ tombs is not ‘worship’ at all but mere ‘reverence’: 
Once again we find that another Aalim (a Muslim scholar) has found the time 
and energy to further divide the already splintered Muslim community of the 
Western Cape … Muslims do not worship the saints (may God bless them) but 
honour them for bringing the light of Islam to all dark corners of the world and 
leading our foregathers away from idolatry and paganism. God Almighty, in His 
infinite wisdom, has chosen them to serve Him and spread His Word. Is it not 
irresponsible for this learned sheikh to say that the apartheid regime constructed 
the shrine at Robben Island ‘to keep the Muslims in spiritual serfdom’ while at 
the same time vehemently discouraging visits to the shrine?23 
 
                                                       
21 Mogamad Fuad Norodien, “Visits to Muslim shrines defended,” Cape Argus, 11 January 2001, 13. 
 
22 Nisaar Dawood, Acting Editor, Al-Qalam, “Visits to Muslim shrines defended,” Cape Argus, 11 January 
2001, 13. (emphasis added) 
 
23 Chairman, Cape Mazaar Society, “Stop this campaign of misinformation,” Cape Argus, 19 January 2001, 
11. 
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A Barelwi scholar and chairman of the Sunni Ulama Council contributed a now-familiar 
response, comparable to Abdun Nabi Hamidi’s rebuff of the Majlisul Ulama:24 criticisms of Sufi 
devotional practices are purely theoretical and have no grounding in what actually happens at the 
shrines. “I do not think that Gamieldien has ever been to a celebration of this nature because of 
his complete ignorance of what happens at a tomb of a holy one. Allah is praised, Our Beloved 
Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) is praised and salutations sent upon Him whereafter Allah is asked 
to bless his friend who lies resting in his tomb. This does not impute partners to Allah because the 
intention to do so is not present.”25 
Two sorts of responses supported Gamieldien’s claims. First, in a new slant on the classic 
Deobandi criticism of Sufi shrines as israf, a ‘waste’ of money, one sort said that funds spent on 
the shrines’ upkeep could be better spent tackling the needs of post-apartheid South Africa. “It is 
ridiculous to ask people to donate R 500 000 to restore a shrine when thousands are starving,” one 
participant in this conversation claimed. And if one is going to cast the Sufi saints as erstwhile 
freedom fighters, then why not “build a shrine to Imam Abdullah Haroon and to Hector Petersen, 
as the Soweto uprisings are directly responsible for us being able to introduce Muslim Personal 
Law on our statute books today?”26  
The second kind of support for Gamieldien was far more grounded in classic Deobandi 
critiques, invoking the Barelwis and particularly critical in its interrogation of ‘culture’:  
Cultural influences, which do not conflict with Islamic teachings, are tolerable. 
However a cultural practice, which leads to the corruption of Islamic beliefs, is 
totally forbidden. It is this that worship at shrines was the main focus of the 
learned Sheikh’s condemnation … Sheikh Yusuf, our esteemed forefather, would 
certainly have frowned upon these practices, which are clearly not Islamic, but 
obviously have their origins in various religions of the East. One only has to 
witness some of the rituals of the Barelwi sect in India to appreciate the truth of 
Sheikh Faiek’s arguments. …Grave worship is not merely evil, but is Satan’s 
                                                       
24 See pg. 200, n. 37.  
 
25 Ebrahim Khan, Chairman, Sunni Ulama Council, “Allah is best guide on shrines,” Cape Argus, 22 
January 2001, 11. 
 
26 S. Ismail, “Shrine money misdirected,” Cape Argus, 16 January 2001, 11. 
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age-old trap door to polytheism. Sheikh Faiek’s departure from the traditional 
Cape Muslim scholar’s silence in the face of numerous un-Islamic tendencies 
among Muslims is welcomed with much relief and optimism.27 
 
Gamieldien responded, finally, with the lapidary rhetoric typical of Salafi critiques of Sufi 
practices: if it is not explicitly authorized in the Qur’an, it cannot possibly be justified: 
By Islam I mean the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions, and not the man-made 
Islam of Mr. Dawood when he says ‘Muslims from various cultural backgrounds 
can only enrich the existing practices and understanding of Islam’, nor the Islam 
of Mr. Norodien who urges us ‘to rethink the link between the shrines and the 
Muslim community’s survival at the Cape under harsh and repressive 
conditions’. May I remind Mr. Norodien that the survival of all depends on the 
Grace of Allah and on nothing else, least of all shrines of bricks and mortar … 
There is no ‘interconnectedness between religion and culture’. There is only 
Islam, ad Din or way of life, revealed by the Divine, whose system of belief can 
therefore never be subject to ‘critical questions’.28 
 
In explicitly calling Islam a ‘system’, Gamieldien locates his attack on shrine-based devotions in 
the language of ways ‘Islam’ itself is objectified, seen as a totalizing system of thought and 
practice.29 It is a form of thinking about Islam that resonates far more deeply with Salafi and 
modernist discourses about Islam as a total socio-political system than it does with Deobandis’ 
traditionalist approach; Deobandis have, for the most part, consciously eschewed this sort of 
language, as I discussed in the second chapter. But more importantly, the language that 
Gamieldien uses here points to new parameters for debating Sufi devotions and new vocabularies 
for how those debates take place after apartheid. 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
27 Mohammed Riaad Akhalwaya, “Religion and culture need clear distinction,” Cape Argus, 19 January 
2001, 11. (emphasis added) 
 
28 Sheikh Faaik Gamieldien, “Survival of all depends on Grace of Allah, not shrines of brick or mortar,” 
Cape Argus, 23 January 2001, 13. (emphasis added) 
 
29 For a now-classic discussion of how ‘Islam’ has been objectified and systematized in contemporary 
discourses, see Dale Eickelman and John Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 42. 
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Devotional Piety after Apartheid: Mawlud, Kramats and the Cape Sufi ‘Heritage’  
The end of apartheid saw an efflorescence of Sufism in South Africa and particularly in 
the Cape, what one scholar has called a “post-apartheid Sufi resurgence” in South Africa.30 
Numerous renowned Sufis have established local branches of their orders in Cape Town, 
discussions about Sufism abound on the Cape’s Muslim radio stations, and the number of local 
zikr halqas has expanded dramatically.31  
In this period, the Cape became a major regional center for the Chishti, Naqshbandi, 
‘Alawi and Qadiri Sufi orders, though the groundwork for this shift was evidence long prior to 
this era. Sayyid Mehboob Ali Shah introduced the Chishti Nizami line to South Africa as early as 
1968. He was a khalifa of Sayyid Faqir Muhammad Shah, successor to Habib Ali Shah of 
Hyderabad, and a local Chishti branch was founded in honor of Faqir Muhammad Shah.32 Sayyid 
Mehboob Ali Shah died on 25 October 2005 and is buried in Cape Town.33 More recently, the 
Cape Town visit in 1997 of Shaykh Muhammad bin `Alawi of Mecca solidified the `Alawi order 
in the Cape.34 Shaykh Muhammad Nizam Adil al-Haqqani of the Naqshbandi Haqqani order 
arrived in 2000 to integrate the local Naqshbandi order, led by Yusuf da Costa and Hasan Walele, 
into its network. During their visit they accepted initiations from local Muslims and visited the 
kramats, while broadcasting their zikrs live on the Voice of the Cape radio station.35  
An important part of this growing interest and participation in Cape Sufism is a revival of 
mawlud historiography. Historians of Cape Islam know that Muslims have celebrated mawlud 
                                                       
30 Armien Cassiem, “Post-Apartheid Sufi Resurgence,” ISIM Review 19 (2007): 38-39. 
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there for generations, but with the surge of interest in Sufism after apartheid, new historiography 
of the mawlud emerged as well. A widely revered Cape historian, Achmat Davids, researched the 
history of mawlud celebrations in the Cape and revealed the rich history and unique features of 
Cape mawluds. The first, Davids argued, could be dated as early as 1772. Introduced by Shaykh 
Yusuf, the Cape mawlud was, in David’s view, perhaps the first means by which Cape Muslims 
staked a visible claim on the land: “It was on a Moulood occasion - in 1772,” Davids concluded, 
“when Islam was first visibly seen to be present in the Mother City,” as Cape Town is often 
called.36  
The Cape boasts numerous ‘moulood jama`ahs’, neighborhood-based clubs that organize 
local mawlud celebrations each Rabi` al-Awwal. A recent comprehensive guide to these clubs 
lists twelve men’s mawlud jama`as and seventy-one women’s mawlud jama`as, each with its own 
name - The Red Crescents, Ubuntu, Summer Roses, White Water Lillies, Jawahiriyyas, to take a 
few examples.37 Cape mawluds have distinctive features that perhaps exist nowhere else, such as 
the practice called rampie-sny, the ‘cutting of the orange leaves’, in which women and girls cut 
the leaves of orange plants into small strips, which are then scented with rose and lemon oils, and 
finally wrapped into small bundles using colorful kite paper. These sachets are then distributed 
among the participants. Some Sufi orders developed their own mawlud liturgies in the Cape; the 
most widely used were those of Tuan Sayyid, whose `Alawi liturgies gained popularity through 
the Cape in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Davids argues that the Cape mawlud - 
despite unique cultural ‘accretions’ such as the rampie-sny - is a strictly orthodox form of 
celebrating the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad: 
Moulood celebration is virtually as old as the history of Islam at the Cape. 
Regarded by some as an innovation, Mouloods were part of the Shari`ah-centric 
Tasawwuf brought to the Cape in these early years. These Mouloods provided 
                                                       
36 Achmat Davids, “Practice of Moulood has deep roots in the Cape,” Muslim Views, June 1998, 10. 
 
37 “Moulood Jamaahs 2002,” Boorhaanul Islam, March-June 2002, 64-69.  See also Davids and da Costa, 
Pages from Cape Muslim History, 140. 
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opportunities for communal gatherings, and helped to strengthen the commitment 
to the unitary being of Allah.38  
 
Despite this confidence in the normativity of mawlud, others have expressed a deep concern that 
its critics have begun to impact local opinion towards the practice.39 
Beyond its historical and cultural resonance in the Cape, mawlud became, for some, a 
seminal form of democratic, post-apartheid political engagement. In a 1999 article, “Our jihad is 
to apply the Seerah,” Muslim Views opined that “Moulood-un-Nabi is a celebration of the birth of 
the world's greatest benefactor ... Muslims have a role to play in this new democracy and we have 
to find the means to use the example of Muhammad (SAW) in order to become a responsible 
Muslim minority.”40 Some began to conceive of the mawlud as both an opportunity to uplift and 
proselytize among South Africa’s poor and an annual re-commitment to the politically 
revolutionary nature of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings: 
With the new South Africa that we are entering in, the upholders and observers 
of Mauloodun Nabi (Prophet’s Birthday) functions should add a NEW 
DIMENSION to such functions, which would also serve the purpose of Da`wah 
(inviting to the Message of Islam) among the indigenous people of the country … 
The organizers of such functions should call upon Muslims to bring with them to 
the functions they attend their gifts, both in cash and kind, that anybody normally 
takes to somebody’s birthday function, but these gifts taken to the Prophet’s 
birthday should be distributed … among the non-Muslim needy attending such 
functions … The upholders and observers of Mauloodun Nabi, therefore, have a 
great role to play in the new South Africa.41 
 
Applying the mawlud to post-apartheid political participation was a double affront to Deobandis: 
not only politicizing the mawlud (and here it is worth recalling Thanawi’s invectives against a 
                                                       
38 Achmat Davids, “Practice of Moulood has deep roots in the Cape,” Muslim Views, June 1998, 10. 
 
39 Imam Abdur Rashied Omar, “Maulid al-Nabi: Celebrations and the Next Generation,” Boorhaanul Islam, 
March-June 2002, 23-24. 
 
40 Muslim Views, June 1999, 1.  
 
41 Mohammed Makki, “Reply to Sheikh Najaar’s Article about Maulood-un-Nabi,” Muslim Digest, 
February-March 1994, 263. 
 257 
mawlud that serves any purpose, however noble, other than praising the Prophet),42 but doing so 
in order to advocate for greater political participation among South Africa’s Muslims. 
 One can see the political utilization of mawlud festivities in contemporary mawluds in the 
Cape, as I observed at one of the annual ‘Mass Womens’ Mouloods’ hosted by the Islamic Unity 
Convention Women’s Forum, an organization affiliated with Qibla. Founded in 1996 and airing 
annually on Radio 786, these mawluds are expressly designed to unite small, neighborhood-level 
‘moulood jama`ahs’ into a single, large celebration of a tradition that “kept Islam alive and united 
the oppressed” under apartheid and now aims “to establish a just social order.”43 The organizer 
called the event a “voice of and for the oppressed of South Africa,” telling me “we praise and 
thank Allah that we could also feed them on this day, while celebrating the Prophet’s birth, 
because one cannot speak to people about spirituality if they are hungry.”44 The participants were 
a mix of Coloured and black women from the ‘Cape Flats’, the vast region beyond central Cape 
Town where the apartheid government consigned most non-whites. One woman told me “you 
must understand the women’s role in [mawlud], for as long as we have honored Nabi in this 
country,” mentioning rampie-sny and other aspects of local mawlud in which exclusively women 
participate.45 Another woman at the event, from Mitchells Plain, said that she had been coming 
annually since the late 1990’s. She described the celebration of mawlud in the Cape as “the best 
way for us to honor our Nabi” but equally as a “a dying tradition.” But the tradition was dying, 
she said, not because of widespread criticisms of mawlud; if anything, “the things that these 
people say about the ‘moulood’, they make us stronger. They make us realize how we must 
protect this tradition.”46 In fact, the perceived decline, in her view, came from a younger 
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generation failing to understand how this sort of devotional piety related to their immediate lives. 
Nearly all of the women with whom I spoke, however, were well aware of the mawlud as point of 
controversy, some referencing the mawlud-related discussions on Cape Muslim radio stations 
throughout the month of Rabi` al-Awwal. 
At the same time that the mawlud was defensively reenvisioned in terms of Cape 
heritage, a similar debate coalesced around the role of the Cape’s Sufi saints’ shrines, known 
locally as ‘kramats’. An index of this interest is the prominence of the Faure Kramat festival, 
which routinely attracts over 40,000 pilgrims and has grown dramatically after apartheid.47 The 
Cape’s Muslims have visited the circle of tombs surrounding the city for generations. In 1934 a 
local naturalist, K. M. Jeffrey, wrote one of the first surveys of the so-called ‘kramats’ and 
described them as a ‘Holy Circle’ surrounding the Cape.48 What is especially remarkable about 
these local shrine pilgrimages is, first, how not all of these early pioneers of Cape Islam were 
Sufis - in fact, we know very little about most of them - and as in Sufi devotional practices 
elsewhere, certainly not all of those who participate in shrine-based devotions are Sufis per se. 
Concern for preserving the kramats certainly predates the end of apartheid. The most 
important body for organizing their preservation is the Cape Mazaar Society, founded in February 
1982 on the occasion of the `urs of Abdul Qadir Jilani.49 In its early days, it was instrumental in 
building or repairing the kramats as they existed at that time. By the early 1990’s the Cape 
Mazaar Society had successfully repaired the kramats of Abdurahman Motura on Robben Island, 
Sayed Jaffar at Oudekraal, and Sayed Mahmood at Constantia. It also organized `urs festivals in 
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 259 
Cape Town and Durban.50 But it published its first guide to visiting the Cape’s Sufi saints’ tombs 
only in 1999, amidst a burgeoning interest in Sufism in the Cape.51  
The Cape Mazaar Society’s guide to visiting the kramats exhibits the flexibility of the 
Cape Sufi saints’ legacies for contemporary Muslims. It highlights the “long established culture” 
of visiting the circuit of saints’ tombs as orthodox Islamic practice at the same time that it 
promotes them as tourism, with different organizations offering their own angle on the kramats in 
the guide’s prefaces.52 Shaykh Nazeem Mohammed of the Muslim Judicial Council said the 
council “would like to be placed on record as supporters of Sufism and its tenets” and even signs 
off on the legitimacy of “urs shareef” at the tombs.53 The language here - going ‘on record’ - 
strongly suggests the MJC is concerned about amending its previous record of criticizing local 
devotional practices.54 The Barelwi-leaning Habibia Soofie Masjid lent their support for 
conserving the memory of the “pioneers” of Islam in the Cape, while the Cape Town Tourism 
Authority (Captour) promoted visiting the kramats for residents and tourists alike.55 In this single 
text, we see multiple overlapping, if perhaps sometimes conflicting, claims on the Cape Sufi 
‘heritage’. 
In the late 1990’s, a concerted effort formed to defend a quintessential ‘Cape’ Islam as 
traditionalist in orientation, set in contrast both to a perceived rise of Wahhabi Islam globally and 
                                                       
50 “Mazaar Society Anniversary: Preserving the Heritage,” Muslim Views, September 1992, 2. 
 
51 For a sense of this interest, see “Sacred Shrines,” Muslim Views, October 1996. 
 
52 Cape Mazaar Society, A Guide to the Kramats of the Western Cape, Cape Town: Cape Mazaar Society, 
1996, 5. 
 
53 Ibid., 6. 
 
54 Sindre Bangstad argues the MJC takes a self-consciously centrist position in debates about Sufism in the 
Cape, offering tacit approval of practices such as mawlud. See his Global Flows, Local Appropriations: 
Facets of Secularlisation and Re-Islamization among Contemporary Cape Muslims, ISIM Dissertations, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007, 222-226. 
 
55 Cape Mazaar Society, A Guide to the Kramats of the Western Cape, 7-8. 
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Deobandi polemics locally.56 But the most serious threats to the kramats came not from 
Deobandis or Salafis but from developers who sought the valuable land where many of them lay. 
Cape Muslims successfully utilized the new legal parameters for cultural preservation to halt 
development plans around the kramats. 
In 1965, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) purchased a large plot of prime real estate at Oudekraal, 
overlooking the Atlantic seaboard on the eastern slope of Cape Town’s iconic Table Mountain, 
land where over numerous Muslim graves sit, including several important kramats dating from 
the eighteenth century, some of which are surrounded by other graves.57 Why development on the 
land did not proceed earlier is unclear, but in 1996, the owners proposed a residential 
development there. Massive protests followed, with a coalition of opponents organized under the 
name Environment Mazaar Action Committee (EMAC). In October 1996, over 50,000 people 
demonstrated in opposition to the development.58 In 2001, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) took action 
against the Cape Town City Council, the South African Heritage Resource Agency and the 
National Parks Board.  
The High Court ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis of ‘cultural rights’ that Muslims 
had over the site, after expert witnesses and aerial photos of the site taken as early as 1945 
showed footpaths leading to the site, sufficient to assert that Muslims had since “time 
immemorial paid homage to the kramats and graves.”59 Opponents of the development invoked, 
among other laws, the National Heritage Resources Act of 1999 that protects gravesites, 
                                                       
56 Auwais Rafudeen, “Revival of traditional Islam,” Muslim Views, April 1998, 13. 
 
57 For a crucial analysis of this case in terms of post-apartheid law, see Abdulkader Tayob, “Muslim shrines 
in Cape Town: Religion and Post-Apartheid Public Spheres,” in Barbara Bompani and Maria Frahm-Arp, 
eds. Development and Politics from Below: Exploring Religious Spaces in the African State, Basingstoke, 
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Heritage Conservation and Property Rights: Some Success at Last for Heritage Conservation - City of Cape 
Town V. Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd. [2007] Jol 20887 (C),” International Journal of Cultural Property 
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58 “1000s oppose desecration of shrines and the environment,” Muslim Views, September 1996, 1. 
 
59 Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town et al.  
Case 25/08, 3 September 2009, section 41. 
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particularly those of cultural and historical significance or that belonged to previously 
disadvantaged populations.60  
 In its judgment, the Supreme Court noted how the kramats are part of the fabric of Sufi 
devotional piety in the Cape, referencing both Muslims’ veneration of the site and their view of 
the ‘friends of God’ interred there: 
They have special religious and cultural significance to the members of Cape 
Town’s Muslim community. Two of the graves are kramats. A kramat is the 
grave of somebody who, among adherents of the Islamic faith, is regarded as 
having attained, through conspicuous piety, ‘an enlightened spiritual situation’. 
Such person having thus been a ‘friend of God’, the spirit of God is to be found 
at the site. The kramats and other graves on the land are also important cultural 
symbols in the Muslim community of its history in the Western Cape going back 
to the era of slavery. Many of the graves are those of escaped slaves and some of 
the kramats are the burial sites of spiritual leaders of the community during those 
times. It is believed by followers of the faith that by spending time at these sites 
they can enhance their own spirituality.61 
 
In its adjudication on this issue, the court clearly invoked a complex web of religious, social, 
cultural and historical factors, pointing out that “grave sites are sacred to Muslims” and that “the 
Muslim faith abhors exhumation.”62 Under apartheid, moreover, Muslims were “politically, 
socially and economically disadvantaged because of repressive and disempowering apartheid 
policies and were therefore unable to effectively assert and protect their interests.”63 The decision 
to halt the development had to consider both the “freedom of religion” and “culture of members 
of the Muslim community.”64   
 Efforts to re-envision the ‘holy circle’ of kramats as an indelible part of Cape heritage are 
                                                       
60 National Heritage Resources Act, 1999, section 36, 3 (b). Staatskoerant van die Republiek van Suid-
Afrika, Vol. 406, No. 19974, 60. The act stipulates that no one may “destroy, damage, alter, exhume, 
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al. Case 41/2003, 28 May 2004, sections 14 and 15. 
 
62 Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town et al.  
Case 25/08, 3 September 2009, section 41. 
 
63 Ibid., section 48. 
 
64 Ibid., section 39. 
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ongoing. As of 2010, the Cape Mazaar Society had applied to Heritage Western Cape, a 
governmental council that identifies Cape heritage sites and ensures their preservation, to acquire 
landmark status for the kramats,65 an effort that the Muslim Judicial Council has also publically 
supported.66 This application is now pending, but upon approval, it will help ensure that future 
development projects do not impinge on the territory of the kramats. The process is the latest 
move in a post-apartheid mobilization to protect local Sufi sites, to which even a local Deobandi 
scholar, Taha Karaan, a graduate of Deoband who directs the Dar al-`Ulum al-Arabiyya al-
Islamiyya in Strand, has made concessions. Speaking on Voice of the Cape radio in 2007, Karaan 
stated: 
If that kabr [grave] is part of our history, then it needs to be preserved and holds a 
certain sentimental value. However, some take it beyond sentimentality to a 
spiritual value, which is where people differ and one needs to hear both sides of 
the argument ... If this was regarded as a heritage site, then it is Islamically 
permissible to visit it. Although we differ on the spiritual value of visiting it, 
there is agreement that such places should be respected. If this is regarded as part 
of a community’s history, then visiting such places is even encouraged.67 
 
Here Karaan attempts to negotiate a space between condemning certain devotional practices that 
exceed mere ‘sentimentality’ and assenting to the popular imaginary that views these shrines in 
terms of Cape Muslim heritage. 
Support for the kramats as heritage sites is not limited to activists and local Muslim 
organizations, but is part of local discourses among participants in Sufi festivities at the sites, as I 
was repeatedly told during my attendance at two `urs festivals at the tomb of Nurul Mubeen, one 
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67 Quoted in Abdulkader Tayob, “Muslim shrines in Cape Town: Religion and Post-Apartheid Public 
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of the Oudekraal tombs that had been slated for demolition.68 The kramat of Nurul Mubeen is 
situated at the top of a circuitous path consisting of ninety-nine steps, one for each of the Islamic 
names of God, and consists of a small tomb with ablution facilities on the side. No one fully 
knows the history of the Nurul Mubeen kramat complex. The Cape Mazaar Society believes that 
he was among the Muslim slaves banished to the Cape, arriving in 1716 to be incarcerated on 
Robben Island. According to popular legends, he miraculously escaped Robben Island, either by 
swimming or by walking across the water to the mainland, and remained in the isolated hills 
where his grave stands today.69  
 Before the `urs began, an elaborate four-hour ceremony, men gathered and chatted 
amongst themselves inside the tomb, a green cement building with wooden double-doors leading 
into a space with stone floors and Persian-style carpet, while women and children sat and 
conversed outside. Behind the shrine, a cooking crew prepared a massive cauldron of lamb 
biryani for about three hundred guests. The tomb itself is covered in ceremonial sheets at all 
times, with four white columns at the four corners of the tomb adorned with fresh flowers. A 
plaque identifies Nurul Mubeen in Arabic as a “perfected saint” (wali kamil) and contains the 
verse from the Qur’an, beloved by Sufis, ‘Behold! Verily on the friends of God there is no fear, 
nor do they grieve’ (Qur’an 10: 62). Most participants touched the cloth over the tomb upon 
entering the shrine and then touched his hand to the forehand. Some left small offerings near the 
grave, mostly incense, rose water or bags of sugar. After a series of Urdu na`ts, a boy distributed 
perfume on the right hand of the participants, while another man came through to collect the 
booklets of na`ts, kissing each.70 Next a lengthy sama` began, culminating as men adorned the 
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69 Cape Mazaar Society, A Guide to the Kramats of the Western Cape, 29-31. 
 
70 One of these, a na`t by a certain Anwar Farkh Abadi, was distributed as a flier. A poem in praise of the 
Prophet, like standard na’ts, this one also reflects on the nature of ‘worship’ (`ibadat) and states: “Worship 
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tomb with a new set of shrouds; each shroud passed between the hands of the participants in a 
complete circle before it was finally laid upon the tomb. The ceremony concluded with all the 
participants facing Mecca and performing `asr salat inside the shrine. Afterwards, everyone 
assembled outside to eat and converse with friends and family. 
As is clear from earlier discussions here, the participants engaged in activities at the tomb 
that would certainly irk reform-minded critics of the `urs: the use of shrouds, circumambulating 
the tomb, leaving sugar, kissing the shroud, and praying inside the tomb, to name a few. But 
participants roundly dismissed these criticisms when I mentioned them. Participants in the `urs 
had many different reasons for attending, but overwhelmingly, they professed not only to 
honoring the saint with their attendance, but viewing the `urs as an opportunity to celebrate Cape 
Sufi history. One man, a retired engineer from Athlone, had come every year since regular ‘urs 
festivities had begun, though he could not recall how many times exactly. He believed that the 
saint was alive in the tomb and could hear his du`as. I asked him if the saint was able to grant 
requests or if he relays requests to God; the man replied that, as far as he is concerned, the 
spiritual mechanics of making supplications were irrelevant: “The saint … is closer to Allah than 
any of us. I don’t know how he is able to do the things that he does. Only Allah knows that. But 
we come here to offer our honor and respect and du`as. We have done it this way for years.” 
Another man, an accountant from Rylands Estate, viewed the `urs not only in terms of Sufi 
devotions but equally in terms of remembering the tribulations of those “who brought Islam to 
South Africa. Without them, we would not be here.”  
Some of the participants were not only aware of Deobandi critiques of these practices but 
had formed complex, self-conscious defenses of them. One participant claimed that the British 
colonial powers in India and the Middle East were complicit in the rise of the Deobandis, the 
Tablighis and the Wahhabis – in his view, all possessing roughly identical ideologies. At the 
same time, he upheld certain aspects of the Deobandi critique, suggesting that those who 
performing salat directly to the shaykh and or pray directly to him are “completely ignorant.” He 
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dismissed such obvious transgressions as the result of “Hindu influence” on Sufism. When I 
asked him about his devotion to Nurul Mubeen, he proceeded to narrate a story from the life of 
the renowned early Sufi Junaid al-Baghdadi (d. 910) of a sort that is anathema to most Deobandis. 
He told of a time when a man was traveling with Junaid as the two came to a river. Junaid tells 
his companion, “Recite ‘Ya Junaid’ as we walk across the water.” Miraculously, they begin to 
walk across. Then Satan approaches Junaid’s companion and whispers, “Say ‘Ya Allah’ instead,” 
and as he does so, he begins to sink into the water. Junaid scolds his companion: “Why did you 
stop saying ‘Ya Junaid’? I am saying ‘Ya Allah’ but I know God – you do not. You say ‘Ya 
Junaid’ and go through me.” The story illustrates one view of a highly contested matter in Sufism, 
that of ‘mediation’ (tawassul) between worshippers and God by way of a Sufi saint, as well as 
taking the names of Sufi saints in various litanies. Deobandis, such as Gangohi, debated fiercely 
over the permissibility of saying ‘Ya Rasulullah’, ‘Ya Shaikh Abdul Qadir [Jilani]’ or ‘Ya 
Junaid’.71 
By and large, it was abundantly clear that there is both widespread cognizance of 
critiques of these practices, and the imperatives of defending against them. Yet participants at 
these `urs festivals did so on their own terms, not with recourse to legal argumentation, as 
Barelwi and other `ulama’ have had, but to popular forms of legitimacy, what could perhaps be 
called ‘normativity by tradition’, or even ‘normativity by numbers’. It is the notion that popular 
memory itself confers legitimacy on these practices. While they reject the legal arguments against 
`urs, participants did not offer counter-arguments on those terms. Rather, participants had 
recourse to ‘tradition’ and a vision that sees celebration of these Sufi saints’ legacies as a crucial 
form of reverence, and one now protected by the legal dispensation of the post-apartheid state. 
This popular memory has reimagined the Cape’s Sufi ancestors as erstwhile ‘freedom 
fighters’, in a manner that expressly links the Sufi ‘heritage’ with Muslim politics in South Africa 
                                                       
71 Gangohi submitted, for instance, that invoking the name of `Abd al-Qadir Jilani in a Sufi wazifa is not 
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today. There are of course precedents for this reimagining during the apartheid era. On the 
occasion of founding the Cape Mazaar Society, we see a rousing, emotional depiction of the 
saintly predecessors as martyrs: 
Brought to the Cape as political prisoners or slave labour, every effort was made 
by the Governors at that time to stifle these crusaders who rebelled against 
exploitation in the land of their origin. These saintly personages were mercilessly 
chained and detained in solitary confinement and suffered the most inhumane 
forms of punishment. Confined to pitch dark, wet and icy cold dungeons, they 
were chained down on solid blocks of granite stone, bared and whip-lashed and 
left lying there surrounded by the stench of the dead and decaying bodies of their 
comrades. Despite all this, La ilaha illalahu Muhammadur Rasool lul Lah 
remained on their breath.72 
 
This narrative anachronistically imposes anti-apartheid politics onto the Cape’s Muslim 
forebears, those who despite arriving here “with chains around their necks, leg-irons and hand 
cuffs on their wrists … brought with them a supra-national ideology of liberation … the ideology 
of ISLAM.” 73 
But after apartheid, this narrative was stamped with the imprimatur of none other than 
Nelson Mandela himself, who lauded “Shaykh Matura, from whose karamat on Robben Island, as 
prisoners we drew deep inspiration and spiritual strength when our country was going through its 
darkest times,” explicitly imagining the Cape’s Sufi saints as ‘freedom fighters’: “Our country 
can proudly claim Muslims as brothers and sisters, compatriots, freedom fighters and leaders, 
revered by our nation. They have written their names on the roll of honour with blood, sweat and 
tears.”74  
Taking the previous two chapters together, how can we evaluate the public reception of 
the Deobandi critique? And how have the new parameters of debate affected the tone and contour 
of classic polemics and counter-polemics, of those that transpired in texts and those that took 
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place in lecture halls and public assemblies? I have argued that Deobandis lost popular support in 
South Africa, not only through their criticism of - and public confrontation with - other Muslims 
during the heyday of anti-apartheid activism, and not only by refusing to mobilize against 
apartheid, but even by justifying that refusal to mobilize in terms of their vision of Sufism. At the 
same time, a massive number of South African Muslims not only mobilized against apartheid, but 
justified their mobilization using Sufi vocabularies and by politicizing Sufi rituals and the 
legacies of local Sufi saints. The post-apartheid ‘Sufi resurgence’ in the Cape coincides with what 
appears to be a tarnishing of the Deobandi ‘brand’. From a historical perspective, whether this is a 
case of causation or one of correlation is up for debate. But it seems indisputable that South 
Africans did not merely reject Deobandis’ critique of Sufism, but indeed, that they rejected 
Deobandi ‘ulama’s leadership, and by extension, their very authority to lead. At the same time, 
despite calls by some during the apartheid era for ‘exporting’ debate over mawlud and `urs back 
to the Indian subcontinent, these debates clearly remain deeply entrenched in Muslim public 
discourse in South Africa. If anything, debate over these contentious issues has expanded widely, 
incorporating new interlocutors and new vocabularies. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
Sufism as a Moving Target 
 
 
 
 
On Thursday evening, 7 October 2010, a group known as Tehrik-e-Taliban claimed 
responsibility for two explosions that rocked the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Pakistan’s port 
city of Karachi.1 The bombers chose Thursday deliberately, as visitors gather at shrines 
throughout South Asia at dusk on Thursdays to celebrate the beginning of jum`a and to 
participate in communal Sufi dhikrs or listen to qawwali sama`. At least seven died instantly, 
while at least sixty-five were injured. It was the first time that Taliban had struck this shrine, and 
coming on the heels of attacks on Sufi shrines in Lahore some three months earlier, the 
brazenness of attacks on large Sufi shrines in major urban centers was especially alarming. These 
bombings are part of a crescendo of violence directed at Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2010 alone. 
In truth, we may know very little about the motivations behind these bombings, but 
regardless of who is responsible, and regardless of whatever ideology allegedly motivates them, 
Deoband will inevitably shoulder some of the blame in the popular imagination. And while 
Deobandi critiques are undoubtedly responsible in part for the antipathy that some Muslims feel 
towards Sufi shrines, it is crude to blame Deoband directly for the violence, and even cruder to 
suggest that these attacks are borne of an alleged Deobandi antipathy towards Sufism as a whole.  
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Ultimately, the violence, both physical and ideological, that surrounds Sufi devotional practices 
calls for renewed attention to Sufism as an ongoing site of contestation in contemporary Islam. 
Surely, to some degree, Deoband’s approach to Sufism militates against Western liberal 
sensibilities, particularly liberal discourses of what Sufism is – or perhaps more appropriately put, 
of what Sufism should be. Deobandis’ connections to the Taliban and the deeply traditionalist 
hermeneutic lens through which Deobandi scholars read contemporary politics, gender, and even 
the agency of the self, combine to render Deoband an object of ridicule in some circles, and a 
source of Islamophobic anxiety in others. 
But we must take Deobandis’ claims to representing Sufism seriously. By this I do not 
mean that scholars of Islam must ratify theirs as the ‘true’ Sufism, to the exclusion of other 
practices and forms of piety that fall under the rubric of Sufism. What I do mean is that 
Deobandis have made a powerful claim on how to define it. Accordingly, this dissertation is a call 
to reflect critically on ‘Sufism’ as a category, in all its manifestations, be they ‘mystical’, 
experiential, ethical, political, institutional, or otherwise. ‘Sufism’ is a diverse, internally 
contested, constantly debated, entity. Accordingly, Robert Rozehnal astutely calls for 
understanding Sufism “as a verb rather than a noun. Sufism is not a static, homogenous ‘thing’ 
that can be studied in isolation. Rather, it is a discursive tradition and an embodied practice that is 
experienced in discreet temporal and cultural locations.”2 And in locating Sufism, we must be 
attune to subtle changes in how Muslims debate Sufism, from within and without, in multiple 
settings, whether privately in the confines of a Deobandi madrasa on the outskirts of 
Johannesburg or publicly on the radio in Cape Town. 
Besides calling for attention to ‘Sufism’ as a complex discursive terrain, this dissertation 
also points to new developments in the study of Islam. Is it, I submit, not sufficient merely to 
reconstruct the textual history of a debate; we must discern how that debate is appropriated and 
contested in public contexts. We must collapse the “sterile dichotomy of texts and practices” to 
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recognize the reciprocities between them and the forms of authority, power and legitimation that 
move “out of contexts into texts and out of texts into their contexts.”3 To this end, I have shown 
ways that the Deobandi critique was altered by the contexts in which it was received – or more 
precisely, rejected – in South Africa, as polemicists attempted to translate the nuance of 
Thanawi’s argumentation, for instance, into readily accessible terms, into forms that could be 
consumed on a mass scale.4  
And how individual Muslims ‘talk back’ to this critique is also essential. What the 
`ulama’ have said about an issue is important; what students, activists, teachers, mothers, workers 
have said about the same issue is equally so. The Deobandi critique of Sufism originated as a 
largely textual debate, but in South Africa, it became one debated in mosques and lecture halls, 
on the radio and at Sufi festivals. The ‘Deobandi critique’ met fierce resistance in South Africa, 
but not only from their classic antagonists, Sufis of the Barelwi tradition. It also met an entirely 
different form of resistance from Muslims who claimed to have little stake in these ‘Indian’ 
debates, who rejected the very terms of the debate, even as public debate of mawlud and `urs 
became unmoored from its ‘Deobandi’ articulations and became issues about which South 
African Muslims generally are ‘expected’ to have an opinion. 
The terms of debate continue to shift. South African Barelwi scholars defended their 
baroque devotionalism with recourse to the same legal hermeneutics as the Deobandis; they are, 
after all, ‘ulama’. While the nuance of these arguments escape popular discourse, popular 
defenses of these practices are perhaps just as ‘normative’ as juristic ones. To borrow Katherine 
Ewing’s phrase, we must attend to the “everyday arguments” of `urs pilgrims as much as we 
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attend to the arguments of Deobandis and Barelwis.5 Defenses of Sufi devotions, like critiques of 
them, are multi-layered and polyvalent, and I suggest here that we give due attention to public, 
popular discourses on Sufi devotions, just as we give to textual, scholarly discourses. We must 
ask, then, to what extent does massive popular participation in a controversial practice lend it 
normativity? While `ulama’ continue to claim the authority to adjudicate on legal contentions, 
should we not also consider the extra-legal forms of argument that prevail in popular discourses? 
More broadly, mass support for Sufi devotional practices continues unabated globally, 
despite powerful critiques from various circles. Deobandi scholars have been critiquing the `urs 
for nearly a century and a half, yet the `urs of Mu`in al-Din Chishti regularly attracts numbers of 
Muslims comparable to the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.6 In Pakistan, devotees of Ali Hujwiri and 
Farid al-Din Ganj-i Shakkar will continue to gather in massive numbers at their shrines, among 
many others, despite the real, existential risks of doing so. And in South Africa, support for Sufi 
devotional practices is unrelenting despite an ideological and physical onslaught. It is impossible 
to predict precisely how these current struggles within Islam will play out. Regardless of what 
that future yields, Sufism, however one defines it, will remain central to the spiritual lives of 
countless Muslims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
5 Katherine Ewing’s work has examined, among other things, the tensions within individual subjectivities 
that reformist critiques have engendered. See her chapter, “Everyday Arguments,” in Arguing Sainthood: 
Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Sainthood, Durham: Duke University Press, 1997, 93-127. 
 
6 Usha Sanyal, “Tourists, Pilgrims and Saints: The Shrine of Mu’in al-Din Chisti of Ajmer,” in Carol E. 
Henderson and Maxine Weisgrau, eds. Raj Rhapsodies: Tourism, Heritage and the Seduction of History, 
Hampshire, England: Ashland, 2007, 183. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Sample Interview Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For confidential interviews with madrasa students: 
 
 How long have you been a student at the madrasa? 
 What do you study at the madrasa? What classes have you taken? Do you study with 
multiple teachers or a single teacher? 
 How would you describe your day-to-day life at the madrasa? What does a typical 
day look like? What is your schedule? Do you live at the madrasa? If not, where do 
you live? And when do you arrive and when do you go home? 
 Do you study books in Arabic? Urdu? English? Other languages? How good is your 
knowledge of these languages? 
 Where did you grow up?  
 Where are your parents from? Grandparents? Great-grandparents? 
 Have you traveled outside of South Africa? If so, where? 
 What do your parents do? 
 What do you want to do after you complete your education at the madrasa? 
 Do you have Deobandis in your family? Or are you the first to attend a Deoband 
madrasa? 
 What is Sufism? What does this mean to you? 
 Have you studied anything at the madrasa that you identify as related to tasawwuf 
(Sufism)? 
 Do you have any Sufis in your family? 
 Do you have a Sufi shaykh? 
 Have you ever visited a Sufi hospice (khanaqah)? If so, when? Where? What did you 
do there? Did you go alone or with parents or friends? How long did you stay? 
 Have you ever visited the tomb of a Sufi? If so, when? Where? What did you do 
there? Did you go alone or with parents or friends? How long did you stay? 
 Have you ever celebrated the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (milad sharif)?  
 Have you ever celebrated the death anniversary (‘urs) of a Sufi? 
 
 
For madrasa personnel (instructors, muftis, directors): 
 
 How long have you been involved with the madrasa?  
 For teachers: What do you teach at the madrasa?  
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 How would you describe your day-to-day life at the madrasa? What does a typical 
day look like? What is your schedule? Do you live at the madrasa? If not, where do 
you live? And when do you arrive and when do you go home? 
 Where did you grow up?  
 Have you traveled outside of South Africa? Have you traveled to Pakistan or India? 
 Where are your parents from? Grandparents? Great-grandparents? 
 Have you traveled outside of South Africa? If so, where? 
 What do/did your parents’ do? 
 What is Sufism? What does this mean to you? 
 Have you taught anything at the madrasa that you identify as related to tasawwuf 
(Sufism)? 
 Do you have any Sufis in your family? 
 Do you have a Sufi shaykh? 
 Have you ever visited a Sufi hospice (khanaqah)? If so, when? Where? What did you 
do there? Did you go alone or with parents or friends? How long did you stay? 
 Have you ever visited the tomb of a Sufi? If so, when? Where? What did you do 
there? Did you go alone or with parents or friends? How long did you stay? 
 Have you ever celebrated the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (milad sharif)?  
 Have you ever celebrated the death anniversary (‘urs) of a Sufi? 
 For muftis: What is the dominant subject about which you receive fatwas? Do you 
receive requests for fatwas concerning specialized matters of Sufi practices? (Such as 
ziyarat, zikr, muraqabat, tasawwur-i shaykh, ‘urs, use of ta’wiz) 
 Have you requested fatwas from the Deoband madrasa in India? If so, concerning 
what? 
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